The introduction of the surplus appraisal by the Bolsheviks. The historical essence of surplus appropriation. The main facts of the surplus appraisal

Prodrazvyorstka, food distribution- system of preparations of agricultural products. It consisted in the obligatory delivery by the peasants to the state at fixed prices of all surpluses (in excess of the established norms for personal and household needs) of bread and other products. It was used by the Soviet state during the period.

Reasons for the introduction

In 1918 the center Soviet Russia was cut off from the most important agricultural regions of the country. Stocks of bread ran out. The urban and poorest rural populations were starving. To meet the minimum requirements, the Soviet government was forced to introduce the strictest accounting of food surpluses, mainly from the prosperous part of the village, which sought to disrupt the state grain monopoly and preserve freedom of trade. In those conditions, the surplus appraisal was the only possible form of grain procurement.

The apportionment was the most accessible measure for an insufficiently organized state to hold out in an unheard of difficult war against the landowners.

Implementation

Surplus appropriation was carried out in the 2nd half of 1918 in the provinces: Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk and others.

By decree of the Council of People's Commissars from the surplus was introduced throughout the territory of Soviet Russia, later - in Ukraine and Belarus (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the decision of the People's Commissariat of Food of 1919 on the procedure for deploying state planning targets, they were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, yields, and stocks of previous years. In the provinces, the apportionment was carried out by counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. The collection of products was carried out by the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Food, food detachments with the active assistance of the committees and local Soviets. The surplus appraisal was an expression of the food dictatorship of the working class and the poorest peasantry.

Initially, the surplus appraisal extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-1920), it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920, almost all agricultural products. In 1918-1919. 107.9 million poods of grain and grain fodder were collected, in 1919-1920. 212.5 million pounds, in 1920-1921. 367 million pounds. The surplus allowed the Soviet state to solve the vital problem of planned food supply, urban workers, and the provision of raw materials for industry. Commodity-money relations narrowed with the increase in surplus-appropriation procurements (the free sale of bread and grain was prohibited). The surplus appraisal left its mark on all aspects of economic relations between the city and the countryside, becoming one of the most important elements of the "" system. With the end civil war the surplus appropriation no longer met the interests of socialist construction, hindered the restoration National economy hindered the growth of productive forces. IN agriculture sown areas were reduced, yields and gross harvests were reduced. The further preservation of the surplus appraisal caused dissatisfaction among the peasants, and in some areas, kulak-Socialist-Revolutionary revolts. With the transition of the Soviet country to

Transition to the NEP and the formation of the USSR

After October revolution, when most of the central departments stopped working, the Ministry of Food continued to conduct it, recognizing the food business as out of politics, and its local bodies adhered to the same opinion. At first, representatives of the Soviet government behaved more or less passively in relation to the existing bodies. However, as early as October 26 (November 8), 1917, the People's Commissariat for Food was established by decree on the basis of the Ministry of Food, whose duties were charged with the procurement and distribution of products and essentials on a national scale. According to the Decree of the 2nd Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies from the same date - until the meeting of the constituent assembly, - a nobleman, a professional revolutionary Ivan-Bronislav Adolfovich Teodorovich, who was deputy chairman of the Petrograd City Duma, became its head. But by mid-December, when he finally left the post of people's commissar, the results of his activities in the people's commissariat were equal to zero and the former structure of the Ministry actually functioned. The Council of People's Commissars appointed a professional revolutionary who did not have higher education A. G. Shlikhter, a supporter of strict administrative methods of work. He very quickly managed to turn both new and old food workers against him. During the meeting of the All-Russian Food Congress (end of November 1917), the Ministry of Food was occupied by representatives of the Soviet government, which caused the cessation of work by its employees. After that, a long process of forming a new structure of the central food authority began. Various combinations were formed and died off - up to dictatorship (Trotsky). This happened until February 1918, when the highest food power began to gradually concentrate in the hands of the food commissar. On November 28, 1917, Tsyurupa was appointed "comrade of the People's Commissar of Food", and on February 25, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved him as People's Commissar of Food. But by the spring of 1918, it became clear that the prolonged crisis of the central food authorities had led to the disorganization of the food authorities and their activities in the localities. This was expressed in ignoring the orders of the center and the actual introduction in each individual province and county of its own "norms" and "orders". The situation was aggravated by the rapidly depreciating money and the lack of consumer goods to support them.

Tsyurupa proposed to send stocks of manufactured goods, agricultural machinery and essentials in the amount of 1.162 million rubles to grain-growing regions. On March 25, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars approved Tsyurupa's report and provided him with the required resources. By the spring of 1918, the producing regions were either cut off or under the control of forces hostile to Soviet Russia. In the controlled regions, the owners of bread did not recognize the decisions of congresses and executive committees of the Soviets on restricting free sale and control measures, responding to attempts to account for and requisition surpluses by stopping the delivery of bread to cities and rural bazaars. Bread has become the strongest means of pressure on the authorities.

By the spring sowing, the state managed to get only 18% of the necessary seeds. They had to be taken with a fight.

The food situation inside the country became critical. The extreme conditions that prevailed in the country at the end of spring (1918) forced the Bolsheviks to resort to emergency measures to obtain grain. Food becomes the basis of the question of the continued existence of Soviet power. On May 9, a Decree is issued confirming the state monopoly of the grain trade (introduced by the provisional government) and prohibiting the private trade in bread.

On May 13, 1918, the decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On granting emergency powers to the People's Commissar of Food to combat the rural bourgeoisie, hiding grain stocks and speculating in them", established the main provisions of the food dictatorship. The goal of the food dictatorship was the centralized procurement and distribution of food, the suppression of the resistance of the kulaks and the fight against bagging. The People's Commissariat for Food received unlimited powers in the procurement of food. To develop plans for the distribution of essential products, the procurement of agricultural products and the exchange of goods, and for the coordination of organizations in charge of supply, a special advisory body, the Supply Council, is established under the Commissariat of Food. It consists of representatives of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, departments of consumer societies (Tsentrosoyuz). The People's Commissariat of Food is given the right to set prices for essentials (under the Agreement with the Supreme Council of National Economy). The Decree of May 27, which appeared as a follow-up to the Decree of May 9, outlined some reorganization of the local food authorities. The decree, while maintaining the county, provincial, regional, city and volost, rural and factory food committees, charges them with the steady implementation of the grain monopoly, the execution of commissariat orders and the distribution of basic necessities.

