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G. K. Zhukov writes in his book: “The victory of our troops near Stalingrad
marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the war in favor of the Soviet
Union and the beginning of the mass expulsion of enemy troops from our territory. WITH
this time and until the very end of the war, the Soviet command completely
took the strategic initiative. "
One cannot but agree with such an assessment. Assuming there weren't
victory at Stalingrad, it becomes clear that the Germans would gain a foothold on
Caucasus, in the Volga region, they would launch a new offensive against Moscow, and the war
would drag on for many years, full of deprivation and suffering of our people,
Seeing our defeat, the allies are unlikely to stay with us. They are so
delayed the opening of a second front in Europe, watching the course of events and
waiting for who will be stronger - us or the Germans. It is possible that Germany
would have achieved world domination, as Hitler dreamed, but this
happened. After the Battle of Stalingrad, everyone realized that a turn had come, and
doubts about our strength disappeared. We have begun a new offensive phase in the war,
leading to victory over Nazi Germany. This change took place after
Stalingrad.
What the battle on the Volga meant for the Germans, writes Lieutenant General Vsetfal:
“The defeat at Stalingrad horrified both the German people and their
army. Never before in the history of Germany had there been such a
terrible loss of so many troops.
After the liquidation of the encircled grouping of German troops near Stalingrad,
the fascists themselves fled from the Caucasus in a panic, fearing a new “cauldron”.
Soviet troops, developing a winter offensive to the west, occupied Rostov,
Novocherkassk, Kursk, Kharkov and a number of other important areas. General operational
the strategic situation for the enemy deteriorated sharply throughout the Soviet
German front.
Some foreign historians distort the facts when they claim that
victory at Stalingrad was achieved not by military art, but by our
overwhelming superiority in manpower and resources. Assessing the value
Battle of Stalingrad, Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky writes in his book “The Case
whole life”: “No matter how zealous modern bourgeois
falsifiers in a malicious distortion of history, they fail
eradicate from the consciousness of mankind greatness
Stalingrad victory. And for our and for future generations forever
it will remain indisputable that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler's
the clique, despite all efforts, could not restore the former
efficiency of his army, found himself in a zone of deep military
political crisis. The Battle of Stalingrad is rightly defined as
the largest military-political event of the entire Second World War”.
To this we can add the opinion of US President Franklin
Roosevelt, expressed in the letter presented to Stalingrad after the battle: “From
in the name of the people of the United States of America, I present this charter to Stalingrad,
to celebrate our admiration for his valiant defenders, the bravery,
whose fortitude and dedication during the siege of September 13, 19442
years to January 31, 1943 will forever inspire the hearts of all free
of people. Their glorious victory stopped the wave of invasion and became a turning point
point of war of the allied nations against the forces of aggression.

RIA Novosti continues to publish doctor's talks historical sciences Valentina FALINA with the agency's military observer Viktor LITOVKIN. They reveal previously little-known pages of the Great Patriotic War, tell about the mechanisms and springs of certain decisions closed to the general public. highest level which sometimes had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of hostilities.

VL: V modern historiography World War II, there are various assessments of its final stage. Some experts argue that the war could have ended much earlier - known, in particular, the memoirs of Marshal Chuikov, who wrote about this. Others believe that it could drag on for at least another year. Who is closer to the truth? And what is it? What is your point of view?

VF: Not only today's historiography is arguing on this issue. There were discussions about the timing of the war in Europe and the time of its end even during the war. They have been going on unceasingly since 1942. To be precise, this question has occupied politicians and the military since the forty-first year, when the vast majority statesmen, including Roosevelt and Churchill, believed that the Soviet Union would hold out for a maximum of four to six weeks. Only Benes believed and argued that the USSR would resist the Nazi invasion and, ultimately, defeat Germany.

Eduard Beneš, if I remember correctly, was the President of Czechoslovakia in exile. After the Munich agreement in 1938 and the seizure of the country, he was in the UK?

Yes. Then, when these assessments and, if you will, the assessments of our resilience did not come true, when Germany suffered its first, I emphasize, strategic defeat in World War II near Moscow, views changed dramatically. There were fears in the West that the Soviet Union would not come out of this war too strong. And if it really turns out to be too strong, it will determine the face of the future Europe. So said Berle, US Deputy Secretary of State, coordinator of US intelligence. Churchill's entourage also thought so, including very respectable people who developed the doctrine of the actions of the British armed forces and all British policy before the war and during the war.

This explains, in many respects, Churchill's resistance to the opening of a second front in 1942. Although Tiverbrook, Crippe in the British leadership, and especially Eisenhower and other planners of the American military plans, believed that there were both technical and other prerequisites for defeating the Germans precisely in the forty-second year. Use the factor of diverting the overwhelming part of the German armed forces to the East and, in fact, the two thousand-kilometer-long coast of France, Holland, Belgium, Norway, and Germany itself, open to invasion for the allied armies. Along the Atlantic coast, the Nazis did not then have any permanent defensive structures.

Moreover, the US military insisted and convinced Roosevelt (there are several memorandums from Eisenhower on this subject) that a second front is necessary, that a second front is possible, that the opening of a second front will make the war in Europe, in principle, short-lived and force Germany to capitulate. If not in the forty-second year, then, at the latest, in the forty-three.

But such calculations did not suit the UK and the figures of the conservative warehouse, of which there were plenty on the American Olympus.
-Who do you mean?

Well, for example, the entire State Department, headed by Hull, was extremely unfriendly towards the USSR. This explains why Roosevelt did not take Hull with him to the Tehran conference, and why the Secretary of State received the minutes of the Big Three meetings for review six months after Tehran. The curiosity is that the protocols were reported to Hitler by the political intelligence of the Reich after three or four weeks. Life is full of paradoxes.

After Battle of Kursk 1943, which ended with the defeat of the Wehrmacht, on August 20, the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Great Britain, as well as Churchill and Roosevelt, met in Quebec. On the agenda was the question of a possible withdrawal of the United States and Britain from anti-Hitler coalition and about entering into an alliance with the Nazi generals to wage a joint war against Soviet Union.

But because, according to the ideology of Churchill and those who shared this ideology in Washington, it was necessary to "detain these Russian barbarians" as far in the East as possible. If not to break the Soviet Union, then to weaken it to the utmost. First of all, by the hands of the Germans. That was the task.

This is the old, old Churchillian intent. He developed this idea in conversations with General Kutepov back in 1919. Americans, British and French fail and cannot crush Soviet Russia he said. This task must be entrusted to the Japanese and Germans. In a similar vein, Churchill instructed Bismarck, the first secretary of the German Embassy in London, in 1930. The Germans behaved like fools in World War I, he argued. Instead of focusing on defeating Russia, they started a war on two fronts. If they had only dealt with Russia, then England would have neutralized France.

For Churchill, it was not so much a fight against the Bolsheviks as a continuation Crimean War 1853-1856, when Russia tried well or badly to put a limit to British expansion.

in the Caucasus, Central Asia, in the oil-rich Middle East...

Naturally. Therefore, when we talk about different options for waging war with Nazi Germany, we should not forget about the different attitudes towards the philosophy of the alliance, towards the obligations that England and the United States assumed before Moscow

I'll digress for a moment. In Ghent in 1954 or 1955 there was a symposium of priests on the topic - do angels kiss? As a result of many days of debate, conclusions were drawn: they kiss, but without passion. Allied relations in the anti-Hitler coalition were somewhat reminiscent of an angelic whim, if not the kisses of Judas. The promises were without obligation or, worse, to mislead the Soviet partner.

Such tactics, let me remind you, disrupted the negotiations between the USSR, Great Britain and France in August 1939, when something could still be done to curb Nazi aggression. Defiantly, they left the Soviet leadership no choice but to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. We were exposed to the blow of the Nazi military machine, ready for aggression. I will refer to the directive as it was formulated in Chamberlain's cabinet: "If London does not get away from the agreement with the Soviet Union, the British signature under it should not mean that in the event of a German attack on the USSR, the British will come to the aid of the victim of aggression and declare war on Germany. We must reserve the opportunity to state that Britain and the Soviet Union interpret the facts differently."

