In the summer of 1939, Soviet and Japanese troops converged near the Khalkhin-Gol River in Mongolian territory. People's Republic(MNR). The endless steppe became the arena of battles, near the riverbed itself, small sandy hills alternated with deep basins. With the help of Soviet and Japanese documents, we will try to figure out how the hostilities at Khalkhin Gol were organized, and how the opponents - the armies of the USSR and the Empire of Japan - assessed each other.

Start

The first battles were marked by extreme confusion. For several days, reports of skirmishes at the border did not even reach Moscow. When it became known about the Japanese provocations on the borders of the MPR, the command of the Red Army had to rush to look for the battle area on the maps and try to understand what the Japanese wanted to achieve in the bare steppe, which had almost no water. For the Red Army, Khalkhin Gol became the first major battle after the end of the civil and Soviet-Polish wars, in which literally everything was tested in combat: from medical service and supply organization to infantry tactics.

At the end of May, after a series of skirmishes, the Soviet and Japanese troops left the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. On the left, western bank of the river, the flywheel of war was only gaining momentum. Tank and aviation units were transferred from the USSR to Mongolia thousands of kilometers away.

Summer battles were characterized by extreme tension - no one wanted to give in. The Soviet troops managed to hold back the July offensive of the Japanese at Mount Bain-Tsagan and push the enemy back to the eastern bank of the river. By August 20, the time the decisive offensive began, the Soviet troops pulled up 574 guns to the battlefield - against 348 in July.

invisible enemy

The enemy did not sit idly by. The Japanese defense was built on separate nodes of resistance and consisted of several lines of trenches. Separate trenches were equipped for snipers and tank fighters, who used gasoline bottles and mines on poles. Each node was adapted for long-term all-round defense and had fire links with its neighbors. Soviet reports after the battles noted that “even with a large presence of hillocks and pits, there was no dead and unaffected space in front of the leading edge”.

In front of their trenches, the Japanese set up targets for shooting - turf sticks, sheets of white paper, cartridge cases and white flags. They were used not only by artillerymen and machine gunners, but also by individual shooters with rifles. The firing points were carefully camouflaged, and the soldiers in positions moved exclusively by crawling or crouching.

Soviet specialists highly appreciated the Japanese tray-shaped shovel, as well as the presence in the troops of ... braids that easily cut thick Mongolian grass. This made it easier to camouflage structures. Often, in order to mislead observers, the Japanese exhibited models of tanks and guns, and stuffed soldiers.

From left to right: Army Commander 2nd Rank Grigory Stern, Marshal of the MPR Khorlogiyin Choibalsan and Commander Georgy Zhukov, 1939

Overlapping field fortifications made of small concrete slabs made it possible to withstand shelling even with 152-mm shells. But the Japanese had almost no minefields, as well as barbed wire. Only in front of some defense nodes were sections of barriers 100–150 m wide. Another drawback of the Japanese defense, according to Soviet estimates, was the crowded location of shelters for infantry.

The Soviet side also had weak points. For example, there was an acute shortage of well-trained infantry, as well as special equipment for it. Even after the first battles, excessive losses in the command staff were noted:

“The reason for the great loss of command staff was the lack of proper disguise (dress uniform, walking in height) and the desire to personally destroy O.T.(firing points) enemy".

Unlike the Japanese army, in the Soviet units, many military personnel, and especially officers, almost universally ignored self-entrenchment and camouflage. Yes, and camouflage equipment in the units either did not exist at all, or they did not match the color of the background of the area.

It turned out that the Soviet small sapper shovel is not very suitable for working in sandy soil. Since in the company and battalion defensive areas they did not bother to dig communication passages, they had to move from unit to unit in open areas. This also led to additional losses of commanders. It is significant that even at the command post of the army group near Mount Khamar-Daba, until August, only commander Georgy Zhukov and the operations department had dugouts with a light overlap. The rest of the departments were located in cars near dug out cracks - shelters from the bombardment.

The leadership of the 36th Infantry Division called the Achilles' heel of the Red Army the weak interaction between all branches of the armed forces, as well as the insufficient use of the terrain, poor observation, and the lack of artillery communications. Particularly poor training stood out for the units recently deployed for mobilization. Strengths were called good security with automatic weapons and "loyalty to the Socialist Motherland, to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin Party".

The Japanese noted the "intrusiveness" of the Soviet attacks, but they easily guessed about their preparation by the loud noise when moving. Night attacks of the Red Army took place stubbornly, but randomly, scattered. That is why, as the Japanese believed, they each time ended unsuccessfully for the Red Army. At the same time, according to Soviet data, at night the Red Army soldiers succumbed to panic more easily: "we are afraid of the enemy at night". More than once there are references to the White Guards, who gave false commands at night. Perhaps it was the ease of such small victories that caused the Japanese contempt for the enemy, for which they soon had to pay.