The Soviet government to a large extent carried out the reforms outlined by the Ministry of the Provisional Government. It strengthened the sole power of the commissars in the food organization and removed the volost bodies from procurement. It introduced representatives of the consuming regions and the center into the membership of the food detachments of the producing regions. The adopted decrees did not contain instructions regarding the rights and powers of local bodies - that in the new conditions, in fact, a freeing of hands for local representatives and arbitrariness from below. This arbitrariness actually turns into a real armed struggle for bread, ideologically motivated as one of the forms of the class struggle of the workers and the poor for bread. The weak supply of grain is presented as a certain policy of the "village kulaks and the rich." The answer to "the violence of the owners of bread against the starving poor must be violence against the bourgeoisie." The decree of May 9 declared all those who had a surplus of grain and did not declare it within a week as "enemies of the people", who were subject to a revolutionary court and imprisonment for at least 10 years, free requisition of bread, confiscation of property. For those who denounced such "enemies of the people", they were entitled to half the cost of bread not declared for delivery. The logical consequence of the decree of May 9 was the appearance of the Decree on July 11 "On the organization of the rural poor" - according to it, "volost and village committees of the rural poor are being established everywhere", one of the two tasks of which is "to assist local food authorities in the removal of grain surpluses from the hands of the kulaks and the rich." As an encouragement for the work of the committees, from the surplus seized before July 15, the distribution of bread to the poor is free of charge, between July 15 and August 15 - at half the price, and in the second half of August - with a 20% discount from the fixed price. For the success of the struggle for grain, in accordance with the decree of May 27, food detachments of workers' organizations are organized. On August 6, a decree was issued on the organization of special harvesting and harvesting-requisition detachments. Each such detachment must consist of at least 75 people and have 2-3 machine guns. With their help, the Soviet government planned to ensure the harvest of winter crops sown by kulaks and landowners in the fall of 1917. The effectiveness of these measures was very low.

In connection with the introduction of the food dictatorship in May-June 1918, the Food and Requisition Army of the People's Commissariat of Food of the RSFSR (Prodarmiya, consisting of armed food detachments) was created. To manage the Prodarmia, on May 20, 1918, the Office of the Chief Commissar and the military leader of all food detachments was created under the People's Commissariat of Food.

Despite this, the grain receipts were very low and were given with a lot of blood. One and a half most difficult months before the new harvest of 1918, the workers produced a little more than 2 million poods of grain, paying for it with the lives of more than 4,100 communists, workers and the poor.

The village, flooded with soldiers returning from the front, responded to armed violence with armed resistance and a whole series of uprisings.

Significant attention was also paid to agitation - a form of influence on producers, also begun during the Provisional Government. A network of courses for food agitators has been set up both in the center and locally under the food agencies in the provinces. The Izvestia of the People's Commissariat of Food, Bulletin of the People's Commissariat of Food, and Handbook of the Food Worker are regularly published. "Memorial book of the food worker" and a number of other propaganda and reference publications.

Despite this, the procurement in May 1918 fell 10 times compared with April of the same year.

The civil war forced emergency measures. On July 1, the People's Commissariat of Food orders by decree the local food authorities to take account of bread and set deadlines for surpluses in accordance with the norms for leaving bread with the owners (dated March 25, 1917), but no more than until August 1, 1918.

On July 27, 1918, the People's Commissariat for Food adopted a special resolution on the introduction of a widespread class food ration divided into four categories, providing for measures to account for stocks and distribute food.

The resolution of August 21 determined the size of the surplus for the new crop of 1918, based on the same norms of March 1917 for seed grain, for food the norms were reduced to 12 pounds of grain or flour and 3 pounds of cereals. Above the norms for each household up to 5 eaters - 5 pounds, over 5 eaters +1 pood for each. Livestock rations have also been reduced. As before, these norms could be lowered by the decision of local organizations.

The food authorities, the People's Commissariat for Food and personally Tsyurupa were given emergency powers to supply the country with bread and other products. Relying on the personnel core of the People's Commissariat and old, experienced food workers, Tsyurupa puts into practice the surplus appropriation developed by the tsarist minister Rittich and the law on the grain monopoly passed by the Cadet Shingarev.

In 1918, the harsh measures recommended by Lenin for the collection of grain did not become widespread. The People's Commissariat for Food was looking for more flexible methods of its withdrawal, which would less embitter the peasants and could give the maximum result. As an experiment, in a number of provinces, a system of agreements, contracts between food authorities and peasants through the Soviets and committees on the voluntary delivery of grain by them with payment for part of it in goods, began to be used. The experiment was first tested in the summer in the Vyatka province by A. G. Schlikhter. In September, he applied it in the Efremov district of the Tula province, achieving a significant result in those conditions. Previously, in the Efremov district, food workers could not feed their workers and the poor even with the help of emergency commissars and military force.

Schlichter's work experience showed that it was possible to reach an agreement with the peasants provided that they were attentive to their needs, understood their psychology, and respected their work. Trust in the peasants, a joint discussion with them of the difficult question of determining surpluses, firmly pursuing one's line without threats and arbitrariness, fulfilling the promises made, helping them as much as possible - all this met with understanding among the peasants, brought them closer to participating in solving the nation's cause. Clarification, help, business control were most valued by the peasants.

The contractual-razvyorstochny method gave a guaranteed collection of bread. It was partially practiced in other provinces - Penza, Kaluga, Pskov, Simbirsk. However, in the Kazan province, the use of agreements with peasants yielded only 18% of the collection of surpluses. Here, in the organization of the apportionment, a serious violation of the class principle was committed - taxation was carried out in an equalizing manner.

Low grain receipts, even with the beginning of the harvest, led to famine in industrial centers. To alleviate hunger among the workers of Moscow and Petrograd, the government went on a temporary violation of the grain monopoly, allowing them, according to the certificates of enterprises, to purchase at free prices and transport one and a half pounds of bread privately for five weeks - from August 24 to October 1, 1918. Permission to transport one and a half pounds took advantage of 70% of the population of Petrograd, having bought or exchanged for things 1,043,500 pounds of bread

Nevertheless, the fulfillment of procurement plans was extremely low (the Provisional Government planned to harvest 440 million pounds in 1918), and the methods of "unlimited" grain procurements on the ground, in many cases looking like robbery and banditry, caused active opposition from the peasantry, which developed into armed uprisings in a number of places. who bore anti-Bolshevik overtones.

By the autumn of 1918, the territory of the former Russian Empire under the control of the Bolshevik Soviets amounted to no more than 1/4 of its original size. Before the end of the large-scale operations of the Civil War, various territories of the former Russian Empire changed hands and were controlled by forces of various directions - from monarchists to anarchists. These regimes, in the case of more or less long-term control over the territory, also formed their own food policy.

