At dawn on June 24 (12, old style) June 1812, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River without declaring war and invaded Russia. Napoleon's army, which he himself called the "Great Army", numbered over 600,000 people and 1,420 guns. In addition to the French, it included the national corps of European countries conquered by Napoleon, as well as the Polish corps of Marshal Yu. Poniatovsky.

The main forces of Napoleon were deployed in two echelons. The first (444,000 people and 940 guns) consisted of three groups: the right wing, led by Jerome Bonaparte (78,000 people, 159 guns) was supposed to move on Grodno, diverting as many Russian forces as possible; the central grouping under the command of Eugene Beauharnais (82,000 people, 208 guns) was supposed to prevent the connection of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies; the left wing, led by Napoleon himself (218,000 people, 527 guns) moved to Vilna - he was assigned the main role throughout the campaign. In the rear, between the Vistula and the Oder, the second echelon remained - 170,000 people, 432 guns and a reserve (corps of Marshal Augereau and other troops).

The invading enemy was opposed by 220 - 240 thousand Russian soldiers with 942 guns - 3 times less than the enemy had. In addition, the Russian troops were divided: the 1st Western Army under the command of the Minister of War, General of Infantry M.B. Barclay de Tolly (110 - 127 thousand people with 558 guns) stretched over 200 kilometers from Lithuania to Grodno in Belarus; The 2nd Western Army, led by General of Infantry P.I.Bagration (45 - 48 thousand people with 216 guns) occupied a line up to 100 kilometers east of Bialystok; The 3rd Western Army of Cavalry General A.P. Tormasov (46,000 men with 168 guns) stood in Volhynia near Lutsk. On the right flank of the Russian troops (in Finland) was the corps of Lieutenant General F.F. Shteingel, on the left flank - the Danube Army of Admiral P.V. Chichagov.

Taking into account the huge size and power of Russia, Napoleon planned to complete the campaign in three years: in 1812, to capture the western provinces from Riga to Lutsk, in 1813 - Moscow, in 1814 - in St. Petersburg. Such gradualness would allow him to dismember Russia, providing the rear and communications of the army operating in vast spaces. The conqueror of Europe did not count on a blitzkrieg, although he was going to quickly defeat the main forces of the Russian army one by one even in the border areas.

But realizing that it was impossible to resist by scattered units, the Russian command began to retreat inland. And this thwarted Napoleon's strategic plan. Instead of a phased dismemberment of Russia, Napoleon was forced to follow the elusive Russian armies deep into the country, stretching communications and losing superiority in forces.

FIRST STAGE OF THE WAR: THE RETREAT

Retreating, the Russian troops fought rearguard battles, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. The main task was to combine the forces of the 1st and 2nd Western armies. Particularly difficult was the position of Bagration's 2nd Army, which was threatened by encirclement. It was not possible to break through to Minsk and connect with Barclay's army there: the path was cut off. Bagration changed the direction of movement, but the troops of Jerome Bonaparte overtook him. On July 9 (June 27, according to the old style), near the town of Mir, a battle took place between the rearguard of the Russian troops (it was the Cossack cavalry of Ataman M.I. Platov) and the French cavalry. The French were defeated and retreated in disarray. The next day there was a new battle, and again the French were defeated. On July 14 (2), near the town of Romanovo, the Cossacks of Platov held back the French for a day in order to allow the army carts to cross the Pripyat. Platov's successful rearguard battles allowed the 2nd Army to reach Bobruisk without hindrance and concentrate its forces, stretched until that moment. All attempts to surround Bagration failed. Napoleon was furious; he accused his brother Jérôme of being slow and handed over the command of his corps to Marshal Davout.

From Tarutino, Kutuzov launched a "small war" with the forces of army partisan detachments. Particularly successful were the detachments of D.V. Davydov, A.N. Seslavin, A.S. Figner, I.S. Dorokhov, N.D. Kudashev, I.M. Vadbolsky. Kutuzov sought to expand the peasant partisan movement, merging it with the actions of army detachments. Some of the peasant detachments numbered several thousand people. For example, the detachment of Gerasim Kurin consisted of 5,000 people. The detachments of Yermolai Chetvertakov, Fyodor Potapov, Vasilisa Kozhina were widely known.

The actions of the partisans inflicted heavy human and material losses on the enemy, and disrupted his connection with the rear. In just six weeks of autumn, the partisans destroyed about 30,000 enemy soldiers.

On October 18 (6) on the Chernishna River, Russian troops defeated the strong vanguard of the French army, commanded by Marshal Murat. This victory marked the beginning of the counteroffensive of the Russian army.

In the same days, active operations of the 3rd Western Army began. On October 17 (5), the battle for Polotsk began, in which, in addition to the soldiers of the Wittgenstein corps, the soldiers of the Novgorod and Petersburg militia took an active part. By the morning of October 20, Polotsk was liberated. In the southwestern direction, Admiral Chichagov threw back the troops of Schwarzenberg and Rainier beyond the Southern Bug, within the Duchy of Warsaw, and moved towards Minsk.

All this prompted Napoleon to take action. On October 19 (7), the French set out from Moscow to Tarutin, hoping to take Kutuzov by surprise, defeat him and break through to Kaluga. The ancient capital of Russia was burned and plundered. The French tried to blow up the Kremlin, but fortunately the destruction was not too great. Napoleon's new plans were again ruined. The partisan detachment of Seslavin discovered the Napoleonic army near the village of Fominskoye and transmitted information about this to Kutuzov's headquarters. The Russian army set out from the Tarutinsky camp and moved towards the French. On October 24 (12), a fierce battle took place between the advanced units of both armies for Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands 8 times. And although in the end the French captured the city, Napoleon had to give up hope of breaking through to Kaluga: the approaching main forces of the Russian army took up strong positions near Maloyaroslavets. Napoleon gave the order to begin a retreat to Mozhaisk and further to the old Smolensk road devastated by the war.

Having finally wrested the strategic initiative from the hands of the enemy, Kutuzov launched a general counteroffensive. It was of an active nature and set as its goal, while preserving the army, not only to drive out, but to completely destroy the enemy. A huge role in the persecution of the French was played by army and peasant partisan detachments, as well as mobile Cossack units of Ataman Platov.

In the battles near Vyazma and Dorogobuzh, the enemy fleeing to the west lost about 13,000 people killed, wounded and captured. In the battle near Lyakhovo, the partisans surrounded and forced to surrender an entire enemy division led by General Augereau. Leaving Moscow, Napoleon had an army of 107,000 men. He managed to bring only about 60,000 people to Smolensk, counting with replenishment.

In mid-November, Russian troops surrounded the Napoleonic army near the Berezina River. However, due to the inconsistency of the actions of the Russian corps, Napoleon managed to cross the Berezina near the village of Studyanki. However, only about 9,000 people crossed to the western coast. The rest either died or were taken prisoner. After the Berezina, Napoleon fled to Paris. To the question "What is the position of the army?" he replied: "The army is no more."

On November 28, according to the old style, Russian troops occupied Vilna. On December 2, about 1,000 enemy soldiers crossed the Neman near Kovno. These were the last remnants of Napoleon's main forces. Out of a total of 600,000" great army"About 30,000 people fled. The war, as Kutuzov wrote," ended with the complete extermination of the enemy.

“No matter how critics speak of individual moments of the persecution, one must attribute the energy with which this persecution was carried out to the fact that the French army was completely destroyed, and a greater result cannot be imagined,” wrote the German military theorist and historian Karl Clausewitz. "

As a result of the defeat of the Napoleonic army in Russia, the national liberation movement intensified in Europe. The patriotic upsurge of 1812 had a huge impact on the growth of self-consciousness of the peoples of Russia.

The Patriotic War of 1812 began on June 12 - on this day, Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman River, unleashing wars between the two crowns of France and Russia. This war continued until December 14, 1812, ending with the complete and unconditional victory of the Russian and allied troops. This is a nice page Russian history, which we will consider, referring to the official textbooks of the history of Russia and France, as well as to the books of the bibliographers Napoleon, Alexander 1 and Kutuzov, who describe in great detail the events taking place at that moment.

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The beginning of the war

Causes of the War of 1812

The causes of the Patriotic War of 1812, like all other wars in the history of mankind, must be considered in two aspects - the reasons from France and the reasons from Russia.

Reasons from France

In just a few years, Napoleon radically changed his own view of Russia. If, having come to power, he wrote that Russia was his only ally, then by 1812 Russia had become a threat to France (consider the emperor). In many ways, this was provoked by Alexander 1 himself. So, this is why France attacked Russia in June 1812:

Breaking the Tilsit Accords: Relaxing the Continental Blockade. As you know, the main enemy of France at that time was England, against which the blockade was organized. Russia also participated in this, but in 1810 the government passed a law allowing trade with England through intermediaries. In fact, this made the entire blockade ineffective, which completely undermined the plans of France.
Refusals in dynastic marriage. Napoleon sought to marry the imperial court of Russia in order to become "God's anointed". However, in 1808 he was denied marriage to Princess Catherine. In 1810 he was denied marriage to Princess Anna. As a result, in 1811 the French emperor married an Austrian princess.
The transfer of Russian troops to the border with Poland in 1811. In the first half of 1811, Alexander 1 ordered the transfer of 3 divisions to the Polish borders, fearing an uprising in Poland, which could be transferred to Russian lands. This step was regarded by Napoleon as aggression and preparation for a war for Polish territories, which by that time were already subordinate to France.

Soldiers! A new, second in a row, Polish war begins! The first ended in Tilsit. There Russia promised to be an eternal ally for France in the war with England, but she broke her promise. The Russian emperor does not want to give explanations for his actions until the French eagles cross the Rhine. Do they think that we have become different? Are we not the winners of Austerlitz? Russia put France before a choice - shame or war. The choice is obvious! Let's go ahead, cross the Neman! The second Polish howl will be glorious for French weapons. It will bring a messenger to the destructive influence of Russia on the affairs of Europe.

Thus began a war of conquest for France.

Reasons from Russia

On the part of Russia, there were also weighty reasons for participating in the war, which turned out to be a liberation state. Among the main reasons are the following:

Great losses of all segments of the population from the break in trade with England. The opinions of historians on this point differ, since it is believed that the blockade did not affect the state as a whole, but only its elite, which, as a result of the lack of the possibility of trade with England, was losing money.
The intention of France to recreate the Commonwealth. In 1807, Napoleon created the Duchy of Warsaw and sought to recreate ancient state in true size. Perhaps this was only in the case of the seizure of Russia's western lands.
Violation of the Treaty of Tilsit by Napoleon. One of the main criteria for signing this agreement was that Prussia should be cleared of French troops, but this was never done, although Alexander 1 constantly reminded of this.

