May 20 General base completed the development of a plan for the Belarusian strategic offensive operation. She entered the operational documents of the Headquarters under the code name "Bagration".
In the first half of 1944, Soviet troops won major victories near Leningrad, in the Right-Bank Ukraine, in the Crimea and on the Karelian Isthmus. By the summer of 1944, these victories provided favorable conditions for the defeat of one of the largest strategic enemy groupings, Army Group Center, and the liberation of the Byelorussian SSR. Since the shortest route to the borders of Germany passed through Belarus, a major offensive operation was carried out here. The operation received the code name "Bagration", it was carried out by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian (commanders K.K. Rokosovsky, G.F. Zakharov, I.D. Chernyakhovsky) and the 1st Baltic (Commander I .Kh. Bagramyan) fronts.
In the summer of 1944, the Nazi command was waiting for the main attack of the Red Army in the south - in the Krakow and Bucharest directions. Most of the Soviet tank armies were on the southwestern sector of the Soviet-German front. This was one of the reasons why the Germans expected the continuation of the offensive in the southwestern direction.
The balance of forces of the parties at the beginning of the operation was in favor of Soviet troops: for people - 2 times, for tanks and self-propelled guns - 4 times and for aircraft 3.8 times. The decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in manpower - 3-4 times, in artillery - 5-7 times and in tanks 5-5.5 times. Soviet troops occupied an enveloping position in relation to the troops of Army Group Center. This contributed to the infliction of flank strikes, their encirclement and destruction in parts.
The concept of the operation: it envisaged the simultaneous transition to the offensive of the troops of four fronts in the Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk directions, the encirclement and destruction of enemy flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the development of gifts in directions converging on Minsk, the encirclement and destruction of the main enemy grouping east of Minsk.
The similarity of the concept of operation "Bagration" with the concept of operation "Uranus" was that both operations provided for a deep bilateral operational coverage, which led to the encirclement of a large strategic grouping of Nazi troops. The difference between the plans was that the plan of the operation "Bagration" provided for the initial encirclement of the enemy's flank groupings. This was supposed to lead to the formation of large operational gaps, which the enemy, due to insufficient reserves, could not quickly close. These gaps were to be used by mobile troops for the rapid development of the offensive in depth and for the encirclement of the 4th German Army in the area east of Minsk. In contrast to the dissecting flank attacks near Stalingrad, in Belarus the front was being crushed.
During the offensive of the Soviet troops that began on June 23, 1944, the German defense was broken through, the enemy began a hasty retreat. However, the Germans did not manage to retreat in an organized manner everywhere. Near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, 10 German divisions hit two "boilers" and were destroyed. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk. In the forests east of Minsk, a 100,000-strong enemy group was surrounded and destroyed. The defeats near Bobruisk, Vitebsk and Minsk were catastrophic for the German army. General Guderian wrote: “As a result of this blow, Army Group Center was destroyed. We suffered huge losses - 25 divisions. All available forces were thrown into the crumbling front. The German defense collapsed. The Germans were unable to stop the offensive of the Soviet troops. On July 13, units of the 3rd Belorussian Front liberated Vilnius. Brest and the Polish city of Lublin were soon occupied. Operation Bagration ended on August 29, 1944 - Soviet troops liberated all of Belarus, part of the Baltic states, entered the territory of Poland and East Prussia.
Tsobechia Gabriel
On July 29, 1944, during the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, better known as Operation Bagration, the Red Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the German Army Group Center. Less than a year remained before the complete defeat of the Nazis.
the day before
Quite widely known fighting on the liberation of Ukraine by units of the Red Army in the autumn of 1943 - in the winter of 1944. To a lesser extent, operations on the territory of modern Belarus are known. And if in South Belarus the Red Army was successful (Gomel, Rechitsa and a number of others were liberated settlements), then the battles in the Orsha and Vitebsk directions went on with heavy losses and without significant advance of the troops. Here the German defenses had to be literally “gnawed through”.
