On the eve of the 69th anniversary of the Great Victory, a round table was held at the site of the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper dedicated to topical issues history of World War II. The event featured famous historians, incl. army general, M.A. Gareev, Doctor of History Yu.V. Rubtsov and others. The Russian Military Historical Society took part in it in the person of the scientific director of the RVIO M.Yu. Myagkov and the head of the scientific sector of the RVIO Yu.A. Nikiforov. Since the newspaper format does not allow us to state in detail many provisions and talk about some sources, we are publishing today the detailed text of M.Yu. Myagkov "Red Star".

1. Could the world have avoided World War II? What are the causes of World War II? What conclusions, instructive for our time, can be drawn from this historical period? ABOUT differences and similarities between the Second and First World Wars.

The question of whether the world could have avoided World War II is rhetorical. The war happened and became the bloodiest in the history of mankind. The reasons for it are well known: the rise of the Nazis to power in the wake of the economic crisis and the desire to revise the Treaty of Versailles; the misanthropic ideology of the Nazis, implicated in aggressive external expansion; the policy of "appeasement" of France and Great Britain, which at the same time feared Hitler and tried to "canalize" his aggression to the east - against Soviet Union. This list can be continued. But the main conclusion that suggests itself today based on a historical retrospective and hope to prevent big war in the future, such is the exclusion of Russia from world politics after the revolution of 1917 and the end of the First World War (not only representatives of Bolshevik Soviet Russia were not admitted to the Versailles Conference, but also leaders white movement) played a cruel joke with the Western winners. Russia (the Soviet Union) was assigned the role of a second-rate power, ignored its interests and did not trust the government.

An arrogant attitude towards the former ally and hatred of the Soviet regime led to only halfway steps towards creating a real barrier to Nazi aggression. Playing its geopolitical game, the West missed the moment when, with the help of the USSR, it was still possible to put the aggressor in his place with the help of a joint political or military demonstration. However, in 1938 the world saw the betrayal of Czechoslovakia in Munich, and the opinion of the USSR was completely ignored, and in the summer of 1939 London and Paris did not agree to equal interaction with Moscow within the framework of a military alliance. As a conclusion, the USSR was forced to move closer to Germany for the sake of its own security. The alternative was to remain one on one with Germany in the west, and with Japan in the east.

Second World War largely grew out of the results of the First World War. But to call it a continuation war would not be entirely correct. Changed not only the scale and geography of hostilities, the means of destruction human lives and losses of the parties. Now the world is faced with a terrible monster - Nazism, ready for its goal not only to conquer and humiliate, but also to destroy entire peoples and races. The West was for some time struck by the shock of what he saw in 1939-1945. the results of the new “Nazi order”, especially since this “order” grew up on the historical stones of good old Europe and became a direct product of the crisis of Western civilization. Then the shock passed, but the question arose why this beast grew up in the West, and not in the "wild" and "uncivilized" East, where he was assigned a place of permanent residence. After the collapse of the USSR, supporters of European integration without Russia tried to turn this issue inside out - we, the "civilized" peoples, they say, are not to blame for anything: Nazism and communism should be considered as things of the same order.

The feeling of inferiority from the fact that not the Europeans themselves, but first of all the Russians and other peoples of the USSR had to liberate the continent from the brown plague, obviously haunts the ideologists of European values ​​and many leaders Western countries. Hence the desire to destroy monuments Soviet soldiers and their commanders, to throw off the pedestals the tanks on which real, not imaginary liberators entered Europe. Such a desire, against the backdrop of a new wave of the crisis of Western values, may push for an increase in popularity. radical ideologies desire to reassert its exclusivity. What this led to in 1933 is well known to everyone ...

2. The main reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

The question of the reasons for the failures of the Red Army at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War began to be discussed in detail in the scientific community since the mid-1950s. However, the tragic 41st year is still fraught with many mysteries. Recently, domestic and foreign historians have done a lot to solve all these difficult puzzles. Many conferences were held at the venues Russian Academy Sciences, Association of Historians of the Second World War, Academy of Military Sciences, Russian Military Historical Society. Fundamental works have been published and continue to be published that address this problem, one of latest editions- a new 12-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945".

It is not worth dwelling here on all the obvious blunders of our leadership that led to the tragic start of the war: distrust of some intelligence, his own hope that Hitler would not launch a big aggression against the USSR, leaving in his rear still undefeated England, the technical backwardness of many models Soviet technology, lack of experience among commanders, pre-war repressions, etc. A well-known military historian, General of the Army M.A. Gareev also repeatedly noted that we were going to repel the enemy’s offensive “shortly”, did not prepare a deep defense in connection with this and thought about it only on the very eve of aggression. All this is so. But the most important reason for the initial failures, in my opinion, was that by the beginning of the enemy invasion on June 22, 1941, our army was not ready institutionally. We were in the process of a gigantic restructuring of both the structure and the technical equipment of our armed forces. The enemy caught us at the most inopportune moment, when the old mechanism had already been largely dismantled, and the new one had not yet been created. Several years were not enough for us - perhaps 1.5 years - for the situation in the theater of operations to look completely different.

We must also not forget - and this is the basis for understanding the tragedy of 1941 - that not only Germany fell upon us, but practically the entire power of the united continental Europe, all the resources of the states allied or conquered by the Nazis. And lastly, the very fact of aggression prepared to the smallest detail, the possibility of choosing the time for the start of the war, the stake on the destruction of the Red Army already in the border battles, in conditions when Stalin tried to buy time and wished not to provoke the Germans at all costs - all this predetermined our defeats in the summer-autumn of 1941. Many conclusions can be drawn from the tragedy, but one of them is quite simple and unambiguous - for any enemy attack you need not only to carefully prepare, but to have the political will to make responsible decisions in the name of the security of your country.

3. Features of the coalition strategy of the anti-Hitler alliance that contributed to the victory.

The anti-Hitler coalition is a military-political alliance of states and peoples who fought in World War II against the aggressive fascist-militarist bloc - Germany, Italy, Japan and their satellites. The anti-Hitler coalition (according to the Anglo-American terminology Grand Alliance - Grand Union) was a unique phenomenon in world history. States with different social systems, hundreds of millions of people from many countries have united in the struggle for a just cause. The core of the coalition, the main force of the Grand Union, was Great Britain, the USSR and the USA. The decisive force of the coalition was the Soviet Union, which made the main contribution to achieving victory.