Ukraine. On July 15, 1918, the government of Hetman Skoropadsky adopted a law “On the transfer of grain from the 1918 harvest to the disposal of the state”, which introduced a grain monopoly regime in the controlled territory. To fulfill obligations to the Austro-Hungarian troops, who essentially controlled this territory, it was necessary to collect 60 million poods of grain. The law assumed the same mechanisms for its implementation as the Law of the Provisional Government - the mandatory delivery of all agricultural products, with the exception of the norms established by the government. For refusal to surrender, requisition was also assumed. These norms, as well as the practice of their implementation on the ground with the participation of units of the Austro-Hungarian army, caused active resistance from the peasants. In addition, detachments hired by the former landowners were operating in the regions, engaged in "withdrawal of compensation" for the land and other property dismantled by the peasants under the Bolsheviks.

At the beginning of 1919, the Petlyura government made similar attempts to monopolize the market for bread and other food products and distribute them. It is worth noting that these attempts did not have a significant scale, because the territory controlled by the Petliura government was small.

Other armed formations that ruled various parts of the country, in most cases, were limited to "routine food seizures" - in fact, armed robberies.

Prodrazvyorstka under Soviet power.

The surplus appraisal was again introduced by the Bolsheviks during the Civil War on January 11, 1919. (Decree on the introduction of food surplus for bread) and became part of the Soviet policy of "war communism".

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 11, 1919 announced the introduction of surplus appropriation throughout the territory of Soviet Russia, but in reality, surplus appraisal was carried out at first only in the central provinces controlled by the Bolsheviks: in Tula, Vyatka, Kaluga, Vitebsk, etc. Only as the control of the Bolsheviks spread over the rest of the territories later surplus appropriation was carried out in the Ukraine (beginning of April 1919), Belorussia (1919), Turkestan and Siberia (1920). In accordance with the resolution of the People's Commissariat for Food of January 13, 1919, on the procedure for deploying state planning targets, they were calculated on the basis of provincial data on the size of sown areas, productivity, and stocks of previous years. In the provinces, the apportionment was carried out by counties, volosts, villages, and then between individual peasant farms. Only in 1919 did improvements become noticeable in the efficiency of the state food apparatus. The collection of products was carried out by the organs of the People's Commissariat of Food, food detachments with the active assistance of the committees (until the termination of their existence in early 1919) and local Soviets.

Initially, the surplus appraisal extended to bread and grain fodder. During the procurement campaign (1919-20) it also covered potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920 almost all agricultural products.

Food was confiscated from the peasants virtually free of charge, since the banknotes that were offered as payment were almost completely depreciated, and the state could not offer industrial goods in return for the seized grain due to the fall in industrial production during the war and intervention.

In addition, when determining the size of the distribution, they often proceeded not from the actual food surpluses of the peasants, but from the food needs of the army and the urban population, therefore, not only the available surpluses, but very often the entire seed fund and agricultural products needed to feed the peasant himself, were confiscated on the ground.

The dissatisfaction and resistance of the peasants during the seizure of products was suppressed by the armed detachments of the committees of the poor, as well as by the special forces of the Red Army (CHON) and detachments of the Prodarmia.

After suppressing the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus appropriation, the Soviet authorities had to face passive resistance: the peasants hid bread, refused to accept money that had lost its purchasing power, reduced the area under crops and production so as not to create useless surpluses for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family.

As a result of surplus appropriation, 832,309 tons of grain were collected for the procurement campaign of 1916-1917; before the October Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government collected 280 million poods (out of 720 planned) in the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (1.08.1918-1.08.1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (08/01/1919-08/01/1920) - 35 million centners; 3rd year (1.08.1920-1.08.1921) - 46.7 million centners.

Annual data on grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 - 1,767,780 tons; 1919/1920 - 3,480,200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6,011,730 tons.

Despite the fact that the surplus appropriation allowed the Bolsheviks to solve the vital problem of supplying food to the Red Army and the urban proletariat, due to the ban on the free sale of bread and grain, commodity-money relations were significantly reduced, which began to slow down the post-war recovery of the economy, and sowing began to decline in agriculture. area, productivity and gross harvest. This was due to the lack of interest of the peasants to produce products that were practically taken away from them. In addition, the surplus appraisal in the RSFSR caused strong discontent among the peasantry and their armed rebellions. A crop failure in 1920 in the Volga region and the central regions of the RSFSR, against the backdrop of a lack of reserves both among the peasants and the government, led to a new food crisis at the beginning of 1921.

In connection with the transition from war communism to the NEP, on March 21, 1921, the surplus appropriation was replaced by a tax in kind, thus having existed in the most critical years of the Civil War period.

V.I. Lenin explained the existence of the surplus appropriation and the reasons for abandoning it this way: Tax in kind is one of the forms of transition from a kind of "war communism", forced by extreme poverty, ruin and war, to the correct socialist product exchange. And this latter, in turn, is one of the forms of transition from socialism, with its peculiarities caused by the predominance of the small peasantry in the population, to communism.

A kind of "war communism" consisted in the fact that we actually took from the peasants all the surpluses and sometimes even not surpluses, but part of the food necessary for the peasant, took it to cover the costs of the army and the maintenance of the workers. They took mostly on credit, for paper money. Otherwise, we could not defeat the landowners and capitalists in a devastated small-peasant country ...

But it is no less necessary to know the real measure of this merit. "War Communism" was forced by war and ruin. It was not and could not be a policy meeting the economic tasks of the proletariat. It was a temporary measure. The correct policy of the proletariat, exercising its dictatorship in a small-peasant country, is the exchange of grain for industrial products needed by the peasant. Only such a food policy meets the tasks of the proletariat, only it can strengthen the foundations of socialism and lead to its complete victory.

The tax in kind is a transition to it. We are still so ruined, so crushed by the yoke of war (which was yesterday and which may break out tomorrow thanks to the greed and malice of the capitalists) that we cannot give the peasant for all the bread we need the products of industry. Knowing this, we introduce a tax in kind, i.e. the minimum necessary (for the army and for workers).

Prodrazverstka is traditionally associated with the first years of Soviet power and the emergency conditions of the Civil War, but in Russia it appeared under the imperial government long before the Bolsheviks.