Nevertheless, by the spring of 1944, the configuration of the front was extremely unfavorable for the German troops, when parts of the Army Group Center turned out to be covered from the north and south. Despite this, the German command expected that the most powerful Soviet strike would follow in Ukraine, it was there that up to 80 percent of German tanks and a large amount of manpower were concentrated. Further events showed that this was one of the miscalculations of the German command. It cannot be said that the offensive was a complete surprise for the German troops - it is impossible to hide the concentration of a large number of troops and equipment, but the strength and direction of the strikes turned out to be largely sudden for the enemy.
Vitebsk Operation
In the course of Operation Bagration, a special place is occupied by the Vitebsk offensive operation, which was carried out by the flank armies of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts and is interesting as successful example interaction between the two fronts.
The encirclement and destruction of a strong German grouping in the Vitebsk region was carried out without the involvement of large tank units - only by combined arms formations.
Despite the fact that the offensive took place in an area unfavorable for large-scale actions, abounding in forests and swamps, the operation was carried out successfully and in an extremely short time. Played a role and, apparently, the personal order of Adolf Hitler, who refused the proposal to leave an extremely important, but at the same time inconvenient for defense sector of the front.
Already on June 23, on the first day of the offensive, significant success was achieved by the Soviet troops, and a day later, battles unfolded in Vitebsk itself, which was liberated in the early morning of June 26. The second part of the operation was connected with the elimination of several enemy groupings that were surrounded.
By the evening of June 28, the enemy's resistance was broken. The main role was played by the speed of action and the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet troops in aviation, since the enemy had practically no opposition in the air. During the occupation and battles, Vitebsk was practically turned into ruins, and out of 167 thousand inhabitants (according to the 1939 census), only 118 people remained in the city at the time of liberation.
Bobruisk offensive operation
A powerful blow was inflicted by units of the Red Army in the Bobruisk direction. Here the German troops, relying on a number of intermediate lines, made an attempt to preserve and withdraw equipment and the most combat-ready units. However, the German troops retreating in dense columns were dispersed and destroyed by artillery and tank attacks. Of great importance in the battles near Bobruisk was the almost complete air supremacy of Soviet aviation.
Bombers and attack aircraft often operated without fighter cover at all. So, in two hours on June 27, 1944, one of German columns 159 tons of bombs fell. Further survey of the area established that the enemy had left more than a thousand dead, 150 tanks, about 1,000 guns and more than 6,500 vehicles and tractors in place.
On June 29, Bobruisk was liberated by Soviet troops. Separate German units managed to break out of the ring to Osipovichi, where they were finally dispersed.
Minsk "cauldron"
The third encirclement of a large German grouping was carried out by Soviet troops in the Minsk region. As in other areas, the offensive of the Soviet troops developed rapidly. Borisov was liberated on July 2 - the occupation of this city lasted exactly three years and one day (from July 1, 1941 to July 2, 1944).
Parts of the Red Army, bypassing Minsk, cut the roads to Baranovichi and Molodechno. German troops east of Minsk and in the city itself were surrounded. In total, about 105 thousand people turned out to be in the ring. Based on the experience of previous campaigns, the Soviet troops managed to very quickly create an external encirclement front and cut the German group into several parts.
On July 3, Minsk was liberated. Today this date is celebrated as the Independence Day of Belarus. Surrounded by German units in small groups of up to two thousand people, repeated attempts were made to break through Minsk from the north and south.
On the first day, German aviation tried to organize an air bridge, but rapid changes in the situation and the dominance of Soviet fighters in the air forced the German command to abandon this option.
Now the surrounded parts were left to themselves. To combat disparate groups in parts of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, they began to form special mobile detachments (three per rifle regiment).
Support for the actions of mobile detachments was carried out from the air, when aviation corrected the actions of ground units and delivered assault strikes. Active support in the destruction of disparate groups of regular troops was provided by about 30 partisan detachments. In total, during the Minsk operation, German troops lost about 72 thousand killed and missing and 35 thousand people. prisoners. The success of operations in the eastern and central parts of Belarus made it possible to proceed without a pause to the liberation of the western regions of the republic, the Baltic states and Poland.
In 1944, the Red Army was able to liberate Belarus. Actions Soviet armies for the liberation of Belarus went down in history as "Operation Bagration". The Soviet command began to develop a plan of operation in the spring of 1944. It was supposed to break through the German defenses in 6 sectors of the front, surround and destroy the Vitebsk, Bobruisk grouping of troops and successively defeat the Orsha and Mogilev grouping of Germans.