"The nature of the battles is a real meat grinder"

In early August, units of the Red Army on Khalkhin Gol received many instructions from the command. The fighters needed to learn close combat and marksmanship, crawling to a distance of up to 400 m, orienteering and self-digging. They should have camouflage nets for helmets and torso: a single soldier and even a group should not have been visible from 50 m. The soldiers should have been able to crawl close to the curtain of their artillery fire in the offensive. Intelligence was instructed to cope with the recognition of the enemy fire system. At night, their troops were required to be designated with white armbands and open fire on the enemy only at point blank range.

On August 20, 1939, having concentrated forces and accumulated fuel and ammunition, the Soviet troops suddenly went on the offensive in order to encircle and destroy the Japanese group. The attack was preceded by a massive artillery and air raid; commander of the 2nd rank Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who led the actions of the 1st Army Group, personally observed the work of one and a half hundred SB bombers. Fighters made 5 - 8 sorties a day. The Japanese heavy artillery, which had not changed positions during the lull, was largely disabled by the first blow. The dominance of Soviet aviation and artillery is repeatedly confirmed by Japanese sources.

The Japanese infantry fought back fiercely. Fights were going on for every height. According to Stern, "the nature of the battles - real meat grinder, since they don’t surrender except for singles, as long as they go only to death ”.

The Soviet troops were rescued by equipment, the infantry went on the attack with the support of tanks and armored vehicles. As noted in the documents following the battles, "each shooting firing point delayed the attack, the attackers lay down until the tank or armored vehicle destroyed it". The tanks broke through the Japanese defenses, went forward, and if the infantry was delayed, they returned and destroyed the surviving enemy firing points. The T-26 chemical (that is, flamethrower) tanks proved to be indispensable in this matter. In the July battles, 13 rifle battalions accounted for 8-9 tank ones. In August, the density of tanks reached 20 vehicles per 1 km of the front, or two companies of tanks per rifle regiment(not counting artillery and flamethrower tanks).

On the other hand, such saturation with armored vehicles led to a shortage of escort infantry. It happened that after the defeat of the next defense unit, tanks without infantry left for refueling and replenishment of ammunition, which was enough for only 3-4 hours of battle. And when the infantry went forward, the already, it would seem, destroyed firing points of the Japanese came to life again. Therefore, Stern demanded first to crush the surrounded pockets of resistance with field cannons, "forty-fives" and flamethrowers, and then to launch tank and infantry units on the offensive.

Zhukov ordered to feed the fighters with hot food and provide hot tea no later than by dawn. "with biscuits and sugar". When conducting encirclement battles, he pointed out: "The main means of combat is a hand grenade, point-blank fire and a bayonet", since the artillery could hit its own.

In August, infantry commanders often threw their last reserve, scouts, into the attack. They were sent to the most difficult points, so intelligence losses were very high - up to 70% of the personnel. Already in the first days of the August offensive, many reconnaissance units of companies and battalions simply ceased to exist.

By the end of the fourth day of the offensive on the territory of the MPR, only, according to Stern, "a group of isolated pockets of desperate and rabid Japanese". But the encircled enemy also had to be destroyed before fresh Japanese units arrived. Captured Japanese often "did not know" (and in fact did not want to say) even elementary things, for example, the numbers of their own unit. Stubborn fighting continued until August 30, and in September 1939, Soviet troops repelled Japanese attempts to cross the border again.

Characteristic is the indication of the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Mekhlis, who saw the newspaper article “The Japanese fled like frightened hares” and noted its wrong tone:

“It is true that no army in the world can compare with the Red Army in terms of staunchness and heroism of soldiers. But it was impossible to turn a blind eye to the fact that an illiterate, downtrodden and deceived Japanese soldier, terrorized by officers, showed great stubbornness, especially in defense: even the wounded fired back, but did not surrender. That is why it was impossible to print this note under such a noisy heading. She incorrectly orients, demagnetizes the fighters. On the other hand, talking about the successes and victories of the Red Army soldiers, units, one should not allow any exaggeration. The material must be checked carefully. We have a sufficient number of truly miraculous feats, heroic episodes, so as not to compose or exaggerate.

Indeed, at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the Red Army won a difficult, hard, but well-deserved victory over a strong and skillful enemy.

Sources and literature:

1. RGVA, f. 32113.
2. Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1940.
3. Armed conflict in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river. M.: "Novalis", 2014.
4. Svoisky Yu. M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. Moscow: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2014.

“When we got into the car, an idea occurred to me, which I immediately expressed to Stavsky, that it would be nice, when the conflict is over, instead of any usual monuments, to put in the steppe on a high place one of the tanks that died here, beaten by shell fragments, torn apart, but victorious.

Konstantin Simonov

From May 11 to September 16, 1939, in Mongolia, near the previously unknown Khalkhin Gol River, there were clashes between Soviet and Japanese troops - starting with small border skirmishes, they ended in full-scale battles using hundreds of tanks, guns and aircraft.