"Wheat and flour crisis"

With the outbreak of the First World War in Russia, essential necessities rose in price, the prices for which by 1916 had increased two to three times. The governors' ban on the export of food from the provinces, the introduction of fixed prices, the distribution of cards and purchases by local authorities did not improve the situation. Cities suffered severely from food shortages and high prices. The essence of the crisis was clearly presented in the memorandum of the Voronezh Stock Exchange Committee to the meeting at the Moscow Stock Exchange in September 1916. She stated that market relations had penetrated the countryside. The peasantry was able to sell less important items of production for a higher price and at the same time hold back bread for a rainy day due to the uncertainty of the outcome of the war and increasing mobilizations. At the same time, the urban population suffered. "We consider it necessary to turn Special attention to the fact that the wheat and flour crisis would have come much earlier if trade and industry had not had some untouchable stock of wheat in the form of another cargo lying at railway stations, waiting for loading since 1915 and even since 1914, at the disposal of trade and industry, - wrote the stockbrokers, - and if the Ministry of Agriculture had not released wheat from its stock in 1916 to mills ... and destined in a timely manner not for the population's food, but for other purposes. "The note firmly expressed confidence that the solution to the crisis that threatened the entire country, can only be found in a complete change in the economic policy of the country and the mobilization of the national economy.Such plans have been repeatedly expressed by various public and government organizations. The situation required radical economic centralization and the involvement of all public organizations in the work.

The introduction of the surplus

However, at the end of 1916, the authorities, not daring to change, limited themselves to a plan of mass requisition of grain. The free purchase of bread was replaced by a surplus appraisal between producers. The size of the outfit was set by the chairman of the special meeting in accordance with the harvest and the size of the reserves, as well as the consumption norms of the province. Responsibility for the collection of grain was assigned to the provincial and district zemstvo councils. Through local surveys, it was necessary to find out the required amount of bread, subtract it from the general attire for the county, and distribute the remainder between the volosts, which were supposed to bring the amount of the attire to each rural community. The councils were supposed to distribute outfits among counties by December 14, by December 20 to develop outfits for volosts, by December 24, for rural communities, and, finally, by December 31, every householder had to know about his outfit. The confiscation was assigned to the zemstvo bodies together with the food procurement commissioners.

Having received the circular, the Voronezh provincial government convened on December 6-7, 1916, a meeting of the chairmen of the zemstvo councils, at which a layout scheme was developed and outfits for counties were calculated. The council was instructed to develop schemes and volost apportionments. At the same time, the question of the unfeasibility of the outfit was raised. According to a telegram from the Ministry of Agriculture, an allotment of 46,951 thousand poods was imposed on the province: 36,470 thousand rye, 3,882 thousand wheat, 2,43 thousand millet, and 4,169 thousand oats. I present to you now to increase the quantity of grains assigned by clause 1m in the allocation, and in the event of an increase of not less than 10%, I undertake by no means to include your province in a possible additional allocation. This meant that the plan was raised to 51 million poods.

The calculations carried out by the zemstvos showed that the full implementation of the apportionment was associated with the seizure of almost all grain from the peasants: at that time only 1.79 million poods of rye remained in the province, and wheat was threatened with a deficit of 5 million. This amount could hardly be enough for consumption and new sowing bread, not to mention the feeding of livestock, which in the province, according to a rough estimate, there were more than 1.3 million heads. Zemstvos noted: “In record years, the province gave 30 million throughout the year, and now it is planned to take 50 million within 8 months, moreover, in a year with a crop below average and on the condition that the population, not confident in sowing and harvesting the future harvest, can't help but strive to stock up." Considering that on railway 20% of the wagons were missing, and this problem was not solved in any way, the meeting considered: "All these considerations lead to the conclusion that the collection of the above amount of grain is in fact impossible." The zemstvo noted that the ministry had calculated the apportionment, obviously not based on the statistical data presented to it. Of course, this was not an accidental bad luck of the province - such a rough calculation, not taking into account the real state of affairs, concerned the whole country. As it was found out from a survey of the Union of Cities in January 1917: "the distribution of grain was carried out in the provinces for no one knows what, sometimes inconsistently, placing on some provinces a completely unbearable burden for them." This alone indicated that the plan would fail. At the December meeting in Kharkov, the head of the provincial council V.N. Tomanovsky tried to prove this to the Minister of Agriculture A.A. Rittikh, to which he replied: “Yes, all this may be true, but such an amount of grain is needed for the army and for factories working for defense, since this apportionment covers exclusively these two needs ... this must be given and we must give it obliged."

The meeting also informed the ministry that "the administrations have neither material resources nor means of influencing those who do not want to obey the conditions of the apportionment", so the meeting requested to give them the right to open bulk points and requisition premises for them. In addition, in order to save fodder for the army, the meeting asked to cancel the provincial outfits for cake. These considerations were sent to the authorities, but had no effect. As a result, the allocation was distributed by the Voronezh residents, and even with the recommended increase of 10%.

The deployment will be done!

The Voronezh provincial zemstvo assembly, due to the busyness of the chairmen of the district councils who were engaged in the collection of bread in the villages, was postponed from January 15, 1917 to February 5, and then to February 26. But even this date the quorum did not take place - instead of 30 people. 18 gathered. 10 people sent a telegram that they could not come to the congress. Chairman of the Zemstvo Assembly A.I. Alekhin was forced to ask those who came not to leave Voronezh, hoping that a quorum would be gathered. It was only at the meeting on March 1 that it was decided "immediately" to start collecting. This meeting also behaved ambivalently. After an exchange of views on the proposal of the representative of the Valuysky district, S.A. The Blinov Assembly drafted a resolution to report to the government, in which it actually recognized its requirements as unrealistic: “The size of the outfit given to the Voronezh province is without a doubt excessively exaggerated and practically unfeasible ... since its implementation in full should have led to the removal of all bread without a trace. The meeting again pointed out the lack of fuel for grinding bread, bread bags, the collapse of the railway. However, the references to all these obstacles ended with the fact that the assembly, having submitted to the supreme authority, promised that "by the common friendly efforts of the population and its representatives - in the person of the zemstvo leaders" the apportionment would be carried out. Thus, contrary to the facts, those "extremely resolute, optimistic statements of the official and officious press" were supported, which, according to contemporaries, accompanied the campaign.