The second stage of the “Operation Bagration” involved the attack of three Belarusian fronts in one direction on Minsk, followed by the encirclement and destruction of enemy troops. The third stage of hostilities involved the expansion of the offensive front, the complete liberation of Belarus and the exit of Soviet troops to the western, pre-war border of the USSR.
On June 23, 1944, the line of the Belarusian front passed: east of Polotsk - Vitebsk - east of Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk, along the Pripyat. The troops of the 1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian fronts were stationed in this sector. The number of Soviet troops reached 1.4 million people, who had 31 thousand guns, 5.2 thousand tanks, more than 5 thousand aircraft at their disposal. The general coordination of the actions of the Soviet troops in this sector was carried out by and.
In Belarus, Soviet troops were opposed by a powerful German group under the command of Field Marshal Bush (Model since July 28). The number of troops under the leadership of Bush was 1.2 million people, which had 9.5 thousand guns, 900 tanks, 1.4 thousand aircraft.
On June 23, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive south of the city of Vitebsk. At the same time, north of Vitebsk, the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front dealt a strong blow. Moving towards each other, the soldiers of the Red Army surrounded 5 German motorized divisions and destroyed them by the 27th. Developing the offensive, on June 28 the city of Lepel was liberated. In the meantime, the fighters of the 3rd Belorussian Front made a decisive thrust forward, and by July 1, Borisov was liberated. As a result of fierce bloody battles, units of the Second Belorussian Front broke through the enemy defenses in a wide zone. On June 28, Mogilev was liberated. Further, the fighters of the second Belorussian Front moved towards Minsk. The troops of the First Belorussian Front, with their pressure, forced the units of the 9th German Army to retreat. By June 29, the Germans were surrounded in the Bobruisk area, where the soldiers of the 1st Belorussian Front destroyed 6 enemy divisions.
As a result of the offensive and subsequent pursuit of the enemy, in parallel directions, east of Minsk, a large German group was surrounded, with a strength of up to 100 thousand people. On July 3, Soviet troops liberated Minsk from the Germans. A large encircled German grouping was destroyed on July 11. The battles went down in the history of the Second World War as the Minsk Cauldron.
During the 12 days of the offensive in Belarus, the soldiers of the Red Army advanced 280 kilometers to the west, liberated most of the country, including Minsk. Since July 5, the Soviet troops, closely coordinating their actions, carried out a number of successful operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok, Lublin-Brest. During these hostilities, serious damage was inflicted on the German Army Group Center. By the end of the summer of 1944, the territory of Belarus was cleared of German troops. Also, the Soviet troops partially liberated the lands of Lithuania and Latvia. At the end of the summer, the soldiers of the Red Army entered Poland, and managed to approach the borders of East Prussia.
In the summer of 1944, Soviet troops carried out a whole cascade of powerful offensive operations along the entire stretch from the White to the Black Seas. However, the first place among them is rightfully occupied by the Belarusian strategic offensive operation, which received the code name in honor of the legendary Russian commander, hero Patriotic War 1812 General P. Bagration.
Three years after the start of the war, Soviet troops were determined to take revenge for the heavy defeats in Belarus in 1941. On the Belarusian direction, 42 German divisions 3rd tank, 4th and 9th field German armies, about 850 thousand people in total. From the Soviet side, initially there were no more than 1 million people. However, by mid-June 1944, the number of units of the Red Army intended for the strike was increased to 1.2 million people. The troops had 4 thousand tanks, 24 thousand guns, 5.4 thousand aircraft.
It is important to note that the powerful operations of the Red Army in the summer of 1944 were timed to coincide with the start of the landing operation of the Western Allies in Normandy. The strikes of the Red Army were supposed, among other things, to pull the German forces onto themselves, to prevent them from being transferred from east to west.
Myagkov M.Yu., Kulkov E.N. Belarusian operation of 1944 // Great Patriotic War. Encyclopedia. /Answer. ed. ak. A.O. Chubaryan. M., 2010
FROM ROKOSSOVSKII'S MEMORIES ON THE PREPARATION AND BEGINNING OF OPERATION BAGRATION, May-June 1944
According to the plan of the Headquarters, the main actions in the summer campaign of 1944 were to unfold in Belarus. To carry out this operation, the troops of four fronts were involved (1st Baltic - commander I.Kh. Bagramyan; 3rd Belorussian - commander I.D. Chernyakhovsky; our right neighbor 2nd Belorussian Front - commander I.E. Petrov, and , finally 1st Belarusian) ...