Back in 1937, a new stage of the war with Japan began in China. The Soviet Union actively supported China. Soviet instructors trained Chinese crews of T-26 tanks sold to China by the USSR, Soviet pilots fought in the skies of China, preventing Japan from achieving final victory. Naturally, the Japanese did not like it. In the summer of 1938, "reconnaissance in force" on Khasan, according to the Japanese, confirmed the low qualities of the Red Army, but the desired effect was not achieved - Soviet aid continued to flow to China.

Mongolia was the next place to test their strength. The Japanese, mastering the territory of Manchuria controlled by them, pulled the railway to the side Soviet border- to Chita. About fifteen kilometers from the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, the first spurs of the Khingan Range began, and in the Khalkhin-Gola section, the Mongolian border formed a large ledge towards Manchuria. Thus, the Japanese had to either build a railroad across the mountains or run it close to the border within gun range. The capture of the right bank of the Khalkhin Gol River would put the USSR "in its place", would test its determination to further aggravate relations with Japan and ensure the safety of the road. The nearest railway station on the Soviet side, Borzya, was about 700 km from the place of the alleged battles, there were no railways at all in Mongolia, and on the Japanese side, the Hailar station was only 100 km away. To the nearest locality, Tamtsak-Bulak, there were 130 km of desert steppe. Thus, the Soviet troops would be cut off from the supply bases, and the Mongolian army would not pose a serious danger to the Japanese.

From the beginning of 1939, the Japanese shelled the Mongolian outposts and crossed the border in small groups, and in May, with the support of aviation, several sections of the territory of Mongolia were occupied. The USSR transferred its units to the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol River (in March, an order was given to move the operational group of the 11th tank brigade to Tamtsak-Bulak). On May 28-29, a group of Japanese soldiers on a truck, meeting with Soviet tank T-37, threw a couple of canisters of gasoline out of the body. When the tank ran into one of the canisters, it was engulfed in flames. Perhaps this incident was the impetus for the use of bottles of gasoline against tanks. On May 29, the debut of 5 KhT-26 flamethrower tanks took place, defeating the Japanese reconnaissance detachment. However, in general, following the results of the May battles, Soviet troops retreated to the western coast of Khalkhin Gol. On June 12, G.K. became the commander of the 57th Special Corps in Mongolia. Zhukov.

Meanwhile, General Michitaro Kamatsubara, who was considered an expert on the USSR, decided to cross Khalkhin Gol, capture Mount Bain-Tsagan, which dominates the area, cut off and destroy Soviet units on the right bank, located 5-6 km east of the river. By the morning of July 3, two infantry regiments with sappers and artillery managed to reach Bain-Tsagan, at the same time an offensive was developing along the coast towards the Soviet crossing. On the right bank, two Japanese tank regiments (86 tanks, of which 26 Otsu and 34 Ha-Go) also advanced towards the crossing, losing about 10 tanks in the night battle on July 2-3.

The Soviet command decided to fend off the threat of encirclement by tanks. 11th tank brigade, 7th armored brigade and 24th motorized rifle regiment moved to the area of ​​Bain-Tsagan. Their task was to destroy the enemy on the east coast, so the retargeting of troops that had already crossed took place at the last moment. The 1st battalion of the brigade (44 BT-5) at a speed of 45-50 km / h ran into the front line of the Japanese, destroyed the enemy with fire and caterpillars. The attack was not supported by infantry and artillery, and the tankers withdrew, leaving 20 wrecked tanks on the battlefield, which were then burned by bottles of gasoline. The 3rd battalion, successively attacking the Japanese units, lost 20 out of 50 BTs burned out and 11 knocked out. The battalion of armored cars was shot at point-blank range by anti-tank guns, losing 20 burned out and 13 knocked out of 50 armored vehicles.

Although the Soviet tankers, attacking without reconnaissance and interaction among themselves, suffered huge losses, the Japanese were shocked by the number of Soviet armored vehicles, reporting an attack of a whole 1000 tanks !!! In the evening, Kamatsubara gave the order to withdraw to the east coast.

On the same day, a battle took place on the eastern coast between Soviet BT-5s, armored cars and Japanese tanks that had crossed at night. The advancing Japanese tanks were shot from cover from a distance of 800-1000 m. According to various sources, the Japanese lost 41-44 out of 77 tanks that were originally available. On July 5, the Japanese tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle and did not participate in the battles again. The plan to defeat the Soviet troops was thwarted.

Although the July Soviet attacks were also unsuccessful, by August 20, 438 tanks and 385 armored vehicles were concentrated in the Khalkhin Gol area. Parts were preparing for battles, a large amount of ammunition and fuel was collected.

On August 20, at 6:15 am, the Soviet offensive began, and by the evening of August 23, the Japanese troops were surrounded. In hot pursuit, there was a "stubborn struggle for each dune" and "high resistance of the surrounded individual centers of defense." By the morning of August 31, the Japanese units remaining in the boiler were completely destroyed.