A well-known historical example, when Germany attacked Poland, an ally of Great Britain, in September 1939, London declared war on Berlin, but did not take a single serious step to really help Warsaw.

But in our case there was no question of even a formal declaration of war. The Tories proceeded from the fact that the German skating rink would pass to the Urals and tamp everything along the way. There will be no one to complain about the treachery of Albion.

This link of times, the link of events existed during the war. She provided food for thought. And these reflections, it seems to me, were not very optimistic for us.

But let's go back to the turn of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year. Could we end the war before May or not?

Let us put the question this way: why was the landing of the allies planned for the forty-fourth year? For some reason, no one emphasizes this moment. Meanwhile, the date was not chosen by chance. In the West, they took into account that near Stalingrad we lost a huge number of soldiers and officers, military equipment. There were colossal casualties in Kursk Bulge... We lost more tanks than the Germans.

In 1944, the country mobilized seventeen-year-old boys. Almost the entire village was cleared. Only at the defense plants spared the age of 1926-1927 - their directors were not released.

American and British intelligence, evaluating the prospects, agreed that by the spring of 1944 the offensive potential of the Soviet Union would be exhausted. That the human reserves will be completely used up, and the Soviet Union will not be able to strike the Wehrmacht with a blow comparable to the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk battles. So, by the time the allies landed, having been bogged down in the confrontation with the Nazis, we would cede the strategic initiative to the United States and England.

By the time the allies landed on the continent, a conspiracy against Hitler was also dated. The generals brought to power in the Reich were to disband Western Front and open space for the Americans and the British to occupy Germany and "liberate" Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Austria ... The Red Army was to be stopped at the borders of 1939.

I remember that the Americans and the British even landed troops in Hungary, in the Balaton region, with the aim of capturing Budapest, but the Germans shot it all...

It was not a landing, but rather a contact group to re-establish ties with the Hungarian anti-fascist forces. But not only that failed. After the assassination attempt, Hitler survived, Rommel was seriously wounded and dropped out of the game, although in the West they were betting on him. The rest of the generals chickened out. What happened happened. The Americans did not succeed in an easy march across Germany to bravura music. They got involved in battles, sometimes difficult, remember the Ardennes operation. Nevertheless, they solved their problems. They solved them, at times, rather cynically.

I will bring specific example. US troops approached Paris. There began an uprising. The Americans stopped thirty kilometers from the capital of France and waited for the Germans to kill the rebels, since they were, first of all, the communists. It was killed there, there are different data, from three to five thousand people. But the rebels took control of the situation, and only then did the Americans take Paris. The same was observed in the south of France.

Let's go back to the point from which we started our conversation.

Winter of the forty-fourth - forty-fifth year.

Yes. In the autumn of 1944, several conferences were held in Germany, led by Hitler, and then on his behalf by Jodl and Keitel. Their meaning boiled down to the following - if you give the Americans a good thrashing, the United States and England will awaken a great taste for negotiations that were conducted in secret from Moscow in 1942-1943.

The Ardennes operation was conceived in Berlin not as an operation to win the war, but as an operation to undermine allied relations between the West and the Soviet Union. The United States had to understand how strong Germany was, how interesting it was for the Western powers in their confrontation with the Soviet Union. And how much the Allies themselves do not have enough strength or will to stop the "Reds" on the outskirts of German territory.

Hitler emphasized that no one would talk to a country that was in a difficult situation - they would only talk to us when the Wehrmacht showed that it was a force.

Surprise was the decisive trump card. The Allies occupied winter quarters, they believed that the Alsace region, the Ardennes mountains - a great place to relax and a very bad place for military operations. The Germans, meanwhile, were about to break through to Rotterdam and cut off the Americans from using the ports of Holland. And this circumstance will completely decide the entire Western company.

The start of the Ardennes operation was postponed several times. Germany did not have enough strength. And it began precisely at the moment when, in the winter of 1944, the Red Army was waging heavy fighting in Hungary, in the Balaton region and near Budapest. At stake were the last sources of oil - in Austria and some in Hungary itself, which were controlled by the Germans.

This was one of the reasons why Hitler decided to defend Hungary no matter what. And why, in the midst of the Ardennes operation and before the start of the Alsatian operation, he began to essentially withdraw forces from western direction and transfer troops to the Soviet-Hungarian front. The main force of the Ardennes operation - the 6th SS Panzer Army was removed from the Ardennes and transferred to Hungary ...

Under Haymashker.

In essence, the redeployment began even before Roosevelt and Churchill’s panic appeal to Stalin, when they, translated from diplomatic to common language, began to ask: help, save, we are in trouble.

But Hitler was estimating, and there is evidence of this, that if our allies so often exposed the Soviet Union to attack and openly waited, and whether Moscow could stand it, if the Red Army would not break, then we can do the same. As in 1941 they were waiting for the fall of the capital of the USSR, when in 1942 not only Turkey and Japan, but also the United States were waiting to see if we would surrender Stalingrad in order to decide to revise our policy. After all, the allies did not even share intelligence information with us, for example, about the plans for the German offensive across the Don to the Volga and further to the Caucasus, and so on and so forth ...

This information, if I am not mistaken, was given to us by the legendary Red Chapel.

The Americans did not provide us with any information, although they had it by the day and hour. Including the preparation of the operation "Citadel" on the Kursk Bulge ...

We, of course, had good reason to look at how our allies knew how to fight, how much they wanted to fight and how much they were ready to promote their main plan for the operation on the continent - the plan, which was called "Ranken". Not "Overlord" was the basis, but "Ranken", which provided for the establishment of Anglo-American control over all of Germany, over all the states of Eastern Europe, in order to prevent us from going there.

Eisenhower, when he was appointed commander of the forces of the second front, received a directive: prepare the Overlord, but always keep the Ranken in mind. If favorable conditions arise for the implementation of the Ranken plan, discard the Overlord, and direct all forces to the implementation of the Ranken plan. The uprising in Warsaw was launched under this plan. And many other things were carried out under this plan.

In this sense, the forty-fourth year, the end of it - the beginning of the forty-fifth became the moment of truth. The war was not on two fronts - East and West, but the war was on two fronts. Formally, the allies were fighting, very important for us - they certainly tied up some part of the German troops. But their main idea was to stop, if possible, the Soviet Union, as Churchill said, and some American generals expressed it more sharply, "to stop the descendants of Genghis Khan."

Incidentally, Churchill formulated this idea in a crudely anti-Soviet form as early as October 1942, when our counter-offensive on November 19 near Stalingrad had not yet begun. "We need to stop these barbarians as far east as possible."

And when we talk about our allies, - in no case do I want and can not belittle the merits of the soldiers and officers of the allied forces who fought, like us, knowing nothing about the political intrigues and machinations of their rulers - they fought honestly and steadfastly . I am not belittling the aid that we received under Lend-Lease, although we have never been the main recipients of this aid. I just want to say how difficult, contradictory and dangerous the situation was for us throughout the war until its victorious salute. And how difficult, at times, was the adoption of a decision. When they didn’t just lead us by the nose, but continued and continued to simply expose us to a blow.

That is, the war could really have ended much earlier than May 1945?

If I answer this question absolutely frankly, then I will say: yes, I could. Only it is not the fault of our country that it did not end in the forty-third year. Not our fault. If only our allies honestly fulfilled their allied duty, if they adhered to the obligations that they assumed before the Soviet Union in the forty-first, forty-second and in the first half of the forty-three years. And since they did not do this, the war dragged on for at least one and a half to two years.

And most importantly - do not be these delays with the opening of the second front, the victims among Soviet people and among the allies, especially in the occupied territory of Europe, there would be 10-12 million less. Even Auschwitz would not have worked, after all, it began to operate at full capacity in the forty-fourth year ...