By the time of the German attack on the USSR, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt came to the general conclusion that they would support the USSR in the fight against Nazi aggression, although what kind of support this would be was far from clear. On June 22, 1941, on the day of the German attack on the USSR, W. Churchill made a statement that Great Britain would help the USSR in the war against Germany. On June 24, F. Roosevelt made a statement of support for the USSR, although the reaction in US government circles to German aggression was ambiguous. So, for example, Senator G. Truman stated “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as many as possible, although I I don't want Hitler's victory under any circumstances." However, most statesmen The US rejected the position of this part of the establishment. Their arguments were realistic and convincing - the defeat of the USSR means not only a direct threat to the world positions of the United States, but also to the very independence of the country.

On July 3, Stalin, for his part, declared his confidence that the just struggle of the Soviet people for the freedom of the country "merges with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms." The path to the creation of a military-political alliance of the three powers was open.

After the trip of the personal representative of the President of the United States and the head of the Lend-Lease Administration G. Hopkins to Moscow at the end of July 1941, a trilateral conference in Moscow (September 28 - October 1, 1941), the Western allies made specific decisions on issues of providing assistance to the USSR . In turn, the USSR announced on September 24, 1941, its agreement with the basic principles of the Atlantic Charter - a declaration on the joint goals of the policy of Great Britain and the United States. The US entry into World War II in December 1941 turned Soviet-American cooperation into a factor of paramount military and political importance.

During 1941 - 1943. the problem of the second front was of critical importance for the Soviet Union. Despite the Kremlin's repeated statements about the need for an early landing of the allies in France, and even the assurances of President Roosevelt, given by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov in 1942 that the United States would seek to open a front in Europe as early as 1942, during the most difficult periods of the war, the Allies did not organize a direct strike on the European continent. Nevertheless, at the Tehran conference in November-December 1943, where I. Stalin, F. Roosevelt and W. Churchill met for the first time at the same table, the issue of the timing of the opening of the second front was resolved. The Allies agreed to land their troops in France in May 1944.

The second front was opened by the landing of the Allied troops in Normandy on June 6, 1944. From that moment on, the actions of the Red Army began to be closely coordinated with the actions of the armies of the Western Allies in Europe. Almost simultaneously, the Red Army launched a strategic offensive coordinated with the Western Allies, and then an offensive in January 1945 between the Vistula and the Oder, accelerated in order to support the Anglo-American troops, who were subjected to an unexpected attack by the Wehrmacht in the Ardennes. The second front accelerated the defeat of Nazi Germany, but over the two-year period of waiting for it - from May 1942 to June 1944. - only the irretrievable losses of the Soviet armed forces (killed, captured and missing) amounted to more than 5 million people.

Of great importance was the interaction of the allies in the economic sphere, primarily in the supply of arms from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Great Britain to the USSR. The deliveries of a number of types of military equipment and industrial equipment, carried out mainly under the Lend-Lease program, contributed to the military efforts of the USSR. They accounted for 15% of aircraft, 12% of tanks, warships and ships, more than 22% of Soviet production (18.3 thousand aircraft, 12 thousand tanks, 596 warships and ships). Of particular note is the value of deliveries of 427,000 cars, about 2,000 steam locomotives, and 11,000 wagons (219,000 cars, 92 steam locomotives, and about 1,000 wagons were produced in the USSR during this period). However, the bulk of Lend-Lease cargo arrived in the USSR in 1943-1945, when a radical change had already occurred on the Soviet-German front. American technology, especially cars, allowed the Red Army to become more maneuverable and mobile, which, of course, affected the pace of offensive operations. But military supplies could not replace the direct participation of the allies in the battles in the main theaters of the war, which was constantly delayed. The Red Army received its main armament from its own industry, and it was not inferior in its characteristics, or was better than the allied one.

With the entry of the Red Army into the territory of the countries of Eastern Europe, contradictions escalated between the allies on the issue of the post-war order of the world. The most important geopolitical task of the Soviet Union was to create on its own western borders"security belt", the basis of which would be the borders of 1941, with friendly border states. The Western allies feared for their interests in Europe. Moreover, the United States sought to organize " open doors"on different continents, where the powerful industry of the Americans will force out any competitor, which will be followed by the establishment of the political and military dominance of Washington.

Even the British Prime Minister could not like this alignment. In October 1944, Churchill flew to Moscow with a plan for the division of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, about which he had held preliminary negotiations with Washington. As the Soviet records of the negotiations and subsequent events explain, the UK and the USSR took some steps to practically divide the spheres of influence in the Balkans, including the UK conceding in Romania, and the USSR in Greece.

In February 1945, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt met again at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference in order to discuss the most important issues of the post-war system. The most difficult problem on which they managed to find a compromise was the problem of the future of the Polish state. In Crimea, the foundations for the activities of a new world security organization were also laid, and the details of the UN charter were worked out.

In April 1945, Vienna, Berlin, and then Prague were out of reach of the troops of the Western Allies. All the more urgent was the creation of a "new front" for Churchill - now against the Red Army. Soon after the Yalta Conference, W. Churchill gave the order to develop a plan military operation, which, according to his plan, was to change the course of events in Europe. On May 22, 1945, the Joint Planning Staff of the British War Cabinet presented a plan for Operation Unthinkable, which indicated the directions of attacks by the Western Allies in Europe. The date of the start of hostilities was indicated in the document - July 1, 1945. The goal was to inflict a total defeat on the Russian troops. However, having studied the issue, the imperial General base came to the conclusion that this plan was unfeasible due to the superiority of the Red Army forces.

Faithful to its allied obligations, on the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and, during the Manchurian operation, defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army (about 1 million people). Thus, the USSR made a significant contribution to the Allied victory in Far East. American military analysts, calculating the cost of the invasion of the Japanese islands, previously noted that the victims of the US army and navy could be up to 1 million people, and the war with Japan threatens to drag on until 1946 or even longer.

The force factor that aggravated the contradictions between the three great powers was the creation and use of atomic weapons by the United States of America at the end of the war. On August 6 and 9, 1945, American planes dropped atomic bombs the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In fact, the Americans sought by this act not only to break the resistance of Japan, but also to show the USSR that they have a "baton" against the Russian guys. Allied principles were increasingly replaced by demands and unilateral decisions. Churchill's speech in Fulton in February 1946 in the presence of Truman, which contained a negative assessment of the policy of the USSR, was regarded in Moscow as "a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord among the allied states." The world began to be drawn into a new cold confrontation.

The anti-Hitler coalition was not formed or dissolved by any special decision. Having achieved its main goal - the defeat of the aggressors - the Grand Union took its rightful place in the history of the twentieth century.

