During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent counter-offensive of the Wehrmacht in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge up to 150 km deep and up to 200 km wide was formed in the center of the Soviet-German front, facing the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge"). During April-June, there was an operational pause at the front, during which the parties were preparing for the summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command decided to conduct a major strategic operation on the Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was planned to launch converging strikes from the areas of the cities of Orel (from the north) and Belgorod (from the south). The shock groups were to link up in the Kursk region, surrounding the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The operation received the code name "Citadel". At a meeting with Manstein on May 10-11, the plan was adjusted at the suggestion of Gott: the 2nd SS Corps turns from the Oboyansky direction towards Prokhorovka, where terrain conditions allow for a global battle with armored reserves Soviet troops. And, based on the losses, continue the offensive or go on the defensive. (From the interrogation of the chief of staff of the 4th tank army, General Fangor)

Kursk defensive operation

The German offensive began on the morning of July 5, 1943. Since the Soviet command knew exactly the start time of the operation - 3 a.m. (the German army fought according to Berlin time - translated into Moscow 5 a.m.), at 22:30 and 2:20 Moscow time, counter-barrage preparation was carried out by the forces of two fronts with the amount of ammunition 0.25 ammo. German reports noted significant damage to communication lines and minor losses in manpower. An unsuccessful air raid was also carried out by the forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies (more than 400 attack aircraft and fighters) on the Kharkov and Belgorod enemy air hubs.

Battle of Prokhorovka

On July 12, the largest oncoming tank battle in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, according to V. Zamulin, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps participated in it, which had 494 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 15 Tigers and not a single Panther. According to Soviet sources, about 700 tanks and assault guns participated in the battle from the German side. On the Soviet side, the 5th Panzer Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks, participated in the battle. After a massive air strike [source not specified 237 days], the battle on both sides entered its active phase and continued until the end of the day. By the end of July 12, the battle ended with unclear results, only to resume on the afternoon of July 13 and 14. After the battle, the German troops were unable to move forward in any significant way, despite the fact that the losses of the Soviet tank army, caused by the tactical errors of its command, were much greater. Having advanced 35 kilometers over July 5-12, Manstein's troops were forced, having trampled on the achieved lines for three days in vain attempts to break into the Soviet defenses, to begin the withdrawal of troops from the captured "bridgehead". During the battle there was a turning point. The Soviet troops, which went on the offensive on July 23, threw back the German armies in the south of the Kursk Bulge to their original positions.

Losses

According to Soviet data, about 400 German tanks, 300 vehicles, over 3,500 soldiers and officers remained on the battlefield in the battle of Prokhorovka. However, these numbers are being questioned. For example, according to the calculations of G. A. Oleinikov, more than 300 German tanks could not take part in the battle. According to the research of A. Tomzov, referring to the data of the German Federal Military Archive, during the battles of July 12-13, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division irretrievably lost 2 Pz.IV tanks, 2 Pz.IV and 2 Pz.III tanks were sent for long-term repairs , in the short term - 15 Pz.IV and 1 Pz.III tanks. The total losses of tanks and assault guns of the 2nd SS TC on July 12 amounted to about 80 tanks and assault guns, including at least 40 units lost by the Totenkopf Division.

- At the same time, the Soviet 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army lost up to 70% of their tanks

The central front involved in the battle in the north of the arc, for July 5-11, 1943, suffered losses of 33,897 people, of which 15,336 were irretrievable, its enemy, the 9th Army of the Model, lost 20,720 people over the same period, which gives a loss ratio of 1.64:1. The Voronezh and Steppe fronts, which participated in the battle on the southern face of the arc, lost 143,950 people on July 5-23, 1943, according to modern official estimates (2002), of which 54,996 were irrevocable. Including only the Voronezh Front - 73,892 total losses. However, the chief of staff of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Ivanov, and the head of the operational department of the front headquarters, Major General Teteshkin, thought differently: they believed the losses of their front to be 100,932 people, of which 46,500 were irretrievable. If, contrary to Soviet documents of the war period, the official numbers are considered correct, then taking into account German losses on the southern front of 29,102 people, the ratio of the losses of the Soviet and German sides is 4.95: 1 here.

- For the period from July 5 to July 12, 1943, the Central Front used up 1079 wagons of ammunition, and Voronezh - 417 wagons, almost two and a half times less.

Results of the defensive phase of the battle

The reason that the losses of the Voronezh Front so sharply exceeded the losses of the Central Front was the smaller massing of forces and means in the direction of the German attack, which allowed the Germans to actually achieve an operational breakthrough on the southern face of the Kursk salient. Although the breakthrough was closed by the forces of the Steppe Front, it allowed the attackers to achieve favorable tactical conditions for their troops. It should be noted that only the absence of homogeneous independent tank formations did not give the German command the opportunity to concentrate their armored forces in the direction of the breakthrough and develop it in depth.

Oryol offensive operation (Operation Kutuzov). On July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily Sokolovsky) and Bryansk (commanded by Colonel General Markian Popov) fronts launched an offensive against the 2nd Panzer and 9th armies of the enemy in the Orel region. By the end of the day on July 13, Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. On July 26, the Germans left the Orlovsky bridgehead and began to withdraw to the Hagen defensive line (east of Bryansk). On August 5, at 05-45, Soviet troops completely liberated Oryol.

Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Rumyantsev). On the southern front, the counteroffensive by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts began on August 3. On August 5, at about 18-00, Belgorod was liberated, on August 7 - Bogodukhov. Developing the offensive, the Soviet troops cut the Kharkov-Poltava railroad on August 11, and captured Kharkov on August 23. The German counterattacks were not successful.

- On August 5, the first salute in the entire war was given in Moscow - in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

- The victory near Kursk marked the transition of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By the time the front was stabilized, Soviet troops had reached their starting positions for an offensive on the Dnieper.

- After the end of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the German command lost the opportunity to conduct strategic offensive operations. Local massive offensives, such as Watch on the Rhine (1944) or the Balaton operation (1945) were also not successful.

- Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who developed and carried out Operation Citadel, later wrote:

- It was the last attempt to keep our initiative in the East. With her failure, tantamount to failure, the initiative finally passed to the Soviet side. Therefore, Operation Citadel is a decisive turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.

- - Manstein E. Lost victories. Per. with him. - M., 1957. - S. 423

- According to Guderian,

- As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were put out of action for a long time due to heavy losses in people and equipment.

- - Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

Differences in loss estimates

- The losses of the parties in the battle remain unclear. Thus, Soviet historians, including Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. M. Samsonov, speak of more than 500,000 killed, wounded and captured, 1,500 tanks and over 3,700 aircraft.

However, German archival data show that in July-August 1943, the Wehrmacht lost 537,533 people on the entire Eastern Front. These figures include those killed, wounded, sick, missing (the number of German prisoners in this operation was insignificant). And even though the main fighting at that time took place in the Kursk region, the Soviet figures of German losses of 500 thousand look somewhat exaggerated.

- In addition, according to German documents, on the entire Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe lost 1696 aircraft in July-August 1943.

On the other hand, even Soviet commanders during the war years did not consider the Soviet military reports about German losses to be true. So, General Malinin (chief of staff of the front) wrote to the lower headquarters: “Looking through the daily results of the day on the amount of manpower and equipment destroyed and captured trophies, I came to the conclusion that these data are significantly overestimated and, therefore, do not correspond to reality.”

Battle of Kursk, which lasted from 07/05/1943 to 08/23/1943, is a turning point in the central event of the Great Patriotic War and giant tank historical battle. The Battle of Kursk lasted 49 days.

Hitler had high hopes for this major offensive battle called the Citadel, he needed a victory to raise the spirit of the army after a series of failures. August 1943 was fatal for Hitler, as the countdown to the war began, the Soviet army confidently marched to victory.

Intelligence service

Intelligence played an important role in the outcome of the battle. In the winter of 1943, the intercepted encrypted information constantly mentioned the "Citadel". Anastas Mikoyan (a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) claims that on April 12, Stalin received information about the Citadel project.

Back in 1942, British intelligence managed to crack the Lorenz code, which encrypted the messages of the 3rd Reich. As a result, the project of the summer offensive was intercepted, and information about the general plan "Citadel", the location and structure of forces. This information was immediately transferred to the leadership of the USSR.

Thanks to the work of the Dora reconnaissance group, the deployment of German troops on the Eastern Front became known to the Soviet command, and the work of other intelligence agencies provided information on other areas of the fronts.

Confrontation

The Soviet command was aware of the exact time of the start of the German operation. Therefore, the necessary counter-preparation was carried out. The Nazis began the assault on the Kursk Bulge on July 5 - this is the date the battle began. The main offensive attack of the Germans was in the direction of Olkhovatka, Maloarkhangelsk and Gnilets.