Chairman of the Voronezh Zemstvo District Assembly A.I. Alekhine. Photo: Rodina/provided by the author

However, it is difficult to say how real the Zemstvos' assurances about the seizure of "all grain without a trace" were in the event of a complete implementation of the apportionment. It was no secret to anyone that there was bread in the province. But its exact amount was unknown - as a result, the Zemstvos were forced to derive figures from the data of the agricultural census, consumption and sowing rates, farm productivity, etc. At the same time, the bread of previous harvests was not taken into account, since, according to the councils, it had already gone for consumption. Although this opinion seems debatable, given that many contemporaries mention the grain reserves of the peasants and the markedly increased level of their well-being during the war, other facts confirm that there was a clear shortage of bread in the countryside. The city shops of Voronezh were regularly besieged by poor peasants from the suburbs and even other volosts. In the Korotoyaksky district, according to reports, the peasants said: "We ourselves can barely get bread, but the gentlemen of the landowners have a lot of bread and a lot of cattle, but their cattle were requisitioned little, and therefore both bread and cattle should be requisitioned more." Even the most prosperous Valuysky uyezd provided for itself largely through the delivery of grain from the Kharkov and Kursk provinces. When deliveries from there were banned, the situation in the county deteriorated noticeably. Obviously, the point is the social stratification of the village, in which the poor of the village suffered no less than the poor of the city. In any case, the implementation of the government plan for distribution was impossible: there was no organized apparatus for collecting and accounting for bread, the distribution was arbitrary, there was not enough material base to collect and store grain, the railway crisis was not resolved. Moreover, the surplus appropriation, aimed at supplying the army and factories, did not solve the problem of supplying cities, which, with a decrease in grain supplies in the province, was only to become aggravated.

According to the plan, in January 1917 the province was to hand over 13.45 million poods of grain: of which 10 million poods of rye, 1.25 - wheat, 1.4 - oats, 0.8 - millet; the same amount was supposed to be prepared in February. To collect grain, the provincial zemstvo organized 120 bulking points, 10 per county, located 50-60 miles from each other, and most of them were supposed to open in February. Difficulties began already during the apportionment: Zadonsky district took over only part of the order (instead of 2.5 million poods of rye - 0.7 million, and instead of 422 thousand poods of millet - 188), and of in February, only 0.5 million was allocated. The distribution of the attire by the volosts was released from the control of the administrations due to the lack of reliable communication with the villages, so the matter dragged on there.

"A whole number of volosts completely refuses ... apportionment"

Already during the period of preparations, the zemstvos were skeptical about their result: “At least, the reports that have already arrived from some counties convince of this, firstly, that whole line volosts completely refuses any kind of apportionment, and, secondly, that even in those volosts where the apportionment was carried out by volost meetings completely - later, during the settlement and household appraisal, it turns out that it is impossible to carry it out. "The sale went unimportantly. Even in Valuysky uyezd, which was subject to the smallest apportionment, and the population was in the very best position, things were going badly - many peasants assured that they did not have so much bread. Where there was bread, speculation dictated the laws. In one village, the peasants agreed to sell wheat at a price of 1.9 rubles. per pood, but soon tacitly refused this: “It then happened that those who responded to the proposal of the authorities had not yet had time to receive money for the delivered bread, when they heard that the fixed price for wheat had risen from 1 ruble 40 kopecks to 2 rubles 50 kopecks "Thus, the more patriotic peasants will receive less for their grain than those who have kept it in. The conviction now reigns among the peasants that the longer they hold back grain, the more the government will increase fixed prices, and the zemstvo chiefs do not need believe, because they only deceive the people."

M.D. Ershov, in 1915-1917. and about. governor Voronezh province. Photo: Rodina/provided by the author

The procurement campaign was not supported by real means of implementation. The government tried to overcome this with threats. On February 24, Rittikh sent a telegram to Voronezh, in which he ordered, first of all, to proceed with the requisition of grain in the villages, most stubbornly unwilling to carry out the apportionment. At the same time, it was necessary to leave one pood of grain per capita on the farm until the harvest of a new crop, but no later than the first of September, as well as for the spring seeding of fields according to the norms established by the zemstvo council and for feeding livestock - according to the norms established by the authorized (even this manifested itself inconsistency). Governor M.D. Ershov, fulfilling the requirements of the authorities, on the same day sent telegrams to the county zemstvo councils, in which he demanded that they immediately start deliveries of bread. If the delivery does not begin within three days, the authorities were instructed to proceed with requisitions "with a decrease in the fixed price by 15 percent and, in the event of the grain not being delivered by the owners to the receiving point, with a deduction in addition to the cost of transportation." The government has not provided any specific directives for the implementation of these instructions. Meanwhile, such actions required providing them with an extensive network of executive apparatus, which the zemstvos did not have. It is not surprising that they, for their part, did not try to be zealous in carrying out an obviously hopeless enterprise. Ershov's order of December 6 to provide the police with "every possible assistance" in the collection of grain did not help much. V.N. Tomanovsky, usually very strict about state interests, took a moderate tone at a meeting on March 1: “From my point of view, we need to collect grain as much as possible, without resorting to any drastic measures, this will be some plus to the amount of stocks It is possible that the traffic of the railway will improve, there will be more cars ... to take drastic measures in the sense that "come on, carry it, by all means" would seem inappropriate.

"The apportionment undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed"

M.V. Rodzianko wrote to the emperor just before the revolution: “The apportionment undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture definitely failed. Here are the figures characterizing the course of the latter. It was supposed to allocate 772 million pounds. That is, 129 million poods less than expected, 2) by uyezd zemstvos 228 million poods, and, finally, 3) by volosts only 4 million poods. These figures indicate the complete collapse of the apportionment ... ".

Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko was forced to state that the surplus appraisal initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture had failed. Photo: Bibliotheque nationale de France

By the end of February 1917, the province not only failed to fulfill the plan, but also failed to deliver 20 million poods of grain. The collected bread, as was obvious from the very beginning, could not be taken out. As a result, 5.5 million poods of grain accumulated on the railway, which the district committee undertook to take out no earlier than in two and a half months. There were no wagons for unloading, no fuel for locomotives. It was impossible even to transport flour to dryers or grain for grinding, since the committee did not deal with domestic flights. And there was also no fuel for the mills, which is why many of them were idle or were preparing to stop working. The last attempt of the autocracy to solve the food problem failed due to the inability and unwillingness to solve the complex of real economic problems in the country and the lack of state centralization of economic management necessary in military conditions.

This problem was inherited by the Provisional Government, which followed the old path. Already after the revolution, at a meeting of the Voronezh Food Committee on May 12, Minister of Agriculture A.I. Shingarev stated that the province was short of 17 out of 30 million poods of grain: "It is necessary to decide: how right is the central administration ... and how successful will the execution of the order be, and can there be a significant excess of the order?" This time, the members of the council, obviously falling into the optimism of the first revolutionary months, assured the minister that "the mood of the population had already been determined in terms of the delivery of grain" and "with the active participation" of the food agencies, the order would be fulfilled. In July 1917, the orders were completed by 47%, in August - by 17%. There is no reason to suspect the local figures loyal to the revolution of lack of zeal. But the future showed that this time, too, the Zemstvo promise was not fulfilled. The objectively prevailing situation in the country - the exit of the economy from state control and the inability to regulate processes in the countryside - put an end to the well-intentioned efforts of local authorities.