4. Sources of the victory of the Soviet people and peoples anti-Hitler coalition.

Thousands of books and articles have been written about the sources of the victory of the USSR and the Anti-Hitler coalition in World War II. Let us recall only the main points that are universally recognized: the determination of the USSR, of the entire Soviet people to stand to the end, regardless of any defeats and losses. The war that was waged was truly the war of the Great Patriotic War, when every soldier understood that the existence of both the state itself and his family, his homeland depends on how he behaves in battle.

Back in the years of industrialization, the USSR managed to create a military-economic base for waging a cruel and protracted war. The feat of the builders of the first five-year plans, in fact, laid the foundation for the superiority of the USSR in the production of basic types of weapons over the fascist bloc. We won also because we could find mutual language with countries that also opposed the hegemony of the Nazis in Europe and the world. Various political systems, as mentioned above, did not prevent the armies of the Anti-Hitler coalition from interacting.

But today it is worth highlighting, perhaps, the main reason for the arrival of the great spring of 1945 - Victory was achieved by unity! The unity of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. It was forged by Russians, Belarusians, Armenians, Chechens already in the casemates of the Brest Fortress, Kazakhs in the trenches at the Dubosekovo junction, Ukrainians at the walls of the mother of Russian cities - Kyiv in 1941 and 1943. Entered Berlin in 1945 great army liberators, the strongest not only due to its professionalism and weapons, but also due to spiritual superiority over the enemy, based on a common cultural code that united peoples with different histories and traditions. And in 1945, another most important page was woven into this code - the common Victory.

5. Historical memory of the Second World War in the countries of the former USSR: positive and negative aspects of the discovery of new facts about the war, a distorted view of events. An attempt to revise the results and causes of the Great Patriotic War.

Situation with historical memory in some countries of the former USSR - not only about the Great Patriotic War, but also about other events of our common history- is of serious concern. We did not focus on this issue for a long time, apparently because in Russia in the 1990s, there was also scatter and vacillation in historical science and education, and often open substitution of concepts and distortion of facts: heroes were declared fanatics , traitors - fighters against the regime, etc. Now we have come to our senses, we are taking steps towards writing objective scientific works and textbooks on the history of the Fatherland. But in such countries as Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Moldova, etc., the process of distorting the truth is gaining momentum. Information about significant events is presented in a distorted mirror. For example, in Ukrainian textbooks, the term "Great Patriotic War" is often thrown out - Ukraine, they say, waged its own separate war within the Second World War, and it had ambiguous consequences for it: "In September 1939, Ukraine entered World War II. Having suffered heavy losses, the Ukrainian people made a worthy contribution to the victory of the United Nations over the aggressor.” Not only is the fact of the common victory of the peoples that were then part of the USSR ignored, the “alternative” of this victory is obscured - the destruction of any statehood, the physical extermination and enslavement of all Soviet people, incl. and Ukrainians, but in some textbooks they go so far as to write: “Detachments of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army under the leadership of Stepan Bandera liberated Ukrainian cities and villages from fascist invaders, defended the civilian population. However, the Soviet government did not want Ukraine to have its own army. Therefore, when in 1943 the Ukrainian lands were liberated from the fascist invaders, the Bolsheviks began to fight the UPA.” There is a desire to fence off at all costs from the common history with Russia, the Soviet Union, there is an active search for "new" heroes of Ukraine. However, not only controversial figures emerge to the surface, but also the faces of outright accomplices of the Nazis and bloody murderers. A clear analysis and assessment of the actions of Bandera, on whose conscience tens of thousands of victims of the Lviv and Volyn massacres, burned Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Russian villages, the murders of women and children, has not been carried out in public discourse. Hence the growth of hatred for strangers, xenophobia, which, sadly, began to determine the consciousness of Ukrainians (and not only in Western Ukraine, but also in the central regions) in recent times. Now that generation of residents of the “square” has grown up, which is ready to perceive Russia not only as a “rude” and “drinking” neighbor, but also as a long-standing adversary, a cunning enemy who has always sought to harm Ukraine. What, for example, are the lines of textbooks about the Battle of Poltava - this is a battle in which "the royal hordes defeated the Cossacks and Swedes", "the defeat of the Swedish-Ukrainian army" had "extremely unfavorable" consequences in Ukraine, "the Poltava catastrophe of 1709". Or about the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian USSR in 1954: “The economic life of Crimea was paralyzed, the RSFSR could not restore these territories after the war,” take responsibility for the restoration of the economic and cultural life of the peninsula.

RIA Novosti continues to publish doctor's talks historical sciences Valentina FALINA with the agency's military observer Viktor LITOVKIN. They reveal previously little-known pages of the Great Patriotic War, tell about the mechanisms and springs of certain decisions at the highest level that were closed to the general public, which sometimes had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of hostilities.

VL: V modern historiography World War II, there are various assessments of its final stage. Some experts argue that the war could have ended much earlier - known, in particular, the memoirs of Marshal Chuikov, who wrote about this. Others believe that it could drag on for at least another year. Who is closer to the truth? And what is it? What is your point of view?

VF: Not only today's historiography is arguing on this issue. There were discussions about the timing of the war in Europe and the time of its end even during the war. They have been going on unceasingly since 1942. To be precise, this question has preoccupied politicians and the military since 1941, when the vast majority of statesmen, including Roosevelt and Churchill, believed that the Soviet Union would hold out for a maximum of four to six weeks. Only Benes believed and argued that the USSR would resist the Nazi invasion and, ultimately, defeat Germany.

Eduard Beneš, if I remember correctly, was the President of Czechoslovakia in exile. After the Munich agreement in 1938 and the seizure of the country, he was in the UK?

Yes. Then, when these assessments and, if you will, the assessments of our resilience did not come true, when Germany suffered its first, I emphasize, strategic defeat in World War II near Moscow, views changed dramatically. There were fears in the West that the Soviet Union would not come out of this war too strong. And if it really turns out to be too strong, it will determine the face of the future Europe. So said Berle, US Deputy Secretary of State, coordinator of US intelligence. Churchill's entourage also thought so, including very respectable people who developed the doctrine of the actions of the British armed forces and all British policy before the war and during the war.

This explains, in many respects, Churchill's resistance to the opening of a second front in 1942. Although Tiverbrook, Crippe in the British leadership, and especially Eisenhower and other planners of the American military plans, believed that there were both technical and other prerequisites for defeating the Germans precisely in the forty-second year. Use the factor of diverting the overwhelming part of the German armed forces to the East and, in fact, the two thousand-kilometer-long coast of France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Germany itself, open to invasion for the allied armies. Along the Atlantic coast, the Nazis did not then have any permanent defensive structures.

Moreover, the US military insisted and convinced Roosevelt (there are several memorandums from Eisenhower on this subject) that a second front is necessary, that a second front is possible, that the opening of a second front will make the war in Europe, in principle, short-lived and force Germany to capitulate. If not in the forty-second year, then, at the latest, in the forty-three.