Blitzkrieg rolled west

As we have already said, the Battle of Kursk was not only Germany's last attempt to wrest the strategic initiative from the Red Army. It became a turning point in the war in the sense that after it the Wehrmacht finally lost the ability to successfully act on a strategic scale. If earlier he could at least conduct large defensive operations such as Rzhev-Vyazemskaya, then by 1944 local operations of an operational scale became the ultimate dream of panzer generals. Yes, the German divisions could still successfully hold the city of N for a week or two. Yes, during the counterattack they could still throw back Soviet troops by 20-30 kilometers. But no more! The Germans could no longer hold the same city N for another two months, unless the Red Army, for strategic reasons, transferred the severity of the blow to another sector of the front. And the Germans did not manage to push back Soviet troops for 50 kilometers until the very end of the war. A reasonable question may arise: so why did the struggle drag on for so long? The first obvious answer is that the Wehrmacht was too huge a structure, and the usual inertia force inherent in such a large mass worked. Stopping it in one moment is simply impossible. The second, no less important, reason was that the Soviet command had not yet fully mastered the changed situation and had not yet learned to act as a complete master of the situation. The lessons of 1941-1942 were also memorable, the education of a victorious instinct is a long and painful process. But when he appears, then the resistance of this army becomes useless, which was proved by the Red Army in 1945. But in 1944 things were a little different. We will consider only three operations that can be considered the most indicative in terms of compliance with the ideas of the big and small blitzkrieg.

Chronologically, the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation was the first, by the way, the most controversial in terms of results. However, if you remember how General Vatutin commanded during the Battle of Kursk, this is not particularly surprising.

By January 1944, the general strategic situation had developed in such a way that the so-called Kanevsky ledge was formed on the southern sector of the front. The Germans stubbornly clung to the coast of the Dnieper in the Kanev region, although by this time the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front had bypassed them far from the west. There were 11 German divisions on the ledge, and their position inspired serious concerns, but Hitler was not going to withdraw them. It's not even about the propaganda slogan "German cooks continue to draw water from the Dnieper." There were also some military considerations. Manstein, of course, blames the Fuhrer for everything. But it seems that the OKH, having lost a sense of reality, still dreamed of a possible strike on the flank of the 1st Ukrainian in the direction of Bila Tserkva, although the Germans no longer had the strength for this.

Interesting feature this operation lies in the fact that the Soviet command decided to start it without a serious superiority in forces. The troops of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts had a total of about 250,000 men, 5300 guns and 670 tanks against the Germans' 170,000 men, 2600 guns and 250 tanks. However, not far from the area of ​​​​the intended pocket, the Germans had several tank divisions in reserve, which had about 600 tanks.

The 2nd Ukrainian Front launched an offensive on January 24, and on the very first day the German tactical defense was almost broken through. But General Konev acted too sluggishly and did not take advantage of the favorable situation. Only the next day, the 5th Guards Tank Army of General Rotmistrov was introduced into the battle, which broke through the German positions. But the delay had an effect, as the enemy pulled up reserves and managed to slow down the offensive. Moreover, our 20th and 29th tank corps were themselves cut off. And then the front commander, General Konev, showed that we had already learned not to be afraid of the Germans. He makes a decision completely unthinkable just a year ago. The 20th corps continues its offensive towards the units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the 29th corps takes up defense with the front to the south, and the reserve units cut through the thin German arm. And so it happened! On January 28, the tanks of the 20th Corps in the village of Zvenigorodka met with the vanguard of the 6th Tank Army. And the German barriers in the offensive zone were overturned and destroyed, the formation of the external and internal fronts of the encirclement began.

Korsun-Shevchenko operation.

The offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front began two days later and at first did not go so smoothly. Heavy fighting ensued in the intended area of ​​the breakthrough, and progress was minimal. The commander of the front, General Vatutin, had to shift the point of application of forces, but in the end, after the 6th Panzer Army was brought into battle, the German defenses were broken through here too. But after the breakthrough, the offensive went on unhindered, and there were no problems until the meeting with Konev's 20th Panzer Corps.

So, we have a kind of classic blitzkrieg operation. A breakthrough of the front, large enemy forces are surrounded, tank units enter the operational space, a period of development of success begins ... But no! This is what Guderian would have done. This is what Manstein would have done. But the Soviet generals did not do that. Not yet. Yes, one reason lay literally on the surface. Panzer divisions suffered losses during the offensive, in addition, mud started, and not only cars, but even tanks got stuck in the mud. But, most likely, the very lack of a victorious instinct, which had already prevented us from developing the success of the breakthrough at Stalingrad and destroying the German troops in the North Caucasus, had an effect. In the same way, now it was still necessary to try to strike further. After all, the combined forces of the two fronts had an excellent prospect of cutting off the entire Nikopol grouping, moreover, all German forces west of the Dnieper.

Apparently, the second time, when the success of the operation exceeded all expectations, the Soviet command was confused and did not show flexibility, reacting in accordance with the changed situation. On the other hand, if you look at the attracted forces, it becomes clear that big tasks were not set for the advancing armies from the very beginning. Defeating an entire army group with 700 tanks is more than difficult.

In addition, a mistake was made that was completely unusual for the Germans. Before the breakthrough began, significant forces were again used to "fetter" the enemy. Oh, it's shackling! It becomes a real scourge of Soviet offensives, diverting from a quarter to a third of the forces that could be used to develop success. The fact is that even if - even if! - the Germans decided to try to transfer troops to the battle area from non-attacked sectors of the front, this would take time. And the Soviet divisions would have been there from the very first day.

In general, the Korsun blitzkrieg lasted exactly 4 days, after which the destruction of the encircled group began. The grouping was not going to capitulate or die, and the soldiers of General Stemmerman offered fierce resistance. The ultimatum presented by the Soviet command was rejected. By the way, we note again that it is precisely such attempts to fight to the end that call into question the key idea of ​​the blitzkrieg - increasing the pace of operations. At the same time, the German command began to prepare a deblocking strike. Manstein was again appointed as the savior of the fatherland on the scale of the 8th Army.

As always, Soviet historians they sing the usual song about the superiority of the Germans in forces, especially in tanks. "As part of some German tanks th divisions (mainly in SS divisions) had heavy tank battalions of Tiger tanks, Ferdinand assault guns. Tiger tanks were also in service with the 503rd and 506th separate tank battalions., - writes A.N. Grylev. In total, Manstein collected about 1000 tanks, despite the fact that only 307 Soviet ones opposed them on the outer ring of encirclement. To be honest, these stories about the ubiquitous "Ferdinands" stuck in my teeth. And in general, what would be the result of a strike by 1000 German tanks is not difficult to imagine.

First, the Germans tried to break through the encirclement in the zone of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, because the distance to the so-called Gorodishchensky ledge was minimal here. But the successes of four tank divisions, which managed to advance only 5 kilometers, turned out to be minimal. Stemmerman, meanwhile, was concentrating his troops on Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, gradually reducing the line of defense and preparing to break through to meet the deblocking groups.

As a result, the main efforts were transferred to the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The tank division "Leibstandarte" appeared here, which spoiled so much blood for our soldiers near Kursk. The commander of the 1st Panzer Army, General Hube, sent an optimistic radiogram to the encircled, urging them to hold on and a firm promise to help them out. He really concentrated three tank divisions with the support of two battalions of "tigers" and on February 4 went on the offensive. On February 6, another tank division arrived at his disposal. To fend off the German attack, Vatutin brought into battle the 2nd Panzer Army, which was still in reserve. Here a reasonable question immediately arises: why was it not previously used to develop success? The German offensive was temporarily halted, and they took a break to regroup their forces.

On the morning of February 11, the Khube shock group (III Panzer Corps) again went on the offensive in the direction of Rizino - Lysyanka. At the same time, the encircled troops of Stemmermann tried to strike towards them from the Steblev area. After fierce fighting, they managed to break through to Shenderovka, and the distance to the vanguards of Khube was only about 10 kilometers. But those miles still had to be covered. Some of the modern Russian historians are trying to justify the frank clumsiness of Vatutin's actions by the fact that the Germans allegedly tried to break through at the junction of two fronts. Full of you! Well, look at the cards you publish in your own books! All events took place in the zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the junction of the fronts was a few tens of kilometers to the east.