The command of the German troops sought to get to Kursk along the shortest path. However, the Russian commanders: N. Vatutin - the Voronezh direction, K. Rokossovsky - the Central direction, I. Konev - the Steppe direction of the front, adequately responded to the German offensive.

The Kursk Bulge was supervised by the enemy by talented generals - these are General Erich von Manstein and Field Marshal von Kluge. Having been rebuffed at Olkhovatka, the Nazis tried to break through at Ponyri, using the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But here, too, they failed to break through the defensive might of the Red Army.

Since July 11, a fierce battle has been going on near Prokhorovka. The Germans suffered significant losses of equipment and people. It was near Prokhorovka that the turning point in the war took place, and July 12 became a turning point in this battle for the 3rd Reich. The Germans struck immediately from the south and western fronts.

One of the global tank battles took place. The Nazi army advanced 300 tanks into the battle from the south, and 4 tank and 1 infantry divisions from the west. According to other sources, the tank battle consisted of about 1200 tanks from 2 sides. The defeat of the Germans overtook by the end of the day, the movement of the SS corps was suspended, and their tactics turned into a defensive one.

During the Battle of Prokhorovka, according to Soviet data, on July 11-12, the German army lost more than 3,500 men and 400 tanks. The Germans themselves estimated the losses of the Soviet army at 244 tanks. Only 6 days lasted the operation "Citadel", in which the Germans tried to attack.

Used technique

Soviet medium tanks T-34 (about 70%), heavy - KV-1S, KV-1, light - T-70, self-propelled artillery mounts, nicknamed "St. SU-122, met in confrontation with German tanks Panther, Tigr, Pz.I, Pz.II, Pz.III, Pz.IV, which were supported by Elefant self-propelled guns (we have Ferdinand).

The Soviet guns were practically incapable of penetrating the frontal armor of the Ferdinands in 200 mm, they were destroyed with the help of mines and aircraft.

Also, the German assault guns were tank destroyers StuG III and JagdPz IV. Hitler counted heavily in the battle for new technology, so the Germans postponed the offensive for 2 months in order to release 240 Panthers to the Citadel.

During the battle, Soviet troops received captured German "Panthers" and "Tigers", abandoned by the crew or broken. After the elimination of breakdowns, the tanks fought on the side of the Soviet troops.

List of forces of the USSR Army (according to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):

• 3444 tanks;
• 2172 aircraft;
• 1.3 million people;
• 19100 mortars and guns.

As a reserve force, there was the Steppe Front, numbering: 1.5 thousand tanks, 580 thousand people, 700 aircraft, 7.4 thousand mortars and guns.

List of enemy forces:

• 2733 tanks;
• 2500 aircraft;
• 900 thousand people;
• 10,000 mortars and guns.

The Red Army had a numerical superiority by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk. However, the military potential was on the side of the Nazis, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of the technical level of military equipment.

Offensive

On July 13, the German army went on the defensive. The Red Army attacked, pushing the Germans further and further, and by July 14 the front line had moved up to 25 km. Having battered the German defensive capabilities, on July 18 the Soviet army launched a counterattack in order to defeat the Kharkov-Belgorod group of Germans. The Soviet front of offensive operations exceeded 600 km. On July 23, they reached the line of the German positions that they occupied before the offensive.

By August 3, the Soviet army numbered: 50 rifle divisions, 2.4 thousand tanks, more than 12 thousand guns. On August 5 at 18 o'clock Belgorod was liberated from the Germans. From the beginning of August, a battle was fought for the city of Orel, on August 6 it was liberated. On August 10, the soldiers of the Soviet army cut the Kharkiv-Poltava railway line during the offensive Belgorod-Kharkov operation. On August 11, the Germans attacked in the vicinity of Bogodukhov, slowing down the pace of fighting on both fronts.

Heavy fighting lasted until 14 August. On August 17, Soviet troops approached Kharkov, starting a battle on its outskirts. The German troops carried out the final offensive in Akhtyrka, but this breakthrough did not affect the outcome of the battle. On August 23, an intensive assault on Kharkov began.

This day itself is considered the day of the liberation of Kharkov and the end of the Battle of Kursk. Despite the actual fights with the remnants of the German resistance, which lasted until 30 August.

Losses

According to various historical reports, the losses in the Battle of Kursk vary. Academician Samsonov A.M. claims that the losses in the Battle of Kursk: more than 500 thousand wounded, killed and captured, 3.7 thousand aircraft and 1.5 thousand tanks.

Losses in the heavy battle on the Kursk Bulge, according to information from the research of G.F. Krivosheev, in the Red Army amounted to:

• Killed, disappeared, were captured - 254,470 people,
• Wounded - 608833 people.

Those. in total, human losses amounted to 863303 people, with average daily losses - 32843 people.

Losses of military equipment:

• Tanks - 6064 units;
• Aircraft - 1626 pieces,
• Mortars and guns - 5244 pcs.

The German historian Overmans Rüdiger claims that the losses of the German army were killed - 130429 people. The losses of military equipment amounted to: tanks - 1500 units; aircraft - 1696 pcs. According to Soviet information, from July 5 to September 5, 1943, more than 420 thousand Germans were destroyed, as well as 38.6 thousand prisoners.

Outcome

Irritated Hitler put the blame for the failure in the Battle of Kursk on the generals and field marshals, whom he demoted, replacing them with more capable ones. However, in the future, the major offensives "Watch on the Rhine" in 1944 and the operation at Balaton in 1945 also failed. After the defeat in the battle on the Kursk Bulge, the Nazis did not achieve a single victory in the war.

August 23 marks the Day of Military Glory of Russia - the Day of the defeat of the Wehrmacht forces by the Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge. Almost two months of intense and bloody battles led the Red Army to this important victory, the outcome of which was not at all a foregone conclusion. The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest battles in world history. Let's remember about it a little more.

Fact 1

The ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front to the west of Kursk was formed during the stubborn battles of February-March 1943 for Kharkov. The Kursk Bulge was up to 150 km deep and 200 km wide. This ledge is called the Kursk Bulge.

Battle of Kursk

Fact 2

The Battle of Kursk is one of the key battles of World War II, not only because of the scale of the battles that took place on the fields between Orel and Belgorod in the summer of 1943. Victory in this battle meant the final turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet troops, which began after Battle of Stalingrad. With this victory, the Red Army, having exhausted the enemy, finally seized the strategic initiative. And that means we are advancing from now on. The defense was over.

Another consequence - political - was the final confidence of the Allies in victory over Germany. At the conference held in November-December 1943 in Tehran, on the initiative of F. Roosevelt, the post-war plan for the dismemberment of Germany was already discussed.

Scheme of the Battle of Kursk

Fact 3

1943 was a year of difficult choices for the command of both sides. Defend or attack? And if you attack, then how large-scale tasks should you set for yourself? Both Germans and Russians had to answer these questions one way or another.

Back in April, G. K. Zhukov sent his report to the Headquarters on possible military operations in the coming months. According to Zhukov, the best solution for the Soviet troops in the current situation would be to wear down the enemy on their defenses, destroying as much as possible more tanks, and then to introduce reserves and go on the general offensive. Zhukov's considerations formed the basis of the campaign plan for the summer of 1943, after the preparation of the Nazi army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge was discovered.

As a result, the decision of the Soviet command was to create a defense in depth (8 lines) in the most likely areas of the German offensive - on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk salient.

In a situation of similar choice, the German command decided to advance in order to keep the initiative in their hands. Nevertheless, even then, Hitler outlined the objectives of the offensive on the Kursk Bulge not to seize territory, but to wear down the Soviet troops and improve the balance of power. Thus, the advancing German army was preparing for a strategic defense, while the defending Soviet troops were determined to attack decisively.

Construction of defensive lines

Fact 4

Although the Soviet command correctly identified the main directions of German attacks, mistakes were inevitable with such a scale of planning.

Thus, the Headquarters believed that a stronger grouping would advance in the Orel region against the Central Front. In reality, the southern grouping, which acted against the Voronezh Front, turned out to be stronger.

In addition, the direction of the main German attack on the southern face of the Kursk salient was inaccurately determined.

Fact 5

Operation Citadel was the name of the plan of the German command to encircle and destroy the Soviet armies on the Kursk ledge. It was planned to deliver converging strikes from the north from the Orel region and from the south from the Belgorod region. The shock wedges were supposed to connect near Kursk. The maneuver with the turn of the Goth tank corps towards Prokhorovka, where the steppe terrain favors the action of large tank formations, was planned in advance by the German command. It was here that the Germans, reinforced with new tanks, hoped to overwhelm the Soviet tank forces.