But such calculations did not suit the UK and the figures of the conservative warehouse, of which there were plenty on the American Olympus.
-Who do you mean?

Well, for example, the entire State Department, headed by Hull, was extremely unfriendly towards the USSR. This explains why Roosevelt did not take Hull with him to the Tehran conference, and why the Secretary of State received the minutes of the Big Three meetings for review six months after Tehran. The curiosity is that the protocols were reported to Hitler by the political intelligence of the Reich after three or four weeks. Life is full of paradoxes.

After the Battle of Kursk in 1943, which ended in the defeat of the Wehrmacht, on August 20, the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain, as well as Churchill and Roosevelt, met in Quebec. On the agenda was the question of the possible withdrawal of the United States and Britain from the anti-Hitler coalition and of entering into an alliance with Nazi generals to wage a joint war against the Soviet Union.

But because, according to the ideology of Churchill and those who shared this ideology in Washington, it was necessary to "detain these Russian barbarians" as far in the East as possible. If not to break the Soviet Union, then to weaken it to the utmost. First of all, by the hands of the Germans. That was the task.

This is the old, old Churchillian intent. He developed this idea in conversations with General Kutepov back in 1919. Americans, British and French fail and cannot crush Soviet Russia he said. This task must be entrusted to the Japanese and Germans. In a similar vein, Churchill instructed Bismarck, the first secretary of the German Embassy in London, in 1930. The Germans behaved like fools in World War I, he argued. Instead of focusing on defeating Russia, they started a war on two fronts. If they had only dealt with Russia, then England would have neutralized France.

For Churchill, it was not so much a fight against the Bolsheviks as a continuation Crimean War 1853-1856, when Russia tried well or badly to put a limit to British expansion.

in the Caucasus, Central Asia, in the oil-rich Middle East...

Naturally. Therefore, when we talk about different options for waging war with Nazi Germany, we should not forget about the different attitudes towards the philosophy of the alliance, towards the obligations that England and the United States assumed before Moscow

I'll digress for a moment. In Ghent in 1954 or 1955 there was a symposium of priests on the topic - do angels kiss? As a result of many days of debate, conclusions were drawn: they kiss, but without passion. Allied relations in the anti-Hitler coalition were somewhat reminiscent of an angelic whim, if not the kisses of Judas. The promises were without obligation or, worse, to mislead the Soviet partner.

Such tactics, let me remind you, disrupted the negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France in August 1939, when something could still be done to curb Nazi aggression. Defiantly, they left the Soviet leadership no choice but to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. We were exposed to the blow of the Nazi military machine, ready for aggression. I will refer to the directive as it was formulated in Chamberlain's cabinet: "If London does not get away from the agreement with the Soviet Union, the British signature under it should not mean that in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the British will come to the aid of the victim of aggression and declare war on Germany. We must reserve the opportunity to state that Britain and the Soviet Union interpret the facts differently."

A well-known historical example, when Germany attacked Poland, an ally of Great Britain, in September 1939, London declared war on Berlin, but did not take a single serious step to really help Warsaw.

But in our case there was no question of even a formal declaration of war. The Tories proceeded from the fact that the German skating rink would pass to the Urals and tamp everything along the way. There will be no one to complain about the treachery of Albion.

This link of times, the link of events existed during the war. She provided food for thought. And these reflections, it seems to me, were not very optimistic for us.

But let's go back to the turn of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year. Could we end the war before May or not?

Let us put the question this way: why was the landing of the allies planned for the forty-fourth year? For some reason, no one emphasizes this moment. Meanwhile, the date was not chosen by chance. In the West, they took into account that near Stalingrad we lost a huge number of soldiers and officers, military equipment. There were colossal casualties in Kursk Bulge... We lost more tanks than the Germans.

In 1944, the country mobilized seventeen-year-old boys. Almost the entire village was cleared. Only at the defense plants spared the age of 1926-1927 - their directors were not released.

American and British intelligence, evaluating the prospects, agreed that by the spring of 1944 the offensive potential of the Soviet Union would be exhausted. That the human reserves will be completely used up, and the Soviet Union will not be able to strike the Wehrmacht with a blow comparable to the Moscow, Stalingrad and Battles of Kursk. So, by the time the allies landed, having been bogged down in the confrontation with the Nazis, we would cede the strategic initiative to the United States and England.

By the time the allies landed on the continent, a conspiracy against Hitler was also dated. The generals brought to power in the Reich were to disband Western Front and open space for the Americans and the British to occupy Germany and "liberate" Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria ... The Red Army was to be stopped at the borders of 1939.

I remember that the Americans and the British even landed troops in Hungary, in the Balaton region, with the aim of capturing Budapest, but the Germans shot it all...

It was not a landing, but rather a contact group to re-establish ties with the Hungarian anti-fascist forces. But not only that failed. After the assassination attempt, Hitler survived, Rommel was seriously wounded and dropped out of the game, although in the West they were betting on him. The rest of the generals chickened out. What happened happened. The Americans did not succeed in an easy march across Germany to bravura music. They got involved in battles, sometimes difficult, remember the Ardennes operation. Nevertheless, they solved their problems. They solved them, at times, rather cynically.

I will bring specific example. US troops approached Paris. There began an uprising. The Americans stopped thirty kilometers from the capital of France and waited for the Germans to kill the rebels, since they were, first of all, the communists. It was killed there, there are different data, from three to five thousand people. But the rebels took control of the situation, and only then did the Americans take Paris. The same was observed in the south of France.

Let's go back to the point from which we started our conversation.

Winter of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year.

Yes. In the autumn of 1944, several conferences were held in Germany, led by Hitler, and then on his behalf by Jodl and Keitel. Their meaning boiled down to the following - if you give the Americans a good thrashing, the United States and England will awaken a great taste for negotiations that were conducted in secret from Moscow in 1942-1943.

The Ardennes operation was conceived in Berlin not as an operation to win the war, but as an operation to undermine allied relations between the West and the Soviet Union. The United States had to understand how strong Germany was, how interesting it was for the Western powers in their confrontation with the Soviet Union. And how much the Allies themselves do not have enough strength or will to stop the "Reds" on the outskirts of German territory.

Hitler emphasized that no one would talk to a country that was in a difficult situation - they would only talk to us when the Wehrmacht showed that it was a force.

Surprise was the decisive trump card. The Allies occupied winter quarters, they believed that the Alsace region, the Ardennes mountains - a great place to relax and a very bad place for military operations. The Germans, meanwhile, were about to break through to Rotterdam and cut off the Americans from using the ports of Holland. And this circumstance will completely decide the entire Western company.