And yet, the situation was really confusing, and the Soviet command confused her. The outer ring of encirclement was held by the Vatutin front, and the inner ring by the Konev front. And it was really difficult to coordinate their actions, although there was a special representative of the Headquarters who was supposed to deal with this. Who? That's right, Marshal Zhukov. It only ended with the fact that “Marshal Zhukov, who coordinated the actions of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, failed to organize a clear interaction between the troops that repelled the onslaught of the enemy, and was recalled by the Headquarters to Moscow.”

In general, the situation was strange - both sides were dissatisfied. The Germans could not break through, the Red Army could not destroy the boiler, although by February 16 it had shrunk to a meager size. The headquarters of the German 8th Army radioed Stemmermann that the offensive of the III Panzer Corps was bogged down and that he himself had to break through to meet him. Stemmermann chose to remain with the rearguard to cover the breakthrough, which was entrusted to command by Lieutenant General Theobald Lieb. By this time, the cauldron was literally reduced to a patch with a diameter of 5 kilometers around Shenderovka. Hitler's permission was required for a breakthrough, but Manstein realized that delaying death was similar, and sent a brief telegram to Stemmermann: “Stichwort Freiheit. Zielort Lysyanka. 23.00 "-" Password "Freedom". Goal Lysyanka.

And at 23.00 the Germans in three columns went to break through with attached bayonets at the ready. After a fierce hand-to-hand fight, some of them managed to break through. However, the left column ran into the tanks of the 5th Guards Tank and was practically destroyed. It dawned, but the fighting was still going on. Konev, realizing that there was a danger of missing the Germans, threw into the attack a brigade of the 20th tank corps, armed with new IS-2 tanks. Having discovered that the Germans did not have anti-tank artillery, the tanks simply crushed the wagons and vehicles with caterpillars.

By noon, the disorganized crowd reached the Rotten Tikich River. The crossing was very reminiscent of everything that happened on the Berezina in 1812, and no statements by German historians will make me believe in "organization and order." Moreover, the German officers themselves admit in their memoirs: for the first time among German soldiers, there are signs of Kesselfurcht - fear of boilers. Pictures of the battlefield clearly prove that there was no order or organization in sight.

Commander tank division SS Viking Gille crossed the river by swimming, although Marshal Konev later wrote in his memoirs: “General Gille, apparently, took off on a plane before the start of the fight, or crawled through the front line, dressed in civilian clothes. I rule out that he made his way on a tank or transporter through our positions and strongholds.. Thank God, no “women's dress” appeared, although no one really made it through the tank.

The outcome of the battle was unsatisfactory for both sides. The Soviet blitzkrieg, which had begun well, was stopped by its own command, which made it possible for part of the encircled group to escape, although Soviet historiography for a long time insisted on the complete destruction of the troops that fell into the cauldron. At the same time, the encircled divisions ceased to exist as combat units and had to be re-formed. The Germans stubbornly insist that 35,000 people out of 60,000 who were surrounded, broke through, but this raises the most serious doubts. Most likely, as is usually the case in such dubious episodes, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

The next operation, deserving, by the way, special attention, is Operation Bagration. From my point of view, which everyone is free to challenge, this is the most brilliant operation of the Red Army in the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. In terms of perfection, only Guderian's breakthrough at Sedan and Rommel's blow at Gazala can be compared with it. But the scale of these operations is many times smaller, and, as we well remember, the complexity of command and control increases in proportion to the square of the number, so the achievements of General Rokossovsky deserve much higher marks than the actions of panzer generals. Especially when you consider the stubbornness and experience of the enemy who opposed him.

The plan of the operation, which provided for the simultaneous defeat of two enemy groups holding the "Belarusian balcony", belonged to General Rokossovsky. Zhukov claimed that the plan was prepared in Moscow even before the meeting, which was attended by representatives of the Stavka and front commanders. This is the absolute truth. But it is also true that the developments of the Rokossovsky headquarters were sent to Moscow even earlier. This is confirmed by an absolutely disinterested witness - S.M. Shtemenko. By the way, with the book of his memoirs " General base during the war years ”one curious episode is connected.

Some now popular historian decided to sparkle with wit and ridicule one of the proposals of the General Staff. The offer was really not the most reasonable. But the method he chose is even worse - a fragmentary quotation so beloved by the Soviet historical school. Compare for yourself:

“The idiocy of this “new idea” was so obvious that, as Shtemenko recalls, “we were corrected.” We decided - to surround, where to go here. This is what Mr. N writes in his work "Stalin's Ten Strikes". And now let's see what Shtemenko actually said: “During these two days, the goal of the Belarusian operation was finally formulated - to encircle and destroy large forces of Army Group Center in the Minsk region. The General Staff, as already noted, did not want to use the word "encirclement", but we were corrected. The encirclement was to be preceded by the simultaneous defeat of the enemy's flank groupings - Vitebsk and Bobruisk, as well as his forces concentrated near Mogilev. This immediately opened the way to the capital of Belarus in converging directions.. Do you feel the difference? Moreover, this paragraph is already on a completely different page of memoirs and is dedicated to a different episode. But - two words are snatched out, and the broth is ready. No, beware of short quotes!

Operation Bagration.

The operation began on June 22, 1944. Probably, there is some higher justice in this - exactly 3 years after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army began its most brilliant operation. The offensive was carried out on a wide front, but the main blows were delivered in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. The beauty of Rokossovsky's plan was that there was no plan for one gigantic super-cauldron formed by converging strikes on Minsk, after which one would have to mess around with the destruction of two or three armies, although, most likely, it was possible to surround them. No, small boilers were planned with the rapid destruction of encircled small groups. The ill-fated example of Stalingrad was still fresh in my memory.

First, the German defenses crackled near Vitebsk in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. On the very first day of the offensive, the 6th Guards Army broke through the defenses and expanded the breakthrough to 50 kilometers. There was a gap between the IX and LIII Corps. The commander of the 3rd Panzer Army, General Reinhardt, requested permission to withdraw. But here, in many ways, the Red Army was helped, oddly enough, by Adolf Hitler. By this time he had lost all sense of reality and was busy building sandcastles on a large scale. Many cities and towns scattered throughout the Eastern Front were declared "fortresses", although in reality they were a few primitive field fortifications hastily built on the outskirts settlements. The units of these "fortresses" were ordered not to retreat and fight to the last bullet. On March 8, 1944, Hitler clarified his definition of a fortress when he issued Order No. 11:

“A distinction will be made between “fortified areas” (Feste Platze), each of which will be subordinate to the “commandant of a fortified area”, and “local strongholds” (Ortzstutzpunkte), under the command of a military commander.

"Fortified areas" will serve as fortresses... They will prevent the enemy from occupying areas of decisive tactical importance. They will allow the enemy to surround themselves, thus fettering the greatest amount of his forces and creating conditions favorable for successful counterattacks.

"Local strong points" are strong points located deep in the war zone, which will be strongly defended in the event of an enemy infiltration. Being included in the main scheme of hostilities, they will serve as a reserve of defense, and in the event of an enemy breakthrough, they will be the cornerstone of the front, forming positions from which it will be possible to carry out counterattacks.

This directive clarified the powers of the commandants of fortified areas and put them under direct subordination to the commander of the corresponding army group. Every person in a fortified area, regardless of military rank or civil status, obeyed the commandant. The garrison had to constantly be in the fortified area and prepare defensive structures. As a rule, Hitler announced that the area had been fortified so late that there was no time to build any significant fortifications before the arrival of the Soviet troops. He ordered the garrison to be at the disposal of the commandant when there was only enough time to take up positions. By Hitler's definition, it is difficult to distinguish between a fortified area and a fortress, except when the fortified areas were mainly on the Eastern Front and, as a rule, did not have fortifications. In general, the Fuhrer personally drove his troops into boilers, which was especially pronounced during Operation Bagration.