Soviet soldiers inspect abandoned Japanese equipment. In the foreground, a light tank Type 95 "Ha-Go", armed with a 37-mm Type 94 gun, the exhaust system of a 120-horsepower Mitsubishi NVD 6120 diesel engine is visible. On the left, a fighter inspects a 75-mm gun, "improved type 38", the main field gun Kwantung Army in the battles at Khalkhin Gol

The reports compiled at the end of the battles testified:

“...tanks BT-5, BT-7 proved to be very good in battles. T-26 - proved to be exceptionally good, walked perfectly on the dunes, very high survivability of the tank. In the 82nd Rifle Division there was a case when the T-26 had five hits from a 37-mm gun, the armor was blown, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle it came to SPAM under its own power. Artillery tanks proved to be an indispensable tool in the fight against anti-tank guns. Artillery installations SU-12 did not justify themselves, as they cannot support tanks in the attack. T-37, T-38 proved to be unsuitable for attack and defense. Slow-moving, caterpillars fly off.

Flamethrower T-26s were praised:

“Introduced only one chemical tank, which gave a stream of fire to the center of resistance, caused panic in the ranks of the enemy, the Japanese fled from the front line of trenches deep into the pit and our infantry, who arrived in time, who occupied the crest of the pit, this detachment was finally destroyed”.

Tanks and armored cars suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank artillery and bottlers - in total, about 80-90% of all losses:

“From throwing bottles, tanks and armored cars are on fire, from hitting anti-tank shells, almost all tanks and armored cars are also on fire and cannot be restored. Cars come into complete disrepair, a fire breaks out in 15-30 seconds. The crew always jumps out with burning clothes. The fire gives a strong flame and black smoke (burns like a wooden house), observed from a distance of 5-6 km. After 15 minutes, ammunition begins to explode, after the explosion of which the tank can only be used as scrap metal.

Japanese soldiers pose with trophies captured in the battles at Khalkhin Gol. One of the Japanese is holding a Soviet 7.62 mm Degtyarev tank machine gun, model 1929, DT-29. Trophies could be captured both from the Soviet troops and from the troops of the Mongolian People's Republic

In the August battles, tanks went into battle already in two echelons - the second echelon shot the Japanese who appeared with bottles and mines.

According to the results of the entire operation, among the main causes of unnecessary losses were “Inattention to intelligence and the inability to organize and directly conduct it, especially at night ... Our commanders and political workers, unfortunately, forget that the loss of an organizer and leader of a battle weakens the troops, and inappropriate, reckless courage increases casualties and harms the cause”(It is worth noting that the commander of the 11th tank brigade, Yakovlev, died while raising the infantry) "... our infantry is poorly trained in joint operations with artillery and tanks".

At least a third of all prisoners of war of the Red Army were captured by the Japanese wounded, burned, shell-shocked, sometimes unconscious. Both Soviet and Japanese documents note that the Soviet crews of wrecked and burnt tanks and armored vehicles fought desperately to the last and were extremely rarely captured. Those who were taken prisoner were often soon killed, especially in the surrounded parts of the Japanese. So, on August 22, several tanks of the 130th separate tank battalion of the 11th tank brigade in the Japanese rear jumped into artillery positions and were shot point-blank with 75-mm cannons. From among their crews, at least six people were taken prisoner and killed.

Thus, it can be stated that, despite the use of tanks not always in the “correct” way, especially at Bain-Tsagan on July 3, tanks made a decisive contribution to the victory. Without tank attacks an attempt by the Japanese to surround the Soviet troops could well have been successful, and this was on the eve of the outbreak of World War II in Europe, in which the USSR managed to avoid fighting on two fronts.

Bibliography:

• Battles at Khalkhin Gol. Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army.– M.:Military Publishing, 1940.
• Kolomiets M. Battles near the Khalkhin-Gol River. - M.: KM Strategy, 2002.
• Simonov K.M. Far to the east. Khalkhin-Gol notes. – M.: Fiction, 1985.
• Svoisky Yu.M. POWs of Khalkhin Gol. - M .: Russian Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Science, 2014

Mongolia Mongolia 2 260 people (2 cavalry divisions)

In Japanese historiography, the term " Khalkhin Gol" is used only for the name of the river, and the military conflict itself is called " Incident at Nomon Khan”, by the name of a small village in this region of the Manchurian-Mongolian border.

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✪ Battles at Khalkhin Gol

✪ Battle on the Khalkhin Gol River (1939)

✪ Battle of Khalkhin Gol in 1939.

✪ War in the days of lotus blossom. Battles near Lake Khasan with the Japanese in 1938

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Background to the conflict

According to the Soviet side, the conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin-Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia, although the border ran 20-25 km to the east. The main reason for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Japanese construction in the area, bypassing Greater Khingan railway Khalun-Arshan - Ganchzhur to the border of the USSR in the region Irkutsk and lakes Baikal, as in some places the distance from the road to the border was only two or three kilometers. According to Soviet historian M. V. Novikov, in order to substantiate their claims, Japanese cartographers fabricated false maps with the border along Khalkhin Gol and “ a special order was issued to destroy a number of authoritative Japanese reference publications, on the maps of which the correct border was given in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River”, but the Russian historian K. E. Cherevko indicates that the administrative border along the Khalkhin Gol channel was marked on a map published on the basis of Russian topographic surveys of 1906 and on physical map Outer Mongolian General Staff Republic of China 1918.