The start of the Ardennes operation was postponed several times. Germany did not have enough strength. And it began precisely at the moment when, in the winter of 1944, the Red Army was waging heavy fighting in Hungary, in the Balaton region and near Budapest. At stake were the last sources of oil - in Austria and some in Hungary itself, which were controlled by the Germans.

This was one of the reasons why Hitler decided to defend Hungary no matter what. And why, in the midst of the Ardennes operation and before the start of the Alsatian operation, he began to essentially withdraw forces from western direction and transfer troops to the Soviet-Hungarian front. The main force of the Ardennes operation - the 6th SS Panzer Army was removed from the Ardennes and transferred to Hungary ...

Under Haymashker.

In essence, the redeployment began even before Roosevelt and Churchill’s panic appeal to Stalin, when they, translated from diplomatic to common language, began to ask: help, save, we are in trouble.

But Hitler was estimating, and there is evidence of this, that if our allies so often exposed the Soviet Union to attack and openly waited, and whether Moscow could stand it, if the Red Army would not break, then we can do the same. As in 1941 they were waiting for the fall of the capital of the USSR, when in 1942 not only Turkey and Japan, but also the United States were waiting to see if we would surrender Stalingrad in order to decide to revise our policy. After all, the allies did not even share intelligence information with us, for example, about the plans for the German offensive across the Don to the Volga and further to the Caucasus, and so on and so forth ...

This information, if I am not mistaken, was given to us by the legendary Red Chapel.

The Americans did not provide us with any information, although they had it by the day and hour. Including the preparation of the operation "Citadel" on the Kursk Bulge ...

We, of course, had good reason to look at how our allies knew how to fight, how much they wanted to fight and how much they were ready to promote their main plan for the operation on the continent - the plan, which was called "Ranken". Not "Overlord" was the basis, but "Ranken", which provided for the establishment of Anglo-American control over all of Germany, over all the states of Eastern Europe, in order to prevent us from going there.

Eisenhower, when he was appointed commander of the forces of the second front, received a directive: prepare the Overlord, but always keep the Ranken in mind. If favorable conditions arise for the implementation of the Ranken plan, discard the Overlord, and direct all forces to the implementation of the Ranken plan. The uprising in Warsaw was launched under this plan. And many other things were carried out under this plan.

In this sense, the forty-fourth year, the end of it - the beginning of the forty-fifth became the moment of truth. The war was not on two fronts - East and West, but the war was on two fronts. Formally, the allies were fighting, very important for us - they certainly tied up some part of the German troops. But their main idea was to stop, if possible, the Soviet Union, as Churchill said, and some American generals expressed it more sharply, "to stop the descendants of Genghis Khan."

Incidentally, Churchill formulated this idea in a crudely anti-Soviet form as early as October 1942, when our counter-offensive on November 19 near Stalingrad had not yet begun. "We need to stop these barbarians as far east as possible."

And when we talk about our allies, - in no case do I want and can not belittle the merits of the soldiers and officers of the allied forces who fought, like us, knowing nothing about the political intrigues and machinations of their rulers - they fought honestly and steadfastly . I am not belittling the aid that we received under Lend-Lease, although we have never been the main recipients of this aid. I just want to say how difficult, contradictory and dangerous the situation was for us throughout the war until its victorious salute. And how difficult, at times, was the adoption of a decision. When they didn’t just lead us by the nose, but continued and continued to simply expose us to a blow.

That is, the war could really have ended much earlier than May 1945?

If I answer this question absolutely frankly, then I will say: yes, I could. Only it is not the fault of our country that it did not end in the forty-third year. Not our fault. If only our allies honestly fulfilled their allied duty, if they adhered to the obligations that they assumed before the Soviet Union in the forty-first, forty-second and in the first half of the forty-three. And since they did not do this, the war dragged on for at least one and a half to two years.

And most importantly, if it were not for these delays with the opening of the second front, there would have been 10-12 million fewer casualties among the Soviet people and among the allies, especially in the occupied territory of Europe. Even Auschwitz would not have worked, after all, it began to operate at full capacity in the forty-fourth year ...

Despite the fact that Great Britain declared war on Germany in 1939, and the United States in 1941, they were in no hurry to open the Second Front, which was so necessary for the USSR. Let's single out the most popular versions of the reasons for the delay of the allies.

unpreparedness for war

Many experts see the unpreparedness of the allies for a full-scale war as the main reason for such a late opening of the Second Front - June 6, 1944. What could, for example, oppose Germany to Great Britain? In September 1939, the British army numbered 1 million 270 thousand people, 640 tanks and 1500 aircraft. In Germany, these figures were much more impressive: 4 million 600 thousand soldiers and officers, 3195 tanks and 4093 aircraft.

Moreover, during the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk in 1940, a significant number of tanks, artillery and ammunition were abandoned. According to Churchill, "in fact, in the whole country there were hardly 500 field guns of all types and 200 medium and heavy tanks."

Even more deplorable was the state of the United States Army. By 1939, the number of regular troops was slightly more than 500 thousand people, with 89 combat divisions, of which only 16 were armored. For comparison: the Wehrmacht army had 170 fully equipped and combat-ready divisions.
However, in a couple of years, both the United States and Great Britain significantly strengthened their military capabilities and in 1942, according to experts, they could already provide real assistance to the USSR, pulling significant forces of the German army from East to West.
When requesting the opening of the Second Front, Stalin relied primarily on the British government, but Churchill, under various pretexts, repeatedly refused the Soviet leader.

Fight for the Suez Canal

The Middle East continued to be a priority for Great Britain at the height of the war. In British military circles, an amphibious landing on the coast of France was considered unpromising, which would only divert the main forces from solving strategic tasks.

The situation by the spring of 1941 was such that the UK was no longer enough food. Importing food products from the main suppliers - the Netherlands, Denmark, France and Norway, for obvious reasons, turned out to be impossible.
Churchill was well aware of the need to maintain communications with the Near and Middle East, as well as India, which would provide Great Britain with much-needed goods, and therefore he threw all his forces into the defense of the Suez Canal. The German threat to this region was quite large.

Allied divisions

An important reason for delaying the opening of the Second Front was the disagreement of the Allies. They were observed between Great Britain and the United States, which were solving their geopolitical problems, but even more contradictions emerged between Great Britain and France.
Even before the surrender of France, Churchill visited the government of the country, which was evacuated to Tours, trying to inspire the French to continue resistance. But at the same time, the Prime Minister did not hide his fear that the French Navy could fall into the hands of the German army and therefore offered to ship it to British ports. From the government of France followed by a decisive refusal.
On June 16, 1940, Churchill proposed to the government of the Third Republic an even more daring project, which practically meant the merging of Great Britain and France into one state on enslaving terms for the latter. The French regarded this as an undisguised desire to take over the country's colonies.
The last step that upset the relationship between the two allies was Operation Catapult, which involved the capture by England of the entire available French fleet or its destruction in order to avoid falling into the hands of the enemy.