Hitler refused to allow LIII Corps to withdraw, but General Reinhardt and Field Marshal Busch, commander of Army Group Center, saw what was happening. They ordered the corps commander, General Gollwitzer, to prepare for a breakthrough. Late! On June 24, the 4th airfield division was surrounded southwest of the city, and the remaining 3 divisions of the corps ended up in a mousetrap in Vitebsk itself. pay attention to important point: all the boilers turned out to be quite small, not the ones that the Sovinformburo reports about under the roar of artillery salute. But I didn't have to deal with them either. Already on July 25, the 4th airfield division ceased to exist under the blows of the 39th army, and the Vitebsk cauldron itself broke up into two more. The 246th Infantry and 6th Airfield Divisions were surrounded 10 kilometers from Vitebsk, and the 206th Infantry was stuck in the city. Under the blows of Soviet aviation, their forces were melting away literally before our eyes. By the evening of June 26, the position of the encircled became hopeless, and General Gollwitzer decided to try to break through in order to save what could still be saved. At dawn on June 27, the Germans launched a breakthrough in small groups. The result of such attempts is well known to us from the events of the summer of 1941. LIII Corps was completely destroyed. True, the Germans still continue to argue about what exactly happened to him. According to one report, 20,000 soldiers died and 10,000 were captured. Other historians claim that 5,000 soldiers died and 22,000 were captured. I think when they get it all figured out, it will be possible to amend the new edition of this book.

Here we have to make a small digression. As we have already seen, in 1941 the Germans very often managed to conduct a blitzkrieg without the participation of tanks. Almost the same thing happened now. Only one tank army, the 5th Guards, participated in Operation Bagration. The reason was quite understandable: the forests and swamps of Belarus are not the best terrain for tanks, they could only operate along the Minsk-Moscow highway. It was there that the German defense was broken through. What is most important soviet tanks they did not linger, "forming an outer ring of encirclement", but moved further to Borisov, as prescribed by all the canons of the blitzkrieg. Parallel to the tank army, General Oslikovsky's cavalry-mechanized group was advancing. Very quickly, the Germans experienced the effectiveness of their own tactics in their own skin. The remnants of the XXVII Corps, which tried to escape from Orsha, ran into the tanks that had broken through, with a completely predictable result.

The Germans faced a difficult task - to try to stop the rapid advance of Soviet tanks, in which the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which was operating south of Rotmistrov's army, also now participated. The Berezina River was chosen as a defensive line. This thankless task was entrusted to the 5th Panzer Division, hastily transferred to Minsk from the Ukraine. She was also assigned to the 505th heavy tank battalion. It was his “tigers” who on June 28 were the first to encounter the 3rd Guards Tank Corps at the Krupki station, but were forced to retreat.

The Soviet command mastered the tricky science of blitzkrieg, and Rotmistrov's tanks did not have to fight alone with the arriving German reserves. On June 29, 5 tanks were already brought up to help the tanks. rifle divisions 11th Guards Army. With a combined attack by infantry and tanks (!) The German defenses were broken through a little north of Borisov, in a weaker place (!), And after a short battle on June 30, the German defenses on the Berezina collapsed. Guderian could have rejoiced at such a skillful application of his theories, but something tells me that the news of these events did not make the inspector general of the Panzerwaffe happy.

The attack on Minsk from the south, which was led by the 1st Belorussian Front under General Rokossovsky, did not develop so successfully in the first days due to the swampy terrain. But on June 24, the main forces of the front entered the battle, and the German defense was broken through here too. The commander of the 9th Army, General Jordan, decided to throw into battle his only reserve - the 20th Panzer Division. By the way, pay attention to the scarcity of German reserves. A division there, a division here - no more. But these were OKH problems. War is not a chess game where both players receive 16 exactly identical pieces before the start. Everyone has what he managed to collect. But failed...

The 20th Panzer Division ran into the advancing Soviet troops south of Bobruisk and was destroyed. By June 26, the 1st Guards Tank Corps reached the city from the south, and the 9th Tank Corps from the east. The very next day, the 9th Panzer Corps captured the crossings over the Berezina, and several more German divisions were surrounded. Rokossovsky did not waste time creating an "iron ring", rightly believing that they would not go anywhere anyway, but abandoned his reserves - the 1st Guards Cavalry and 1st Mechanized Corps - further west, to Baranovichi. The defense of the German 9th Army collapsed along the entire front. True, it is not very clear why the Germans do not like to admit that the affairs of the 4th Panzer Army in the north were no better.

Field Marshal Bush knew that his army group was in danger of total annihilation. Together with General Jordan on June 26, he flew to Hitler's Headquarters, but failed to explain anything to the Fuhrer. The only result of the visit was that Hitler removed both Bush and Jordan. Field Marshal Model was entrusted with saving the situation.

Around 40,000 German soldiers were surrounded in the Bobruisk area. Rokossovsky proved that he perfectly understands how to act in such a situation. Soviet artillery and aviation successfully crushed one German regiment after another, while the tanks continued their advance. Surrounded by XXXI Panzer Corps, it made several attempts to break out of the city, but was dismembered, defeated and destroyed. In just less than a week, about 50,000 German soldiers died during the fighting, and another 20,000 were captured.

After the German front collapsed north and south of Minsk, it was possible to start solving larger tasks. Soviet troops launched an offensive on the capital of Belarus, threatening to trap the remnants of the forces of Army Group Center. The planned cauldron was much larger than all the previous ones, but here the most important thing was done successful condition blitzkrieg - the enemy's will to resist was completely broken.

Here we have to argue a little with the very authoritative historian Stephen Zaloga. He claims that the German command, in desperation, resorted to the last measure and tried to use strategic aviation in order to stop the Soviet offensive. In general, he claims correctly, but he is very much mistaken in details. The fact is that the last major bombing offensive of the Luftwaffe on the Eastern Front began long before Operation Bagration by the IV Air Corps, and it had completely different goals. Operation Zaunkönig began on March 27 with raids on the Sarny railway junction in order to prevent our attack on Kovel, that is, all this had nothing to do with the battles in Belarus. The raids continued until July 1944. During these operations, the already small stocks of aviation gasoline were practically used up. Therefore, the participation of the He-177 bombers in the July battles was extremely limited, although they did one or two hits on Soviet tanks near Minsk. Moreover, German sources emphasize that although the attacks were carried out during the day, the losses were very small, since the Soviet pilots simply did not have the experience of fighting such large aircraft.

However, let us descend from heaven to sinful earth. The Red Army continued to advance on Minsk from the north and south, and attempts to stop them led to nothing. On July 1 and 2, fierce tank battles took place northeast of Minsk - the 5th Panzer Division and the 505th Heavy Tank Battalion tried to stop the 5th Guards Tank Army. Rotmistrov was unlucky again, although, perhaps, he was simply a useless general. And the marshal - even more so. It was not for nothing that he, it was he, who received a reprimand from Stalin, while Chernyakhovsky and Rokossovsky are new stars for shoulder straps. By the way, golden star Rotmistrov managed to get it only in 1965, during the period of the famous Brezhnev distributions. During the war years, he could not be compared with either Katukov or Lelyushenko. Rotmistrov's army again suffered significant losses, but the German tank group simply disappeared. Only 18 vehicles remained in the 5th Panzer Division, and the "tigers" were killed to the last.

Panic reigned in Minsk, very similar to what the Germans themselves saw in France in the summer of 1940. The city was filled with crowds of unarmed fugitives and staff officers, who were not at all eager to die a hero's death, defending Fester Platz Minsk, which was created by Hitler's order. On the contrary, they stormed the trains leaving for the West. Here you can throw a serious reproach to the Soviet aviation, which never managed to block the railways.