Soviet tankers inspecting the wrecked "Tiger"

Fact 6

Often the battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not so. It is believed that the multi-day battle that took place already in the first week of the war (June 23–30), 1941, was larger in terms of the number of participating tanks. It happened in Western Ukraine between the cities of Brody, Lutsk and Dubno. While about 1,500 tanks from both sides converged near Prokhorovka, more than 3,200 tanks participated in the battle of 41.

Fact 7

In the Battle of Kursk, and in particular in the battle of Prokhorovka, the Germans especially counted on the strength of their new armored vehicles - the Tiger and Panther tanks, the Ferdinand self-propelled guns. But perhaps the most unusual novelty was the Goliath wedges. This caterpillar self-propelled mine without a crew, it was controlled remotely by wire. It was intended to destroy tanks, infantry and buildings. However, these tankettes were expensive, slow-moving and vulnerable, and therefore did not provide much help to the Germans.

Memorial in honor of the heroes of the Battle of Kursk

We continue the topic of the Kursk Bulge, but first I wanted to say a few words. Now I have moved on to the material on the loss of equipment in our and German units. With us, they were significantly higher, especially in the battle of Prokhorov. The reasons for the loss suffered by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army, was engaged, created by the decision of Stalin, a special commission chaired by Malenkov. In the report of the commission, in August 1943, the military operations of the Soviet troops on July 12 near Prokhorovka were called a model of an unsuccessful operation. And this is a fact, by no means victorious. In this regard, I want to bring you several documents that will help you understand the reason for what happened. I especially want you to pay attention to Rotmistrov's report to Zhukov dated August 20, 1943. Although she sins in places against the truth, she nevertheless deserves attention.

This is only a small part of what explains our losses in that battle...

"Why was the battle of Prokhorov won by the Germans, despite the numerical superiority of the Soviet forces? The answer is given by combat documents, links to the full texts of which are given at the end of the article.

29th Panzer Corps :

“The attack began without artillery processing of the occupied line by the pr-com and without air cover.

This made it possible for the pr-ku to open concentrated fire on the battle formations of the corps and with impunity to bomb tanks and motorized infantry, which led to large losses and a decrease in the rate of attack, and this, in turn, made it possible for the pr-ku to conduct more effective artillery and tank fire from a place . The terrain for the offensive was not favorable due to its ruggedness, the presence of hollows impassable for tanks northwest and southeast of the PROKHOROVKA-BELENIKHINO road forced the tanks to cuddle up to the road and open their flanks, not being able to cover them.

Separate units that pulled ahead, approaching even the svh. KOMSOMOLETS, having suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and tank fire from ambushes, retreated to the line occupied by fire forces.

There was no air cover for the advancing tanks until 1300. From 13.00, cover was provided by groups of fighters from 2 to 10 vehicles.

With the release of tanks to the front line of defense, pr-ka from the forest with / z. GUARD and east. env. STOROGEVOE pr-k opened heavy fire from ambush tanks "Tiger", self-propelled guns and anti-tank guns. The infantry was cut off from the tanks and forced to lie down.

Having broken through into the depths of the defense, the tanks suffered heavy losses.

Parts of the pr-ka, with the support of a large number of aircraft and tanks, launched a counterattack and parts of the brigade were forced to withdraw.

During the attack on the front edge of the pr-ka, self-propelled guns, acting in the first echelon of battle formations of tanks and even breaking ahead of the tanks, had losses from the anti-tank fire of the pr-ka (eleven self-propelled guns were put out of action).

18th Panzer Corps :

"Enemy artillery fired intensely at the battle formations of the corps.
The corps, not having proper support in fighter aircraft and suffering heavy losses from artillery fire and intense bombardment from the air (by 12.00 enemy aircraft had made up to 1500 sorties), slowly moved forward.

The terrain in the zone of action of the corps is crossed by three deep ravines, passing from the left bank of the river. PSEL to the railway BELENIKHINO - PROKHOROVKA, why the tank brigades advancing in the first echelon 181, 170 were forced to act on the left flank of the corps strip near a strong enemy stronghold of the temporary storage warehouse. OCTOBER. 170 brigade, operating on the left flank, by 12.00 lost up to 60% of its combat materiel.

By the end of the day, from the KOZLOVKA, GREZNOE area, the enemy launched a frontal tank attack with a simultaneous attempt to bypass the battle formations of the corps units from the direction of KOZLOVKA, POLEZHAEV, using their Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns, intensively bombarding the battle formations from the air.

Fulfilling the assigned task, the 18th tank met a well-organized, strong anti-tank defense of the enemy with tanks and assault guns dug in advance at the turn of heights 217.9, 241.6.

In order to avoid unnecessary losses in personnel and equipment, by my order No. 68, parts of the corps went on the defensive at the achieved lines.

"The car is on fire"

The battlefield on the Kursk Bulge. In the foreground on the right is a wrecked Soviet T-34

Shot down near Belgorod T-34 and the dead tanker

T-34 and T-70 shot down during the Battle of Kursk. 07.1943

Destroyed T-34s during the battles for the Oktyabrsky state farm

Burnt T-34 "For Soviet Ukraine" near Belgorod. Kursk Bulge. 1943

MZ "Li", 193rd separate tank regiment. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

MZ "Li" - "Alexander Nevsky", 193rd separate tank regiment. Kursk Bulge

Destroyed Soviet light tank T-60

Destroyed T-70s and BA-64s from the 29th Tank Corps

OWL. SECRET
Ex. No. 1
TO THE FIRST DEPUTY PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE UNION OF THE USSR - MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION
Comrade Zhukov

In tank battles and battles from July 12 to August 20, 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army met with exclusively new types of enemy tanks. Most of all, there were T-V ("Panther") tanks on the battlefield, a significant number of T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, as well as modernized T-III and T-IV tanks.

Commanding tank units from the first days of the Patriotic War, I am forced to report to you that our tanks today have lost their superiority over enemy tanks in terms of armor and weapons.

The armament, armor and aiming of the fire of the German tanks became much higher, and only the exceptional courage of our tankers, the greater saturation of the tank units with artillery did not give the enemy the opportunity to fully use the advantages of their tanks. The presence of powerful weapons, strong armor and good aiming devices in German tanks puts our tanks in a clearly disadvantageous position. The efficiency of using our tanks is greatly reduced and their failure is increasing.

The battles I conducted in the summer of 1943 convince me that even now we can successfully conduct a maneuverable tank battle on our own, using the excellent maneuverability of our T-34 tank.

When the Germans, with their tank units, go on the defensive, at least temporarily, they thereby deprive us of our maneuvering advantages and, on the contrary, begin to fully use the aiming range of their tank guns, being at the same time almost completely out of reach of our aimed tank fire. .

Thus, in a collision with German tank units that have gone on the defensive, we, as a general rule, suffer huge losses in tanks and have no success.

The Germans, having opposed our T-34 and KV tanks with their T-V ("Panther") and T-VI ("Tiger") tanks, no longer experience their former tank fear on the battlefields.

T-70 tanks simply could not be allowed to engage in tank combat, as they are more than easily destroyed by German tank fire..

We have to state with bitterness that our tank equipment, with the exception of the introduction of self-propelled guns SU-122 and SU-152, did not give anything new during the war years, and the shortcomings that took place on the tanks of the first production, such as: the imperfection of the transmission group (main clutch, gearbox and side clutches), extremely slow and uneven turret rotation, exceptionally poor visibility and cramped crew accommodation have not been completely eliminated to date.

If our aviation during the years of the Patriotic War, according to its tactical and technical data, has been steadily advancing, producing more and more advanced aircraft, then unfortunately this cannot be said about our tanks.

Now the T-34 and KV tanks have lost their first place, which they rightfully had among the tanks of the warring countries in the first days of the war.

Back in December 1941, I captured a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of field tests conducted by the Germans of our KV and T-34 tanks.

As a result of these tests, the instructions were written, approximately, as follows: german tanks they cannot conduct tank battles with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank battles. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another sector of the front.

And, indeed, if we recall our tank battles in 1941 and 1942, then it can be argued that the Germans usually did not enter into battle with us without the help of other branches of the armed forces, and if they did, then with a multiple superiority in the number of their tanks, which it was not difficult for them to achieve in 1941 and in 1942.

On the basis of our T-34 tank - the best tank in the world at the beginning of the war, the Germans in 1943 managed to give an even more advanced T-V tank, "Panther"), which is essentially a copy of our T-34 tank, in terms of its qualities it is significantly higher than the T-34 tank, and especially in terms of the quality of weapons.