For a long time, France has been trying to encroach on the independence of Russia. Always we tried to be meek, thinking so to deflect her attempts at capture. With all our desire to keep the peace, we are forced to gather troops to defend the Motherland. There are no possibilities for a peaceful solution to the conflict with France, which means that only one thing remains - to defend the truth, to defend Russia from the invaders. I do not need to remind commanders and soldiers of courage, it is in our hearts. In our veins flows the blood of the victors, the blood of the Slavs. Soldiers! You are defending the country, defending the religion, defending the fatherland. I'm with you. God is with us.

The balance of forces and means at the beginning of the war

Napoleon's crossing of the Neman took place on June 12, with 450 thousand people at his disposal. Around the end of the month, another 200,000 people joined him. If we take into account that by that time there were no large losses on the part of both sides, then the total number of the French army at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 was 650 thousand soldiers. It is impossible to say that the French made up 100% of the army, since the combined army of almost all European countries (France, Austria, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Prussia, Spain, Holland) fought on the side of France. However, it was the French who formed the basis of the army. These were proven soldiers who won many victories with their emperor.

Russia after mobilization had 590 thousand soldiers. Initially, the size of the army was 227 thousand people, and they were divided along three fronts:

Northern - First Army. Commander - Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Toli. The population is 120 thousand people. They were located in the north of Lithuania and covered St. Petersburg.
Central - Second Army. Commander - Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Number - 49 thousand people. They were located in the south of Lithuania, covering Moscow.
Southern - Third Army. Commander - Alexander Petrovich Tormasov. The number is 58 thousand people. They were located in Volhynia, covering the attack on Kyiv.

Also in Russia, partisan detachments were actively operating, the number of which reached 400 thousand people.

The first stage of the war - the offensive of Napoleon's troops (June-September)

At 6 am on June 12, 1812, the Patriotic War with Napoleonic France began for Russia. Napoleon's troops crossed the Neman and headed inland. The main direction of the strike was supposed to be in Moscow. The commander himself said that “if I capture Kyiv, I will lift the Russians by the legs, I will capture St. Petersburg, I will take it by the throat, if I take Moscow, I will strike the heart of Russia.”

The French army, commanded by brilliant commanders, was looking for a general battle, and the fact that Alexander 1 divided the army into 3 fronts was very helpful to the aggressors. However, at the initial stage, Barclay de Toli played a decisive role, who gave the order not to engage in battle with the enemy and retreat inland. This was necessary in order to combine forces, as well as to pull up reserves. Retreating, the Russians destroyed everything - they killed cattle, poisoned water, burned fields. In the literal sense of the word, the French moved forward through the ashes. Later, Napoleon complained that the Russian people were carrying out a vile war and were not behaving according to the rules.

North direction

32 thousand people, led by General MacDonald, Napoleon sent to St. Petersburg. The first city on this path was Riga. According to the French plan, MacDonald was to capture the city. Connect with General Oudinot (he had 28 thousand people at his disposal) and go further.

The defense of Riga was commanded by General Essen with 18,000 soldiers. He burned everything around the city, and the city itself was very well fortified. MacDonald by this time captured Dinaburg (the Russians left the city with the outbreak of war) and did not conduct further active operations. He understood the absurdity of the assault on Riga and was waiting for the arrival of artillery.

General Oudinot occupied Polotsk and from there tried to separate Wittenstein's corps from the army of Barclay de Toli. However, on July 18, Wittenstein delivered an unexpected blow to Oudinot, who was saved from defeat only by the corps of Saint-Cyr who came to the rescue. As a result, a balance came and no more active offensive operations were carried out in the northern direction.

South direction

General Ranier with an army of 22 thousand people was supposed to act in the young direction, blocking the army of General Tormasov, preventing it from connecting with the rest of the Russian army.

On July 27, Tormasov surrounded the city of Kobrin, where the main forces of Ranier gathered. The French suffered a terrible defeat - 5 thousand people were killed in the battle in 1 day, which forced the French to retreat. Napoleon realized that the southern direction in the Patriotic War of 1812 was in danger of failure. Therefore, he transferred the troops of General Schwarzenberg there, numbering 30 thousand people. As a result, on August 12, Tormasov was forced to retreat to Lutsk and take up defense there. In the future, active offensive operations on southbound the French did not. The main events took place in the Moscow direction.

The course of events of the offensive company

On June 26, the army of General Bagration advanced from Vitebsk, tasked by Alexander 1 to engage in battle with the main enemy forces in order to wear them out. Everyone was aware of the absurdity of this idea, but only by July 17 the emperor was finally dissuaded from this undertaking. The troops began to retreat to Smolensk.

On July 6, the large number of Napoleon's troops became clear. To prevent the Patriotic War from dragging on for a long time, Alexander 1 signs a decree on the creation of a militia. Literally all the inhabitants of the country are recorded in it - in total, there were about 400 thousand volunteers.

On July 22, the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly united near Smolensk. The command of the united army was taken over by Barclay de Tolly, who had 130 thousand soldiers at his disposal, while the front line of the French army consisted of 150 thousand soldiers.

On July 25, a military council was held in Smolensk, at which the issue of accepting the battle was discussed in order to go on the counteroffensive and defeat Napoleon with one blow. But Barclay spoke out against this idea, realizing that an open battle with the enemy, a brilliant strategist and tactician, could lead to a grand failure. As a result, the offensive idea was not implemented. It was decided to retreat further - to Moscow.

On July 26, the retreat of the troops began, which General Neverovsky was supposed to cover, occupying the village of Krasnoe, thereby closing the bypass of Smolensk for Napoleon.

On August 2, Murat with a cavalry corps tried to break through the defenses of Neverovsky, but to no avail. In total, more than 40 attacks were made with the help of cavalry, but it was not possible to achieve the desired.

August 5 is one of important dates in the Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon began the assault on Smolensk, capturing the suburbs by evening. However, at night he was driven out of the city, and the Russian army continued its massive retreat from the city. This caused a storm of discontent among the soldiers. They believed that if they managed to drive the French out of Smolensk, then it was necessary to destroy it there. They accused Barclay of cowardice, but the general implemented only 1 plan - to wear down the enemy and take the decisive battle when the balance of power was on the side of Russia. By this time, the French had the advantage.

On August 17, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov arrived in the army, who took command. This candidacy did not raise questions, since Kutuzov (a student of Suvorov) used great respect and was considered the best Russian commander after the death of Suvorov. Arriving in the army, the new commander-in-chief wrote that he had not yet decided what to do next: "The question has not yet been resolved - either lose the army or give up Moscow."

On August 26, the Battle of Borodino took place. Its outcome still raises many questions and disputes, but there were no losers then. Each commander solved his own problems: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow (the heart of Russia, as the emperor of France himself wrote), and Kutuzov was able to inflict heavy damage on the enemy, thereby introducing an initial turning point in the battle of 1812.

September 1 is a significant day, which is described in all history books. A military council was held in Fili, near Moscow. Kutuzov gathered his generals to decide what to do next. There were only two options: retreat and surrender Moscow, or organize a second general battle after Borodino. Most of the generals on the wave of success demanded a battle in order to as soon as possible defeat Napoleon. Opponents of such a development of events were Kutuzov himself and Barclay de Tolly. The military council in Fili ended with the phrase Kutuzov “As long as there is an army, there is hope. If we lose the army near Moscow, we will lose not only the ancient capital, but the whole of Russia.”

September 2 - following the results of the military council of the generals, which took place in Fili, it was decided that it was necessary to leave the ancient capital. The Russian army retreated, and Moscow itself, before the arrival of Napoleon, according to many sources, was subjected to terrible looting. However, even this is not the main thing. Retreating, the Russian army set fire to the city. Wooden Moscow burned down almost three-quarters. Most importantly, literally all food depots were destroyed. The reasons for the Moscow fire lie in the fact that the French did not get anything from what the enemies could use for food, movement, or in other aspects. As a result, the aggressor troops found themselves in a very precarious position.

The second stage of the war - the retreat of Napoleon (October - December)

Having occupied Moscow, Napoleon considered the mission accomplished. The commander's bibliographers later wrote that he was faithful - the loss of the historical center of Rus' would break the victorious spirit, and the leaders of the country had to come to him with a request for peace. But this did not happen. Kutuzov deployed with an army 80 kilometers from Moscow near Tarutin and waited until the enemy army, deprived of normal supplies, weakened and itself introduced a radical change in the Patriotic War. Without waiting for an offer of peace from Russia, the French emperor himself took the initiative.

Napoleon's Desire for Peace

According to Napoleon's original plan, the capture of Moscow was to play a decisive role. Here it was possible to deploy a convenient bridgehead, including for a trip to St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia. However, the delay in moving around Russia and the heroism of the people, who literally fought for every piece of land, practically thwarted this plan. After all, a trip to the north of Russia in winter for the French army with irregular food supplies was actually equal to death. This became clear by the end of September, when it started to get colder. Subsequently, Napoleon wrote in his autobiography that his biggest mistake was a trip to Moscow and a month spent there.

Understanding the severity of his position, the French emperor and commander decided to end the Patriotic War of Russia by signing a peace treaty with her. Three such attempts have been made:

September 18th. Through General Tutolmin, a message was sent to Alexander 1, which said that Napoleon honored the Russian emperor and offered him peace. Russia is only required to give up the territory of Lithuania and return to the continental blockade again.
September 20th. Alexander 1 was delivered a second letter from Napoleon with an offer of peace. The conditions were the same as before. The Russian emperor did not answer these messages.
The 4th of October. The hopelessness of the situation led to the fact that Napoleon literally begged for peace. Here is what he writes to Alexander 1 (according to the prominent French historian F. Segur): “I need peace, I need it, no matter what, just save the honor.” This proposal was delivered to Kutuzov, but the emperor of France did not wait for an answer.

The retreat of the French army in autumn-winter 1812

For Napoleon, it became obvious that he would not be able to sign a peace treaty with Russia, and to stay for the winter in Moscow, which the Russians, retreating, burned down, was recklessness. Moreover, it was impossible to stay here, since the constant raids of the militias caused great damage to the army. So, for a month, while the French army was in Moscow, its number was reduced by 30 thousand people. As a result, the decision was made to retreat.

On October 7, preparations began for the retreat of the French army. One of the orders on this occasion was to blow up the Kremlin. Luckily, he didn't succeed. Russian historians attribute this to the fact that due to the high humidity, the wicks got wet and failed.

On October 19, the retreat of Napoleon's army from Moscow began. The purpose of this retreat was to get to Smolensk, since it was the only major nearby city that had significant food supplies. The road went through Kaluga, but this direction was blocked by Kutuzov. Now the advantage was on the side of the Russian army, so Napoleon decided to get around. However, Kutuzov foresaw this maneuver and met the enemy army at Maloyaroslavets.

On October 24, a battle took place near Maloyaroslavets. During the day, this small town passed 8 times from one side to the other. In the final stage of the battle, Kutuzov managed to take up fortified positions, and Napoleon did not dare to storm them, since the numerical superiority was already on the side of the Russian army. As a result, the plans of the French were frustrated, and they had to retreat to Smolensk along the same road along which they went to Moscow. It was already scorched earth - without food and without water.