The first units of the 2nd Panzer Corps broke into the outskirts of Minsk early in the morning of July 3. In the afternoon, the 1st Guards Tank Corps entered Minsk from the southeast. The 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts united. The resistance of the Germans in the city itself was suppressed very quickly, because, as we have already said, there was no one to defend it. The encirclement closed, and inside were 5 German corps, or 25 divisions. The 9th and 4th tank armies ceased to exist, as did the entire Army Group Center as a whole. It was the largest defeat of the Wehrmacht in the entire Second World War, much more terrible than Stalingrad. You can talk about further operations of the Red Army - Vilnius, Lvov-Sandomierz, Kaunas, and indeed write a huge volume on the Belarusian operation. But this is already superfluous, and we will not talk about the pursuit of the defeated enemy.

In total, during Operation Bagration, the Germans lost about 400,000 soldiers, 10 generals were killed, and 22 were captured. You can at least count the generals, but even the Germans themselves do not know the exact figures for their total losses. Once upon a time, brave warriors dreamed of marching in parade through Moscow, and on July 17, 1944, their dream came true. True, not quite as it once seemed to all these "dreamers". But 56,000 German soldiers and officers, led by 19 generals, had to pass through the streets of the Soviet capital.

The last operation that we would like to consider will be Yasso-Kishinevskaya. In some respects, it was even a purer blitzkrieg than the Bagration, as in this case the Soviet tanks were put into a clean breach. However, let's talk about everything in order.

Yasso-Chisinau operation.

In the summer of 1944 the German Eastern front collapsed literally in all areas - from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea. German generals still dreamed of organizing a tough defense, of transferring military operations to a positional channel, as was the case during the First World War. Hitler muttered something about fortresses and an invincible wall. Yes, the Wehrmacht tried to build a wall. It just happened in accordance with the famous phrase: “The wall is rotten. Poke - and fall apart. They poked at the northern sector - Army Group Center shattered into dust. Poked in the south - the Army Group "Southern Ukraine" had no better.

By mid-August, a situation had developed in Moldova that was strikingly reminiscent of Stalingrad. The German 6th Army occupied a ledge that went deep into the front line, and its flanks were covered by the Romanian troops - the 3rd and 4th armies. Perhaps the Germans should have given the unfortunate army a different number, if only out of superstition, otherwise it was just asking for trouble, although now it was commanded by General Fretter-Pico, and not Paulus at all.

The idea of ​​the operation was simple - to strike at two far-distant sectors of the front: northwest of Yass and south of Bender, where the Romanian troops held the defense. If successful, the 6th Army in in full force found herself in a cauldron and could share the fate of her predecessor. The Soviet command concentrated significant forces and created a multiple superiority in manpower, tanks and artillery in the breakthrough areas. For example, it was possible to bring the density of artillery to 280 barrels per kilometer of the front, which they had not even dared to think about before. The main difference from the Byelorussian operation was that in the southern sector of the front the terrain was much more favorable for the use of tanks, so 1870 tanks and self-propelled guns were assembled here.

The offensive of both fronts began on August 20 after a powerful artillery preparation. The artillery strike was so strong that in some places the first strip of German defense was swept away. Here are the memories of one of the participants in the offensive:

“When we moved forward, the terrain was black to a depth of about ten kilometers. The enemy's defense was practically destroyed. The enemy trenches, dug to their full height, turned into shallow ditches, no more than knee-deep. The dugouts were destroyed. Sometimes dugouts miraculously survived, but the enemy soldiers who were in them were dead, although there were no signs of wounds. Death came from high air pressure after shell explosions and suffocation.

The troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General Malinovsky, broke through the main line of defense on the very first day, and the 27th Army broke through the second one too. In one day, our troops advanced 16 kilometers. The commander of Army Group South Ukraine, General Frisner, later wrote that chaos had begun in the disposition of his armies. In order to somehow stop the rapidly developing offensive, he threw 3 infantry and 1 tank divisions into a counterattack near Iasi. But this attack was not successful. In the middle of the day, Malinovsky introduced the 6th Panzer Army into the breakthrough, which struck at the third and last line of defense of the Germans.

It is completely incomprehensible for what reasons, but the Soviet Military Encyclopedia suddenly begins to talk complete nonsense, talking about the second day of the operation. Say, "the enemy pulled units of 12 divisions, including two tank divisions, to the breakthrough area of ​​the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and tried to stop his advance with counterattacks." Yes, Frisner did not have such forces. He does not mention in a single word about any counterattacks on 21 August. On the contrary, all his thoughts were focused on one thing - how to organize a more or less orderly withdrawal of troops beyond the Prut or even the Danube. Frisner did not want his divisions to share the fate of Field Marshal Bush's troops, so he spat on the vaunted German discipline, spat on the orders of the Fuhrer and ordered the withdrawal of troops. But it was already too late. Soviet tanks were deep in the German rear, cutting off the headquarters of the corps from the headquarters of the 6th Army. General Fretter-Pico did not want to join the commander of the first 6th Army and hastily moved his headquarters further to the rear. So hastily that then he had to wash off the accusations of fleeing from the battlefield for a long time. Frisner tries to justify him, but he himself immediately writes that the headquarters of the army group was forced to take command of the divisions. This is not done from a good life.

On the front of the Romanian 3rd Army, our offensive also developed successfully. On August 22, the 3rd Ukrainian Front finally cut off the German 6th Army from the Romanian 3rd Army. Army General Tolbukhin correctly assessed the potential of both, and therefore decided to leave the Romanians to themselves, concentrating the main efforts on actions against the right flank of the German army. The 4th Guards and 7th Mechanized Corps were thrown into the gap, which began a rapid advance to the west, deviating slightly to the north in order to meet Malinovsky's units on the banks of the Prut. Already on August 23, Malinovsky's 18th tank corps captured Khushi, and Tolbukhin's mechanized corps captured the crossings at Leuseni and Leovo. On the third day of the operation, the encirclement of the German 6th Army was completed! And Guderian himself would envy the pace of advancement of Soviet tanks.

By the way, after the war, another battle near Iasi broke out - the battle of memoirs, in which Guderian and Frisner tried hard to push the blame for this catastrophe onto each other. However, we will be indulgent to the panzer generals. None of them could save the situation, and in general one should not talk about German mistakes (and who does not allow them?), But about the correct decisions of Malinovsky and Tolbukhin. The fact is that this time the mistakes of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation were not repeated. The 6th Panzer Army, without delay and without being distracted by any "encirclement fronts", continued to develop the offensive to the south, in the direction of Bucharest. Did you want blitzkrieg? You got it!

Meanwhile, the troops of the Soviet 46th Army crossed the Dniester and began to advance in a southeasterly direction. On August 23, when the ring around the main pocket was closed, the 46th Army, as they say, in passing, slammed the Romanian 3rd Army, which capitulated with practically no resistance. Tolbukhin looked into the water when he did not want to allocate large forces to fight it. 3 divisions and 1 brigade surrendered. This turned out to be the last straw that broke the determination of the ruling circles of Romania to continue the struggle. On the evening of August 23, a "coup d'état" took place in Bucharest, as our historians sometimes write. But what kind of revolution was it? King Mihai removed Prime Minister Antonescu and appointed another general in his place - C. Sanatescu. At 11:30 p.m., the king's declaration on the cessation of hostilities against the Allies was broadcast on the radio. The Soviet command did not count on such a result of the operation - Germany lost another ally. Although here, the SVE could not resist telling another tale about the "anti-fascist uprising led by the Communist Party." The funny thing is that modern historians repeat this tale, although literally after a couple of pages they absolutely seriously write that communist party Romania numbered less than 1000 people and did not have any influence.

In general, by August 23, the inner front of the encirclement was formed, in which there were 18 German divisions. About how they were defeated, General Frisner is modestly silent. In general, he shifts all the blame for the defeat of the 6th Army onto the Romanians and ... Guderian. He himself is not at all to blame, and the Soviet troops, as it were, were present at this, no more.