To characterize and compare our and German tanks, I give the following table:

Brand of tank and SU	Nose armor in mm.	Forehead tower and stern	Board	Stern	Roof, bottom	Gun caliber in mm.	Qty. shells.	Speed ​​max.
T-34	45	95-75	45	40	20-15	76	100	55,0
T-V	90-75	90-45	40	40	15	75x)
KV-1S	75-69	82	60	60	30-30	76	102	43,0
T-V1	100	82-100	82	82	28-28	88	86	44,0
SU-152	70	70-60	60	60	30-30	152	20	43,0
Ferdinand	200		160	85		88		20,0

x) The barrel of a 75 mm gun is 1.5 times longer than the barrel of our 76 mm gun and the projectile has a much higher muzzle velocity.

I am an ardent patriot tank troops I beg you, Comrade Marshal Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and manufacturers, and with all acuteness will raise the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, surpassing the existing types of German tanks in their combat qualities and design.

In addition, I ask you to dramatically improve the equipment of tank units with evacuation means.

The enemy, as a rule, evacuates all his wrecked tanks, and our tankers are often deprived of this opportunity, as a result of which we lose a lot on this in terms of tank recovery. At the same time, in those cases when the field of tank battles remains with the enemy for a certain period, our repairmen instead of their wrecked tanks find shapeless piles of metal, since this year the enemy, leaving the battlefield, blows up all our wrecked tanks.

TROOP COMMANDER
5 GUARDS TANK ARMY
GUARD LIEUTENANT GENERAL
TANK TROOPS -
(ROTMISTROV) Signature.

active army.
=========================
RTsHDNI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 9027s, l. 1-5

Something I would definitely like to add:

"One of the reasons for the stunning losses of the 5th Guards TA is also the fact that about a third of its tanks were light T-70. Frontal hull armor - 45 mm, turret armor - 35 mm. Armament - 45 mm gun 20K model 1938, armor penetration 45 mm at a distance of 100 m (one hundred meters!). Crew - two people. These tanks on the field near Prokhorovka had nothing to catch at all (although, of course, they could damage a German tank of the Pz-4 class and older, driving up at close range and working in the "woodpecker" mode ... if you persuade the German tankers to look the other way; well, or an armored personnel carrier, if you are lucky enough to find one, drive it into the field with a pitchfork). There is nothing to catch in the framework of an oncoming tank battle, of course - if they were lucky enough to break through the defenses, then they could quite successfully support their infantry, for which, in fact, they were created.

One should also not discount the general lack of training of the personnel of the 5th TA, which received replenishment literally on the eve of the Kursk operation. Moreover, the untrainedness of both directly ordinary tankers and junior / middle-level commanders. Even in this suicidal attack, better results could have been achieved by observing a competent formation - which, alas, was not observed - everyone rushed into the attack in a bunch. Including self-propelled guns, which have no place at all in attacking formations.

Well, and most importantly - monstrously inefficient work of repair and evacuation teams. It was generally very bad with this until 1944, but in this case, 5 TA simply failed on a large scale. I don’t know how many were at that moment in the state of the BREM (and whether they were even in those days in its battle formations - they could have forgotten in the rear), but they did not cope with the work. Khrushchev (then a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front) in a report on July 24, 1943 to Stalin on the tank battle near Prokhorovka writes: "when retreating, the enemy evacuates his wrecked tanks and other materiel, and everything that cannot be taken out, including our tanks and our material part, burns and undermines. As a result, the damaged material part captured by us in most cases cannot be repaired, but can be used as scrap metal, which we will try to evacuate from the battlefield in the near future "(RGASPI, f. 83, op.1, d.27, l.2)

………………….

And a little more to add. Regarding the general situation with command and control.

The point is also that the German reconnaissance aviation had previously revealed the approach to Prokhorovka of the formations of the 5th Guards TA and 5th Guards A, and it was possible to establish that on July 12, near Prokhorovka, the Soviet troops would go on the offensive, so the Germans especially strengthened the anti-tank defense on the left flank of the division " Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzer Corps. They, in turn, were going to, after repelling the offensive of the Soviet troops, themselves go on the counteroffensive and surround the Soviet troops in the Prokhorovka area, so the Germans concentrated their tank units on the flanks of the 2nd SS TC, and not in the center. This led to the fact that on July 12, 18 and 29, the most powerful German PTOPs had to be attacked head-on, which is why they suffered such heavy losses. In addition, German tankers repulsed the attacks of Soviet tanks with fire from a place.

In my opinion, the best thing Rotmistrov could do in such a situation is to try to insist on the cancellation of the July 12 counterattack near Prokhorovka, but no traces of him even trying to do this have been found. Here, the difference in approaches is especially clear when comparing the actions of the two commanders of the tank armies - Rotmistrov and Katukov (for those who are bad with geography, I’ll clarify - Katukov’s 1 tank army occupied positions west of Prokhorovka at the Belaya-Oboyan line).

The first disagreements between Katukov and Vatutin arose on July 6. The front commander orders a counterattack by the 1st Panzer Army together with the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps in the direction of Tomarovka. Katukov sharply replies that in the conditions of the qualitative superiority of German tanks, this is disastrous for the army and will cause unjustified losses. the best way combat is a maneuverable defense with the help of tank ambushes, which allows you to shoot enemy tanks from short distances. Vatutin does not cancel the decision. Further events occur as follows (I quote from the memoirs of M.E. Katukov):

"Reluctantly, I gave the order to launch a counterattack. ... Already the first reports from the battlefield near Yakovlevo showed that we were doing something completely wrong. As expected, the brigades suffered serious losses. With pain in my heart, I saw NP, how thirty-fours are burning and smoking.

It was necessary, by all means, to achieve the abolition of the counterattack. I hurried to the command post, hoping to urgently contact General Vatutin and once again report my thoughts to him. But as soon as he crossed the threshold of the hut, the head of communications in some especially significant tone reported:

From Headquarters... Comrade Stalin. Not without emotion I picked up the phone.

Hello Katukov! said a well-known voice. - Report the situation!

I told the Commander-in-Chief what I saw on the battlefield with my own eyes.

In my opinion, - I said, - we hurried with the counterattack. The enemy has large unused reserves, including tank ones.

What are you offering?

For the time being, it is advisable to use tanks for firing from a place, burying them in the ground or setting them in ambushes. Then we could let the enemy's vehicles within a distance of three hundred or four hundred meters and destroy them with aimed fire.

Stalin was silent for some time.

Well, - he said - you will not counterattack. Vatutin will call you about this."

As a result, the counterattack was canceled, the tanks of all units ended up in the trenches, and the day of July 6 became the "blackest day" for the 4th German Panzer Army. During the day of fighting, 244 German tanks were knocked out (48 tanks lost 134 tanks and 2 SS tanks - 110). Our losses amounted to 56 tanks (for the most part in their own formations, so there were no problems with their evacuation - I again emphasize the difference between a knocked out and destroyed tank). Thus, Katukov's tactics fully justified themselves.

However, the command of the Voronezh Front did not draw any conclusions and on July 8 gives a new order to conduct a counterattack, only 1 TA (due to the stubbornness of its commander) is tasked not to attack, but to hold positions. The counterattack is carried out by 2 TC, 2 Guards TC, 5 TC and separate tank brigades and regiments. The result of the battle: the loss of three Soviet corps - 215 tanks irrevocably, the loss of German troops - 125 tanks, of which 17 are irretrievable. Now, on the contrary, the day of July 8 is becoming the "blackest day" for the Soviet tank forces, in terms of its losses it is comparable to the losses in the Battle of Prokhorov.

Of course, there is no particular hope that Rotmistrov would be able to push through his decision, but at least it was worth a try!

At the same time, it should be noted that it is unlawful to limit the battles near Prokhorovka only on July 12 and only to the attack of the 5th Guards TA. After July 12, the main efforts of the 2nd SS TC and 3rd TC were aimed at encircling the divisions of the 69th Army, south-west of Prokhorovka, and although the command of the Voronezh Front managed to withdraw the personnel of the 69th Army from the formed bag in time, however, most of the weapons and they had to abandon technology. That is, the German command managed to achieve a very significant tactical success, weakening the 5 Guards A and 5 Guards TA and depriving 69 A of combat capability for some time. After July 12, the German side actually attempted to encircle and inflict maximum damage on the Soviet troops withdraw their forces to the former front line). After that, the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, quite calmly withdrew their troops to the lines occupied by them until July 5, evacuating the damaged equipment and subsequently restoring it.