Japanese threat and Moroccan interest

At the end of 1941, the attack of the Japanese Air Force on the American military base in Pearl Harbor, on the one hand, it finally placed the United States in the ranks of the allies of the Soviet Union, but on the other hand, it pushed back the opening of the Second Front, as it forced the country to concentrate its efforts on the war with Japan. For a whole year, the Pacific theater of operations for the American army became the main arena of battles.
In November 1942, the United States began to implement the Torch plan to capture Morocco, which at that time was of the greatest interest to American military and political circles. It was assumed that the Vichy regime, with which the United States continued to maintain diplomatic relations, would not resist.
And so it happened. In a matter of days, the Americans took over major cities Morocco, and later, having united with the allies - Britain and the "Free France" continued successful offensive operations in Algeria and Tunisia.

Personal goals

Soviet historiography almost unanimously expressed the opinion that the Anglo-American coalition deliberately delayed the opening of the Second Front, expecting that the exhausted long war The USSR will lose the status of a great power. Churchill, even while promising military assistance to the Soviet Union, continued to call it a "sinister Bolshevik state".
In a message to Stalin, Churchill writes very vaguely that "the chiefs of staff do not see the possibility of doing anything on such a scale that it could bring you even the smallest benefit." This answer is most likely due to the fact that the prime minister shared the opinion of the military-political circles of Britain, who argued: "the defeat of the USSR by the Wehrmacht troops is a matter of several weeks."
After the turning point in the war, when a certain status quo was observed on the fronts of the USSR, the Allies were still in no hurry to open the Second Front. They were occupied with completely different thoughts: would the Soviet government agree to a separate peace with Germany? The Allied intelligence report contained the following words: "A state of affairs in which neither side can count on a quick complete victory will in all likelihood lead to a Russo-German agreement."
The wait-and-see attitude of Great Britain and the United States meant one thing: the allies were interested in weakening both Germany and the USSR. Only when the fall of the Third Reich became inevitable did certain shifts take place in the process of opening the Second Front.

War is big business

Many historians are perplexed by one circumstance: why the German army allowed the British landing force to retreat almost unhindered during the so-called "Dunkirk operation" in May-June 1940. The answer most often sounds like this: "Hitler received instructions from the British not to touch."
Doctor of Political Sciences Vladimir Pavlenko believes that the situation around the entry of the US and Great Britain into the European arena of war was influenced by big business represented by the Rockefeller financial clan. The main goal of the tycoon is the Eurasian oil market. It was Rockefeller, according to the political scientist, who created the "American-British-German octopus - the Schroeder Bank in the status of an agent of the Nazi government" is responsible for the growth of the German military machine.
For the time being, until the time Hitler's Germany was needed by Rockefeller. British and American intelligence agencies repeatedly reported on the possibility of removing Hitler, but each time they received a go-ahead from the leadership. As soon as the end of the Third Reich became obvious, nothing prevented Britain and the United States from entering the European theater of operations.

Why did World War II become inevitable?

Suvorov claims that Stalin unleashed the Second World War. How did the "Kremlin mountaineer" manage to do this? This is a pretty rare occurrence! - Suvorov condescends to explanations. It turns out that "Stalin's plan is simple: to force France and Britain to declare war on Germany ... or to provoke Germany into such actions that will force France and Britain to declare war on Germany ... Delegations of France and Britain [at the Moscow talks in the summer of 1939], wanting to prove the seriousness of their intentions , informed the Soviet side of information of extreme importance: if Germany attacked Poland, Britain and France would declare war on Germany. This was the information that Stalin was waiting for. Hitler believed that the attack on Poland would pass with impunity, like the capture of Czechoslovakia. And Stalin now knew that Hitler would be punished for this. So the key to the start of World War II ended up on Stalin's table. Stalin had only to give the green light to Hitler: attack Poland, I won't interfere with you ... (Viktor Suvorov, "M Day", chapter "Prologue at Khalkhin Gol).

Suvorov here again uses his favorite method - impudent lies. As Comrade Stalin said in such cases - "Not so it was. Absolutely not so."

Shortly after Munich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov received the French ambassador Coulondre. Litvinov, in particular, said: “We consider what happened a catastrophe for the whole world. One of two things: either England and France will continue to satisfy all the demands of Hitler and the latter will gain dominance over all of Europe, over the colonies, and he will calm down for a while, to digest what they have swallowed, or England and France will realize the danger and begin to look for ways to counteract further Hitlerite dynamism, in which case they will inevitably turn to us and speak to us in a different language. (Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov with the French Ambassador to the USSR R. Coulondrom. October 16, 1938, "Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War", vol. 1, p. 248).

The People's Commissar's forecast turned out to be correct not in everything and did not begin to come true right away. At first, the British and French were quite satisfied with their remarkable diplomatic victory. Well, maybe only French Prime Minister Daladier was a little bit jealous of Hitler for Chamberlain. After all, the British Prime Minister in the same place, at the Munich conference, together with the German Fuhrer, managed to sign the Anglo-German declaration that from now on they will resolve all issues without war and without fail through consultations. However, the French did not suffer long. In December, Ribbentrop arrived in Paris and, to everyone's delight, waved a similar Franco-German declaration.

Not that Hitler didn't bother Chamberlain and Daladier at all. But for a completely incomprehensible reason, the leaders of the Western countries were sure (or hoped?) That Hitler's further expansion would unfold in the direction of the USSR. Discussions about Transcarpathian Ukraine became incredibly popular for a while. Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Germany G. Astakhov reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in December: "According to correspondents of The Times and the New York Herald Tribune, the topic of Ukraine is now one of the most fashionable in Berlin." ("The Year of the Crisis 1938–1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., p. 144.) At the same time, the French Chargé d'Affaires J. de Monba reported to Paris: "According to some foreign sources, Hitler's plan for Ukraine is to try to create, if possible, with the help of Poland, which will be offered a kind of condominium, something like the European Manchukuo, placed in more or less close vassalage. (Ibid., p. 137).