Napoleon's retreat was accompanied by heavy losses. Indeed, in addition to clashes with the army of Kutuzov, we also had to deal with partisan detachments that daily attacked the enemy, especially its trailing units. Napoleon's losses were terrible. On November 9, he managed to capture Smolensk, but this did not make a radical change in the course of the war. There was practically no food in the city, and it was not possible to organize a reliable defense. As a result, the army was subjected to almost continuous attacks by militias and local patriots. Therefore, Napoleon stayed in Smolensk for 4 days and decided to retreat further.

Crossing the Berezina River

The French were heading to the Berezina River (in modern Belarus) in order to force the river and go to the Neman. But on November 16, General Chichagov captured the city of Borisov, which is located on the Berezina. Napoleon's situation became catastrophic - for the first time, the possibility of being captured actively loomed for him, since he was surrounded.

On November 25, by order of Napoleon, the French army began to simulate a crossing south of Borisov. Chichagov bought into this maneuver and began the transfer of troops. At that moment, the French built two bridges across the Berezina and began crossing on November 26-27. Only on November 28, Chichagov realized his mistake and tried to give battle to the French army, but it was too late - the crossing was completed, albeit with the loss of a huge number of human lives. When crossing the Berezina, 21,000 Frenchmen died! The "Great Army" now consisted of only 9 thousand soldiers, most of whom were already unfit for combat.

It was during this crossing that unusually severe frosts set in, to which the French emperor referred, justifying the huge losses. In the 29th bulletin, which was published in one of the French newspapers, it was said that until November 10 the weather was normal, but after that there were very severe colds for which no one was ready.

Crossing the Neman (from Russia to France)

The crossing of the Berezina showed that Napoleon's Russian campaign was over - he lost the Patriotic War in Russia in 1812. Then the emperor decided that his further stay with the army did not make sense and on December 5 he left his troops and headed for Paris.

On December 16, in Kovno, the French army crossed the Neman and left the territory of Russia. Its number was only 1600 people. The invincible army, which inspired fear throughout Europe, was almost completely destroyed by Kutuzov's army in less than 6 months.

Below is a graphical representation of Napoleon's retreat on a map.

Results of the Patriotic War of 1812

The Patriotic War between Russia and Napoleon great importance for all countries involved in the conflict. Largely due to these events, the undivided dominance of England in Europe became possible. Such a development was foreseen by Kutuzov, who, after the flight of the French army in December, sent a report to Alexander 1, where he explained to the ruler that the war must be ended immediately, and the pursuit of the enemy and the liberation of Europe would be beneficial for strengthening the power of England. But Alexander did not heed the advice of his commander and soon began a campaign abroad.

Reasons for Napoleon's defeat in the war

Determining the main reasons for the defeat of the Napoleonic army, it is necessary to focus on the most important ones that historians most often use:

The strategic mistake of the emperor of France, who sat in Moscow for 30 days and waited for the representatives of Alexander 1 with pleas for peace. As a result, it began to get colder and to run out of provisions, and the constant raids of partisan movements made a turning point in the war.
Unity of the Russian people. As usual, before the threat great danger Slavs are rallying. So it was this time. For example, the historian Lieven writes that the main reason for the defeat of France lies in the mass nature of the war. Everyone fought for the Russians - both women and children. And all this was ideologically justified, which made the morale of the army very strong. The emperor of France did not break him.
The unwillingness of the Russian generals to accept a decisive battle. Most historians forget about this, but what would have happened to Bagration's army if he had accepted a general battle at the beginning of the war, as Alexander 1 really wanted? 60 thousand army of Bagration against 400 thousand army of aggressors. It would be an unconditional victory, and after it they would hardly have had time to recover. Therefore, the Russian people must express their gratitude to Barclay de Tolly, who, by his decision, gave the order to retreat and unite the armies.
Genius Kutuzov. The Russian general, who learned well from Suvorov, did not make a single tactical miscalculation. It is noteworthy that Kutuzov never managed to defeat his enemy, but he managed to win the Patriotic War tactically and strategically.
General Frost is used as an excuse. In fairness, it must be said that the frost did not have any significant effect on the final result, since at the time of the start of abnormal frosts (mid-November), the outcome of the confrontation was decided - the great army was destroyed.

2012 marks the 200th anniversary of the military-historical patriotic event - the Patriotic War of 1812, which is of great importance for the political, social, cultural and military development of Russia.

The beginning of the war

June 12, 1812 (old style) the French army of Napoleon, having crossed the Neman near the city of Kovno (now it is the city of Kaunas in Lithuania), invaded Russian Empire. This day is recorded in history as the beginning of the war between Russia and France.

In this war, two forces clashed. On the one hand, Napoleon's half-million army (about 640,000 men), which consisted of only half the French and included, in addition to them, representatives of almost all of Europe. An army intoxicated with numerous victories, led by famous marshals and generals, led by Napoleon. Strengths the French army was a large number, good material and technical support, combat experience, faith in the invincibility of the army.

She was opposed by the Russian army, which at the beginning of the war represented one-third of the French army. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian-Turkish war 1806-1812. The Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration and A. P. Tormasov). Alexander I was at the headquarters of Barclay's army.

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken over by the troops stationed on western border: 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and 2nd Army of Bagration (total 153 thousand soldiers).

Knowing his numerical superiority, Napoleon pinned his hopes on a blitzkrieg war. One of his main miscalculations was the underestimation of the patriotic impulse of the army and the people of Russia.

The beginning of the war was successful for Napoleon. At 6 am on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian city of Kovno. The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. After 5 days, another grouping (79 thousand soldiers) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, crossed the Neman to the south of Kovno. At the same time, even further south, near Grodno, the Neman was crossed by 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers) under the general command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte. In the northern direction, near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald (32 thousand soldiers), which was aimed at St. Petersburg. In the southern direction from Warsaw through the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-33 thousand soldiers) began to invade.

The rapid advance of the powerful French army forced the Russian command to retreat inland. The commander of the Russian troops, Barclay de Tolly, evaded the general battle, saving the army and striving to unite with Bagration's army. The numerical superiority of the enemy raised the question of an urgent replenishment of the army. But in Russia there was no universal military service. The army was completed by recruiting sets. And Alexander I decided on an unusual step. On July 6, he issued a manifesto calling for the creation of a people's militia. So the first partisan detachments began to appear. This war united all segments of the population. As now, so then, the Russian people are united only by misfortune, grief, tragedy. It didn't matter who you were in society, what wealth you had. Russian people fought unitedly, defending the freedom of their homeland. All people became a single force, which is why the name "Patriotic War" was determined. The war became an example of the fact that a Russian person will never allow freedom and spirit to be enslaved, he will defend his honor and name to the end.

The armies of Barclay and Bagration met near Smolensk at the end of July, thus achieving the first strategic success.

Battle for Smolensk

By August 16 (according to the New Style), Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand soldiers. After the connection of the Russian armies, the generals began to insistently demand a general battle from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly. At 6 am August 16 Napoleon launched an assault on the city.

In the battles near Smolensk, the Russian army showed the greatest stamina. The battle for Smolensk marked the unfolding of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy. Napoleon's hope for a blitzkrieg collapsed.

Battle for Smolensk. Adam, circa 1820

The stubborn battle for Smolensk lasted 2 days, until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew troops from the burning city in order to avoid a big battle with no chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration's army).After the capture of Smolensk, Napoleon moved to Moscow.

Meanwhile, the protracted retreat caused public discontent and protest among most of the army (especially after the surrender of Smolensk), so on August 20 (according to the new style), Emperor Alexander I signed a decree appointing M.I. Kutuzov. At that time, Kutuzov was in his 67th year. The commander of the Suvorov school, who had half a century of military experience, he enjoyed universal respect both in the army and among the people. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3 (according to the New Style), the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. By that time, Napoleon's army had already suffered significant losses, and the difference in the size of the two armies was reduced. In this situation, Kutuzov decided to give a pitched battle.

To the west of Mozhaisk, 125 km from Moscow near the village of Borodina August 26 (September 7, new style), 1812 there was a battle that went down in the history of our people forever. - the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 between the Russian and French armies.

The Russian army numbered 132 thousand people (including 21 thousand poorly armed militias). The French army, pursuing her on the heels, 135,000. Kutuzov's headquarters, believing that there were about 190 thousand people in the enemy's army, chose a defensive plan. In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on the line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes).

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army. But the steadfastness of the Russian troops, where every soldier, officer, general was a hero, overturned all the calculations of the French commander. The fight went on all day. Losses were huge on both sides. battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their composition. There were almost no prisoners on either side. French losses amounted to 58 thousand people, Russian - 45 thousand.

Emperor Napoleon later recalled: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is what I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians - to be called invincible.

Cavalry fight

On September 8 (21), Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army. The Russian army retreated, but retained its combat capability. Napoleon failed to achieve the main thing - the defeat of the Russian army.

September 13 (26) in the village of Fili Kutuzov held a meeting on a further plan of action. After the military council in Fili, the Russian army, by decision of Kutuzov, was withdrawn from Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost, but with the loss of the army, Russia is lost”. These words of the great commander, which went down in history, were confirmed by subsequent events.

A.K. Savrasov. The hut in which the famous council in Fili was held

Military Council in Fili (A. D. Kivshenko, 1880)

Capture of Moscow

In the evening September 14 (September 27, new style) Napoleon entered deserted Moscow without a fight. In the war against Russia, all the plans of Napoleon were consistently destroyed. Expecting to receive the keys to Moscow, he stood for several hours in vain on Poklonnaya Hill, and when he entered the city, he was met by deserted streets.

Fire in Moscow on September 15-18, 1812 after the capture of the city by Napoleon. Painting by A.F. Smirnova, 1813

Already on the night of 14 (27) to 15 (28) September, the city was engulfed in fire, which increased so much by the night of 15 (28) to 16 (29) September that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.

On suspicion of arson, about 400 townspeople from the lower classes were shot. The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, after Napoleon left the city, "hardly 5 thousand" remained.

While Napoleon's army was inactive in Moscow, losing combat effectiveness, Kutuzov retreated from Moscow, first to the southeast along the Ryazan road, but then, turning to the west, went to the flank of the French army, occupied the village of Tarutino, blocking the Kaluga road. gu. In the Tarutino camp, the foundation was laid for the final defeat of the "great army".

When Moscow was on fire, bitterness against the invaders reached its highest intensity. The main forms of the war of the Russian people against the invasion of Napoleon were passive resistance (refusing to trade with the enemy, leaving bread unharvested in the fields, destroying food and fodder, going into the forests), partisan warfare and mass participation in militias. To the greatest extent, the course of the war was influenced by the refusal of the Russian peasantry to supply the enemy with food and fodder. The French army was on the verge of starvation.