At the same time, the decision of the command of the Voronezh Front to switch to stubborn defense on the occupied lines from July 16 becomes completely incomprehensible, when the Germans are not only not going to attack, but rather gradually withdraw their forces (in particular, the Dead Head division actually began to withdraw as early as July 13 ). And when it was established that the Germans were not advancing, but retreating, it was already too late. That is, it was already too late to quickly sit on the Germans' tail and peck at the back of their heads.

One gets the impression that the command of the Voronezh Front had a poor idea of ​​what was happening at the front in the period from 5 to 18 July, which manifested itself in a too slow reaction to the rapidly changing situation at the front. The texts of orders for advancement, attack or redeployment are replete with inaccuracies and uncertainties, they lack data on the opposing enemy, his composition and intentions, there is not at least approximate information about the outline of the front line. A significant part of the orders in the Soviet troops during the Battle of Kursk was given "over the head" of lower-ranking commanders, and the latter were not informed of this, wondering why and why their subordinate units were performing some incomprehensible actions.

So there is nothing surprising that sometimes indescribable mess reigned in the parts:

So on July 8, the Soviet 99th tank brigade of the 2nd tank corps attacked the Soviet 285 rifle regiment 183 rifle divisions. Despite the attempts of the commanders of the units of the 285th regiment to stop the tankers, they continued to crush the fighters and fire guns at the 1st battalion of the designated regiment (total: 25 people were killed and 37 were wounded).

On July 12, the Soviet 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards TA (sent as part of the combined detachment of Major General K.G. Trufanov to help the 69th Army) did not have accurate information about the location of their own and the Germans and did not send reconnaissance ahead (into battle without reconnaissance - this is close and understandable to us), the tankers of the regiment on the move opened fire on the combat formations of the Soviet 92nd Infantry Division and the tanks of the Soviet 96th Tank Brigade of the 69th Army, defending themselves from the Germans in the area of ​​​​the village of Aleksandrovka (24 km southeast of Prokhorovka station). Having passed with a fight through their own, the regiment stumbled upon the advancing German tanks, after which it turned around and, crushing and dragging separate groups of its own infantry along with it, began to retreat. The anti-tank artillery following the front line behind the same regiment (53rd Guards Tank Regiment) and just arrived at the scene of events, mistaking the tanks of the 96th brigade for German, pursuing the 53rd Guards Separate Tank Regiment, turned around and did not open fire on its infantry and tanks only thanks to happy accident.

Well, and so on ... In the order of the commander of the 69th army, all this was described as "these outrages." Well, to put it mildly.

So it can be summarized that the Germans won the battle of Prokhorov, but this victory was a special case against a general negative background for Germany. The German positions at Prokhorovka were good if a further offensive was planned (as Manstein insisted), but not for defense. And it was impossible to advance further for reasons not directly related to what was happening near Prokhorovka. Far from Prokhorovka, on July 11, 1943, reconnaissance in force began on the part of the Soviet Western and Bryansk fronts (taken by the German command of the OKH ground forces as an offensive), and on July 12, these fronts really went on the offensive. On July 13, the German command became aware of the impending offensive of the Soviet Southern Front in the Donbass, that is, practically on the southern flank of Army Group South (this offensive followed on July 17). In addition, the situation in Sicily became much more difficult for the Germans, where on July 10 the Americans and the British landed. Tanks were also needed there.

On July 13, a meeting was held with the Fuhrer, to which Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was also summoned. Adolf Hitler ordered to stop the operation "Citadel" in connection with the activation of Soviet troops in various areas Eastern Front and sending part of the forces from it to form new German formations in Italy and the Balkans. The order was accepted for execution, despite the objections of Manstein, who believed that the Soviet troops on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge were on the verge of defeat. Manstein was not explicitly ordered to withdraw troops, but was prohibited from using his only reserve, the 24th Panzer Corps. Without the commissioning of this corps, the further offensive lost perspective, and therefore there was no point in holding the captured positions. (soon, 24 TC was already repelling the offensive of the Soviet Southwestern Front in the middle reaches of the Seversky Donets River). 2nd SS TC was intended for transfer to Italy, but it was temporarily returned for joint operations with 3rd TC in order to eliminate the breakthrough of the troops of the Soviet Southern Front on the Mius River, 60 km north of the city of Taganrog, in the defense zone of the German 6th Army.

The merit of the Soviet troops is that they slowed down the pace of the German offensive on Kursk, which, combined with the general military-political situation and the combination of circumstances that were developing everywhere in July 1943, not in favor of Germany, made Operation Citadel unfeasible, but talking about purely military victory Soviet army in the Battle of Kursk wishful thinking. "

In order to realize this opportunity, the German military leadership launched preparations for a major summer offensive in this direction. It hoped to defeat the main forces of the Red Army on the central sector of the Soviet-German front, by delivering a series of powerful counter-attacks, to regain the strategic initiative and change the course of the war in its favor. The concept of the operation (code name "Citadel") provided for strikes in converging directions from the north and south at the base of the Kursk ledge on the 4th day of the operation to surround and then destroy the Soviet troops. Subsequently, it was planned to strike at the rear of the Southwestern Front (Operation Panther) and launch an offensive in a northeast direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central grouping of Soviet troops and create a threat to Moscow. For the operation "Citadel" were involved the best generals Wehrmacht and the most combat-ready troops, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and big number separate units that were part of the 9th and 2nd armies of the Army Group Center (Field Marshal G. Kluge), the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force of the Army Group South (Field Marshal E. Manstein). They were supported by aviation of the 4th and 6th air fleets. In total, this grouping consisted of over 900 thousand people, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, up to 2700 tanks and assault guns, and about 2050 aircraft. This amounted to about 70% of tank, up to 30% of motorized and more than 20% of infantry divisions, as well as over 65% of all combat aircraft operating on the Soviet-German front, which were concentrated on a sector that was only about 14% of its length.

In order to achieve the rapid success of its offensive, the German command relied on the massive use of armored vehicles (tanks, assault guns, armored personnel carriers) in the first operational echelon. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V ("panther"), T-VI ("tiger"), the Ferdinand assault guns, which entered service with the German army, had good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with a direct range of 1.5-2.5 km were 2.5 times the range of the 76.2-mm gun of the main Soviet T-34 tank. Due to the high initial speed of the projectiles, increased armor penetration was achieved. The Hummel and Vespe armored self-propelled howitzers, which were part of the artillery regiments of tank divisions, could also be successfully used for direct fire at tanks. In addition, excellent Zeiss optics were installed on them. This allowed the enemy to achieve a certain superiority in tank equipment. In addition, new aircraft entered service with the German aviation: the Focke-Wulf-190A fighter, the Henkel-190A and Henkel-129 attack aircraft, which were supposed to maintain air supremacy and reliable support for tank divisions.

The German command attached particular importance to the surprise operation "Citadel". To this end, it was envisaged to conduct disinformation of the Soviet troops on a large scale. To this end, intensive preparations for Operation Panther continued in the Army Zone South. Demonstrative reconnaissance was carried out, tanks were advanced, crossing facilities were concentrated, radio communications were carried out, the actions of agents were activated, rumors were spread, etc. In the band of the army group "Center", on the contrary, everything was carefully disguised. But although all the activities were carried out with great care and method, they did not give effective results.

In order to secure the rear areas of their strike groups, the German command in May-June 1943 undertook large punitive expeditions against the Bryansk and Ukrainian partisans. Thus, more than 10 divisions acted against 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and in the Zhytomyr region the Germans attracted 40 thousand soldiers and officers. But the enemy failed to defeat the partisans.

When planning the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) planned to conduct a broad offensive, delivering the main blow in the south-western direction in order to defeat Army Group South, liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the river. Dnieper.

The Soviet command began to develop a plan for the upcoming actions for the summer of 1943 immediately after the end of the winter campaign at the end of March 1943. The Supreme Command Headquarters, the General Staff, all front commanders who defended the Kursk ledge took part in the development of the operation. The plan provided for the main attack in the south-western direction. Soviet military intelligence was able to timely reveal the preparation of the German army for a major offensive on the Kursk Bulge and even set a date for the start of the operation.

Before the Soviet command stood difficult task- choose a method of action: attack or defend. In his report on April 8, 1943 Supreme Commander with an assessment of the general situation and his thoughts on the actions of the Red Army for the summer of 1943 in the area of ​​the Kursk Bulge, the marshal reported: “I consider it inexpedient to go over to the offensive in the coming days with the aim of preempting the enemy. It would be better if we exhaust the enemy on our defenses, knock out his tanks, and then, introducing fresh reserves, by going over to the general offensive, we finally finish off the main enemy grouping. The leader was of the same opinion. general staff: "A thorough analysis of the situation and foresight of the development of events made it possible to draw the correct conclusion: the main efforts must be concentrated north and south of Kursk, bleed the enemy here in a defensive battle, and then go on the counteroffensive and defeat him."

