The Russians have become more conflicted, angrier, bolder and in many ways have lost the ability to self-control. This conclusion was made by experts from the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. They conducted a study aimed at assessing the change in the typical psychological makeup of our fellow citizens from 1981 to 2011. It turned out that today our psychological appearance is terribly far from what we want.

Andrey Yurevich, Deputy Director of the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, spoke about why we have become like this, about ways to overcome aggression.

Andrei Vladislavovich, judging by your data, relatively distant 80s, we all became three times more aggressive, the same number of times more rude and completely unceremonious. But how to measure, for example, aggression?

Andrey Yurevich: I’ll clarify right away that, of course, not “all of us”. We are talking about the general psychological characteristics of society, that is, in general, about the "average temperature in the hospital." As for the ways to evaluate and measure the level of aggressiveness, the simplest way is to statistics, say, the number of serious crimes of an aggressive nature. The most compelling indicator is the homicide statistics. In this parameter, we are almost four times superior to the United States and about ten times most countries. Western Europe. The second way is sociological or socio-psychological research, for example, carried out in public transport. The classic variant of such studies is that those who conduct them walk, say, along the subway cars and ask to give up their seat, while recording which part of the passengers give it up and how they react to this request. Well, the third method is our everyday experience with you. We constantly use public transport, observe the behavior of our motorists on the roads, our fellow citizens in shops, on the street, and, if we want, we can count how many times in a week or a month we have been rude or shown other forms of disrespect. In this regard, I note that it is customary to single out different forms of aggression - physical, verbal, etc. For example, widespread obscenity is also a manifestation of aggression, but verbal.

It seems to me that places in transport began to give way more willingly.

Andrey Yurevich: This is true. In the early 1990s this happened very rarely. Moreover, it was possible to observe the opposite phenomenon, when, say, a young healthy bull occupied two or three places and defiantly did not give them up to anyone, thus showing his "toughness". "Today, places began to give way much more often. But at the same time, if we talk about serious crimes, a trend characteristic of our country is manifested: about 80 percent of murders in our country are committed in a state of spontaneous aggressiveness.These are the so-called domestic murders, behind which there is no self-interest, malicious intent, etc. kill each other, neighbors and drinking companions do the same. In general, statistics show that in every fourth family domestic violence is committed. One of the reasons is a very low domestic culture. Violence is committed mainly in low-income families with a low level of education, culture and unrestrained drunkenness of both spouses.

Your study says that the media and crime create the fashion for aggression. How does this happen?

Andrey Yurevich: For the criminal world, the norm of aggressiveness is very characteristic. And crime culture has had a huge impact on our society since the late 1980s. Much has been borrowed from it - from slang ("hit", "roof", etc.) to behavior patterns (for example, when spouses hire killers to sort things out). The media also influence with their fashion for the "corpse that enlivens the frame." In addition, by constantly demonstrating the glamorous life of show business stars, etc., they create in our fellow citizens, especially among young people, obviously unattainable landmarks, the unattainability of which causes frustration, that is, a complex of negative feelings from the unattainability of the goals set, and the one that according to a well-known law in psychology, it generates aggression. At the same time, the word "aggressive" often has a positive meaning for us. "Aggressive advertising" is good advertising, "aggressive car design" is good design again. The fashion for aggressiveness is also formed by various subcultures, for example, football fans, nationalist organizations. Our government and the media also contribute. Thus, political TV programs form a rather aggressive attitude towards some countries, create an image of the world surrounding our country as hostile and dangerous, and the image of the enemy, characteristic of Soviet ideology, has not been written off for circulation. Dissatisfaction with the government also breeds aggression. Moreover, since ordinary citizens "can't get hold of power," they often switch their annoyance with it to each other and to various social groups.

But we are not the first to experience an era of aggressiveness.

Andrey Yurevich: In the history of any country that today is considered civilized, one can find a period marked by terrible events. Let us recall the Middle Ages in Europe or fascism in the history of now civilized Germany. And what was going on in the USA in the 1930s, which went down in the history of this country as the years of rampant banditry and gangster shootings? More modern trend is that when a country is undergoing radical reforms, drastic socio-political and economic changes, the level of aggressiveness of its citizens increases significantly.

Are there any mechanisms to return to human form?