From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, traveled about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, her communication lines were greatly stretched. Given this fact, the command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments for operations in the rear and on the enemy’s communication lines, in order to prevent his supply and destroy his small detachments. The most famous, but far from the only commander of the flying detachments was Denis Davydov. Army partisan detachments received comprehensive support from the spontaneous peasant partisan movement. As the French army moved deep into Russia, as violence from the Napoleonic army grew, after the fires in Smolensk and Moscow, after the decrease in discipline in Napoleon's army and the transformation of a significant part of it into a gang of marauders and robbers, the population of Russia began to move from passive to active resistance to the enemy. Only during their stay in Moscow, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from the actions of the partisans.

The partisans constituted, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring was made up of militias. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a dense ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.

Tarutinsky fight

After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov apparently avoided a major battle, the army was building up strength. During this time, a 205,000 militia was recruited in the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others), and 75,000 in Ukraine. By October 2, Kutuzov led the army south to the village of Tarutino closer to Kaluga.

In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap, it was not possible to spend the winter in the city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city was not successful, the stretched communications of the French were very vulnerable, the army was beginning to decompose. Napoleon began to prepare for a retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and the Dvina.

When the "great army" retreated from Moscow, its fate was sealed.

Battle of Tarutino, October 6th (P. Hess)

October 18(according to the new style) Russian troops attacked and defeated near Tarutino Murat's French corps. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers, the French retreated. The battle of Tarutino became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.

Napoleon's retreat

October 19(according to the new style) the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga road. But the road to Kaluga to Napoleon was blocked by Kutuzov's army, located near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned in the area of the village of Troitskoye (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev highway) in order to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga road.

Kutuzov's army by October 22 consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had at hand up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers, the cavalry practically disappeared, the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one.

October 12 (24) took place battle near Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm.On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk.

A. Averyanov. Battle for Maloyaroslavets October 12 (24), 1812

In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic task - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk road.

From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the same road along which it had advanced on Moscow.

The final defeat of the French troops took place at the crossing of the Berezina. The battles of November 26-29 between the French corps and the Russian armies of Chichagov and Wittgenstein on both banks of the Berezina River during the crossing of Napoleon went down in history as battle on the Berezina.

The retreat of the French through the Berezina on November 17 (29), 1812. Peter von Hess (1844)

When crossing the Berezina, Napoleon lost 21 thousand people. In total, up to 60 thousand people managed to cross the Berezina, most of them civilian and non-combatant remnants of the "Great Army". Unusually severe frosts, which hit even during the crossing of the Berezina and continued in the following days, finally destroyed the French, already weakened by hunger. On December 6, Napoleon left his army and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those who died in Russia.

The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in the face of a significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memoirs of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.

By the end of December, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

"Russian campaign of 1812" was over December 14, 1812.

The results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Great Army.Napoleon lost about 580,000 soldiers in Russia. These losses include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland. The losses of the Russian army, according to some estimates, amounted to 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the "Foreign campaign of the Russian army" began - fighting moved to Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France.

The victory over Napoleon as never before raised the international prestige of Russia, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exerted a decisive influence on the affairs of Europe.

Main dates

June 12, 1812- The invasion of Napoleon's army into Russia across the Neman River. 3 Russian armies were at a great distance from each other. Tormasov's army, being in Ukraine, could not participate in the war. It turned out that only 2 armies took the hit. But they had to retreat in order to connect.

August 3rd- the connection of the armies of Bagration and Barclay de Tolly near Smolensk. The enemies lost about 20 thousand, and ours about 6 thousand, but Smolensk had to be left. Even the united armies were 4 times smaller than the enemy!

8 August- Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. An experienced strategist, wounded many times in battles, Suvorov's student fell in love with the people.

August, 26th- The Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours. It is considered a pitched battle. On the outskirts of Moscow, the Russians showed mass heroism. The losses of the enemies were greater, but our army could not go on the offensive. The numerical superiority of the enemies was still great. Reluctantly, they decided to surrender Moscow in order to save the army.

September October- Seat of Napoleon's army in Moscow. His expectations were not met. Failed to win. Kutuzov rejected requests for peace. The attempt to move south failed.

October December- the expulsion of Napoleon's army from Russia along the destroyed Smolensk road. From 600 thousand enemies, about 30 thousand remained!

December 25, 1812- Emperor Alexander I issued a manifesto on the victory of Russia. But the war had to continue. Napoleon had armies in Europe. If they are not defeated, then he will attack Russia again. The foreign campaign of the Russian army lasted until victory in 1814.

Prepared by Sergey Shulyak

INVASION (animated film)

PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812

Causes and nature of the war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the largest event in Russian history. Its emergence was caused by the desire of Napoleon to achieve world domination. In Europe, only Russia and England retained their independence. Despite the Treaty of Tilsit, Russia continued to oppose the expansion of Napoleonic aggression. Napoleon was especially annoyed by her systematic violation of the continental blockade. Since 1810, both sides, realizing the inevitability of a new clash, were preparing for war. Napoleon flooded the Duchy of Warsaw with his troops, created military depots there. The threat of invasion loomed over the borders of Russia. In turn, the Russian government increased the number of troops in the western provinces.

In a military conflict between the two sides, Napoleon became the aggressor. He began hostilities and invaded Russian territory. In this regard, for the Russian people, the war became liberation, Patriotic. It was attended not only by the regular army, but also by the broad masses of the people.

The ratio of forces. Preparing for the war against Russia, Napoleon gathered a significant army - up to 678 thousand soldiers. These were well-armed and trained troops, hardened in previous wars. They were led by a galaxy of brilliant marshals and generals - L. Davout, L. Berthier, M. Ney, I. Murat and others. They were commanded by the most famous commander of the time, "Napoleon Bonaparte. The vulnerability of his army was its motley national composition. German and Spanish , Polish and; Portuguese, Austrian and Italian soldiers were deeply alien to the aggressive plans of the French bourgeoisie.

Active preparations for the war, which Russia has been conducting since 1810, have brought results. She managed to create modern armed forces for that time, powerful artillery, which, as it turned out during the war, was superior to the French. The troops were led by talented military leaders M.I. Kutuzov, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration, A.P. Ermolov, N.N. Raevsky, M.A. Miloradovich and others. They were distinguished by great military experience and personal courage. The advantage of the Russian army was determined by the patriotic enthusiasm of all segments of the population, large human resources, food and fodder supplies.

However, at the initial stage of the war, the French army outnumbered the Russian. The first echelon of troops that entered Russia consisted of 450 thousand people, while the Russians on the western border were about 320 thousand people, divided into three armies. 1st - under the command of M.B. Barclay de Tolly - covered the St. Petersburg direction, 2nd - led by P.I. Bagration - defended the center of Russia, 3rd - General A.P. Tormasov - was located in the southern direction.

Side plans. Napoleon planned to seize a significant part of Russian territory up to Moscow and sign a new treaty with Alexander in order to subjugate Russia. Napoleon's strategic plan rested on his military experience acquired during the wars in Europe. He intended to prevent the dispersed Russian forces from connecting and decide the outcome of the war in one or more frontier battles.

On the eve of the war, the Russian emperor and his entourage decided not to make any compromises with Napoleon. With the successful outcome of the collision, they were going to transfer hostilities to the territory Western Europe. In the event of a defeat, Alexander was ready to retreat to Siberia (up to Kamchatka, according to him), in order to continue the fight from there. Russia had several strategic military plans. One of them was developed by the Prussian General Fuhl. It provided for the concentration of most of the Russian army in a fortified camp near the city of Drissa on the Western Dvina. According to Fuhl, this gave an advantage in the first frontier battle. The project remained unrealized, as the position on Drissa was unfavorable and the fortifications were weak. In addition, the balance of power forced the Russian command to choose an active defense strategy, i.e. retreat with rearguard battles deep into the territory of Russia. As the course of the war showed, this was the most correct decision.

The beginning of the war. On the morning of June 12, 1812, French troops crossed the Neman and forced a march into Russia.

The 1st and 2nd Russian armies retreated, evading the general battle. They fought stubborn rearguard battles with separate units of the French, exhausting and weakening the enemy, inflicting significant losses on him. The two main tasks faced by the Russian troops were to eliminate disunity (not to allow themselves to be defeated one by one) and to establish unity of command in the army. The first problem was solved on July 22, when the 1st and 2nd armies joined near Smolensk. Thus, Napoleon's original plan was thwarted. On August 8, Alexander appointed M.I. Kutuzov Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army. This meant the solution of the second problem. M.I. Kutuzov took command of the combined Russian forces on 17 August. He did not change his retreat tactics. However, the army and the whole country expected a decisive battle from him. Therefore, he gave the order to look for a position for a pitched battle. It was found near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow.

Battle of Borodino. M.I. Kutuzov chose defensive tactics and deployed his troops in accordance with this. The left flank was defended by the army of P.I. Bagration, covered with artificial earth fortifications - flushes. An earth mound was poured in the center, where the artillery and troops of General N.N. Raevsky. Army M.B. Barclay de Tolly was on the right flank.

Napoleon adhered to offensive tactics. He intended to break through the defenses of the Russian army on the flanks, surround it and finally defeat it.

Early on the morning of August 26, the French launched an offensive on the left flank. The battle for flushes continued until 12 noon. Both sides suffered huge losses. General P.I. was seriously wounded. Bagration. (He died of his wounds a few days later.) Taking the fleches did not bring much advantage to the French, since they could not break through the left flank. The Russians retreated in an organized manner and took up a position at the Semenovsky ravine.

At the same time, the situation in the center became more complicated, where Napoleon directed the main blow. To help the troops of General N.N. Raevsky M.I. Kutuzov ordered the Cossacks M.I. Platov and the cavalry corps of F.P. Uvarov to make a raid behind French lines. Napoleon was forced to interrupt the assault on the battery for almost 2 hours. This allowed M.I. Kutuzov to bring fresh forces to the center. Battery N.N. Raevsky several times passed from hand to hand and was captured by the French only at 16 o'clock.

The capture of Russian fortifications did not mean the victory of Napoleon. On the contrary, the offensive impulse of the French army dried up. She needed fresh forces, but Napoleon did not dare to use his last reserve - the imperial guard. The battle, which lasted more than 12 hours, gradually subsided. Losses on both sides were huge. Borodino was a moral and political victory for the Russians: the combat potential of the Russian army was preserved, while that of Napoleon's was significantly weakened. Far from France, in the vast Russian expanses, it was difficult to restore it.

From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets. After Borodino, the Russians began their retreat towards Moscow. Napoleon followed, but did not seek a new battle. On September 1, a military council of the Russian command was held in the village of Fili. M.I. Kutuzov, contrary to the general opinion of the generals, decided to leave Moscow. The French army entered it on September 2, 1812.

M.I. Kutuzov, withdrawing troops from Moscow, carried out an original plan - the Tarutinsky march-maneuver. Retreating from Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army turned sharply to the south and, in the area of Krasnaya Pakhra, reached the old Kaluga road. This maneuver, firstly, prevented the capture by the French of the Kaluga and Tula provinces, where ammunition and food were collected. Secondly, M.I. Kutuzov managed to break away from Napoleon's army. He set up a camp in Tarutino, where the Russian troops rested, replenished with fresh regular units, militia, weapons and food supplies.