As a result, an unprecedented decision was made to go over to the defensive in the area of ​​the Kursk salient. The main efforts were concentrated in the areas north and south of Kursk. There was a case in the history of the war when the strongest side, which had everything necessary for the offensive, chose from several possible options the most optimal course of action - defense. Not everyone agreed with this decision. The commanders of the Voronezh and Southern fronts, the generals, continued to insist on a preemptive strike in the Donbass. They were supported, and some others. The final decision was made in late May - early June, when it became known exactly about the "Citadel" plan. Subsequent analysis and the actual course of events showed that the decision to deliberately defend in the face of significant superiority in forces in this case was the most rational type of strategic action.

The final decision for the summer and autumn of 1943 was drawn up by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in mid-April: the German occupiers were to be driven out of the Smolensk-r. Sozh - the middle and lower reaches of the Dnieper, crush the so-called defensive "eastern rampart" of the enemy, and also eliminate the enemy foothold in the Kuban. The main blow in the summer of 1943 was supposed to be inflicted on the southwestern, and the second on western directions. On the Kursk ledge, it was decided to deplete and bleed the shock groups of German troops by deliberate defense, and then complete their defeat by going over to the counteroffensive. The main efforts were concentrated in the areas north and south of Kursk. The events of the first two years of the war showed that the defense of the Soviet troops did not always withstand the massive attacks of the enemy, which led to tragic consequences.

To this end, it was supposed to make the most of the advantages of a pre-created multi-lane defense, bleed the enemy's main tank groupings, wear out his most combat-ready troops, and gain strategic air supremacy. Then, going over to a decisive counteroffensive, complete the defeat of the enemy groupings in the area of ​​the Kursk ledge.

The troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts were mainly involved in the defensive operation near Kursk. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command understood that the transition to deliberate defense was associated with a certain risk. Therefore, by April 30, the Reserve Front was formed (later renamed the Steppe Military District, and from July 9 - the Steppe Front). It included the 2nd reserve, 24th, 53rd, 66th, 47th, 46th, 5th guards tank armies, 1st, 3rd and 4th guards, 3rd, 10th and 18th tank armies, 1st and 5th th mechanized corps. All of them were stationed in the areas of Kastornoye, Voronezh, Bobrovo, Millerovo, Rossosh and Ostrogozhsk. The field control of the front was located not far from Voronezh. Five tank armies, a number of separate tank and mechanized corps, a large number of rifle corps and divisions were concentrated in the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), as well as in the second echelons of the fronts, at the direction of the Supreme High Command. From April 10 to July, the Central and Voronezh Fronts received 10 rifle divisions, 10 anti-tank artillery brigades, 13 separate anti-tank artillery regiments, 14 artillery regiments, eight guards mortar regiments, seven separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments. In total, 5635 guns, 3522 mortars, 1284 aircraft were transferred to two fronts.

By the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Central and Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District included 1909 thousand people, more than 26.5 thousand guns and mortars, over 4.9 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations (ACS), about 2.9 thousand aircraft.

After achieving the goals of the strategic defensive operation, it was planned that the Soviet troops would go over to the counteroffensive. At the same time, the defeat of the Oryol grouping of the enemy (plan "Kutuzov") was assigned to the troops of the left wing of the Western (Colonel-General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (Colonel-General) and the right wing of the Central Fronts. Offensive operation in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction (the plan "Commander Rumyantsev"), it was planned to carry out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts in cooperation with the troops of the South-Western Front (General of the Army R.Ya. Malinovsky). The coordination of the actions of the troops of the fronts was entrusted to the representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of Marshals of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky, colonel-general of artillery, and aviation - to air marshal.

The troops of the Central, Voronezh Fronts and the Steppe Military District created a powerful defense, which included 8 defensive lines and lines with a total depth of 250-300 km. The defense was built as an anti-tank, anti-artillery and anti-aircraft defense with a deep separation of battle formations and fortifications, with a widely developed system of strong points, trenches, communications and barriers.

On the left bank of the Don, a state line of defense was equipped. The depth of the defense lines was 190 km on the Central Front, and 130 km on the Voronezh Front. At each front, three army and three front defensive lines were created, equipped in engineering terms.

Both fronts had six armies each: the Central Front - 48, 13, 70, 65, 60th combined arms and 2nd tank; Voronezh - 6th, 7th guards, 38th, 40th, 69th combined arms and 1st tank. The width of the defense lines of the Central Front was 306 km, and the Voronezh - 244 km. All combined-arms armies were located in the first echelon on the Central Front, and four combined-arms armies were located on the Voronezh Front.

The commander of the Central Front, General of the Army, having assessed the situation, came to the conclusion that the enemy would deliver the main blow in the direction of Olkhovatka in the defense zone of the 13th Combined Arms Army. Therefore, it was decided to reduce the width of the defense zone of the 13th Army from 56 to 32 km and bring its composition to four rifle corps. Thus, the composition of the armies increased to 12 rifle divisions, and its operational formation became two-echelon.

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. It was more difficult for Vatutin to determine the direction of the enemy's main attack. Therefore, the defense zone of the 6th Guards Combined Arms Army (it was she who defended herself in the direction of the main attack of the 4th tank army of the enemy) was 64 km. In the presence of two rifle corps and one rifle division in its composition, the army commander was forced to build army troops in one echelon, allocating only one rifle division to the reserve.

Thus, the depth of defense of the 6th Guards Army initially turned out to be less than the depth of the strip of the 13th Army. Such an operational formation led to the fact that the commanders of rifle corps, trying to create a defense as deep as possible, built a battle formation in two echelons.

Great importance was attached to the creation of artillery groupings. Special attention turned to the massing of artillery in the likely directions of enemy strikes. On April 10, 1943, the People's Commissar of Defense issued a special order on the use of the artillery of the reserve of the High Command in battle, the assignment of reinforcement artillery regiments to the armies and the formation of anti-tank and mortar brigades for the fronts.

In the defense zones of the 48th, 13th and 70th armies of the Central Front, on the intended direction of the main attack of Army Group Center, 70% of all guns and mortars of the front and 85% of all artillery of the RVGK were concentrated (including the second echelon and reserves of the front). Moreover, 44% of the artillery regiments of the RVGK were concentrated in the zone of the 13th Army, where the point of impact of the main enemy forces was aimed. This army, which had 752 guns and mortars with a caliber of 76 mm and above, was given the 4th breakthrough artillery corps, which had 700 guns and mortars and 432 rocket artillery installations, for reinforcement. This saturation of the army with artillery made it possible to create a density of up to 91.6 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front (including 23.7 anti-tank guns). There was no such density of artillery in any of the previous defensive operations.

Thus, the desire of the command of the Central Front to solve the problems of the insurmountability of the defense being created already in the tactical zone, not giving the enemy the opportunity to break out of it, clearly loomed, which significantly complicated the further struggle.

The problem of using artillery in the defense zone of the Voronezh Front was solved somewhat differently. Since the troops of the front were built in two echelons, the artillery was distributed between the echelons. But on this front, in the main direction, which accounted for 47% of the entire defense zone of the front, where the 6th and 7th Guards Armies were stationed, it was possible to create sufficient high density- 50.7 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. 67% of the guns and mortars of the front and up to 66% of the RVGK artillery (87 out of 130 artillery regiments) were concentrated in this direction.

The command of the Central and Voronezh fronts paid great attention to the use of anti-tank artillery. They included 10 anti-tank brigades and 40 separate regiments, of which seven brigades and 30 regiments, that is, the vast majority of anti-tank weapons, were located on the Voronezh Front. On the Central Front, more than one third of all artillery anti-tank weapons became part of the artillery anti-tank reserve of the front, as a result, the commander of the Central Front, K.K. Rokossovsky got the opportunity to quickly use his reserves to fight enemy tank groups in the most threatened areas. On the Voronezh front, the bulk of the anti-tank artillery was transferred to the armies of the first echelon.

Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy grouping opposing them near Kursk in personnel by 2.1, artillery - by 2.5, tanks and self-propelled guns - by 1.8, aircraft - by 1.4 times.