Andrey Yurevich: Apparently, any nation cannot be in an overly aggressive state for a long time. The period of anger and aggressiveness is passing, and calmer times are coming. In addition, there are mechanisms for self-preservation of any nation, and if aggressiveness remained on high level, for example, after the war, when human losses are already very high, then the nation would be doomed to self-destruction.

What saved us after the 90s? Or is it too early to talk about salvation?

Andrey Yurevich: It is too early. So far, the level of aggression in our society is quite high, and we can only talk about a partial improvement in the situation, but not about its cardinal change.

What or to whom did these improvements happen?

Andrei Yurevich: We are moving further and further away from the beginning of the 1990s, when the most radical changes in society took place, we are gradually calming down and getting used to new realities. In addition, many of our fellow citizens go on vacation - mostly to very friendly European countries, see how it is customary to treat them there, feel that goodwill is the norm of social relations, assimilate this norm and transfer it to their native land.

We also used to be kind...

Andrey Yurevich: Yes. Even at a later Soviet time- despite the fact that in times of queues and shortages, the other person was perceived as a competitor in the struggle for basic necessities, the relationship between people was quite friendly. It is worth recalling the relations between representatives of different nationalities that were characteristic of that time. I would like to hope that such relations will be revived, and that globalization will gradually lead us to assimilate the values, norms and behavior patterns that are typical for European countries today, although, of course, everything is not quite safe there either.

Is there more quick ways get rid of anger?

Andrey Yurevich: Yes, and there are special psychological techniques. For example, this practice is common in the USA. If a motorist gets into an accident, the cause of which is recognized as his too aggressive driving, he is sent to special courses in aggression control. It would be nice to implement this in our country. Now in Western countries the so-called "positive psychology" is very popular, aimed at developing all the best that is in a person. Psychologists and psychotherapists have found that it is not enough to free a person from what makes him unhappy - neuroses, phobias, depressions, etc., you also need to specifically develop positive states. If formed in a person positive image himself, his life and the world around him, then his relations with people become much better, aggressiveness disappears. After all, the three main psychological prerequisites for aggression are: a person’s dissatisfaction with himself and his life, a negative attitude towards other people or social groups, the conviction that they are to blame for his failures and hinder the achievement of his goals. Changing all three negative elements of this scheme to positive ones is the main psychological conditions reducing aggressiveness. In our country, unfortunately, for the most part, everything is done the other way around, including through such powerful information (and disinformation) resources as television.

We cannot change our television.

Andrey Yurevich: I would like to hope that we will eventually be able to... Another powerful channel of influence is the system of education and upbringing. It is very important that this system form a positive attitude towards the world. Take, for example, the new history textbooks. It is calculated that in them the number of negative episodes in the history of our country significantly prevails over the number of positive ones. In the United States, for example, the opposite is true, their history is retouched in better side which gives Americans a positive image of their country and their people. It is clear that in such cases there is a conflict with the norm of objectivity. But a reasonable measure is necessary, because the abundance of negative episodes creates a negative image of the history of the country, and, therefore, the country as a whole. In general, any subject can be taught from different positions. It is known that in the socio-philosophical tradition there are two models of man. According to one of them, a person is bad, aggressive, hostile, and the task of the state is to somehow limit him. The second model is that a person is good in principle, he can be trusted, and only his minimal control by the state is necessary. The future indicators of aggressiveness in our society largely depend on which model the teacher or the author of this or that textbook chooses today.

In the eighteen years of Vladimir Putin in power, a new identity has emerged. In the past there was a person of the Stalinist or Brezhnev type, now we can speak of the Putin type of person.

Just as the socialist project forced democracy to become more flexible and socially oriented, so the current Russian propaganda has forced the West to remember its own basic principles - not economic, but ethical. An attempt to bring the world to its limit, to a hypothetical catastrophe, to artificially blur the ontological boundary between good and evil, on the contrary, turned into the restoration of these boundaries, Andrei Arkhangelsky writes on the pages of the Carnegie Moscow Center.

In an authoritarian society, a specific phenomenon arises -. Eighteen years of Vladimir Putin in power is a sufficient period for a new identity to form: just as there was a Stalinist or Brezhnev man, so now we have reason to talk about the Putin type of person.

Should this type be considered within the broad framework of the Soviet or post-Soviet project?

The concept of “post-Soviet” is like a manicure or a perm, it does not reflect essential changes. The principal distinction still runs along the Soviet/non-Soviet border. In a recent letter to the Minister of Culture, members of the Public Council under the same ministry write for good reason that this definition, as we see, has not lost its relevance for the current government.