May

The Soviet command took radical measures. May 29 a group of aces pilots headed by the deputy chief of the Red Army Air Force flew from Moscow to the combat area Ya. V. Smushkevich. 17 of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, many had combat experience wars in Spain and China. They began to train pilots, reorganized and strengthened the system of air surveillance, warning and communications.

To strengthen the air defense, two divisions of the 191st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment were sent to the Trans-Baikal Military District.

In early June, Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and in his place, at the suggestion of the chief of the operational department of the General Staff M. V. Zakharova Was assigned G. K. Zhukov. The brigade commander who arrived with Zhukov became the chief of staff of the corps. M. A. Bogdanov. Shortly after arriving in the area of ​​military conflict in June, the chief of staff of the Soviet command proposed a new plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead behind Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack on the opposing Japanese grouping Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with Bogdanov's proposals. The necessary forces began to be drawn to the area of ​​hostilities: troops were brought along Trans-Siberian Railway To Ulan-Ude, and further on the territory of Mongolia they followed the marching order for 1300-1400 km. Corps commissar became Zhukov's assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry Zhamyangiin Lhagvasuren.

To coordinate the actions of the Soviet troops on Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army from Cheats commander arrived in the area of ​​the Khalkhin-Gol river 1st Separate Red Banner Army commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern.

Air battles resumed new force from 20 June. In the battles of June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

July

Fierce battles unfolded around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and in the sky above the mountain at some points there were up to 300 aircraft from both sides. The 149th Infantry Regiment of Major I. M. Remizova and the 24th motorized rifle regiment I. I. Fedyuninsky.

On the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol by night 3 July Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, withdrew to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, however, the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki failed to complete the task assigned to her.

The grouping of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan was in a semi-encirclement. By the evening 4th of July Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. 5'th of July Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, on the orders of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge over Khalkhin Gol that they had at their disposal was blown up. In the end, the Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, although according to the estimates of the Japanese themselves, their total losses for the entire period of hostilities amounted to 8632 people. killed. The Japanese side lost almost all tanks and most of the artillery. These events became known as the "Bayan-Tsagan battle".

The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops "no longer ventured to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River." All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely defeating the entire Japanese grouping located on the territory of Mongolia.

July August

The 57th special corps was deployed into the 1st army (front) group under the command of commander G. M. Stern. In accordance with the decision of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, the Military Council of the army group was established to lead the troops, consisting of: commander commander of the 2nd rank G. M. Stern, chief of staff brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov, Commander of Aviation Corps Ya. V. Smushkevich, commander G. K. Zhukov , division commissioner M. S. Nikishev.

New troops urgently began to be transferred to the place of conflict, including 82nd Rifle Division. From Moscow military district the 37th tank brigade was deployed, which was armed with tanks BT-7 And BT-5, in the territory Trans-Baikal Military District partial mobilization was carried out and formed 114th And 93rd rifle divisions.

General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. At the same time, taking into account the sad experience of the battles for the Japanese on Mount Bayan-Tsagan, this time the enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Forcing the river was not planned.

During the preparation by the Soviet command offensive operation Soviet and Mongolian troops carefully developed and strictly observed a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy. All movements of troops in the front line were carried out only at night, it was strictly forbidden to send troops to the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by the command staff was carried out only on trucks and in the form of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, all the time preparing for the offensive, the Soviet side was actively electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening in on telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed in order to misinform the enemy. Negotiations were only about the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. The radio exchange in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code.

Despite the general superiority in the forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive, Stern managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. For the offensive operation, two-week stocks of ammunition, food, fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4,000 trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1,300-1,400 kilometers. It should be noted that one car trip with cargo and back lasted five days.

During the offensive operation, the Soviet command, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, planned to surround and destroy the enemy with unexpected strong flank attacks in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational tasks as the main striking force of flank groupings that performed encirclement maneuvers.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern Group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapova, auxiliary strike - Northern group, commander colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of the brigade commander D. E. Petrov was supposed to tie down the enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. In the reserve, concentrated in the center, were 212th Airborne, 9th armored brigade and tank battalion. Mongolian troops also participated in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions, as well as a motor transport division under the general command of Marshal X. Choibalsana.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The balance of forces of the parties before the start of the offensive

August

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command.

At 06:15 a powerful artillery preparation and an air raid on enemy positions began. 153 were lifted into the air bomber and about 100 fighters. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with the plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred during the crossing of the tanks of the 6th tank brigade, since the pontoon bridge induced by the sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks during the crossing of Khalkhin Gol.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance in the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications. Here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day.

Already on the 21st and 22nd of August, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so the Soviet command had to bring into battle the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade.