On the morning of July 5, the main forces of the enemy strike groupings, weakened by the pre-emptive artillery counter-preparation of the Soviet troops, went on the offensive, throwing up to 500 tanks and assault guns against the defenders in the Orel-Kursk direction, and about 700 tanks and assault guns in the Belgorod-Kursk direction. German troops attacked the entire defense zone of the 13th Army and the flanks of the 48th and 70th armies adjoining it in a 45 km wide zone. The main blow was delivered by the northern enemy grouping with the forces of three infantry and four tank divisions to Olkhovatka against the troops of the left flank of the 13th army of the general. Four infantry divisions advanced against the right flank of the 13th and the left flank of the 48th Army (commander - general) to Maloarkhangelsk. Three infantry divisions attacked the right flank of the General's 70th Army in the direction of Gnilets. The advance of the ground forces was supported by air strikes. Heavy and stubborn battles ensued. The command of the 9th German Army, which did not expect to meet such a powerful rebuff, was forced to repeat an hour-long artillery preparation. In increasingly fierce battles, warriors of all branches of the armed forces fought heroically.

Defensive operations of the Central and Voronezh fronts during the Battle of Kursk

But the enemy tanks, despite the losses, continued to stubbornly move forward. The front command promptly reinforced the troops defending in the Olkhovat direction with tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, rifle formations, field and anti-tank artillery. The enemy, intensifying the actions of his aviation, also brought heavy tanks into battle. On the first day of the offensive, he managed to break through the first line of defense of the Soviet troops, advance 6-8 km and reach the second line of defense in the area north of Olkhovatka. In the direction of Gnilets and Maloarkhangelsk, the enemy was able to advance only 5 km.

Having met the stubborn resistance of the defending Soviet troops, the German command brought into battle almost all the formations of the attack group of the Army Group Center, but they could not break through the defense. In seven days they managed to advance only 10-12 km, without breaking through the tactical defense zone. By July 12, the enemy's offensive capabilities on the northern face of the Kursk Bulge had dried up, he stopped his attacks and went on the defensive. It should be noted that the enemy did not conduct active offensive operations in other directions in the defense zone of the troops of the Central Front.

Having repelled enemy attacks, the troops of the Central Front began to prepare for offensive operations.

On the southern face of the Kursk salient, in the zone of the Voronezh Front, the struggle was also of an exceptionally tense character. As early as July 4, the forward detachments of the 4th German Tank Army tried to shoot down the outposts of the General's 6th Guards Army. By the end of the day, they managed to reach the front line of the army's defense at several points. On July 5, the main forces began to operate in two directions - on Oboyan and Korocha. The main blow fell on the 6th Guards Army, and the auxiliary - on the 7th Guards Army from the Belgorod region to Korocha.

Memorial "Beginning of the Battle of Kursk on the southern ledge". Belgorod region

The German command sought to build on the success achieved by continuing to build up its efforts along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. By the end of July 9, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps not only broke through to the army (third) defense line of the 6th Guards Army, but also managed to wedge into it about 9 km southwest of Prokhorovka. However, he failed to break into the operational space.

On July 10, Hitler ordered the commander of Army Group South to bring about a decisive turning point in the course of the battle. Convinced of the complete impossibility of breaking the resistance of the troops of the Voronezh Front in the Oboyan direction, Field Marshal E. Manstein decided to change the direction of the main attack and now advance on Kursk in a roundabout way - through Prokhorovka. At the same time, an auxiliary strike group attacked Prokhorovka from the south. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was brought up to the Prokhorovka direction, which included the elite divisions "Reich", "Dead Head", "Adolf Hitler", as well as parts of the 3rd Panzer Corps.

Having discovered the maneuver of the enemy, the front commander, General N.F. Vatutin advanced the 69th Army in this direction, and then the 35th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to strengthen the Voronezh Front at the expense of strategic reserves. As early as July 9, she ordered the general commander of the Steppe Front to move the 4th Guards, 27th and 53rd armies to the Kursk-Belgorod direction and transfer them to General N.F. Vatutin 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The troops of the Voronezh Front were to thwart the enemy's offensive by inflicting a powerful counterattack (five armies) on his grouping, wedged in the Oboyan direction. However, on July 11, it was not possible to launch a counterattack. On this day, the enemy captured the line planned for the deployment of tank formations. Only by bringing into battle four rifle divisions and two tank brigades of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the general managed to stop the enemy two kilometers from Prokhorovka. Thus, the oncoming battles of the forward detachments and units in the Prokhorovka area began already on July 11.

Tankers, in cooperation with the infantry, counterattack the enemy. Voronezh front. 1943

On July 12, both opposing groups went on the offensive, striking in the Prokhorovka direction on both sides of the Belgorod-Kursk railway. A fierce battle unfolded. The main events took place southwest of Prokhorovka. From the northwest, formations of the 6th Guards and 1st Tank armies attacked Yakovlevo. And from the northeast, from the Prokhorovka area, in the same direction, the 5th Guards Tank Army with attached two tank corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army attacked in the same direction. To the east of Belgorod, the strike was undertaken by rifle formations of the 7th Guards Army. After a 15-minute artillery raid, the 18th and 29th tank corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd and 2nd Guards Tank Corps attached to it on the morning of July 12 went on the offensive in the general direction of Yakovlevo.

Even earlier, at dawn, on the river. Psyol in the defense zone of the 5th Guards Army, the tank division "Dead Head" launched an offensive. However, the divisions of the SS Panzer Corps "Adolf Hitler" and "Reich", which directly opposed the 5th Guards Tank Army, remained on the occupied lines, having prepared them overnight for defense. On a rather narrow section from Berezovka (30 km northwest of Belgorod) to Olkhovatka, a battle took place between two tank strike groups. The battle went on all day. Both sides suffered heavy losses. The fight was extremely fierce. The losses of the Soviet tank corps amounted to 73% and 46%, respectively.

As a result of a fierce battle in the Prokhorovka region, none of the parties was able to solve the tasks assigned to it: the Germans - to break through to the Kursk region, and the 5th Guards Tank Army - to reach the Yakovlevo region, defeating the opposing enemy. But the enemy's path to Kursk was closed. The motorized divisions of the SS "Adolf Hitler", "Reich" and "Dead Head" stopped the attacks and entrenched themselves on the achieved lines. The 3rd German tank corps advancing on Prokhorovka from the south was able to push the formations of the 69th army by 10-15 km that day. Both sides suffered heavy losses.

The collapse of hope.
German soldier on the Prokhorovsky field

Despite the fact that the counterattack of the Voronezh Front slowed down the advance of the enemy, it did not achieve the goals set by the Supreme Command Headquarters.

In fierce battles on July 12 and 13, the enemy strike force was stopped. However, the German command did not abandon its intention to break through to Kursk, bypassing Oboyan from the east. In turn, the troops participating in the counterattack of the Voronezh Front did everything to fulfill the tasks assigned to them. The confrontation between the two groups - the advancing German and the Soviet counterattack - continued until July 16, mainly on the lines that they occupied. In these 5-6 days (after July 12) there were continuous battles with enemy tanks and infantry. Attacks and counterattacks followed each other day and night.

On the Belgorod-Kharkov direction. Broken enemy equipment after a Soviet air raid

On July 16, the 5th Guards Army and its neighbors received an order from the commander of the Voronezh Front to switch to a tough defense. The next day, the German command began to withdraw its troops to their original positions.

One of the reasons for the failure was that the most powerful grouping of Soviet troops struck at the most powerful enemy grouping, but not in the flank, but in the forehead. The Soviet command did not use the favorable configuration of the front, which made it possible to strike under the base of the enemy penetration in order to encircle and subsequently destroy the entire grouping of German troops operating north of Yakovlevo. In addition, Soviet commanders and staffs, the troops as a whole, did not yet properly master combat skills, and military leaders did not yet possess the art of the offensive. There were also omissions in the interaction of infantry with tanks, ground forces with aviation, between formations and units.

On the Prokhorovsky field, the number of tanks fought against their quality. The 5th Guards Tank Army had 501 T-34 tanks with a 76-mm cannon, 264 T-70 light tanks with a 45-mm cannon, and 35 Churchill III heavy tanks with a 57-mm cannon received by the USSR from England. This tank had very low speed and poor maneuverability. Each corps had a regiment of SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, but not a single SU-152. The Soviet medium tank had the ability to pierce armor 61 mm thick at a distance of 1000 m and 69 mm thick at 500 m with an armor-piercing projectile. Tank armor: frontal - 45 mm, side - 45 mm, turret - 52 mm. The German medium tank T-IVH had armor thickness: frontal - 80 mm, side - 30 mm, turret - 50 mm. The armor-piercing projectile of its 75-mm cannon at a range of up to 1500 m pierced armor over 63 mm. The German heavy tank T-VIH "Tiger" with an 88-mm gun had armor: frontal - 100 mm, side - 80 mm, towers - 100 mm. Its armor-piercing projectile pierced armor 115 mm thick. He pierced the armor of the thirty-four at a distance of up to 2000 m.