We prepared for the battles carefully. The preparation of the plan was preceded by a lot of work on the ground. Especially at the forefront. I had to literally crawl on my stomach. The study of the terrain and the state of the enemy defense convinced me that on the right wing of the front it was advisable to deliver two strikes from different sectors ... This went against the established view, according to which one main blow is delivered during an offensive, for which the main forces and means are concentrated . Taking a somewhat unusual decision, we went to a certain dispersal of forces, but in the swamps of Polesye there was no other way out, or rather, we had no other way to the success of the operation ...
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and his deputies insisted on inflicting one main blow - from the bridgehead on the Dnieper (Rogachev region), which was in the hands of the 3rd Army. Twice I was asked to go into the next room to think over the Stavka proposal. After each such "thinking" I had to new force defend your decision. Convinced that I firmly insist on our point of view, he approved the plan of operation in the form in which we presented it.
“The persistence of the commander of the front,” he said, “proves that the organization of the offensive is carefully thought out. And this is a reliable guarantee of success ...
The offensive of the 1st Belorussian Front began on June 24. This was heralded by powerful bomber strikes in both areas of the breakthrough. For two hours, artillery destroyed the enemy's defenses at the forefront and suppressed his fire system. At six o'clock in the morning, units of the 3rd and 48th armies went on the offensive, and an hour later, both armies of the southern shock group. A fierce battle unfolded.
The 3rd Army on the front of Ozerane, Kostyashevo on the first day achieved insignificant results. The divisions of its two rifle corps, repulsing the fierce counterattacks of the infantry and tanks of the enemy, captured only the first and second enemy trenches at the line of Ozerane, Verichev and were forced to gain a foothold. The offensive developed in the sector of the 48th Army with great difficulties. The wide swampy floodplain of the Drut River extremely slowed down the crossing of infantry and especially tanks. Only after a two-hour intense battle did our units knock out the Nazis from the first trench here, and by twelve o'clock in the afternoon they had captured the second trench.
The offensive developed most successfully in the zone of the 65th Army. With the support of aviation, the 18th Rifle Corps broke through all five lines of enemy trenches in the first half of the day, deepened by 5-6 kilometers by the middle of the day ... This allowed General P.I. Batov to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough .. .
As a result of the first day of the offensive, the southern strike group broke through the enemy defenses on the front up to 30 kilometers and in depth from 5 to 10 kilometers. Tankers deepened the breakthrough to 20 kilometers (Knyshevichi, Romanishche area). A favorable situation was created, which we used on the second day to enter the battle at the junction of the 65th and 28th armies of the cavalry-mechanized group of General I.A. Pliev. It advanced to the Ptich River to the west of Glusk, crossing it in places. The enemy began to retreat to the north and northwest.
Now - all the forces for a rapid advance to Bobruisk!
Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier duty. M., 1997.
VICTORY
After breaking through the enemy defenses in Eastern Belarus, the fronts of Rokossovsky and Chernyakhovsky rushed further - in converging directions to the Belarusian capital. A huge gap appeared in the German defense. On July 3, the guards tank corps approached Minsk and liberated the city. Now the formations of the 4th German army were in complete encirclement. In the summer and autumn of 1944, the Red Army achieved outstanding military successes. During the Belarusian operation, the German Army Group "Center" was defeated and driven back 550 - 600 km. In just two months of fighting, she lost more than 550 thousand people. A crisis arose in the circles of the highest German leadership. On July 20, 1944, at a time when the defense of Army Group Center in the east was bursting at the seams, and in the west the Anglo-American formations began to expand their bridgehead for the invasion of France, an unsuccessful attempt was made to assassinate Hitler.