Soviet aviation also operated well at that time. Only for 24 and 25-th of August bombers Sat made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to support its troops defending on the flanks. Armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of the Soviet-Mongolian troops to the end August, 26th united and completed the complete encirclement of the 6th Japanese army. After that, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts And bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese August 23 on the Central sector of the front, the Soviet command even had to bring into battle its last reserve: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. At the same time, it took a considerable risk, since the closest reserve of the commander - the Mongolian armored brigade - was in Tamtsak-Bulak, 120 kilometers from the front.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to conduct counterattacks and release the group surrounded in the Khalkhin Gol region ended in failure. 24 August regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, approached from hailara to the Mongolian border, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment, which covered the border, but neither that day nor the next could they break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. After the fighting on August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, did not try to release its encircled troops, resigned to the inevitability of their death.

The Red Army captured 100 vehicles, 30 heavy and 145 field guns, 42 thousand shells, 115 easel and 225 light machine guns, 12 thousand rifles and about 2 million cartridges, and many other military equipment as trophies.

The last battles were still going on 29 and August 30 in the area north of the Khailastyn-Gol River. By the morning August 31 the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of hostilities.

In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207 aircraft, Japan - 162.

During the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River, Soviet troops actively used artillery: according to incomplete data (the results of the shelling of a number of objects in the adjacent territory were not established), 133 artillery pieces were destroyed by artillery fire (six 105-mm guns, 55 pcs. 75- mm guns, 69 small-caliber and three anti-aircraft guns), 49 mortars, 117 machine guns, 47 artillery, 21 mortar and 30 machine-gun batteries were suppressed, 40 tanks and 29 armored vehicles were knocked out, 21 observation posts, 55 dugouts, 2 fuel depots and 2 warehouses with ammunition

Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government turned to the government of the USSR with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the MPR and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River, which entered into force the next day.

But "de jure" the conflict ended only in May 1942 signing the final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese, based on old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats on the Soviet-German front, then a rather difficult situation developed. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Japanese. But it only lasted 1945 before the surrender of Japan World War II.

Results

The victory of the USSR and the MPR at Khalkhin Gol became one of the reasons for the refusal of Japan's attack on the USSR during Great Patriotic War. Immediately after the start of the war, the General Staff of Japan, taking into account, among other things, the experience of Khalkhin Gol, decided to enter the war against the USSR only if Moscow fell before the end of August. In response to Hitler's demand in a telegram from 30 June immediately fulfill their allied obligations and strike at the USSR from the east, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers July 2 the final decision was made to wait until Germany was certain to win.

In Japan, defeat and simultaneous (August 23) signing Soviet-German non-aggression pact led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet Hiranuma Kiichiro. New Japanese government 4 September stated that it did not intend to interfere in any form in the conflict in Europe, and September 15th signed an armistice agreement April 13 1941 to the conclusion Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. In the traditional confrontation between the Japanese army and navy, the “sea party” won, defending the idea of ​​​​cautious expansion in South-East Asia and to the islands Pacific Ocean. The military leadership of Germany, having studied the experience Japanese wars in China and at Khalkhin Gol, rated Japan's military capabilities very low and did not recommend Hitler to associate himself with her by an alliance.

The fighting on the territory of the MPR coincided with the negotiations of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Hachiro Arita with the British Ambassador in Tokyo Robert Craigie. In July 1939 between England and Japan an agreement was concluded, according to which Great Britain recognized the Japanese seizures in China (thus providing diplomatic support for the aggression against the MPR and its ally, the USSR). At the same time, the US government extended the trade agreement with Japan, which was denounced on January 26, for six months, and then completely restored it. As part of the agreement, Japan purchased trucks for the Kwantung Army, machine tools for aircraft factories for $3 million, strategic materials (until 10/16/1940 - steel and iron scrap, until 07/26/1941 - gasoline and oil products), etc. A new embargo was imposed only on July 26 1941. However, the official position of the US government did not mean a complete cessation of trade. Goods and even strategic raw materials continued to flow to Japan until the start of the war with the United States.

The events at Khalkhin Gol also became an important element propaganda in USSR. Its essence boiled down to the idea of ​​the invincibility of the Red Army in a future war. Members tragic events summer 1941 year many times noted the harm of excessive optimism on the eve of big war.

The influence of the Khalkhin-Gol campaign on the Sino-Japanese War is poorly understood.

"Golden Star"

The government of the Mongolian People's Republic established the badge " Participant fights at Khalkhin-Gol”, which was awarded to distinguished Soviet and Mongolian military personnel.

Khalkhin-Gol was the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown division commander (deputy commander of the ZapOVO), after the victory over the Japanese, headed (June 7, 1940) the largest in the country Kyiv Military District and later became chief General Staff Red Army.