The large cauldron immediately fell apart into two smaller ones, the liquidation of which was completed on August 27 and 29. After that, the operation could be considered completed. The Yasso-Kishinev operation is characterized by very small losses of the Soviet troops - only about 67,000 killed and wounded, while the Germans lost about 250,000 people. This offensive also had more distant consequences - it opened the way for the Soviet troops to the borders of Bulgaria. As a result, on September 5, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria, but already on September 9, this “war without shots” ended.

In the autumn of 1944, the OKH had to do the thankless task for the second time - to re-form the 6th Army. By the way, few people know, but in last days fighting in Stalingrad, Hitler ordered to collect one soldier from each of the encircled divisions, so that they would become the "core" of the new 6th "avengers" army. Now there was no time to engage in such nonsense, and the army was formed around the Fretter-Pico headquarters that managed to escape. It will be interesting to compare the composition of this ill-fated army in different periods of its existence.

November 19, 1942, on the day the Soviet offensive near Stalingrad began: XIV Panzer Corps (60th and 3rd motorized, 16th tank, 94th infantry divisions); LI Corps (389, 295, 71, 79th Infantry, 100th Jaeger, 24th Tank Divisions); VIII Corps (113th, 76th Infantry Divisions); XI Corps (44th, 384th Infantry Divisions), 14th Panzer Division directly subordinated to the army headquarters.

The reconstituted army on April 9, 1943: XVII Corps (302, 306, 294th Infantry Divisions); XXIX corps (336th, 16th motorized, 15th airfield divisions); XXIV Panzer Corps (11th Infantry, 454th, 444th Security Divisions); corps group "Mitsch" (335th, 304th infantry, 3rd mountain rifle divisions); the 79th and 17th infantry, 23rd tank divisions are subordinated to the army headquarters.

VII Corps (Romanian 14th Infantry, 370th, 106th Infantry Divisions); LII Corps (294, 320, 384, 161st Infantry Divisions); XXX Corps (384, 257, 15, 306, 302nd Infantry Divisions); XXXIV Corps (258, 282, 335, 62nd Infantry Divisions); The 13th Panzer Division is directly subordinated to the army headquarters.

LVII Panzer Corps (76th Infantry, 4th Mountain Rifle, remnants of the 20th Panzer Division), 8th SS Cavalry Division Florian Geyer, Winkler Group. That is, nothing remains of the August composition.

As we can see, immediately after the defeat at Stalingrad, the dead divisions were not restored, despite the Fuhrer's theatrical gesture. But it is pleasant to note that the 384th Infantry Division came under distribution twice - near Stalingrad and near Chisinau. Well no luck. However, we digress a little.

Summary. The battles of 1944 showed that the Soviet command gradually mastered the art of blitzkrieg - swift cutting blows, encirclement of enemy armies and their subsequent destruction with the simultaneous development of success by tank units. This detail is especially important, since only the summer offensives demonstrated this in full. During winter operations, our command still paid too much attention to encircled groups. In the summer of 1944, the Soviet command succeeded in several operations in the style of the classic blitzkrieg, which are worthy of being included in any textbook.

It is obvious that the subjugation of Western Europe by Russia is becoming less and less possible every day, and that such subordination is simply impossible for a long time.

(K. Marx, 1850)

So, May 1945. The war in Europe was over, and as a result, Stalin got only a smaller and worse half of Europe. War on Far East is still going on, but it is already obvious that the USSR can only count on Korea (as it turned out later, not all of it) and northern China.

Second World War lost. But at Stalin's disposal is a huge military machine: tank armadas of an unprecedented quantity and quality, excellent artillery, powerful aircraft, 11.4 million soldiers hardened in battle. Why not try to start and win the Third World War - in other words, not throw the armies of the Western Allies into the ocean and take over all of Europe (and the Middle and Far East)? This is exactly what Zhukov advised Stalin (“to advance from Brest to Brest”).

Many of our people - from ardent Stalinists to no less ardent anti-Stalinists - are convinced that Stalin made a fatal mistake by rejecting Zhukov's proposal.

Let's figure it out. To avoid accusations of bias, we will proceed from the most favorable scenario for Stalin: the United States did not use atomic weapons in the war, and the Red Army remained loyal to the regime and fought against the allies in the same way as before against the Germans (remember what was written in the eighth chapter) .

First of all, the war with the United States and Britain for Stalin was, by definition, to turn into a protracted one. In fact, we reached the English Channel, and then? The fleet, the allies, dominated the sea, and Stalin had no chance of defeating it: somewhere, where, but at sea the Russians were not warriors against the Anglo-Saxons. The Japanese fleet of 1941 was much stronger than the Soviet one in 1945, and it started the war with a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Singapore. Nevertheless, by the end of 1944 from Japanese fleet there were “horns and legs” (and by the summer of 1945 - neither horns nor legs: the last large ship, the battleship Yamato, was sunk by the Americans on April 7, 1945). The Soviet fleet about the surprise attack on naval forces Anglo-Americans could not think: as soon as it became known that Soviet tanks went on the offensive in Europe, the Allied fleets would be ready to fight back.

True, Soviet amphibious tanks, judging by the tests as early as 1935, could technically cross the English Channel (Suvorov V ... Suicide. S. 189-193), but still, I think, not under the fire of heavy Allied naval guns. So England is invulnerable, America even more so. Then what is a protracted war? It seems so.

Supporters of the fact that it was necessary to strike the Allies in 1945, fascinated by the huge superiority of the Soviet ground forces, forget the words of Stalin himself that "aggressive nations are better prepared for the outbreak of war than peace-loving nations," as well as the fact that such an advantage is a temporary factor, while economic superiority is a permanent factor (Stalin I.V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, pp. 166–167). And the superiority of the American economic potential over the Soviet one was huge - ten times (more on this will be discussed at the end of the book).

They forget that the parties were, to put it mildly, in different starting conditions: until 1940-1941. America practically did not prepare for war, while the USSR in the 1920s-1930s. did almost nothing else. Suffice it to say that tank forces as an independent branch of the military were established in the United States on July 10, 1940 - already after the Wehrmacht crushed Western Europe; by June 1941, the entire US tank fleet consisted of 400 vehicles of hopelessly obsolete designs (British and American Tanks of World War II. N.Y., 1969. P. 11; cited by: Suvorov V. Suicide. S. 183).

Here good example: in the spring of 1941, Soviet and American delegations of tank experts visited the German tank factories almost simultaneously. Both were shown everything that at that time was available in Germany. And here is the reaction. “The Americans were shocked by the German achievements. But then a Soviet delegation appeared (headed by the people's commissar of heavy engineering, I. T. Tevosyan, by the way). Our engineers indifferently glanced at the combat vehicles and demanded that the antediluvian equipment be removed, and instead show what they promised - modern tanks. The Germans assured that they were showing the best they had. Soviet engineers refused to believe it” (Suicide, pp. 220–221). By the way, in Germany, a country fundamentally unprepared for a protracted war, they managed to significantly reduce the military-technical gap from the USSR during the war. In 1942–1943 The Germans had heavy tanks. And what about the United States, a country with inexhaustible economic opportunities, perfectly prepared specifically for a protracted war?

By 1945, the United States was still far behind the USSR in the quantity and quality of tanks, but compared to 1940-1941. the backlog was reduced by m> row. Already in 1943-1944. the United States had not only quite decent medium tanks M-4 and M-7 weighing 25 and 32 tons, with 85 mm frontal armor, 500 hp engines. With. and guns of 75, and on some even 105 mm, but also heavy tanks M1A and M1B, respectively, weighing 57 and 50 tons, with 100 mm and 200 mm frontal armor (our KB has 100 mm), with an engine in 1000 hp, on which there were one 75-mm and two 37-mm guns each (TSB. 1st ed. T. 51. S. 771–772).