Without asking at all about the degree of feasibility of the "Carpathian-Ukrainian" plans (at least from the point of view of geography!), quite officials stubbornly developed this topic in conversations with Soviet diplomats. Thus, for example, Sir Horatio Wilson, the chief adviser to the British government on matters of industry (and trusted political adviser to Chamberlain), Sir Horatio Wilson, told the somewhat dumbfounded Soviet plenipotentiary Ivan Maisky: “Hitler has now taken as the next stage the strike line to the east, towards Ukraine ... Ukraine a large separatist movement and play this card in approximately the same spirit as the Czechoslovak card was played. The slogan of "self-determination" will be used again. In this plan, Hitler expects to get Ukraine without a big war." (Ibid., pp. 119–120).

Maisky, of course, ridiculed Sir Horatio. Let us ask ourselves, however, what should Moscow have thought about such arguments of Western diplomats? The conclusion was obvious - there is a large-scale provocation by England and France, who, without assuming any obligations, want to draw the USSR into a conflict with Germany. It was with this assessment of the "Ukrainian theme" that Stalin spoke on March 10, 1939. He spoke from the highest podium, devoting a few words to this topic in the Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the XVIII Congress. Stalin, in particular, said: “The noise that the Anglo-French and North American press raised about Soviet Ukraine is typical. The leaders of this press shouted hoarsely that the Germans were going to Soviet Ukraine, that they now had in their hands the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. , numbering about 700 thousand people, that the Germans will annex Soviet Ukraine, which has more than 30 million inhabitants, to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine as soon as this spring. It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason ... "(Ibid., pp. 261-262.)

The paradox is that Stalin was not quite right. Now, after studying the documents, it becomes clear that, firstly, Hitler really considered various plans related to Transcarpathian Ukraine - first of all, meaning to get leverage on Poland (Polish politicians were terribly afraid of creating an “independent” Transcarpathian Ukraine , knowing that this would cause unrest in the Ukrainian regions occupied by Poland). And, secondly, it becomes quite obvious that the politicians of the West so passionately desired the emergence of the Soviet-German conflict that they diligently deceived themselves. IN the highest degree A telegram from British Ambassador to Germany Henderson to British Foreign Secretary Halifax is typical. Sir Neville Henderson wrote to Lord Halifax: “As regards the Ukraine, although I find the idea of ​​conquest improbable, it nevertheless seems to me inevitable that Germany will be willing to attempt to wrest this rich country from the vast state which she regards as her main enemy. In her own interests she would naturally prefer that the Ukraine be independent and serve as a buffer state between her and that enemy, and it is quite obvious that she would like to enjoy the prevailing economic and political influence there.I do not think that the USSR would dutifully submit to the German intrigue to such an extent, and it seems to me that the less we take sides in this conflict, the better ... Hitler made it clear in Mein Kampf that "living space" for Germany can only be found in expansion into East, and expansion to the East means that sooner or later a clash between Germany and Russia is very likely." (Documents on British Foreign Policy…Third series. Vol. IV. P. 213-217., cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., pp. 257-258).

The most remarkable thing about this telegram is not the British diplomat's naive hopes of a "clash between Germany and Russia", but the date (March 9, 1939) and a postscript: "the telegram was written before the current crisis in academic interest.

Indeed, Sir Neville had no time to send his wise analysis to the British Foreign Office, and the Slovak separatists financed and led by Berlin began to portray something like "mass riots." They portrayed, however, not very convincing. As Coulondre, who by that time had been transferred to the post of French ambassador to Germany, noted, “if we exclude Bratislava, where the unrest was fomented by the German self-defense service and Glinka’s guards, who received weapons from Germany, order was in no way violated either in Slovakia, or in Bohemia, or in Moravia, for example, the English consul, in a report to his envoy in Prague, stated that in Brunn, where, according to the German press, German blood flowed like a river, absolute calm reigned. (Letter from Coulondre to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France J. Bonnet., "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., p. 284). Nevertheless: “Starting from [March] 12, the tone of the Berlin press became even more frantic… Within 24 hours the accents shifted. allegedly became Czechoslovak Germans (immigrants from the Reich) or representatives of an ethnic minority.If you believe the newspapers of the Reich, which spoke not only in the same language, but also in the same expressions as in September 1938, then the life of 500 thousand Czechoslovak Germans was hung over the most terrible danger." (Ibid., p. 284).

When urgent reports about the Czechoslovak events came to London, Prime Minister Chamberlain declared, speaking in Parliament: “The occupation of Bohemia [Czech Republic] by the German armed forces began today at six o’clock in the morning ... The Slovak Parliament declared Slovakia independent. This declaration puts an end to the internal disintegration of the state, the boundaries of which we intended to secure, and His Majesty's Government cannot therefore consider themselves bound by this obligation." The British Prime Minister has officially declared null and void the very guarantee he used to justify Munich agreement. And that's all. Chamberlain considered this topic exhausted. Churchill's testimony: "Chamberlain was due to speak in Birmingham two days later ... Having received energetic presentations about the opinion of the House, the public and the Dominions, he put aside a long-written speech on domestic affairs and social services and took the bull by the horns ... "We are now told that this seizure of territory was dictated by the riots in Czechoslovakia ... If there were riots, were they not inspired from outside? .. "(Winston Churchill, World War II, vol.

In other words - by no means fulfilling the duty of the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and not realizing the real and imminent danger of Hitler's aggression, but only public opinion, outraged by the tragic results of the protracted policy of "appeasement", made Neville Chamberlain resolutely condemn the occupation of Czechoslovakia and think about how to put an end to the Nazi invasion? That Chamberlain's wrath was primarily aimed at the public is evidenced by the calmness with which British (and French, of course) leaders reacted to another small capture of Hitler that followed just a few days later. On March 20, the German government demanded an ultimatum from Lithuania to transfer the Memel region (Klaipeda region) to Germany. The status of Memel, as an integral part of Lithuania, was enshrined in the Klaipeda Convention of 1924. Britain and France were the guarantors of the convention, but there was no reaction from them. More precisely, there was no reaction to rebuff the aggressor. According to N. Pozdnyakov, temporary charge d'affaires of the USSR in Lithuania, N. Pozdnyakov, in a private conversation, the head of the office of the Lithuanian cabinet told him that the British ambassador "openly became indignant when the Lithuanian government hinted at resistance in Klaipeda." ("The year of the crisis 1938-1939". Documents and materials. Vol. 1, p. 319).

At that time, a British representative, R. Hudson, Minister for Overseas Trade of Great Britain, was in Moscow. Hudson's mission was twofold: on the one hand, he conducted trade negotiations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mikoyan, and on the other, he probed the ground for joint action to curb Hitler. In a conversation with Maxim Litvinov, Hudson said that he "came with an 'open mind' and is ready to listen to how we [the USSR] think of cooperation and what ways we propose for this." (Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov with the Minister for Overseas Trade of Great Britain R. Hudson, "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Vol. 1, p. 319). "There will be no second Munich," the British minister assured. It was March 23 - the very day when, having lost any support and assistance from the Anglo-British "guarantors", the Lithuanian government was forced to capitulate. On the same day, Hitler entered the port of Memel aboard the battleship Deutschland.