With the release of Soviet units on the approaches to Warsaw, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet fronts were practically exhausted. A respite was needed, but it was at this moment that an event occurred that was unexpected for the Soviet military leadership. On August 1, 1944, at the direction of the London government in exile, an armed uprising began in Warsaw, led by the commander of the Polish Home Army T. Bur-Komarovsky. Not coordinating their plans with the plans of the Soviet command, the "London Poles" in fact went on an adventure. Rokossovsky's troops made great efforts to break through to the city. As a result of heavy bloody battles, they managed to liberate the Warsaw suburb of Prague by September 14. But the Soviet soldiers and fighters of the 1st Army of the Polish Army, who fought in the ranks of the Red Army, did not manage to achieve more. On the outskirts of Warsaw, tens of thousands of Red Army soldiers were killed (the 2nd Panzer Army alone lost up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns). On October 2, 1944, the rebels capitulated. The capital of Poland could only be liberated in January 1945.
The victory in the Belarusian operation in 1944 went to the Red Army at a high price. Only irretrievable Soviet losses amounted to 178 thousand people; over 580,000 servicemen were wounded. However, the overall balance of forces after the end of the summer campaign has changed even more in favor of the Red Army.
TELEGRAM FROM THE US AMBASSADOR TO THE US PRESIDENT, September 23, 1944
Tonight I asked Stalin how satisfied he is with the ongoing Red Army battles for Warsaw. He replied that the ongoing battles had not yet brought serious results. Due to the heavy fire of the German artillery, the Soviet command was unable to transport their tanks across the Vistula. Warsaw can only be taken as a result of a wide outflanking encirclement maneuver. Nevertheless, at the request of General Beurling, and contrary to the best use of the Red Army troops, four Polish infantry battalions still crossed the Vistula. However, due to the heavy losses they suffered, they soon had to be taken back. Stalin added that the rebels still continued to fight, but their struggle now gives the Red Army more difficulties than real support. In four isolated districts of Warsaw, insurgent groups continue to defend themselves, but they have no opportunities for offensive action. Now there are about 3,000 rebels in Warsaw with weapons in their hands, in addition, they are, where possible, supported by volunteers. It is very difficult to bomb or fire on the German positions in the city, since the rebels are in close fire contact and mixed with the German troops.
For the first time, Stalin expressed his sympathy for the rebels in my presence. He said that the command of the Red Army had contacts with each of their groups, both by radio and through messengers who made their way to the city and back. The reasons why the uprising began prematurely are now clear. The fact is that the Germans were going to deport the entire male population from Warsaw. Therefore, for men there was simply no other choice but to take up arms. Otherwise, they were in danger of death. Therefore, the men who were part of the rebel organizations began to fight, the rest went underground, saving themselves from repression. Stalin never once mentioned the London government, but said that they could not find General Bur-Komarovsky anywhere. He obviously left the city and "is in command through a radio station in some secluded place."
Stalin also said that contrary to the information that General Dean has, the Soviet Air Force is dropping weapons to the rebels, including mortars and machine guns, ammunition, medicines, and food. We receive confirmation that the goods arrive at the designated place. Stalin noted that Soviet planes drop from low altitudes (300-400 meters), while our Air Force - from very high altitudes. As a result, the wind often blows our cargo to the side and they do not get to the rebels.
When Prague [a suburb of Warsaw] was liberated, the Soviet troops saw to what an extreme extent its civilian population was exhausted. The Germans used police dogs against ordinary people in order to deport them from the city.
Marshal in every possible way showed his concern about the situation in Warsaw and his understanding of the actions of the rebels. There was no sign of vindictiveness on his part. He also explained that the situation in the city would become clearer after Prague was completely taken.
Telegram from US Ambassador to the Soviet Union A. Harriman to US President F. Roosevelt about the reaction of the Soviet leadership to the Warsaw Uprising, September 23, 1944
US. Library of Congress. Manuscript Division. Harriman Collection. cont. 174.
Mikhail Myagkov
Belarusian strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops June 23 - August 29, 1944. Another name is Operation Bagration, named after the famous Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812, Pyotr Bagration.
In 1944, the Red Army carried out a whole cascade of powerful offensive operations in the northern, southern and central directions. According to their number, these operations are often called Stalin's ten strikes. The diamond in the series of these strikes was Operation Bagration.
Its main task was to defeat the most powerful grouping of German troops (Army Group Center), consisting of 69 divisions. The scene of action is a direction that leads directly through Poland to the heart of Germany - Berlin.