Notes
1. Voronezh telegraph. 1916. N 221. October 11.
2. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly of the regular session of 1916 (February 28 - March 4, 1917). Voronezh, 1917. L. 34-34v.
3. State Archive Voronezh region(GAVO). F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 23v.-25.
4. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 43v.
5. Sidorov A.L. The economic situation in Russia during the First World War. M., 1973. S. 489.
6. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2225. L. 14v.
7. Journals of the Voronezh Provincial Zemstvo Assembly. L. 35, 44-44v.
8. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. No. 46. February 28.
9. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. No. 49. March 3.
10. Sidorov A.L. Decree. op. S. 493.
11. Popov P.A. City government of Voronezh. 1870-1918. Voronezh, 2006. P. 315.
12. GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 1. D. 1249. L.7
13. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. No. 39. February 19.
14. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. N 8. January 11.
15. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. No. 28. February 4.
16. GAVO. F. I-21. Op.1. D. 2323. L. 23v.-25.
17. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. N 17. January 21.
18. GAVO. F. I-1. Op. 2. D. 1138. L. 419.
19. GAVO. F. I-6. Op. 1. D. 2084. L. 95-97.
20. GAVO. F. I-6. Op.1. D. 2084. L. 9.
21. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 15v.
22. Note by M.V. Rodzyanki // Red archive. 1925. T. 3. S. 69.
23. Bulletin of the Voronezh district zemstvo. 1917. No. 8. February 24.
24. GAVO. F. I-21. Op. 1. D. 2323. L. 15.
25. Bulletin of the Voronezh provincial food committee. 1917. N 1. June 16.
26. Voronezh telegraph. 1917. N 197. September 13.

Such a phenomenon as the food appropriation, also known under the abbreviated name of the surplus appraisal, took place in Russia in the period from 1919 to 1921. At this time, the government decided to establish certain norms for bread and other products that the peasants could store, and they had to sell all the surplus to the state at minimum prices. Food brigades and regional councils took part in the surplus appropriation, forcibly forcing the peasants to hand over their stocks.

Impact on the population

The introduction of surplus appropriation further exacerbated the already difficult situation of the ordinary population. The norms for the delivery of bread, which were distributed or allocated as a tribute, very often exceeded the actual reserves of the inhabitants.

Many peasants attempted to hide their products, but the food detachments quickly found everything and even punished the malicious "concealers".

Surplus appraisal results

Already during the first year of the food terror and the beginning of food distribution, about 44.6 million poods of grain were purchased from the population. The second year marked a serious increase in indicators and brought the state 113.9 million pounds. The sharp increase in indicators was provoked by the invasion of whites, since part of the ordinary population agreed to support the communists in order to avoid the victory of enemy forces. Therefore, in November 1917 alone, about 33.7 million poods were handed over, but this became possible only thanks to the Provisional Government's food reserves apparatus, which was then functioning, with the help of which the surplus was carried out.

This phenomenon, the purpose of which was to provide the armed forces, had a number of disadvantages. The main problem here was poor organization, due to which a large part of the collected stocks never reached their destinations on time, but simply deteriorated from time to time. For the needs of the army, 60% of meat and fish, 100% of tobacco and 40% of bread, which were collected according to the surplus appropriation, were used. The peasants and ordinary workers were forced to starve, while the food taken from them, reaching the big cities, was very often stolen and divided into rations.

What was the surplus for?

The definition of limits for the amount of products of the peasants made it possible to keep workers and employees at least half-starved. The soldiers were a little more lucky, and the state leadership was on the best conditions, which was provided with regular meals. The surplus appropriation became the reason for the lack of desire among the peasants to work, since the entire crop was taken away from them anyway. This was one of the main factors that led to the complete ruin of agriculture by 1921. Mass uprisings of peasants began throughout the country, demanding the abolition of such procedures.

During this period, the surplus appropriation was replaced by a tax in kind, which was the first and most important step for

Advantages and disadvantages

Despite the fact that this process was able to relatively stabilize the food situation in the country, it also brought many negative consequences. Officially, the surplus appraisal was introduced on January 11, 1919, in a very difficult period for the Soviet government, when the country needed support.

By official version, the peasants had to hand over the surplus of their products, which exceeded the norms established by the government, but did the surplus take place? It is quite difficult to establish now, almost a century later, but still some authentic information has been preserved. Sometimes ordinary peasants were also taken away from what was supposed to remain for the personal needs of the population, and the money they were supposed to receive was replaced by various kinds of receipts for which nothing could be purchased. This led to bloodshed, arrests and uprisings. Therefore, from a historical point of view, this is a twofold process.

Data

The first stages of surplus appropriation in a slowly collapsing Russian Empire began in December 1916. But this, like many other undertakings of the government, only contributed to the imminent collapse of the state.
which also resorted to food revisions, was able to succeed in replenishing food stocks, collecting 280 million poods of grain out of a planned 650.

Prodrazverstka, officially introduced at the beginning of 1919, became part of the Bolsheviks' food terror during which it took place during the time of "war communism".
For the Bolsheviks, the surplus appraisal (this has been officially proven) was rather difficult. Its implementation was initially impossible in some territories, so it was carried out only in the central region of the country.
Initially, the surplus appraisal applied exclusively to grain, but at the end of 1920, measures were already applied to all existing agricultural products.
Initially, the peasants were going to be paid for the collected products, but the delivery of goods turned out to be practically free of charge, because the money was depreciated, and the industry was in complete decline - there was nothing to change for.

Naturally, the peasants did not always agree to voluntarily part with their belongings, so there were special armed detachments, committees of the poor and Red Army units.
When the peasants no longer had the desire or the ability to resist the measures of the government, they began to hide food and grow bread no more than the norm.
Even taking into account that the food dictatorship led to the deprivation of the peasants, there is no doubt that only the surplus appropriation could feed the army. This phenomenon also helped to save the urban proletariat.
Between 1918 and 1920, the head of the Russian food detachment was a communist who later became a member. It was Roland Freisler.

Outcome

The phenomenon of food distribution, like many other initiatives introduced by the Bolsheviks, had both a number of advantages and many shortcomings. Although this process helped provide the military with the necessary products, most of the goods simply disappeared, although they were taken from the people who needed them - this is how the surplus was actually carried out. The year when it began was the beginning of stability and the beginning of everything that would lead to a serious crisis in the future.