Commander of the 1st Army Group Commander G. M. Stern and Air Commander Ya. V. Smushkevich were awarded medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol "Golden Star". After the end of the conflict, Smushkevich was appointed chief Air Force RKKA, Stern commanded 8th Army during Soviet-Finnish war.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Group brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 17, 1939, he was awarded Order of the Red Banner. At the end of hostilities in September 1939, by order of the NKO of the USSR, he was appointed deputy commander of the 1st Army Group (Ulaanbaatar). In the same month, by a Decree of the Government of the USSR, he was appointed chairman of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation to the Mixed Commission for resolving disputes over the state border between the MPR and Manchuria in the conflict area. At the end of the negotiations, as a result of a provocation from the Japanese side, Bogdanov made "a gross mistake that damaged the prestige of the USSR", for which he was put on trial. On March 1, 1940, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was convicted under Art. 193-17 paragraph "a" for 4 years ITL. By the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 23, 1941, he was amnestied with the removal of a criminal record and sent to the disposal of the NPO of the USSR. He finished the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general.

Side losses

According to official Soviet data, the losses of the Japanese-Manchurian troops during the fighting from May to September 1939 amounted to more than 61 thousand people. killed, wounded and captured, including about 25,000 killed (of which about 20 thousand were actually Japanese losses) . Officially announced losses of the Kwantung Army: 18 thousand people [ ] . Independent Japanese researchers give figures up to 45 thousand people. [ ] . In the studies of A. Nakanishi, only the Japanese lost 17,405 - 20,801 people killed and wounded, the losses of the Manchus are not taken into account.

According to Soviet data, 227 Japanese and Manchurian soldiers were captured during the fighting. Of these, 6 died in captivity from wounds, 3 refused to return to Japan, the rest were handed over to the Japanese side). Also three barguta refused to return to Inner Mongolia.

The irretrievable losses of the Soviet troops amounted to 9,703 people (including 6,472 dead, 1,152 dead from wounds in hospitals, 8 dead from diseases, 2,028 missing, 43 dead from accidents). Sanitary losses amounted to 15,952 people (including 15,251 wounded, shell-shocked and burned, 701 sick). According to official figures, the losses of the Mongolian troops amounted to 165 killed and 401 wounded (sometimes, with reference to a certain Mongolian historian T. Ganbold, data are given about 234 killed and 661 wounded, and a total of 895 people were the total losses of the Mongolian troops). In the studies of A. Nakanishi, the losses of the Soviet-Mongolian side amounted to 23,000 - 24,889.

During the fighting, 97 Soviet servicemen were captured. Of these, 82 were returned by prisoner exchange in September, 11 people were killed by the Japanese in captivity, 4 refused to return from captivity. Of the prisoners of war returned to the Soviet Union, 38 people were tried by a military tribunal on charges of voluntarily surrendering or collaborating with the Japanese in captivity.

Reflection in literature and art

The events at Khalkhin Gol were reflected in Soviet and world literature and art. Novels, poems and songs were written about them, articles were published in newspapers.

• K. M. Simonov- the novel "Comrades in Arms", the poem "Far in the East", the poem "Tank", the poem "Doll".
• F. Bokarev - poem "Memory of Khalkhin Gol"
• H. Murakami- novel " Chronicles Clockwork Birds(Lt. Mamiya's long story).
• Gelasimov A. V.- novel "Steppe gods", 2008.

In cinema

• "Khalkhin-Gol" () - documentary, CSDF.
• « Listen, on the other side"() - a Soviet-Mongolian feature film dedicated to the battles at Khalkhin Gol.
• "I, Shapovalov T.P." ( , dir. Karelov E. E.) - the first part of the dilogy " High rank”, an episode in the film.
• “By the Ways of the Fathers” () is a television film by Irkutsk TV journalist Natalia Volina, dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.
• Khalkhin Gol. Unknown War ”() - a documentary film dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Khalkhin Gol River. The film uses a large number of chronicles, as well as comments by veterans participating in those events and historians.
• Volunteers
• My way (film, 2011)(Korean: 마이웨이) is a Korean film directed by Kang Jae-gyu, released in 2011. The film is based on the story of Korean Yang Kyongjon and Japanese Tatsuo Hasegawa, who were captured by the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol.

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which went from May 11 to September 16. In this collision...

Not everyone remembers that in 1939 the USSR won the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River, which went from May 11 to September 16. In this collision, he managed to show himself with better side Georgy Zhukov. The fights took place in Mongolia, near the border of the country of Manchukuo, which was created by the Japanese rulers, in the area where the Khalkhin Gol River flowed.

How it all started

From the very beginning of 1939, the Japanese carried out regular attacks on the border guards of Mongolia.

In the first days of May, the Japanese became especially active, and on the 11th the Japanese cavalry detachment advanced fifteen kilometers into the territory of Mongolia. Then the ground troops were supported by aviation.

The USSR and Mongolia signed a “Protocol of Mutual Assistance”, so on May 17, Soviet troops arrived to help their “younger brother”. Soon, even larger armed forces began to be pulled up, armored vehicles and aircraft arrived.

At first, an active air war was waged, which advanced with varying success, then a large-scale battle began on the ground.

Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol.