Among the Soviet command there were different opinions on how to achieve a decisive result in the center of the Soviet-German front in the summer campaign of 1944. It was proposed, in particular, the encirclement of Army Group Center by means of a strike from Ukraine to the north, since the vast territories of the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine had already been liberated. Such a blow would have been aimed at the rear of Army Group Center, which was then commanded by Field Marshal E. Bush. It was proposed to reach the Baltic Sea with a powerful blow, cut off the Germans from the rest of the territory, and then cut and destroy the enemy troops. But such broad operations with huge coverage are always fraught with numerous gaps. The enemy would get the opportunity to launch a counterattack in the butt of our troops. In the end, another option was chosen.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command had been carefully planning the operation in Belarus since April. Ultimately, it was decided that in the best possible way offensive is a strike from east to west with access to Minsk. In the future, a breakthrough to western borders THE USSR. On May 20, 1944, the commanders were summoned to Headquarters Soviet fronts who were to participate in the operation: representatives of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian Fronts and the 1st Baltic Front - Rokossovsky, Zakharov, Bagramyan. I.D. Chernyakhovsky (commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front) was ill at that moment and could not participate in the meeting.
After a thorough analysis of the situation, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, K.K. Rokossovsky, suggested that in his sector near Bobruisk there should be not one main blow, but two. The terrain in this area was wooded and swampy, so they had to operate in extremely cramped conditions. In the event of a single strike, the troops simply would not be able to fully deploy. According to Rokossovsky's memoirs, Stalin twice asked him to leave the hall and think carefully about his proposals. But Rokossovsky remained firm. In the end, he insisted on his decision, after which Stalin was forced to agree with him.
Before the operation great importance was given to the interaction of regular troops with partisans. The Germans in their rear, in fact, had a whole partisan army, which did not give the enemy a single day of rest. Partisan raids were planned with the destruction of the German infrastructure in the main directions, undermining railway lines, etc. The timing of the operation was postponed to an earlier time in order to help the encircled partisan formations.
It should be noted that the operation "Bagration" carried a task of a more global nature. By this time, the Allies had already landed in Normandy (Operation Overlord, June 6, 1944). Even at the Tehran conference, Stalin promised to support the landing of the Anglo-American forces with strikes on eastern front. The task of the operation "Bagration" was, among other things, to prevent the Germans from transferring their troops from east to west - to the shores of the English Channel, which made it possible for the allies to firmly gain a foothold in their positions.
On June 22, Soviet fronts carried out reconnaissance in force, and on June 23 a general offensive began. Tens of thousands of barrels of Soviet artillery fired their shells, thousands of Soviet bombers and fighters took off into the sky. The first stage of the operation "Bagration" consisted in the creation of a number of encirclements of German troops during the Bobruisk, Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, and Polotsk operations. All of them ended successfully. Rokossovsky's front surrounded six enemy infantry divisions. By the end of June, a situation developed when the Soviet troops had already entered the operational space. The German front was crumbling before our eyes. The Soviet formations were tasked with a quick exit to Minsk. Two powerful wedges, advancing from the northeast and southeast, rushed to the capital of Soviet Belarus. Our tanks were ahead, sweeping away everything in their path. They walked several tens of kilometers a day.
Already by July 3, Soviet troops united near Minsk and liberated the city. Most of the Germans east of the Soviet wedges were surrounded. They had to go into the forests, trying to break through to the west, abandoning their equipment and weapons. These groups finished off for a few more weeks. And the main Soviet forces rushed further to the west. At this moment, Marshal Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front also went on the offensive.
The enemy was unable to organize effective counterattacks against the Soviet troops. The fact is that even before the offensive, the German command did not understand the intelligence reports and largely believed the disinformation that was thrown at them by the Soviet leadership. In Berlin and at the headquarters of Army Group Center, they believed that the main Soviet strike would still come from Ukraine, and they began to transfer tank units from north to south. Our offensive found many formations of the Wehrmacht on the march, in the process of being transferred. When the Germans realized it and began to withdraw them back, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. Thus, a significant part of the enemy's tank and infantry divisions was taken out of the game for a long time even without a fight. They entered the battle separately, no longer able to influence the situation as a whole.