The occupation of Moscow did not benefit Napoleon. Abandoned by the inhabitants (an unprecedented event in history), it blazed in the flames of fires. It had no food or other supplies. The French army was completely demoralized and turned into a bunch of robbers and marauders. Its decomposition was so strong that Napoleon had only two options - either immediately make peace, or start a retreat. But all the peace proposals of the French emperor were unconditionally rejected by M.I. Kutuzov and Alexander.

On October 7, the French left Moscow. Napoleon still hoped to defeat the Russians, or at least break through into the unravaged southern regions, since the issue of providing the army with food and fodder was very acute. He moved his troops to Kaluga. On October 12, another bloody battle took place near the city of Maloyaroslavets. Again, neither side achieved a decisive victory. However, the French were stopped and forced to retreat along the Smolensk road they had devastated.

Expulsion of Napoleon from Russia. The retreat of the French army was like a rout. It was accelerated by the unfolding partisan movement and the offensive actions of the Russian troops.

The patriotic upsurge began literally immediately after Napoleon's entry into Russia. Looting and looting by French soldiers provoked resistance from local residents. But this was not the main thing - the Russian people could not put up with the presence of invaders on native land. Names in history ordinary people(A.N. Seslavin, G.M. Kurin, E.V. Chetvertakov, V. Kozhina), who organized partisan detachments. "Flying detachments" of regular army soldiers led by career officers were also sent to the rear of the French.

At the final stage of the war, M.I. Kutuzov chose the tactics of parallel pursuit. He took care of every Russian soldier and understood that the enemy's forces were dwindling every day. The final defeat of Napoleon was planned near the city of Borisov. For this purpose, troops were brought up from the south and northwest. Serious damage was inflicted on the French near Krasny in early November, when more than half of the 50,000 men of the retreating army were taken prisoner or fell in battle. Fearing encirclement, Napoleon hastened to transport his troops on November 14-17 across the Berezina River. The battle at the crossing completed the defeat of the French army. Napoleon abandoned her and secretly left for Paris. Order M.I. Kutuzov in the army on December 21 and the Tsar's Manifesto on December 25, 1812 marked the end of the Patriotic War.

The meaning of war. The Patriotic War of 1812 is the greatest event in Russian history. In its course, heroism, courage, patriotism and selfless love of all sectors of society and especially ordinary people for their own were clearly manifested. Motherland. However, the war caused significant damage to the Russian economy, which was estimated at 1 billion rubles. About 2 million people died. Many western regions of the country were devastated. All this had a huge impact on the further internal development of Russia.

What you need to know about this topic:

Socio-economic development of Russia in the first half of the XIX century. The social structure of the population.

Development of agriculture.

The development of Russian industry in the first half of the XIX century. The formation of capitalist relations. Industrial revolution: essence, background, chronology.

Development of water and highway communications. Start of railway construction.

Aggravation of socio-political contradictions in the country. The palace coup of 1801 and the accession to the throne of Alexander I. "The days of Alexander's are a wonderful beginning."

Peasant question. Decree "on free cultivators". Government measures in the field of education. State activity M.M. Speransky and his plan of state reforms. Creation of the State Council.

Russia's participation in anti-French coalitions. Treaty of Tilsit.

Patriotic War of 1812. International relations on the eve of the war. Causes and beginning of the war. The balance of forces and military plans of the parties. M.B. Barclay de Tolly. P.I.Bagration. M.I.Kutuzov. Stages of the war. The results and significance of the war.

Foreign campaigns of 1813-1814 Congress of Vienna and its decisions. Holy Union.

The internal situation of the country in 1815-1825. Strengthening of conservative sentiments in Russian society. A.A. Arakcheev and Arakcheevshchina. military settlements.

Foreign policy tsarism in the first quarter of the 19th century.

The first secret organizations of the Decembrists were the Union of Salvation and the Union of Welfare. Northern and Southern society. The main program documents of the Decembrists are "Russian Truth" by P.I. Pestel and "Constitution" by N.M. Muravyov. Death of Alexander I. Interregnum. Uprising December 14, 1825 in St. Petersburg. The uprising of the Chernigov regiment. Investigation and trial of the Decembrists. Significance of the Decembrist uprising.

The beginning of the reign of Nicholas I. Strengthening autocratic power. Further centralization, bureaucratization of the Russian state system. Strengthening repressive measures. Creation of the III branch. censorship statute. The era of censorship terror.

Codification. M.M. Speransky. Reform of the state peasants. P.D. Kiselev. Decree "on obligated peasants".

Polish uprising 1830-1831

The main directions of Russian foreign policy in the second quarter of the XIX century.

Eastern question. Russo-Turkish War 1828-1829 The problem of the straits in the foreign policy of Russia in the 30-40s of the XIX century.

Russia and the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in Europe.

Crimean War. International relations on the eve of the war. Reasons for the war. The course of hostilities. Russia's defeat in the war. Peace of Paris 1856. International and domestic consequences of the war.

Accession of the Caucasus to Russia.

The formation of the state (imamate) in the North Caucasus. Muridism. Shamil. Caucasian war. Significance of joining the Caucasus to Russia.

Social thought and social movement in Russia in the second quarter of the 19th century.

Formation of government ideology. The theory of official nationality. Mugs of the late 20s - early 30s of the XIX century.

Circle of N.V. Stankevich and German idealistic philosophy. A.I. Herzen's circle and utopian socialism. "Philosophical letter" P.Ya.Chaadaev. Westerners. Moderate. Radicals. Slavophiles. M.V. Butashevich-Petrashevsky and his circle. The theory of "Russian socialism" A.I. Herzen.

Socio-economic and political prerequisites for bourgeois reforms in the 60-70s of the XIX century.

Peasant reform. Preparing for reform. "Regulations" February 19, 1861 Personal liberation of the peasants. Allotments. Ransom. duties of the peasants. Temporary state.

Zemstvo, judicial, city reforms. financial reforms. Reforms in the field of education. censorship rules. military reforms. Significance of bourgeois reforms.

Socio-economic development of Russia second half of XIX V. The social structure of the population.

Industry development. Industrial revolution: essence, background, chronology. The main stages in the development of capitalism in industry.

The development of capitalism in agriculture. Rural community in post-reform Russia. The agrarian crisis of the 80-90s of the XIX century.

Social movement in Russia in the 50-60s of the XIX century.

Social movement in Russia in the 70-90s of the XIX century.

The revolutionary populist movement of the 70s - early 80s of the XIX century.

"Land and Freedom" of the 70s of the XIX century. "Narodnaya Volya" and "Black Repartition". The assassination of Alexander II March 1, 1881 The collapse of the "Narodnaya Volya".

Labor movement in the second half of the 19th century. Striking fight. The first workers' organizations. The emergence of a work question. factory law.

Liberal populism in the 80-90s of the XIX century. Spread of the ideas of Marxism in Russia. Group "Emancipation of Labor" (1883-1903). The emergence of Russian social democracy. Marxist circles of the 80s of the XIX century.

Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. V.I. Ulyanov. "Legal Marxism".

Political reaction of the 80-90s of the XIX century. The era of counter-reforms.

Alexander III. Manifesto on the "immutability" of the autocracy (1881). The policy of counter-reforms. Results and significance of counter-reforms.

International position Russia after Crimean War. Changing the foreign policy program of the country. The main directions and stages of Russia's foreign policy in the second half of the 19th century.

Russia in the system international relations after the Franco-Prussian War. Union of three emperors.

Russia and the Eastern crisis of the 70s of the XIX century. Goals of Russia's policy in the Eastern question. Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878: causes, plans and forces of the parties, the course of hostilities. San Stefano Peace Treaty. Berlin Congress and its decisions. The role of Russia in the liberation of the Balkan peoples from the Ottoman yoke.

Foreign policy of Russia in the 80-90s of the XIX century. Formation of the Triple Alliance (1882). Deterioration of Russia's relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary. The conclusion of the Russian-French alliance (1891-1894).

Buganov V.I., Zyryanov P.N. History of Russia: the end of the 17th - 19th centuries. . - M.: Enlightenment, 1996.

Beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812

The beginning of the war

June 12, 1812 (old style) Napoleon's French army, having crossed the Neman near the city of Kovno (now it is the city of Kaunas in Lithuania), invaded the Russian Empire. This day is recorded in history as the beginning of the war between Russia and France.

In this war, two forces clashed. On the one hand, Napoleon's half-million army (about 640,000 men), which consisted of only half the French and included, in addition to them, representatives of almost all of Europe. An army intoxicated with numerous victories, led by famous marshals and generals, led by Napoleon. The strengths of the French army were large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, and faith in the invincibility of the army.

She was opposed by the Russian army, which at the beginning of the war represented one-third of the French army. Before the start of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian-Turkish war of 1806-1812 had just ended. The Russian army was divided into three groups far apart from each other (under the command of Generals M. B. Barclay de Tolly, P. I. Bagration and A. P. Tormasov). Alexander I was at the headquarters of Barclay's army.

The blow of Napoleon's army was taken over by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration (a total of 153 thousand soldiers).

The armies of Barclay and Bagration met near Smolensk at the end of July, thus achieving the first strategic success.

Battle for Smolensk

Battle for Smolensk. Adam, circa 1820

The stubborn battle for Smolensk lasted 2 days, until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew troops from the burning city in order to avoid a big battle with no chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration's army). After the capture of Smolensk, Napoleon moved to Moscow.

Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russian army. But the steadfastness of the Russian troops, where every soldier, officer, general was a hero, overturned all the calculations of the French commander. The fight went on all day. Losses were huge on both sides. The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their composition. There were almost no prisoners on either side. French losses amounted to 58 thousand people, Russian - 45 thousand.

Cavalry fight

A.K. Savrasov. The hut in which the famous council in Fili was held

Military Council in Fili (A. D. Kivshenko, 1880)

Capture of Moscow

Fire in Moscow on September 15-18, 1812 after the capture of the city by Napoleon. Painting by A.F. Smirnova, 1813

Tarutinsky fight

When the "great army" retreated from Moscow, its fate was sealed.

Napoleon's retreat

October 12 (24) took place battle near Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk.

From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the same road along which it had advanced on Moscow.

The retreat of the French through the Berezina on November 17 (29), 1812. Peter von Hess (1844)

By the end of December, the remnants of Napoleon's army were expelled from Russia.

The results of the war

The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Great Army. Napoleon lost about 580,000 soldiers in Russia. These losses include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland. The losses of the Russian army, according to some estimates, amounted to 210 thousand soldiers and militias.

In January 1813, the "Foreign campaign of the Russian army" began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated at the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France.

Main dates

8 August- Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief. An experienced strategist, wounded many times in battles, Suvorov's student fell in love with the people.