The uniqueness of the man of the Putin era is that in many of his manifestations today he seems to be more Soviet than under Soviet rule (while his economic behavior is, in fact, rather un-Soviet). How is this possible?

Just as a bullet in flight reveals its qualities, even if it had lain in a warehouse for many years before that, so soviet man fully revealed only in the post-Soviet period. And it was precisely when it began to seem that “everything was over” – decades later. This, of course, is not about the external attributes of loyalty, such as faith in the victory of communism - they crumbled. But the Soviet manifested itself in deep attitudes, habits, reactions, behavior patterns. This deeply Soviet outside the Soviet project appeared today as if in an experimental purity, in a sterile, evaporated form. We will call this Soviet essence, to avoid confusion, Sovietness.

It is this energy of the "soviet bullet" that the Kremlin still uses, but any flight is finite. In the short story, popularly called "Martin Alekseevich", from the novel "Norma" - the debut work of Vladimir Sorokin, written at the end of Soviet power, in 1983 - it is described, as soon as it has now become clear, this same Sovietness, its origin and decay. The Soviet man will end with the speech; but first he must speak to the end - to the letter, to the sound. What, in fact, today we are witnessing: the total process of pronouncing the Soviet from oneself. This "Martin Alekseevich" is Sovietness itself, the language of violence, which is directed at others, but ultimately destroys itself.

Soviet ideology appealed to universal concepts: freedom, equality, friendship of peoples. Putin's man is, as it were, local, chamber, in contrast to the Soviet man designed for large halls. He ceased to "live in the world", turned out to be cut off from the universalist roots that connected him with humanity. A paradox - this happened when, it would seem, there were thousands of times more connections with the world.

Kitchen and yard

“The representative of the Russian authorities ridiculed such and such” (opponent) is now a common cliché in the Russian media. The language of propaganda is most reminiscent of the language of the kitchen, moreover, communal. In the communal kitchen, in the language of Negri and Hart, there is no history, but only an event - it now determines the worldview. The language of the communal kitchen is a way, with the help of language, to preventively protect oneself from possible encroachment; he does not trust anyone and sees a threat in everyone, so he is always on edge. Hence this strange mixture of sarcasm and gloating, which also play the role of a kind of protection from the Other.

Another important word in this universe is "yard." Konstantin Gaase introduced it into a wide political turn, referring to the royal court. But the word is universal, here we are talking about the principles of Soviet courtyard culture.

The kitchen and yard are the assembly points of Sovietness.

Dmitry Gromov, a leading researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, noted that a powerful social and age layer of yard teenagers developed in the USSR in the 1950s–1980s. In the mid-1970s, the USSR recorded the emergence of a new phenomenon, partly reminiscent of the pre-revolutionary one: the emergence of large hooligan gangs that divided Soviet cities into districts that were at war with each other. The enemy is usually assigned according to a simple territorial principle - for example, factories against cities. But this is also a convention; two regions can be deadly at enmity, which are no different from each other. This scheme is reproduced one to one in almost all Soviet republics, territories and regions.

Why did grassroots aggression peak during relatively vegetarian times, the 1970s? This can be explained by a paradoxical compensation: as the external totalitarian system weakens, a homegrown, own quasi-totalitarian system arises from below. One more lack of freedom is created by one's own forces - within the already existing common one. It’s a paradox, but the Soviet court and the “district”, despite their “illegality”, do not contradict at all Soviet system- they seem to confirm it in a radical form or mimic it.

The yard is a micromodel of the Soviet world. First of all, this is the rejection of the modern world, the open world. Openness is the enemy of the court. Its closeness is a sacred value. “The similarity (of yard teenagers throughout the USSR. - A.A.) is found in social composition, the distribution of roles, the choice of places for parties and fights, the motivation for holding fights, the patterns of unwinding conflicts ... ”- writes Dmitry Gromov.

The court is not at enmity because there is someone else. The court itself produces the alien, to paraphrase Sartre. This is its most important function. The Soviet court produces Alien. Living in a situation of inevitable conflict and creating conflict yourself are two different things.

Glorified today as a “school of courage,” the Soviet court is a space of archaization, dead-end communications, and the destruction of meaning. He creates a conflict from any material at hand (nationality, wealth inequality, location). But it is always a means; the only goal is to produce a conflict literally out of nothing, from scratch. This simplest way adolescent negative self-identification, but later it becomes the only way acquiring an identity. And, accordingly, a comfortable state.