After the liberation of Minsk, the Red Army carried out a number of offensive operations - Bialystok, Lublin, Siauliai, Vilnius, Brest. Thanks to them, the German groups suffered crushing defeats over a vast territory. The Red Army reached the borders of Poland.
But soon an unforeseen event happened. The fact is that the Soviet command knew nothing about the plans of the Home Army, which was subordinate to the Polish government in exile in London. On August 1, this army, on orders from England, raised an uprising in Warsaw. The commander of the uprising, Bur-Komarovsky, only after it began, got in touch with Rokossovsky, declaring that he was going to seize power in the Polish capital even before the Red Army entered it. But the complete coordination of the actions of the rebels with the Soviet troops was again not proposed. And on our front, by this time, the attenuation of the offensive was just indicated. To continue it, it was necessary to regroup forces, accumulate reserves, and develop further plans for offensive operations. Many rear areas lagged behind the advanced formations by tens or even hundreds of kilometers. And in this position, the Red Army was asked to strike with a weakened group in order to help the Poles. The uprising was nothing more than a gamble by the government in exile, and yet, in Moscow, it was decided, on the basis of humane considerations, to provide him with possible support.
In this direction, the First Army of the Polish Army fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops. In September, despite fierce German resistance, Rokossovsky's front managed to liberate the suburb of Warsaw - Prague, located on the right bank of the Vistula, but further attacks were repelled by the enemy. The fate of the rebels was sad. Despite the help of the Allies and the Red Army by air - dropping supplies with supplies and weapons - the uprising was brutally crushed. Having pinned the Poles in the central part of Warsaw, the Germans destroyed them with artillery and mortar fire, widely used flamethrowers. More than 200 thousand Varsovians died. This was the price for adventurism and the lack of common sense in the emigrant government, retribution for the desire to liberate the capital without anyone's help, in spite of any objective circumstances.
Nevertheless, during the Belarusian operation, the Red Army reached the frontiers, from where the opportunity opened up for the liberation of all of Poland and a further blow to Germany itself. After the successful completion of the first phase of the operation, Stalin was informed that the Western press underestimated the number of dead and captured German soldiers. To which the Supreme Commander proposed to conduct columns of Wehrmacht servicemen, recently captured by the Red Army, through Moscow. Foreign correspondents were invited to watch the procession, but, most importantly, Soviet civilians. This parade of the vanquished took place on July 17, 1944. Captured Germans were taken to the east and unloaded at Moscow railway stations along the way. Behind the Belorussky railway station on the territory of the Central Airport, they lined up in columns and walked along the streets of the capital. Muscovites were previously informed in the newspapers that 57,000 prisoners would be led through city streets and avenues. Residents were asked to keep calm and order. The German column reached Mayakovsky Square and then split into two parts, which went north and south along the Garden Ring. Well-groomed German generals “marched” ahead. Many of them, as Hero noted Soviet Union scout Vladimir Karpov (who later became famous writer) remained haughty facial expressions. One of the officers, passing by Karpov, suddenly threatened him with his fist, to which our hero pointed to his throat, and with his hand made a sign that they could hang him up on a rope. After that, the German turned away in mute hatred. But, in general, the order on the streets was strictly observed. Behind the German column were watering trucks, washing away enemy traces from Moscow's pavements. Thus ended the symbolic parade of the vanquished. The German command at one time wanted to march through Moscow with a solemn march, and as a result, humiliated and suppressed prisoners of war of the Wehrmacht marched through the Soviet capital.
The losses of the Soviet troops in the operation "Bagration" were great - 158 thousand dead. But the Germans lost an entire grouping in the central direction, their total losses amounted to 550 thousand people. It was now a matter of time before the Red Army invaded East Prussia and Central Germany. Operation Bagration is also characterized by the fact that it became the embodiment of the pre-war Soviet plans for a deep (or sequential) offensive operation. Now we were actually transferring the war to the territory of the enemy.
The consequences of the offensive in Belarus resulted in a crisis of the German leadership. His expression was the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944. The agony of the German command began. It could no longer effectively lead the troops. Our troops avenged the defeats of 1941, utterly crushing the Germans.
Mikhail Yurievich Myagkov- doctor historical sciences, Scientific Director of the Russian Military Historical Society.