September October- Seat of Napoleon's army in Moscow. His expectations were not met. Failed to win. Kutuzov rejected requests for peace. The attempt to move south failed.

October December- the expulsion of Napoleon's army from Russia along the destroyed Smolensk road. From 600 thousand enemies, about 30 thousand remained!

Perception of the events of the Patriotic War of 1812 by the Russian common people

The theme of the perception of the events of the war of 1812 by contemporaries remains one of the least developed in the extensive historiography of this event. The focus continues to be exclusively on the military and political aspects of the topic.

This problem has been of interest for a long time. Back in 1882, N.F. Dubrovin spoke about the need to create a non-military history of 1812, in 1895 he published a number of interesting articles on the perception of Napoleon by Russian society early XIX V.

In 1893, on the pages of the Russian Starina magazine, V.A. Bilbasov wrote that it is especially interesting for history to study the influence of the war of 1812 on contemporaries (both on representatives of the educated class and on the common people), the most valuable material on this problem is contained in numerous memoirs of the era. In the famous seven-volume book "Patriotic War and Russian Society", which was created with the participation of more than 60 prominent Russian historians, only a few articles contained material on the perception of the events of the Patriotic War by Russian contemporaries (an educated society). Almost nothing was said about the attitude towards the war of the bulk of the population (the peasantry, the common people in the cities, the semi-educated urban society), only information was given about the anti-serf uprisings of 1812, as well as some general arguments about the “people in 1812”, which were not based on to sources.

Until the revolution of 1917, according to the prominent historian K.A. Voensky, the "everyday" history of 1812 remained completely undeveloped.

In the Soviet period, the theme of the Patriotic War of 1812 remained unclaimed until 1937. In the 1920s, the theory of “historian number one” M.N. Pokrovsky, voiced in his "History of Russia in the most concise essay", as well as in the collection "Diplomacy and wars of tsarist Russia in the 19th century". The author, as he himself admitted, basically "turned the face of literature", he portrayed the war of 1812 as a struggle between reactionary Russia and the progressive Napoleonic army, the bearer of democratic principles. The people in 1812 thought only of the liberation and overthrow of the hated regime. In the same spirit, the work of Z. and G. Gukovsky "Peasants in 1812" was written.

From the end of the 1930s, and especially after 1951, Soviet historians actually revived the monarchical myth about the people during the Patriotic War of 1812, only without the king. The people acted as a faceless gray mass, doing nothing but performing patriotic deeds.

Of the works related to the topic of the perception of the war of 1812 by contemporaries, two articles were published in the Soviet period, devoted to the educated Russian society.

From latest research only one article can be noted, also devoted to the reflection of the events of 1812 in the minds of an educated society (based on letters from contemporaries). The bulk of Russians in 1812 again remained out of sight of researchers. As far as we know, there are no special studies of the problem of the perception of the war of 1812 by the common people.

The main source for studying the Russian common people in 1812 are the memoirs of Russians and foreigners. Among the memoirs of the Russian educated society, there is very little information about the people, since the memoirists had almost no contact with them and, as a rule, did not consider the “rabble” worthy of their attention. A typical example is the famous memoirs of A.T. Bolotov, who left one of the largest memoirs of the epoch of the 18th - early 19th centuries. (completely not yet published). As soon as in his notes it comes to the “mob”, “vile people”, the author immediately says that everything related to this “does not deserve any attention”. As Bolotov himself points out, he first became acquainted with the "Russian people" in 1762, when he rounded up all his peasants to equip the garden. The nobles of 1812 did not know their people at all, revolving exclusively in a narrow circle of an elected society - for example, the landowner M.A. Volkova in 1812 first became acquainted with the provincial society (Tambov), this happened due to extreme military circumstances that forced her to leave Moscow. Also as a result of this move, she gained some insight into the "people" by watching the warriors from the window of her house.

Of the memoirs of an educated society, the memoirs of Muscovite A. Ryazantsev, who survived the entire period of the occupation of the capital and left detailed notes about this time, are of the greatest interest for research. The author himself was very close to the urban common people, in 1812 he was 14 years old, he studied at the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy. His memoirs draw a detailed portrait of Moscow in 1812: the author used many records of peasant conversations, dialogues between the Moscow common people and residents of villages near Moscow, described in detail the situation in Moscow under the French, and provided valuable data on contacts between the local population and the enemy.

In addition, some curious information about the masses of the people in 1812 is scattered throughout the extensive memoirs of other representatives of the educated Russian class, of particular interest are synchronistic sources - diaries and letters.

The main source for studying our topic is the memoirs of the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812: soldiers, peasants, courtyards, poor merchants and lower-ranking priests. Unfortunately, the tradition of writing memoirs among the bulk of Russian contemporaries of 1812 was completely absent: in the entire 18th century, only 250 Russians left memoirs, of which only one peasant. The memoirs created by the representatives of the common people themselves in 1812 are an extremely rare phenomenon, as a rule, their memoirs have come down to us in the form of records of oral stories.

We know one memoir of a soldier in 1812 and two memoirs of 1839 from the words of a private and a non-commissioned officer who participated in the Battle of Borodino. "Notes" by Pamfiliya Nazarov is the rarest memoir written by a soldier in 1812. The author is completely alien to any historical or ideological assessments of the events of 1812-1814, he is poorly aware of the importance of what he experienced. In form, these are notes for himself and a narrow circle of relatives, which he wrote in 1836 at the end of his service life. The publishers of "Russian Antiquity" noted the uniqueness of this source, which "does not resemble anything."

The works of I.N. Skobelev, published in the 1830-1840s. In the 1800s, the author served in the lower ranks for more than four years, subsequently rising to the rank of general, a participant in the Patriotic War (with the rank of captain). Contemporaries quite reasonably asserted that he knew the Russian soldier like no one else. In his works “Soldier's Correspondence of 1812” and “Stories of a Russian Armless Disabled Man”, the author describes the events of the Patriotic War on behalf of a simple soldier. These books contain the most valuable material: this is the soldier's language of the era of 1812 and the peculiarities of the perception of the war by Russian soldiers, transmitted by Skobelev.

Of particular interest are the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko - in 1803-1824. Serf Count Sheremetyev, later a professor at St. Petersburg University and a prominent official of the Ministry of Public Education. The author describes in detail the life and customs of serfs, the provincial society of Russia in the 1800-1820s.

The most valuable material on the topic was collected in the 1860s - 1880s. writer E.V. Novosiltseva (pseudonym T. Tolycheva). She focused on collecting memories of 1812 among the common people, as a result of searches in Moscow and Smolensk, she collected unique memories of witnesses of the Patriotic War living out their lives from peasants, former serfs and courtyards, merchants and clergy. In total, she managed to record the memoirs of 33 witnesses to the war of 1812. In 1894, Novosiltseva created a work for the people "The Old Woman's Tale of the Twelfth Year" - a story about the events of 1812 from the beginning of the invasion to the expulsion of Napoleon from Russia, where the story is told in the first person. As Novosiltseva pointed out in the preface, the information given in the book was not fictitious, all of it was gleaned by her during a survey of her contemporaries in 1812 from the people, many of the memoirs collected by the author were not published, but were reflected in this book.

An analysis of the memoirs published by Novosiltseva shows that the original notes were stylistically and systematically reworked to give them a more coherent and literary look.

In 1912, on the centenary of the Patriotic War, interesting memoirs and legends of the inhabitants of the Smolensk province about the period of the Napoleonic invasion were published in the Smolensk Diocesan Gazette, based on materials from local archives, as well as on the basis of questions from old-timers. It is also worth noting the records of the memoirs of three peasants published in 1869, witnesses of the crossing of Napoleon's army across the Berezina, which, unfortunately, are extremely short and uninformative.

Rumors were the main source of information about the war for most Russians in 1812 (both educated society and commoners). Important role printed materials were played, on their basis some rumors were formed that circulated among the people; during the Patriotic War, the indirect influence of the press on the population was quite significant. It is impossible to clearly separate the influence of oral and printed sources of information on Russians, since both sources were closely related.

More or less reliable information about the war of 1812 was provided by printed materials. Their use presupposes the ability to read, and the level of literacy in Russia in 1812 was negligible. The most detailed study of literacy in Russia, closest to the period under study, took place in 1844; 735,874 people were surveyed. :

estate	Number of respondents	Total literate %


State peasants
Church peasants
Landlord peasants
Yard people (in cities)

Thus, only 3.6% of all respondents were literate and semi-literate. In France, even towards the end of the Old Order (1788-1789) total number At least 40% of the population was literate (52% of men and about 27% of women), during the Revolution and especially under Napoleon, many new schools were opened, education was provided free of charge, or for the most moderate fee.

Under Alexander I, they talked a lot about "enlightenment", but all the achievements in this environment were exclusively in words: the total number of secular students educational institutions Russia increased from 46 thousand (1808) to 69 thousand (1824), the numbers are so insignificant that it is hardly worth mentioning them! For comparison - in 12 million Prussia in 1819, more than 1.5 million people studied in elementary secular schools alone (already then almost All population school age received an education), in 1830 this number exceeded 2.2 million people.

in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. up to 2.8 million people lived in cities, the main population of cities were philistines, merchants and courtyards, as can be seen from the table, their level of education was approximately the same, on average about 30% of them knew how to read, this amounted to 750 thousand people per the whole empire. Average level literacy among peasants did not exceed 3%, or about 1 million people. So, the number of literate people in the cities in 1812 was almost equal to the number of literate people throughout the rest of Russia.

In addition, bookstores were located exclusively in cities (in 1811, out of 115 bookstores, 85 were located in Moscow and St. Petersburg), it was possible to subscribe to time-based publications. In addition to total illiteracy, the most important obstacle to the distribution of printed matter was its high cost and, of course, the poverty of the population: in 1812, as can be seen from the advertisements placed in the St. 5-7 rubles, and the price of an annual subscription to a newspaper or magazine is 15-20 rubles, amounts unthinkable for most Russians. For clarity, we will give information about the earnings of residents of territories that were invaded by Napoleonic troops (although these data refer to the 1840s, they almost correspond to the realities of 1812): in a fairly rich Moscow province, a farmer earned an average of 35-47 rubles. per year, in the Vitebsk province - 12-20 rubles, less often - 36 rubles, in Smolensk - 10-15 rubles, very rarely - up to 40 rubles. (women and teenagers were paid several times less); the majority of urban residents (philistines) at that time did not have a regular income, their incomes were extremely low; in the most privileged position were Moscow coachmen, who received up to 20-30 rubles. per month (240-360 rubles per year), as well as watchmen and janitors, who earned 100-130 rubles each. per month, but the latter constituted an extremely small part of the population.