Today I would like to analyze in detail one more "argument" in the galaxy of Soviet "criticism" of the Russian Empire, namely, the rulade about surplus appropriation. More than once or twice, in disputes about the enormity of the Soviet surplus appraisal of the period of military communism, users with Soviet-colored avtars with foam at the mouth and anger in their voice gloomily state - uh, father liberal / monarchist / socialist-traitor, and after all, the surplus appraisal was introduced in 1916 by BATYUSHKA- TSAR. Thus, as if making it clear that Lenin and the people's commissars simply took and continued the fierce tradition of backward tsarism, that is, it’s not particularly worth worrying about the cruelty of the Bolshevik requisition, the tsar nightmared the unfortunate peasants, and now Lenin will also have a nightmare with the same methods (war communism), but Lenin has an important justification - the tsar did this to win the imperialist war, and Comrade Lenin forced the people to endure for a brighter future and DneproGES in the future. Our comrades urge us to think broader and shorter.

The thing is that the essence of this propaganda lie lies in a simple, it would seem, forgery - Soviet patriots, as it were, take it for granted that fact and we are forced to believe that the tsarist and Leninist apportionment (like hunger, like repressions on political line) were identical or at least remotely similar.

These maxims are an obvious lie and hypocrisy.

I. Imperial surplus.
The tsarist surplus differed in all systemic criteria (I singled out the three most common ones, there are many more) from Lenin's, about the same as modern Norway differs from Eastern Congo or Somalia.

I'll try to show you why.

There are three main systemic differences.

There were also procedural and quantitative differences, which, in view of the review nature of the essay, I will not dwell on.

1. The tsarist allocation included only bread, and the Soviet one included almost all food products.
At first, in the young Soviet state, bread and grain were taken away. Then, from 1919, potatoes, meat, and by the end of 1920, almost all agricultural products.

2. Food was confiscated during the councils from the peasants practically free of charge. Under the tsar, bread was bought from the peasants for real money, and not for depreciated paper money, and transportation to the station was paid, as a stimulus measure at the suggestion of Rittich, at the expense of the Ministry of Agriculture.

The leading motive in the policy of the Ministry of Agriculture was the desire not to infringe on the parallel free purchase. This, in the end, led to the failure of this enterprise, which required the readiness for self-sacrifice of the masses of producers - which was not there - or the use of requisitions - which Rittich and the government did not agree to. Damned satraps, pests and spies of the German General Staff.

As a result of the surplus, 832309 tons of grain were collected in the procurement campaign of 1916-1917 (Kondratyev N.D. The market for bread and its regulation during the war and revolution. - M .: Nauka, 1991). For comparison - for the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (1/VIII 1918-1/VIII 1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (1/VIII 1919-1/VIII 1920) - 35 million centners 3rd year (1/VIII 1920-1/VIII 1921) - 46.7 million centners

3. The royal layout was voluntary(!) - this is perhaps the most significant difference that eludes many Soviet patriots.

There are several proofs of this. First of all, the report of the Minister of Agriculture Rittich in the Duma in February 1917.

The minister emphasizes (!) the absence of coercive measures in the case of surplus appropriations (!). And for some reason, none of the deputies cut him off and accused him of violence against the peasants - and this despite the fact that in the tsarist Duma everyone who was not extremely right was in opposition to the government and no one ever missed the opportunity to kick this government.

For those who wish, here is the text of the report of the Minister of Agriculture Alexander Rittich at the 19th meeting of the State Duma on February 14, 1917. The minister, IMHO, speaks from a purely literary and rhetorical point of view more beautiful and more fluent than Kudrin, Gref, Gryzlov or the Soviet people's commissars before them, so you can read it.

A.A. On February 17, 1917, Rittich spoke in the State Duma with a detailed justification for surplus allocation as a means of solving food problems, pointing out that, as a result of political bargaining, fixed prices for the purchase of products by the state were set in September 1916 somewhat lower than market prices, which immediately significantly reduced delivery of bread to the centers of transportation and grinding. He also pointed out the need for the voluntariness of the surplus appraisal:

In general, gentlemen, I have come to the conclusion that the question of fixed prices in its decision requires both timeliness and the greatest caution. After all, fixed prices - this, gentlemen, is the most serious interference of state power in the sphere of private law relations, interference, however serious it may be, is inevitable, however, in a protracted war. But, gentlemen, when the government, when the state power intervenes in private law relations, have you not noticed that absolutely all the laws of the world, of all states, they, imposing state decrees on private will, on private law, strive to be extremely attentive to the benefits, to the interests of the one who is deprived of the free disposal of this right. It is everywhere and always. Our basic laws say that the remuneration in these cases must be "fair and decent" - this is the true expression of the law. Messrs., therefore, there is no doubt for me that the demand that was presented this autumn and which amounted to the fact that prices should be moderate at all costs, I repeat this term, it figures to this day in statements, that protect the interests of consumers. [...] The state of affairs and the level of fixed prices must be such that grain is willingly transported, for it seems to me that this task too difficult, and perhaps unbearable. You might say that the trading apparatus is able to do this. Yes, gentlemen, but in this case the trading apparatus—this is the best proof—which has hundreds of thousands of agents who have acquired experience and skill from a very young age, and sometimes are hereditary in this business—even the trading apparatus turned out to be powerless before those fixed prices that were established, it turned out to be powerless to extract the bread that disappeared without a trace. It naturally follows that our delegates, in spite of their desperate efforts, could achieve little results in comparison with the assignments, and we found ourselves in a serious shortfall for a full third of our food period. The consequences of this shortfall, gentlemen, are clear to you. Fix them quickly, I think it's hard work. They will make themselves felt until they can catch up. Gentlemen, this task clearly confronted me from the very first days of my assumption of office. I saw that quick measures were needed, perhaps extreme measures, in order somehow to rectify the matter, somehow to correct this shortfall. [...] The first measure was the allotment. Its idea was to transfer the delivery of peasant grain from the realm of a simple commercial transaction to the realm of fulfilling civic duty, a must for every grain holder. I believed that this could only be done through a quota, explaining to the population that the fulfillment of this quota is as much a duty for them as the sacrifices that they so meekly bear for the war. Therefore, in this apportionment, Messrs., I included the entire amount needed for the army, with the addition of all the amount that is necessary for the needs of the large working population working in factories, therefore serving the same defense. And this total (quantity with an indication that everything in it is required for defense needs, this is the total) amount was included in the allocation and was reported to the places. The very same apportionment for the provinces was provided to me by a resolution of the Special Conference, in view of the urgency of this matter, and the grounds for it were established. The same grounds were also indicated in the opinion expressed by the State Duma. They were accepted verbatim, and the most numerical part of the layout was based on the data that were presented to us by the zemstvos in the late autumn, which corrected the results of the agricultural census and which, in addition, were verified by additional communications with the zemstvos a week before the production of this layout. One of the most important elements was the figure of the average annual export from a given province. I repeat, the conclusions from all these elements have been reduced to a significant extent and to a degree so that this apportionment would not, for any reason, be difficult to implement. She was reported to the provinces; provincial zemstvos were to produce it between counties; counties between volosts; and there the apportionment was to be made by the volost and rural gatherings. And so, gentlemen, at first this apportionment, according to all the information that came about it, went very successfully, at least the information turned out to be very favorable. I must say frankly that initially I felt, I will say frankly, a patriotic impulse. This apportionment by a number of Zemstvos was increased by 10% or even more. With a request for such an increase, I turned to the zemstvos and also turned to agricultural societies, pointing out that this allowance was necessary in order to provide our valiant army with supplies on a wider scale. These allowances were made by the provincial and district zemstvos and in this form were to be transferred to the volosts. But, gentlemen, immediately after this, doubts and a lot of serious criticism were introduced into this matter; I will say frankly that a sharp critical attitude to the question of the distribution of a certain trend in our social thought has been revealed.