The Soviet kitchen and yard are places of extraction, development, production of conflict.

We can say that the current Russian propaganda is doing the same thing - it produces a conflict, often already for its own sake. This is the philosophy of the kitchen and the yard, transferred today to the public space with the help of propaganda: what is important is not what is said, it is important how. First of all, she freely shares with you violence, hatred and contempt for any universals.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the world was already virtual and was producing a symbolic product with might and main - instead of iron and steel. Russia joined this symbolic economy late and had to look for its own exclusivity. As such an exclusive situation, conflict trading took shape - first, in the "dashing nineties", literally physically, on the domestic market; then, in the 2000s–2010s, violence moved to the symbolic level, transforming into a specific language of hatred, the language of propaganda. This is our contribution to the world's immaterial labor, according to Negri and Hart. Then the Soviet man tried to capitalize this know-how - the ability to produce conflict - by supplying it to the world market.

Soviet life taught people to disinterestedly hate, to compensate for external lack of freedom by internal violence towards each other. We are good at quarreling, cursing, hating; we do not know how to negotiate and even despise it as a sign of weakness; we know how to produce conflict literally out of thin air, out of nothing. Unlimited supplies of violence have been accumulated, as well as the skills to produce it. We produce what the Soviet government taught us - distrust and aggression. We mine the conflict, in modern terms.

Radio and TV propagandists, troll factory or pranksters, ministerial speakers - these are all producers of conflict, and it must be admitted that for the most part they produce it disinterestedly, because this is the only skill they possess. The troll factory is already mining conflict on a global scale. Trolls work not so much in favor of one of the candidates, but for the sake of the desire to "feed the atmosphere of hostility and chaos."

disaster man

Another know-how of the Soviet man 2.0 is the production of a catastrophe.

A short post by singer Elena Vaenga in connection with the Pussy Riot action in 2012 immortalized her: the formula "would they try this ..." over the next years turned into a universal one. A recent example is the reaction on the net to the speech of the schoolboy Nikolai Desyatnichenko in the Bundestag: "He would have tried it in the Knesset" (meaning - to make the same speech).

The twin brother of this phrase is the famous "we can repeat."

Both of these expressions help to understand the essence of what is called catastrophic thinking - psychological feature Putin man.

Trying to understand where the roots of these expressions are, another enigmatic phrase comes to mind: “Stalin is not on you,” which has remained popular for sixty years now. It is a threat of violence, albeit an impracticable one. Thus denoted extreme point, the worst that can happen. This threat is ambivalent, since it carries a danger, including for the speaker himself. Another thing is that he is not always aware of it.

Russian gloomy genius last decade He came up with the formula of "symbolic collapse": to bring the situation to the limit, to put the world in a dead end, to make any undertaking meaningless. At the same time, in principle, the threat cannot be realized, and the speaker is well aware of this. It is always a threat in a word - hypothetical, mentally bringing the situation to a catastrophe, to the extreme; turn any bad situation into an absolutely bad one, from which there is no way out, to look over the edge.

The speaker at the same time, as it were, desires this, and is horrified possible consequences- Does he scare himself? – you can never understand what his goal really is. It turns out that he voluntarily or involuntarily wishes for a catastrophe, including for himself, seeing this as a kind of satisfaction.

At the same time, the catastrophe has become synonymous with the present, sincerity and peace of mind. And even a synonym for a kind of faith.

In essence, propaganda is today such a constant looking over the edge. Looking into hell Of course, to save the "real values" and compensate for the loss of meaning.

Where does the hidden craving for disaster come from in Soviet man 2.0? This is painful compensation for the collapse of the Soviet project. The Soviet man was promised that the collapse of capitalism and the victory of communism were inevitable. Instead, communism itself collapsed. A disaster is like back side promised communism. Its underside. Since the catastrophe has happened to us, let it happen to everyone else, otherwise it is unfair. Soviet thinking operated with desubjectivized categories (masses, bourgeoisie, classes); the current thinks in similar categories of unnamed "dark forces", "world government", "the West".