Domestic books had the least influence on the population. According to researchers, the total number of active readers of Russia in 1820 was only 50 thousand people, or less than 0.1% of the population of the Empire. The number of publications was extremely small, they hardly touched on any topical topics, most of them were novels. In the most educated Moscow in 1803, only about 20 thousand books were sold with a population of 250 thousand people, that is, one book for ten people. Presumably, the greatest influence on the common people of the era of the Patriotic War had short essay F.V. Rostopchin “Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch of the Russian nobleman Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev”, published in 1807 and sold in an unprecedented circulation of 7 thousand copies. As far as we know, this is the most circulated work of secular literature of that time, moreover, it is one of the few books addressed to the people. The work is a monologue of a tipsy nobleman trying to speak in a "folk style". In fact, this is a continuous abuse against the French and their imitators, where the French are presented as worthless and insignificant people. The book contributed to the maintenance of frivolous and hatred moods among the people. During the campaign of 1812, only a few propaganda books about the war were published, they initially focused on the upper strata of society, in general, their influence was negligible.

More or less up-to-date information about the events was provided by the periodical press. Due to censorship restrictions (despite the liberal censorship charter of 1804), she also hardly touched on topical topics, in fact she had no right to express her point of view on anything. The situation as a whole almost corresponded to the words of L.V. Dubelt on the rights of the periodical press, said in a conversation with F.V. Bulgarin in 1826: “The theater, exhibitions, guest houses, flea markets, taverns, confectioneries - this is your area, and not a step further!”

In 1801-1806. in Russia there were only 27 newspapers and magazines, by 1810 - 60, by 1824 - 67 (of which only 33 were in Russian). The most circulation time-based publications during this period were the newspaper Severnaya Pochta, which had 1768 subscribers in 1810, by 1816 - 2306 people, the journal Vestnik Evropy with a circulation of 1200 copies. (1802), by 1820 this figure had dropped to 1,000 copies. The popular patriotic magazine of S. N. Glinka "Russian Messenger" in 1811 had only 750 subscribers (300 of them in Moscow). Other publications were issued in microscopic editions. Under Alexander I, the newspaper "Russian Invalid" had the largest circulation - 4 thousand copies (1821). In general, the reading audience of the Russian periodical press was very small, however, as already mentioned, it had an indirect influence on the common people.

In Russian villages in 1812, newspapers and magazines met, here literate people read them in the presence of the entire population. It should be emphasized that the trust in printed word the then commoners had a huge. In 1807-1812. for political reasons, the government diligently concealed its contradictions with France, only brief correspondence appeared on the pages of newspapers, reporting, as a rule, on the successes of the French. Extremely valuable evidence of the influence of the press on the common people is contained in the secret report of the head of the office of the Special Department of the Ministry of Police M.Ya. von Fock (dated May 15, 1812): “unenlightened people living inside the Empire, and especially the middle class and commoners, who are accustomed to considering everything that is printed as undeniable truth, become discouraged and hear only about victories and conquests Napoleon, who enslaves all peoples, lose their spirit of vivacity, especially in remote cities and villages, where every sexton and clerk is a luminary and every printed line is a Gospel.

Information from the pre-war press about the successes of Napoleon caused panic among the Russian population, the rumors generated by them, which greatly exaggerated everything, convinced many common people that the enemy was invincible.

During the war Russian newspapers and magazines placed official news from the army about the course of hostilities, letters, captured documents (rarely), correspondence from different places, translations foreign articles. In journalistic articles, the enemy was humiliated in every possible way, often in a rude way, the idea was carried out about the superiority of everything Russian over foreign. During 1812, the main printed source of information about the war was flying leaflets published by the army's field printing house and sent to officials, the texts of these leaflets were reprinted by newspapers and published as supplements (often in a distorted form). In total, in July-December 1812, about 80 such leaflets were issued. They contained daily records of the movements of the army, military clashes, enemy losses and trophies (always greatly exaggerated), from the autumn of 1812 they described the plight of the French army.

It was difficult for a simple person to delve into the text of many leaflets published in the summer - early autumn of 1812, since they contained a lot of meaningless titles settlements, many names unknown to him. Leaflets were read publicly in large crowds. DI. Zavalishin recalled how the governor of Vologda read the news about military operations, and the people listened to him and sobbed. All that could be understood was that the Russian army was retreating, and from October 1812 it was advancing.

In Moscow, the posters of F.V. Rostopchin, the printed appeals of the governor to the residents, written in a folk style, they very much resembled the chatter of the tipsy Sila Andreevich Bogatyrev. In total, the researchers identified 57 Moscow “posters” created in July-December 1812, of which 23 are attributed to F. V. Rostopchin. The author reassured and encouraged the inhabitants, assuring them that the enemy was about to be defeated, sneered at the French, sometimes recounted the content of official news about military operations, and cited astronomical figures about the number of Russian troops. Posters were famous not only in Moscow.

As early as 1811, a wide variety of rumors about the coming war with Napoleon were circulating among the Russian common people, and quite reliable information was circulating among the mass of absurdities that England and Sweden would help Russia. However, it was not political news that had the greatest influence on the Russians of that time, but the famous comet of 1811, which began to pay close attention from August. Here is what D.I. wrote about this. Zavalishin, who lived at that time in Tver: “It was in August and, therefore, when we went to church, it was still very light. But towards the end of the vigil, but even before the time when the people dispersed, there was an unusual movement on the porch at the door of the church. Somehow people would come out and come in again, and as they went in, they sighed heavily and began to pray fervently. Finally, the time came to leave the church, but the first ones to leave stopped, and the crowd thickened so that it was impossible to squeeze through it. And those standing behind, having lost patience, began to loudly ask: “What is it there? Why don't they come?" The answer was: "Star". Little by little, however, the crowd dispersed, so that we, too, could go out almost behind everyone and saw the famous comet of 1811 directly in front of us.

The next day, even before sunset, people began to go out into the street and look at the place where yesterday they saw the rising of a star. At twilight, our square was almost completely crowded with people, so that it was very difficult not only for the carriages to pass, but also to push through on foot. In place of yesterday's appearance of the star, however, there was a black cloud. Despite all this, the people did not leave, but persisted in waiting. In other parts of the sky it was clear and there were already small stars. But as soon as 9 o'clock struck, the cloud seemed to settle under the horizon, and yesterday's star appeared in an even more formidable form. As if on cue, everyone took off their hats and crossed themselves. I heard heavy, where suppressed, where loud sighs. For a long time they stood in silence. But then one woman fell into hysterics, others sobbed, a conversation began, then loud exclamations: “It’s true, the Lord was angry with Russia”, “They sinned in a wrong way, well, they waited,” etc. Comparisons began: who said that the tail of a comet this is a bunch of rods, who likened a broom to sweep all the lies out of Russia, etc. Since then, the people crowded the streets every evening, and the star became more and more terrible. Rumors began about the end of the world, about the fact that Napoleon is the predicted Antichrist, indicated directly in the Apocalypse under the name of Apollyon.

Interesting information about the comet of 1811 was recorded by a contemporary of the Patriotic War, Muscovite Pyotr Kicheev (according to "Annuaire pour l'an 1832"): the light from this comet at the moment of the highest voltage was equal to 1/10 of the light of the full moon, on October 15, 1811 the comet approached Earth at a minimum distance (47 million leagues), the diameter of its core was 1089 leagues, and the length of the tail reached 41 million leagues (172 million 200 thousand versts). In the vault of heaven, the comet occupied up to 23 degrees. Kicheev also noted the great impression made by the comet on Muscovites.

An inexperienced Russian in 1812 was convinced that war is God's punishment, therefore, it cannot depend on the tricks of diplomats and the will of individuals; he tried to unravel the traces of its approach and its course by various signs (the comet of 1811, frequent fires, etc.). During the war, the Russians tried to find answers to all questions in the most revered and authoritative source - the Bible. D. Zavalishin recalled how the inhabitants of the province came to people who had a Slavic Bible and asked them what was written there about Bonaparte and what he would do with Russia, deeply convinced that all this was described there. In 1812, various predictions, revelations, descriptions of signs, etc., became extremely widespread among the people.

The Muscovite A. Ryazantsev left the most detailed notes on the reaction of the common people to the invasion: after the news of the declaration of war, the people of Moscow gathered in the square and began to reason. First of all, it was unanimously decided that war was God's punishment and that one should pray fervently, and one merchant said that he had long smelled something was wrong: and the porridge in his pot was cooking wrong, and brownie got naughty and the cat Vaska began to look unkindly. Fables about the French began to spread intensively, here is one of them: “The French, leaving the Christian faith, turned into idolatry, invented some kind of god Egghead and slavishly worship him, that this blockhead Egghead ordered them all to be equal and free, forbade them to believe in the true God and not recognize any earthly authorities. The idolaters, obeying their idol, rebelled, plundered their churches and turned them into places of entertainment, destroyed civil laws and, to complete their atrocities, killed their innocent, good, lawful king. This description French Revolution almost verbatim coincides with the description of F.V. Rostopchin from the mentioned book "Thoughts aloud on the Red Porch ...", which is why it is more or less plausible, here we are dealing with the indirect influence of his work, which confirms its importance for the formation of public opinion. Or: “The French surrendered themselves to the Antichrist, chose his son Appolion as their commander, a wizard who, by the course of the stars, determines, predicts the future, knows when to start and when to end the war, moreover, has a wife, a sorceress who speaks firearms that are opposed to her husband why the French come out victorious. E.V. Novosiltseva wrote down some folk legends in 1812, which said that the French were afraid of the cross, etc. A. Ryazantsev recalled that in the summer of 1812, from everything he heard, his “young fantastic imagination painted the French not as people, but as some kind of monsters with wide mouth, huge fangs, bloodshot eyes with a copper forehead and an iron body, from which, like peas from a wall, bullets bounce off, and bayonets and sabers break like torches. At the end of August 1812, he went to look at a group of prisoners of war who had arrived in Moscow to make sure "whether the enemy soldiers really do not look like people, but like terrible monsters?" . Almost all of Moscow gathered to look at the prisoners.

In the described rumors, the worldview of the Russians is clearly traced - a bizarre mixture of pagan and Christian ideas. The pagan element seems to be stronger. This is most clearly confirmed by the following example: a Moscow janitor explained the cause of death of the French cavalrymen killed by the Cossacks as follows: they were strangled by the brownie, because they did not pray to God when they went to bed. A.T. Bolotov was convinced that the majority of Russian peasants remained pagans. A.V. Nikitenko, having visited the village of Timokhovka in the Mogilev province in the summer of 1839, wrote in his diary that local peasants go to pray to the gods and gods.

Oil was added to the fire by official propaganda, in 1812 the Synod, as before in 1807, obediently proclaimed Napoleon the Antichrist; for propaganda in the army, professor at Dorpat University V. Getzel sent M.B. Barclay de Tolly, an article in which he argued that Napoleon is the Antichrist, he proposed to distribute its content among the soldiers. For the French, this had the most unfortunate consequences. Among the Russian common people and soldiers, the Great Army was perceived in the most literal sense as the army of the devil. I.N. Skobelev in "Soldier's Correspondence of 1812" calls Napoleon "the warlock Bounaparte", Napoleonic soldiers - "sorcerers", describing the retreat of the Napoleonic army, he writes that Napoleon calculated when to retreat "according to his black (i.e. witchcraft - L.A.) books.