Fight on the ground

At first, Zhukov was sent to Mongolia only to inspect the military situation there. Some believe that Budyonny stood up for him. At the end of May, Zhukov reported that the commander of the corps, N. V. Feklenko, did not have sufficient military skills to lead this sector of the front. As a result, Feklenko was recalled, and Zhukov was appointed instead. This is how Stalin always acted - to those who criticized, they gave the opportunity to show themselves in action. This was a good moment for Zhukov.

The newly formed headquarters under the leadership of Zhukov decided to act according to the following scheme: to defend firmly on the territory beyond the Khalkhin Gol River and prepare a counterattack against the Japanese. This plan was able to be carried out in full measure, since these days there was a fight in the air, and there was a lull on the ground.

The Japanese, meanwhile, made their plans. By the end of June 1939, they decided to encircle and kill the troops of the Red Army on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, swim across the river and break the front line. In early July, the Japanese troops went on the offensive, crossed Khalkhin Gol, fortified on Mount Bayan-Tsagan forty kilometers from the border, Soviet troops had a hard time. Japanese troops strengthened their conquests more and more. Georgy Zhukov, taking responsibility for correcting

situation, sent a Soviet tank brigade to the fight with a division of Mongolian armored vehicles, although motorized rifles did not protect them. This group of troops justified the hopes of Georgy Konstantinovich. True, half of the armored division was lost, but the situation leveled off. Help arrived, the Japanese began to retreat. To prevent this, the Japanese military leaders ordered the last bridge over Khalkhin Gol to be blown up, but a general flight of Japanese soldiers began. The Japanese side lost thousands of people killed, almost all armored vehicles and artillery.

Yakovlev, Mikhail Pavlovich (November 18, 1903 - July 12, 1939), Hero Soviet Union posthumously.

Broken Soviet armored car BA-10.

On the east coast of Khalkhin Gol, Soviet forces retreated, reducing the occupied territory, but were not broken. For a complete victory over the Japanese, it was necessary to clear the eastern coast of them, to redefine the border. Zhukov planned the attack. The Japanese thought the same, but they were already afraid to swim across the river. They just wanted to defeat the Russians, removing them from the eastern shore.

The Soviet side attracted additional troops - rifle division, tankers, combat-ready men were mobilized in Transbaikalia, organizing two more divisions, from there they invited a border battalion, which was able to catch many scouts from the Japanese side.

The Russian troops numbered 57,000 fighters, they were equipped with more than 500 guns, more than 500 tanks, more than 300 armored vehicles and more than 500 aircraft. On the part of the Japanese, they were opposed by an army of 75,000 soldiers, about 500 guns, and almost 200 tanks.

Four days in early July, the battle for the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol continued, the Red Army did not budge. There were no battles for ten days, during which time the Russians fortified their positions, more motorized riflemen and machine gunners came to the rescue. On July 23 and 24, the Japanese went on the offensive, but could not do anything.

M. A. Bogdanov.

Komkor Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan.

Long-awaited victory

The troops of the Red Army were preparing for the main attack in secret, moving equipment only at night, radio conversations were only about defense, in the dark, radio stations transmitted recordings of the sounds of moving equipment and aircraft, so that the Japanese would dull their perception.

As a result, the Soviet attack at the end of August was a big surprise for the Japanese, who themselves wanted to attack only 4 days later. military operation according to the canons of the classics, where tanks and armored personnel carriers hit from the flanks in order to encircle the enemy and defeat them in the territory between the river and the official border of Mongolia. This is how our Red Army, led by Zhukov, acted even before the well-known blows of the Nazis in Poland and France. Attacked 3 groups: South - the main attack, North - auxiliary strike, Central group - the main battle.

At the beginning of the seventh morning, artillery and aviation set out, at 9 o'clock the infantry and tanks went. The most heated battle took place in the Central Department of the Front, where the enemy was very powerfully fortified. In the next two days, Zhukov connected the reserves - a motorized armored group, then in the Central sector - airborne troops and border guards. Aviation was very effective. The Japanese were unable to coordinate their actions in time and defend themselves well from the flanks. By August 26, 1939, the Red Army caught the Japanese troops in the "boiler".

Japanese fighters also fought very bravely, literally stood to death, did not go into captivity, but still could not get out of the encirclement.

In the first days of September, Japanese troops again tried to seize lands outside Mongolia, but were brutally defeated.

As a result, on September 15, 1939, the USSR, Mongolia and Japan signed an agreement to end the fighting near the Khalkhin Gol River. The final agreement was reached in 1942, it contained many concessions to Japan, since the USSR was at a disadvantage. But in 1945, all the lands given to Japan again passed to Mongolia.

Results:

Memorial "Zaisan", Ulaanbaatar.

• The fact that the USSR showed its strength during the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River was the reason Japan refused to clash with the Red Army and they began to expand their empire to the south. This is before the Great Patriotic War was very useful for the Soviet Union, since friendly Mongolia was in the rear.
• The battles at Khalkhin Gol contributed to the start of the dizzying military career of Georgy Zhukov.