The Soviet man continues instinctively, as a self-defence, to look for all the same “regularities in the development of history” promised by Marx, which just assumed the catastrophe of capitalism. Here we observe an amazing synthesis of the communist idea and eschatology: both live in expectation of the End, and belief in its approach, paradoxically, becomes the last Hope. The recent conflict in Catalonia, for example, was assessed by Kremlin commentators as "analogous to the collapse of the USSR" and the "collapse of the European Union", which has already become a cliché. It looks similar in form, but not in essence: the European Union is not a totalitarian empire, but an economic union; even with the release of some countries (Britain, for example), the structure will not collapse.

Thinking within the framework of a catastrophe distorts the picture of the world, deprives trust, the ability to dialogue, and ultimately deprives one of faith in a person. The Soviet consciousness cannot get used to what is always decided by the individual, and not by the masses. That the world does not have an “overseas master” and that decisions are made by freedom in the person of man.

So, Putin's man knows how to produce conflicts and catastrophe - and today he is trying to sell this skill on the world market. How did it affect the world?

Salvation of meaning

Last year marked the tenth anniversary of the death of the philosopher Jean Baudrillard. In the Russian collective memory, perhaps only the word "simulacrum" remained from him. Meanwhile, the most important idea of ​​Baudrillard is a kind of Manichaeism, to which he came back in the 1980s. The world has become too sterile, evil has been expelled from the world, but without it, good also disappears, ontological chaos sets in, and the usual existential balance is disturbed.

Baudrillard wrote about this, of course, with the aim of theoretical deconstruction, but in Russia this idea was understood (as always) dogmatically, as a literal guide to action. That is, they began to deconstruct the world literally - recalling that "man is invariably bad", with the help of cynicism, undermining the foundations of philanthropy, communication and world politics.

When they say that Putin's ideology does not have a philosophical basis, this is not true: digging around, you can find echoes of the ideas of Heidegger (merging the leader and the people into a single body) and Carl Schmitt (the state of emergency as a confirmation of sovereignty). But the main source is Baudrillard (apparently due to his publicism and popularity in the 1990s-2000s). He drew and creatively reworked the idea of ​​bringing back "enough evil" for balance.

The former deputy head of the presidential administration, Vyacheslav Surkov, was the first to unconsciously articulate this idea. Actually, he sets out the same idea in a veiled form in a recent article "The Crisis of Hypocrisy": there is no need to invent a new one, the world was and will remain bad, let's return to the "old good evil”- the state, which should be left with the right to use violence. This is done, of course, in order to avoid the worst evil - chthonic, unconventional, such as world terrorism. “It is better to put up with a familiar evil than to seek flight to an unfamiliar one.” Otherwise, hell.

But hell does not come contrary to the prophecies. The postmodern world turned out to be more complex than Baudrillard expected. In an open society there are always hidden reserves, an antidote, new effective solutions. They do not arise from above, not directively; they are produced by society itself. “Millions of local decisions taken at once by people”, according to Friedrich Hayek, are the main advantage of the free market compared to a planned economy. Now we can apply Hayek's formula to moral decision making.

A free society, like a free market, develops moral norms, norms of coexistence more efficiently than the state, which lowers them from above, directively. Like a planned economy, planned morality - as it is now in Russia - does not keep up with the changes below that occur every day. In a free society, people make decisions, not leaders or concepts.

This can be called a new philosophy of communication. The point is not even in social networks, not in technology, but in the ability and willingness of people to negotiate on their own. This is the main antidote to conflict and disaster today. Anti-yard and anti-kitchen. It is the ability of people to negotiate that helps to avoid political and social hell every time. And in order to find meaning, it is not necessary to look over the edge of the abyss.

Another thesis of Baudrillard - that the postmodern world is a complete fake - was also taken by Russian political strategists directly, as a given. Since the world has become a fake, since everything is allowed and there are no more borders between good and evil - Baudrillard also wrote about this, then you can create a simulacrum in Russia, an imitation of democracy, without any hesitation.

But it's one thing - desubjectivation, virtualization, "pulverization of the individual" that have developed in Europe and America as a result of the natural development of the economy, emancipation, transparency, global networks - as a side effect of democracy. And another thing is the conscious transformation of democratic principles and institutions into imitation, into a global attraction; an attempt to fake not only the principles, but also the emotions of the people themselves.

And then a paradoxical thing happened. If the Western world before and felt like a fake, then against the background of our fake, it seemed to have acquired its new essence. You could say it has become real. Russia played the role of a crooked mirror, looking into which the West suddenly again found itself as a subject. Thus, Putin's project returned to the West its own meaning, which was lost in the 1990s-2000s. For this, the West can be grateful to Putin.