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks supplied to the USSR under Lend-Lease is advancing to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. July 1943

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which opposed the army, had 400 modern tanks: about 50 heavy tanks "tiger" (88-mm cannon), dozens of high-speed (34 km / h) medium tanks "panther", modernized T-III and T-IV ( cannon 75 mm) and heavy assault guns "Ferdinand" (cannon 88 mm). To hit a heavy tank, the T-34 had to approach it by 500 m, which was far from always possible; the rest Soviet tanks I had to get even closer. In addition, the Germans placed some of their tanks in caponiers, which ensured their invulnerability from the side. Fighting with the hope of success in such conditions was possible only in close combat. As a result, losses increased. Near Prokhorovka, Soviet troops lost 60% of tanks (500 out of 800), while German troops lost 75% (300 out of 400; according to German data, 80-100). For them it was a disaster. For the Wehrmacht, such losses were difficult to replace.

The repulse of the most powerful blow by the troops of the Army Group "South" was achieved as a result of the joint efforts of the formations and troops of the Voronezh Front with the participation of strategic reserves. Thanks to the courage, steadfastness and heroism of soldiers and officers of all branches of the armed forces.

Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul on the Prokhorovsky field

The counteroffensive of the Soviet troops began on July 12 with strikes from the northeast and east of the formations of the left wing of the Western and troops of the Bryansk Fronts against the German 2nd Tank Army and the 9th Army of Army Group Center, which were defending in the Oryol direction. On July 15, troops of the Central Front attacked Kromy from the south and southeast.

Soviet counteroffensive during the Battle of Kursk

Concentric strikes by troops from the fronts broke through the enemy's defenses in depth. Advancing in converging directions on Oryol, Soviet troops liberated the city on August 5. Pursuing the retreating enemy, by August 17-18 they reached the Hagen defensive line, prepared in advance by the enemy on the outskirts of Bryansk.

As a result of the Oryol operation, Soviet troops defeated the enemy's Oryol grouping (defeated 15 divisions) and advanced westward up to 150 km.

Residents of the liberated city of Orel and soviet soldiers at the entrance to the cinema before showing the newsreel-documentary film "Battle of Oryol". 1943

The troops of the Voronezh (from July 16) and the Steppe (from July 19) fronts, pursuing the retreating enemy troops, by July 23 reached the lines occupied before the start of the defensive operation, and on August 3 launched a counteroffensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

Forcing the Seversky Donets by soldiers of the 7th Guards Army. Belgorod. July 1943

With a swift blow, their armies defeated the troops of the German 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf task force, and liberated Belgorod on August 5.

Soldiers of the 89th Belgorod-Kharkov Guards Rifle Division
pass along the street of Belgorod. August 5, 1943

The Battle of Kursk was one of the largest battles of World War II. On both sides, more than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, up to 12 thousand aircraft were involved in it. Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions (including 7 tank) of the enemy, whose losses amounted to over 500 thousand people, 3 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and assault guns, over 3.7 thousand aircraft . The failure of Operation Citadel forever buried the myth created by Nazi propaganda about the “seasonality” of Soviet strategy, that the Red Army could only advance in winter. The collapse of the offensive strategy of the Wehrmacht once again showed the adventurism of the German leadership, which overestimated the capabilities of its troops and underestimated the strength of the Red Army. The Battle of Kursk led to a further change in the balance of forces on the front in favor of the Soviet Armed Forces, finally secured their strategic initiative and created favorable conditions for the deployment of a general offensive on a broad front. The defeat of the enemy at the "Fiery Arc" was an important step in achieving a radical turning point in the course of the war, the overall victory of the Soviet Union. Germany and its allies were forced to go on the defensive in all theaters of World War II.

Cemetery of German soldiers near Glazunovka station. Oryol region

As a result of the defeat of significant Wehrmacht forces on the Soviet-German front, more favorable conditions were created for the deployment of American-British troops in Italy, the beginning of the disintegration of the fascist bloc was laid - the Mussolini regime collapsed, and Italy withdrew from the war on the side of Germany. Under the influence of the victories of the Red Army, the scale of the resistance movement in the countries occupied by German troops increased, and the authority of the USSR as the leading force of the anti-Hitler coalition was strengthened.

In the Battle of Kursk, the level of military art of the Soviet troops increased. In the field of strategy, the Soviet Supreme High Command creatively approached the planning of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. decision expressed in the fact that the side with the strategic initiative and overall superiority in forces went over to the defensive, deliberately giving an active role to the enemy in the initial phase of the campaign. Subsequently, as part of a single process of campaigning, following the defense, it was planned to switch to a decisive counteroffensive and deploy a general offensive in order to liberate the Left-Bank Ukraine, Donbass and overcome the Dnieper. The problem of creating an insurmountable defense on an operational-strategic scale was successfully solved. Its activity was ensured by the saturation of the fronts big amount mobile troops (3 tank armies, 7 separate tank and 3 separate mechanized corps), artillery corps and artillery divisions of the RVGK, formations and units of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. It was achieved by conducting artillery counter-preparation on the scale of two fronts, extensive maneuvering of strategic reserves to reinforce them, and delivering massive air strikes against enemy groupings and reserves. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully determined the plan of conducting a counteroffensive in each direction, creatively approaching the choice of the directions of the main attacks and methods of defeating the enemy. Thus, in the Oryol operation, Soviet troops used concentric strikes in converging directions, followed by fragmentation and destruction of the enemy grouping in parts. In the Belgorod-Kharkov operation, the main blow was delivered by the adjacent flanks of the fronts, which ensured a quick break-in of the enemy's strong and deep defenses, cutting his grouping into two parts and the exit of Soviet troops to the rear of the enemy's Kharkov defensive area.

In the Battle of Kursk, the problem of creating large strategic reserves and their effective use was successfully solved, strategic air supremacy was finally won, which was held by Soviet aviation until the end of the Great Patriotic War. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command skillfully carried out strategic interaction not only between the fronts participating in the battle, but also with those operating in other directions (the troops of the Southwestern and Southern fronts on the pp. Seversky Donets and Mius fettered the actions of German troops on a wide front, which made it difficult for the Wehrmacht command to transfer from here his troops near Kursk).

The operational art of the Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk for the first time solved the problem of creating a deliberate positional insurmountable and active operational defense up to 70 km deep. The deep operational formation of the troops of the fronts made it possible during a defensive battle to firmly hold the second and army defense lines and front lines, preventing the enemy from breaking through into the operational depth. High activity and greater stability of the defense were given by a wide maneuver of the second echelons and reserves, artillery counter-preparation and counter-attacks. During the counteroffensive, the problem of breaking through the enemy’s defense in depth was successfully solved by decisive massing of forces and means in the breakthrough areas (from 50 to 90% of their total number), skillful use of tank armies and corps as mobile groups of fronts and armies, close interaction with aviation , which carried out in full on the scale of the fronts an air offensive, which to a large extent ensured the high pace of the offensive of the ground forces. Valuable experience was gained in conducting tank battles both in a defensive operation (near Prokhorovka) and during an offensive when repelling counterattacks by large enemy armored groupings (in the areas of Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka). The problem of ensuring stable command and control of troops in operations was solved by bringing command posts closer to the combat formations of the troops and the widespread introduction of radio equipment in all organs and command posts.

Memorial complex "Kursk Bulge". Kursk

At the same time, during the Battle of Kursk, there were also significant shortcomings that negatively affected the course of hostilities and increased the losses of the Soviet troops, which amounted to: irretrievable - 254,470 people, sanitary - 608,833 people. They were partly due to the fact that by the beginning of the enemy offensive, the development of a plan for artillery counter-preparation in the fronts had not been completed, because. reconnaissance could not accurately identify the places of concentration of troops and placement of targets on the night of July 5. The counter-preparation began prematurely, when the enemy troops had not yet fully taken up their starting position for the offensive. In a number of cases, fire was fired at the squares, which allowed the enemy to avoid heavy losses, put the troops in order in 2.5-3 hours, go on the offensive and on the first day wedged into the defense of the Soviet troops for 3-6 km. The counterattacks of the fronts were hastily prepared and often delivered against the enemy, who had not exhausted his offensive potential, so they did not reach the final goal and ended with the transition of the counterattacking troops to the defense. During the Oryol operation, excessive haste was allowed during the transition to the offensive, not due to the situation.

In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, steadfastness and mass heroism. Over 100 thousand people were awarded orders and medals, 231 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, 132 formations and units received the title of guards, 26 were awarded the honorary titles of Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachev.

The material was prepared by the Research Institute

(military history) Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation

(Used illustrations from the book Arc of Fire. Battle of Kursk July 5 - August 23, 1943 Moscow and / d Belfry)