All that was happening contributed very little to the serious attitude of the Soviet government towards the beginning of the "new era" of British diplomacy - attempts to stop the gangrene of Hitlerism with the help of a collective security system.

And still " new era", indeed, began. Even Chamberlain finally realized that Hitler was quite serious about theoretical constructs his work "Mein Kampf". And there it is very clearly formulated that before proceeding with the development of "living space" in the East, it is necessary first to destroy France and deprive England of any influence on the continent. After the capture of Czechoslovakia, understanding came to many Western politicians and diplomats. On March 19, 1939, Coulondre, the French ambassador to Germany, wrote about this to his minister. "However," Coulondre clarified melancholy, "the concept of the author of Mein Kampf is identical to the classical doctrine of the German General Staff." ("The year of the crisis 1938-1939". Documents and materials. P. 301).

In a word, as the Soviet People's Commissar Litvinov suggested, the leaders of England and France had only two choices. The first to give up their countries and peoples of their countries as a sacrifice to Hitler in fulfillment of the theoretical doctrines of "Mein Kampf" and the strategic developments of the German General Staff. The second is to resist the aggressor. At least try. However, there was very little time to maneuver. Hitler was deeply convinced that the age of his precious person was the determining factor in military operations, and therefore he was in a hurry. Chamberlain had to hurry too. On March 31, 1939, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that Great Britain was providing guarantees to Poland. On April 13, British guarantees to Greece and Romania were announced, as well as French guarantees to Greece, Romania and Poland.

Suvorov claims that at the Moscow talks the representatives of France and England provided Comrade Stalin with "information of extreme importance." And he specifies which ones: "if Germany attacks Poland, Britain and France will declare war on Germany." This is an incredible discovery! Well, just "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"! It is very strange that Mr. Suvorov, this "great dissident" by class military history, for some reason does not know that this very "information of extreme importance" was announced loudly from the rostrum of the British Parliament! The whole world knew about the English and French guarantee to Poland! And Comrade Stalin knew, and Hitler. Hitler even, having learned about the announcement of the guarantee, was terribly upset. According to Admiral Canaris, Hitler rushed around the room, banged his fists on the marble top of the table, his face twisted with anger, he constantly shouted threats to the British: "I will cook them such a roast that they will choke!" (William Shearer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Vol. 1, p. 502).

The problem was that Stalin (and Hitler, too) treated the Anglo-French guarantee with ba-alsh distrust. There were good reasons for this. And not only "Munich and much more," as Churchill delicately put it. After "Munich" there was also "a lot". So, for example, at the end of July 1939, a terrible scandal erupted in England. It turned out that from 18 to 21 July, at the very height of the Moscow negotiations, other negotiations were going on in London - unofficial, but very intense. It was discussed nothing less than the delimitation of the spheres of interests of Germany and the British Empire. The negotiations were conducted by K. Wohlthath, an employee of the German department for the implementation of the four-year plan, and very significant persons in British politics - Chamberlain's trusted adviser Wilson and Foreign Trade Minister Hudson. Yes, yes, with the same Hudson who had been in Moscow four months earlier and so solemnly declared to Litvinov: "There will be no second Munich!" Moreover, the initiative for negotiations came from the British. Horace Wilson even had a draft agreement prepared, the purpose of which, as Sir Horace explained, was "the broadest Anglo-German agreement on all important questions." At the same time, "Wilson definitely told Mr. Wohlthath that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would give England the opportunity to free itself from its obligations with regard to Poland," the German ambassador Dirksen reported to Berlin. Maybe all these negotiations were independently started by "individual British politicians" at their own peril and risk? In no case. Dirksen elaborates: “Sir Horace Wilson made it quite clear that Chamberlain approved of this program; Wilson suggested that Wohlthath immediately talk with Chamberlain so that Wohlthath would receive from him confirmation of what Wilson had said. However, Wohlthath, due to the informal nature of his negotiations, considered it inappropriate for such a conversation with Chamberlain." (Note of the German Ambassador to Great Britain G. Dirksen, July 24, 1939, cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials, vol. 2, pp. 113-117).

Wohltath's talks with Hudson and Wilson broke down as confidentiality was breached (journalists unearthed and published). The scandal was huge. But after all, in addition to "unofficial" negotiations, British diplomats were also quite open. On July 24, 1939, the joint declaration of the governments of Great Britain and Japan (the "Arita-Craigie Agreement") was officially promulgated. In this document, the British government declared that the Japanese troops invading China "have special needs in order to ensure their own security and maintain public order in areas under their control." (Documents on British Foreign Policy… Third Series, vol. IX, p. 313, cited in The Crisis Year 1938-1939, vol. 2., p. 122). Paying tribute to the specific English humor (Japanese troops must be in China to ensure their own security), it must be noted that it was all the same "Munich" policy, only not in Europe, but in the Far East. And this happened at a time when the British representatives were in intense negotiations with the USSR, which, true to its allied duty, fought the Japanese troops in Mongolia!

Stalin's doubts that the British and French (who in fact subordinated their diplomacy to English) really intended to put up an effective rebuff to the aggressor were completely justified. And Hitler, having made a fuss at first, on the same grounds, believed that they would not fight. Later, a week before the attack on Poland, Hitler did not believe either the British Prime Minister Chamberlain (who in an official message warned him that in the event of aggression, England would be forced to "use without delay all the forces at her disposal"), nor the French ambassador Coulondre, who assured the Führer with his word of honor from an old soldier that "in the event of an attack on Poland, France will be on the side of Poland with all its forces." (Message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain N. Chamberlain to the Reich Chancellor of Germany A. Hitler, cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939", vol. 2, pp. 313-314; William Shearer, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", vol. 1, p. 582).

Hitler believed neither the official declarations, nor the personal message of Chamberlain, nor word of honor Coulondra. Asking the question - "How did it happen that Hitler was involved in the" big war "that he so wanted to avoid?", the British military historian Liddell Hart (the same Basil Liddell Hart, whom Suvorov recognizes as a "great" and "outstanding military historian" ) answers very clearly: “The answer should be sought in the support that the Western powers have given him [Hitler] for so long with their accommodating position, and in their unexpected “turn” in the spring of 1939. The “turn” was so sharp and unexpected that the war became inevitable." (Basil Liddell Hart, World War II, p. 21).

| |