Just as the socialist project forced democracy to become more flexible and socially oriented, so the current Russian propaganda has forced the West to remember its own basic principles - not economic, but ethical. An attempt to bring the world to the limit, to a hypothetical catastrophe, to artificially blur the ontological boundary between good and evil, on the contrary, turned into the restoration of these boundaries.

Russia again served as a negative example here, alas. Faced with a crude fake, a parody of itself, the West found a foothold. The opposite effect worked: the reaction to the propaganda was a return to the discussion of the basic concepts of freedom, the principles of democracy, and human rights.

This was especially evident in the reaction to the migration crisis and the right-wing revenge that followed it, which is already considered within the framework of psychology as a global “revenge of violence”, which is actually an attempt by society to protect itself from rapid modernization. In some places this "right march" has achieved tactical success, but on the whole, the right idea has not yet been able to gain the upper hand in Europe.

Thus, the Soviet man, outside the Soviet project, acted as an involuntary savior of the meaning of the postmodern era. In our time, it is difficult to hope for the restoration of the "present", but it arose from the opposite, "thanks" in many respects to the actions of Russia. Here you will inevitably think about fishing, or at least about the fact that in history nothing disappears without a trace, everything is needed for something - we just don’t always guess for what.

A familiar graduate student, having learned about my quirks with writing an article on the topic of patriotism, threw me an interesting excerpt from one monograph.
Damn it, how long can you get me patriotic education!

However, I liked the passage.
Very clearly, although not without cheating, it describes psychological picture Russian person.
And no cynicism. It is understandable, serious literature after all.

I will bring it here, and in the public domain. Because it's good to know.
Material mastered, and in principle approved.
No matter how many atheists bombard, the fact remains that human qualities are not brought up without faith.

National characteristics of a person's character to a certain extent influence the construction of value orientations of education. Therefore, it seems to us appropriate to identify what constitutes the psychological portrait of a Russian person.

In Russia, there are no statistical data that could be used to judge the psychological type of the average Russian. However, being engaged in the psychology of management, psychologists of St. Petersburg University (Nikiforov) conducted a study to study the psychological orientations and behavioral stereotypes of the Russian ethnic group. Respondents were asked to name the ten most characteristic, from their point of view, features of the Russian people. After statistical processing, a generalized psychological portrait of a Russian person was obtained. The basis of this portrait was five blocks of psychological orientation:

- focus on collectivism;- orientation to spiritual values;- orientation to power;- focus on a better future;- Orientation to the quick solution of vital problems. Each of the identified orientations is represented in certain stereotypes of behavior and personality traits. Despite the fact that the orientations were revealed through the prism of the concepts of management psychology, the data obtained make it possible to identify some of the value orientations of education in their cultural and historical heritage.

So, focus on collectivism forms such behavioral stereotypes and personality traits as mutual assistance, gullibility, tolerance, generosity, hospitality.

Orientation to spiritual values determines the desire for justice, truthfulness, altruism, conscientiousness, breadth of soul, wisdom, talent, a tendency to a philosophical perception of life, the search for absolute truth.

Power orientation leads a Russian person to formal law-abidingness, controllability, servility, loyalty, conformism.

Orientation towards a better future is associated with such stereotypes of behavior and character traits of a Russian person as optimism, endurance, the hope that “everything will work out by itself”, disorganization, optionality, irresponsibility, carelessness, laziness, mismanagement, impracticality.

Orientation to the quick solution of vital problems gives rise to such behavioral stereotypes and personality traits as diligence, the ability to get together and organize in extreme situations, sacrifice, labor heroism, daring, habit of rush jobs.

The data obtained by psychologists indicate that the psychological portrait of a Russian person is largely due to such features that are a manifestation of the national characteristics of a person brought up in the spiritual and cultural tradition of Christianity. Indeed, one can trace how the character traits of a Russian Orthodox person are connected with the existing deep setting of his consciousness to fulfill the commandments of Christ.

Thus, the value orientations of education should take into account the already laid down and existing deep-seated attitudes of the consciousness of a Russian person to fulfill the commandments of Christ and ensure their continuity in achieving the goals and objectives of spiritual and moral revival outlined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the National Doctrine.

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Berseneva T.A. The educational potential of the way of life in the Russian cultural tradition. Monograph.

St. Petersburg: SPbAPPO, 2007. - 172 p. (p. 18-20)