Alexander Alexandrovich Rittikh.

“I must say that where there have already been cases of refusal or where there have been short cuts, they immediately asked me from the localities what should be done next: should I act as required by the law, which indicates a certain way out when rural or volost Societies do not decide the sentence that is required of them for the performance of this or that duty or assignment - whether this should be done, or whether it should, perhaps, resort to requisition, also provided for by the decision of the Special Conference, but I always and everywhere answered that here it is necessary to wait with this, it is necessary to wait: perhaps the mood of the meeting will change; it is necessary to assemble it again, indicate to him the purpose for which this apportionment is intended, that this is exactly what the country and homeland need for defense, and depending on the mood of the gathering, I thought that these decisions would change. In this direction, voluntary I considered it necessary to exhaust all means.

Rittich's initiative was smashed to smithereens by criticism from the left.

Yes, and there is not a single factual confirmation of the existence of food detachments, prodarmies and the use of troops to extort bread under the king.

The Soviets can shake their spears as much as they like, but there are NO figures, no facts, or even overwhelming memoirs on this issue.

Rittich says that the cost of horse-drawn transport from the barn to the station is now (!) pays(!) to the peasants the Ministry of Agriculture. O satraps! Murderers! Compare with Lenin's food intelligence.

We draw conclusions about the conscientiousness, objectivity and incorruptibility of these rules and the people who express them.

One more nuance.
The Soviets base their opinion on the exorbitant ferocity of the tsarist requisition primarily on the figures of the requisition - they say, the tsarist requisition was larger. And the fact that Soviet Russia in 1919 was “slightly” smaller in size than Tsarist Russia is nothing, these Soviet patriots do not take into account at all.
In Kondratiev's fundamental monograph there is a special, beautifully written chapter devoted to the grain allocation of 1916. Simultaneously with the grain allocation, the payment for transporting grain from the barn to the station was increased. Since the payment for transportation was included in the calculations of the state with the owners of grain, grain prices were actually raised, which formally remained "fixed".

It is also important to note that during the "royal apportionment" no one rummaged through the barns. The only repressive measure under the tsar in the conditions of the world war was the requisition (at a fixed price) of grain, which was exported for trade if the apportionment was not fulfilled. If the owner did not carry out the apportionment, but did not take out the grain either, then it calmly remained in the barn.

As a result, it turns out that for some reason there is no evidence of royal requisitions with the use of troops - no, no eyewitness memories, no memories of royal officials on this topic. In general, somehow empty.
At the same time, there is no reason not to trust Rittich's report in the State Duma.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the grain crisis of 1916-1917 was caused by low fixed prices for bread. (Although, by the way, in Germany the grain monopoly and fixed prices have existed since the beginning of the war). Yes, only if violent requisitions were carried out, then there would be no crisis (well, they would have taken away the bread from the peasants and that’s it - what a crisis there is).
Read on. Here is the speech of deputy Gorodilov (Vyatka province) in the Duma on February 17th:

“As a peasant I live in the countryside. Solid low prices they ruined the country for bread, they killed the entire agricultural economy. The village will not sow bread, except for its own subsistence. Who, gentlemen, is the culprit? The law on lowering fixed prices was adopted by the State Duma itself at the insistence of the Progressive Bloc.

How! "The village will not sow bread" ... Is Gorodilov crazy? What, he does not know that at the same time in the village the royal food detachments are in full swing? What does he not know that the tsar takes the last thing from the peasants, and shoots those who are dissatisfied? So if the peasants will not sow bread (“except for their own subsistence”), then starvation awaits them all (after all, the latter will be taken away according to the apportionment). And one more thing: in the speech of the peasant Gorodilov - not a word about violence against the peasants.

II.Soviet food requisitioning. (Kondratiev N.D. The market for bread and its regulation during the war and revolution. - M .: Nauka, 1991)

The most famous are the strongest Kronstadt and Tambov uprisings, and in their shadow remained the West Siberian uprising, covering the Tyumen, Omsk, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg provinces. This is precisely the result of the DIFFERENCE of the royal and Soviet surplus.

After the suppression of the active resistance of the peasants to the surplus, the Soviet authorities had to face passive resistance: the peasants hid bread, refused to accept money that had lost solvency, reduced the area under crops and production so as not to create useless surpluses for themselves, and produced products only in accordance with the consumer norm for their family .

As a result of surplus appropriation, 832,309 tons of grain were collected in the procurement campaign of 1916-1917; before the October Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government collected 280 million poods (out of 720 planned) in the first 9 months of Soviet power - 5 million centners; for 1 year of surplus appropriation (1/VIII 1918-1/VIII 1919) - 18 million centners; 2nd year (1/VIII 1919-1/VIII 1920) - 35 million centners 3rd year (1/VIII 1920-1/VIII 1921) - 46.7 million centners.

Annual data on grain procurements for this period: 1918/1919 −1,767,780 tons; 1919/1920 −3480200 tons; 1920/1921 - 6011730 tons.

It is extremely curious - A.A. Ritikh, whose proposals for voluntary surplus appropriation were severely criticized by the State Duma, was a member of the Russian society in England in 1921 to help the starving in Russia.