Repeatedly distorted and completely ridiculous rumors reached the provinces, a resident of the Smolensk province F.I. Levitsky recalled: “It was terrible in Moscow, and it was even more terrible in county towns and villages. Something that was not told by the people! You used to hear enough of these rumors, so you won’t fall asleep at night. ” Many residents were sure that the French... eat people! Back in 1807, when Napoleon was first declared the Antichrist by the Synod, one captured Russian officer asked the French not to eat his subordinates! Such absurd statements were based on primitive counter-revolutionary propaganda, in every possible way depicting that in France since 1793 almost the end of the world had come. F.V. Rostopchin in "Thoughts aloud ..." claimed that the French during the revolution fried people and ate! F.N. Glinka seriously believed that the French during the revolution unnecessarily “killed, fried and ate many of their mayors. Their own history is not silent about this. Colonel M.M. Petrov believed that the French during the revolution guillotined millions their compatriots. Peasant woman Agafya Ignatieva of the village of Volti (Smolensk province) recalled that in 1812 she was sure that the French would eat her (she was then 9 years old), all peasant children thought so. Meanwhile, the French (natural French, not their allies) almost never offended children and treated them very kindly. In a number of settlements, nothing was known about the war at all. This was due to the fact that in 1812, on the territory of Belarus and central Russia (the main theater of military operations), the vast majority of villages were located far from roads, population migration was minimal, many villages were in impenetrable wilderness, where no stranger had ever set foot. in Russia at the beginning of the 19th century. the bulk of the population had absolutely no experience of communicating with foreigners, the enemy did not appear on the primordially Russian territories for almost 200 years, which was quite rightly pointed out by M.I. Kutuzov in a conversation with the French ambassador Lauriston in the autumn of 1812. Russian peasants lived in isolation and traditionally, everything new was decidedly alien to them. As can be seen from a number of memoirs, for many residents of the Russian hinterland, meeting with a Napoleonic soldier was an event more surprising than meeting with an alien for modern man. As we showed above, the imagination of the peasants was fueled by the most monstrous rumors about the enemy, very often it is fear before the enemy as such forced them to leave their homes. The Napoleonic officer, Italian C. Laugier, in his diary describes the occupation of Smolensk by the Great Army - the locals mostly fled, those who remained hid in churches and prayed earnestly, hoping that the holy place would protect them from the enemy. The Italian soldiers who entered the church, wishing to distribute food to them, were themselves dumbfounded with fear, when those who were there began to utter wild cries of horror, it was truly animal fear .

In August 1812, a deaconess from the village of Novy Dvor (Smolensk province), having seen the French cavalrymen, lost consciousness and did not recover for a long time, she was introduced to Napoleon, and she, trembling, continuously crossed herself and prayed, convinced that the French were devils out of hell .

Of course, not all representatives of the common people perceived the French so primitively: an old peasant woman from the village of Staraya Rusa (80 miles from Moscow) was not afraid of the French, saying: “They won’t touch me, an old woman. And what profit would they have to kill me? After all, they are not animals either.

Kuzma Egorovich Shmatikov, a resident of Smolensk, tells how the people perceived the war of 1812 in their own way, as he describes the assault on Smolensk in August 1812: “I can’t tell you what fear we were in, because until then we hadn’t assumed how the city would be taken. Well, let's say we were children and there were all women around us. Yes, some men reasoned no smarter than us: they thought that the armies would go one against the other in a fistfight. Many climbed up the trees to watch it.” Comments are generally unnecessary here. When Napoleon's army entered Moscow, crowds of people for about two hours (exactly the French troops entered the capital) argued whether it was the Swedes or the British who came to our aid.

Having processed a large array of materials, we came to the conclusion that the behavior of the inhabitants of central Russia during 1812 can be divided into four main types: 1) panic; 2) perfect calmness and arrogant hatred moods; 3) the desire to throw off the serf yoke, the hope for the help of Bonaparte; 4) absolute ignorance or indifference. Arrogant moods, the belief in absolute superiority over the enemy were extremely common among the people, especially in territories that had not been invaded. Similar sentiments were even among the most educated segments of the population, the commander-in-chief of the 2nd Western Army P.I. Bagration was deeply convinced that the French would be defeated instantly, on June 8, 1812, he wrote to the tsar, begging him to allow the Russians to advance and invade Poland themselves. Many other memoirs also record similar hatred moods, they were actively supported by the press, especially Rostopchin's posters. Grandfather P. Kicheev firmly believed them and therefore remained in Moscow, one Moscow priest on the very day of the surrender of Moscow laughed at his wife, who claimed that there were French in the city, his argument was as follows: “You believe the deacon, but you don’t believe the governor-general!” When the French came to his house, he fell silent and tore up the poster.

I must say that such moods instantly disappeared with the approach of the enemy, impudent self-confidence was instantly replaced by panic and apathy, which is described in detail in the memoirs.

In Russia in 1812 there were many people who thought about the possibility of freeing themselves from the serfdom, the war provided a good opportunity for this. In 1812, the serfs made up about 44% of the population of the Empire (23 million people), the living conditions of the majority of the serfs were monstrous both materially and morally. Recently, the realities of serfdom have been actively hushed up in historiography, trying in every possible way to embellish it. The most detailed and accurate life of the serfs of the early XIX century. described in the memoirs of A.V. Nikitenko, it is supplemented by the memoirs of the surgeon F. Mercier, who spent two years in Russian captivity. The vast majority of Russian landowners were small landlords and owned, as a rule, several dozen peasants, and in order to live “decently for their rank”, they needed hundreds, or even thousands of rubles a year. Knowing the size of the earnings of the peasants (see above), it is easy to calculate that the serf gave most of the money earned to the landowner, who sucked all the juice out of him. Add to this the robbery of estate managers, whom no one actually controlled, oppression by wealthy peasants, etc. For thinking people, such as Father A.V. Nikitenko, the most terrible thing in their position was the complete lack of rights and the terrible humiliations associated with it, to which this noble man was subjected until his death. The following figure gives an idea of the scope of the atrocities committed by the landowners against the serfs: only in 1834-45. 2838 landlords were brought to trial for cruel treatment of peasants, of which 630 were convicted. At the same time, the vast majority of the crimes of the landowners remained unpunished.

According to historians, only for 1796-1825. more than 1,200 major peasant uprisings took place in Russia, these figures are far from complete. Since 1961, it is believed that in 1812 there were 60-67 anti-serf uprisings, this figure is greatly underestimated and needs to be clarified. Here, information about uprisings in the occupied territories, which were most affected by the anti-serfdom movement, is almost completely ignored. As contemporaries note, in particular, Brigadier General of the Great Army Dedem de Gelder, quartermaster of the Vitebsk province A. Pastore (an official of the French occupation administration), who acted in the rear of the French partisans A.Kh. Benckendorff, all Belarus (the territories of the Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev provinces) was engulfed in an anti-serfdom fire, the peasants here rebelled against their landowners everywhere.

Sometimes anti-serf uprisings took place "not without instigation from the enemy", such as a major uprising on the Baryshnikov estate in the Dorogobuzh district.

Hatred of the nobles continued to smolder among the people; only 37 years had passed since the time of the Pugachevshchina in 1812. The nobles themselves instinctively felt this hatred and were extremely afraid of it. It is impossible to estimate the scope of anti-serfdom sentiments in 1812 by the number of uprisings; it is clear from the memoirs that the hope for freedom from Bonaparte was extremely widespread. A memoirist from the Moscow common people heard with his own ears from the peasants near Moscow who were ordered to prepare horses in the bar: “How! We will prepare horses about the master's good. Bonaparte will come, he will give us freedom, but we don’t want to know the gentlemen anymore! Former serf A.A. Sazonova recalled that “the people grumbled at the gentlemen very much”, Muscovite G.Ya. Kozlovsky, who survived the occupation of Moscow, claimed that he was much more afraid of Russian peasants than the French. D.M. Volkonsky, in his diary on September 10, 1812, noted with horror that the people were already ready for excitement. Marshal L.G. Saint-Cyr was absolutely right when he wrote that the war of 1812 demonstrated the internal weakness of Russia, the French simply did not take advantage of it.

About the attitude towards the war in the provinces, A.V. Nikitenko (in 1812 he lived in Ukraine): “It is strange that at this moment of great upheavals that Russia was experiencing, not only our close circle, with the exception of the young Tatarchukov, but also the entire surrounding society was indifferent to the fate of the fatherland. ... I never heard notes of warm participation in the events of the time in their conversations. Everyone seemed to be only interested in their own personal affairs. The name of Napoleon caused more surprise than hatred. In a word, our society was striking in its imperturbable attitude towards the misfortune that threatened Russia. This could partly stem from the remoteness of the theater of war ... But the main reason for this, I believe, was hiding in the apathy characteristic of people who were alienated, as the Russians were then, from participation in public affairs and accustomed not to talk about what was happening around, but only implicitly obey the orders of the authorities.

IN national historiography the myth is often repeated that in 1812 the people gladly joined the army. It is based on the memoirs of representatives of the nobility. Let us cite the most valuable evidence from the diary of the Rostov official M.I. Marakuev, entry dated July 12, 1812: Emperor Alexander arrived in the Kremlin, a huge number of people gathered, a rumor suddenly spread that they would be ordered to “lock all the gates and take everyone by force into soldiers. As soon as this rumor rushed, the mob rushed out and in a few minutes the Kremlin was empty. From the Kremlin, an echo spread throughout Moscow and many black people fled from it. This happened in the presence of the emperor himself! The next day, outside Moscow, he met crowds of peasants who had fled the capital. They asked him if they were recruiting soldiers in Moscow. P. Nazarov, drafted into the army in September 1812, wrote that no one from his village wanted to serve. During the war, the authorities repeatedly reassured the militias, confirming that they were serving in the army only temporarily. The war ends sooner or later, and you will have to serve for 25 years, if you are not killed, you will be disabled, most likely without a pension. P. Nazarov received a pension of 20 rubles for 25 years of service and several severe wounds. per year, which was barely enough to live on. Here is what the soldiers themselves said about their problems (from the memoirs of D.I. Zavalishin): “I tell the truth that even after December 14, the soldiers of those regiments and detachments where there were no members of society and were not, therefore, the goals of the coup were explained to them, entered willingly talking with us ... talking about the double oath to Konstantin and Nikolai, they constantly told us the same thing: “We didn’t care either one or the other. Now, if, gentlemen, you then told us that there would be a deduction from service, that they would not be driven into a coffin with sticks, that you would not walk around with a bag after retirement, that children would not be irrevocably taken to the soldiers, well, we would have gone for this ” » . Only for 1815-1825. 15 uprisings took place in the Russian army.

As a result of the study, we outlined some prospects for studying the theme of the perception of the Patriotic War by the common people.