If we extrapolate the balance of power into the future, then, taking into account the constantly acting factor of the ratio of economic potentials, it is very possible to imagine that by 1950 the United States could, by exerting itself, surpass the USSR in this one as well. Moreover, all the best Soviet tanks had an American progenitor - the American tank Walter Christie; a sample of this tank was sold to the USSR at the end of 1930 (Shmelev I.P. Tanks BT. S. 7; Mealson A. Russian BT Series. Windsor, 1971; Zaloga S. Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two. P 67, cited in: Icebreaker, pp. 27–28; The Last Republic, pp. 157–158). The American state, which at that moment was not going to fight with anyone, did not claim the genius of Christie and his students, but life could force ... And in general, who created in the 1920s-1930s. huge military power of the Soviet Union? Mostly the same American engineers on American technology (see: Harrison M. Soviet production 1941-1945. To reassessment / / Russia in the XX century. Historians of the world argue. S. 492-501; Sutton A National Suicide: A Military Aid to the Soviet Union and many other authors).

At the same time, we must not forget: the Second World War for the United States was not so much a land war as sea and air, so tank building was given secondary attention. As for the fleet and aviation, then no one could equal America. The American fleet, which had shared the first place with the British until 1941, was unmatched in 1945 (and the British had grown significantly over the years).

Germany, for which all of Europe worked, built in 1941-1944. 98,000 aircraft at full effort; During the period from July 1, 1941 to June 30, 1945, the USSR, receiving huge assistance from the USA, built 140,000 aircraft - also at full effort ( The World History. M., 1965. T. 10. S. 427); The United States, without receiving help from anyone and helping everyone through Lend-Lease, built 182,300 aircraft in 1943-1944 alone, and without much effort (Ibid., p. 433) (according to other sources, even more - 60,000 aircraft in 1942, 125,000 aircraft in one year 1943 (LE Utkin. Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt. S. 224).

And the quality of the aircraft was appropriate. Already in 1943-1944. aircraft were built with a ceiling of 10.5–11.5 km (flying fortress bombers, B-17 C and Martin B-26, Airacobra fighter), and even 14 km (Thunderbolt), with a range a flight of 4820 km (“Flying Fortress”), 5100 km (heavy bombers “Mariner”), finally, 6400 km (heavy bombers “Coronado”) (TSB. 1st ed. T. 51. S. 777– 778). Such a ceiling made American bombers practically inaccessible to the enemy - for fighters (10 km), and "Thunderbolt" - and for anti-aircraft guns (12 km) (Den-MS 26). And as for the range, then estimate for yourself on the map. And remember that this is only 19,431,944 years, far from the limit of American possibilities (we will talk about the possibilities in more detail below). The USSR in 1944–1945, by the way, was engaged in the fact that it collected damaged B-29s in territories previously controlled by Germany and Japan and, accordingly, subjected to American air strikes, and occupied by Soviet troops during the war; these aircraft were used to build their own strategic bombers (Sokolov B. Pobeda, which was worse than many defeats).

The Germans, except for Coventry, could not destroy a single city properly in a year of bombardment of England; this is not surprising, considering that in two years (1940-1941) they dropped only 58,000 tons of bombs on England; the Americans, in three years (starting in the spring of 1942), dropped 2,650,000 tons of bombs on Germany (Brekhill P. The Dam Busters. L, 1951. P. 47, 117, 166, 249; Goralski P. World War II Almanac P. 438; cited in: The Last Republic, p. 153; Suicide, p. 250; my calculations. -D.V.). The difference is 45 times, almost two orders of magnitude! Since 1942, the Americans have destroyed German and Japanese cities in a matter of days (Cologne, 1942, Hamburg, 1943) or even hours (Dresden, February 1945, a number of Japanese cities, March 1945; Tokyo suffered from a raid on March 10, 1945 more severely, than from the earthquake of 1923).

As for the superiority of the Soviet military art (and it really was!), It is always transient. All the conquerors at first surpassed their opponents in the ability to fight - and Alexander the Great, and Attila, and Genghis Khan, and Napoleon, and many others of a lower rank. Only such superiority never lasted - the victims quickly learned to fight, and soon the war was on an equal footing. There is no reason to think that this time it would be different.

However, in some ways the Americans had superiority even then.

In the air defense system, equipped with the latest electronic means, radars, and so on, the Americans and the British already in 1940 were sharply superior to both Germany and the USSR, as well as in the system of commands, control, command and communications. The reason for this was that Stalin declared cybernetics "a bourgeois pseudoscience alien to Marxism"; By the way, almost at the same time, Hitler called cybernetics "Jewish pseudoscience alien to National Socialism." The result was the defeat of the Luftwaffe in the "Battle of England" in 1940-1941. (Bunin K Groza, p. 144) and the USSR's lifelong lag behind the United States and its allies in the most important area of ​​modern warfare. By the way, during the Great Patriotic War, the USSR received 1803 radar stations from Britain - we didn’t have our own (Zalessky S. Lend-Lease is worth a lot).

However, Stalin's dislike of communication was largely forced by the very nature of totalitarianism. Radio is a device, in theory, anti-Soviet. You can listen to "enemy voices", you can talk to each other uncontrollably, you can also transmit espionage information to enemies. Wired communication with field phones is somehow more reliable. Approximately the same thing was done in the rear - radio stations instead of radio receivers. Hitler, by the way, envied Stalin in this regard and was going to carry out a general radioification of Germany after the war.

Only during the war, the need forced Stalin to put the radio first on planes, then on tanks. This, by the way, was possible only with the powerful help of the United States. And the USSR began to produce civilian radios only after the death of the Leader of the Peoples.

This is yet another reason for the failures of 1941 and the loss of the entire struggle for world domination associated with them. What is the use of the excellent T-34 and KB tanks if, due to the lack of communications, they were not given fuel and shells? V. Lebedev compares such an army with a prehistoric lizard: a mountain of muscles, half-meter claws, monstrous fangs ... and half a kilogram of a small, poorly organized brain (Lebedev V. March of Suvorov and Bunich to the book market / / Bulletin. 1998. No. 5–6). But such a state was forced - by the very nature of totalitarianism.

In the same pen was under Stalin and the organization of communications; the military transport service (albeit for other reasons) and at the end of 1940 almost 80% worked at the expense of horse-drawn transport. The rear service was organized even worse. The medical service also left much to be desired (Ibid., pp. 334-336). During the Great Patriotic War, all this was more or less managed only thanks to the supplies of the allies, among which, in addition to the already mentioned, almost half a million cars and, among other things, 423,107 field telephones, hundreds of thousands of radio stations, and much more (quoted from: The Last Republic pp. 147–148). According to some reports, the Allies provided the USSR with almost 100% communications (Sokolov B. Pobeda ...).

An analogy between Stalin and Napoleon is appropriate here. He also rejected the idea of ​​a steam fleet, rejected the use of convex missiles, etc. So the point here is not that Roosevelt was smarter than Stalin - it’s not at all a fact that this was the case. But the very principle of concentrating all power and all decisions in one hand seems vicious in the industrial, and even more so in the post-industrial era. One person, even if it is such a person as Stalin, cannot know everything and understand everything! And you can’t keep smart advisers around you on certain issues either. A democratic leader can afford to keep advisers smarter than himself, because he will still be elected president, since a public politician who knows how to please the voters is one thing, and a “very smart” adviser is quite another, voters will not like him. But the autocrat, in principle, cannot afford to have advisers smarter than himself: this is a blow to the “sacred” nature of his power.

By the way, about the "sacred" nature of power. Alexander Dugin laments that in Germany (Nazi) and Russia (Soviet) geopolitics was not recognized, unlike the USA and England, and rightly sees this as not the last reason for the historical defeat of Germany and Russia (Osnovy geopolitiki. M., 2001). But why did this happen? Yes, precisely because in non-democratic states the power is so dear to the heart of Mr. Dugin "sacred" character. Not a person paints a place, but exactly the opposite. Hence the point of view: once appointed to a position, it means that the mind should automatically increase. And if so, then there is nothing to listen to any geopoliticians from the outside. It is quite possible to answer them: “We know everything ourselves” or “We have someone to do this.” Or even ruder: “None of your business” or “Know your place!” And then there is nothing to be surprised at the results.

There is no reason to be surprised at the results of "autocratic-"sacred" power in other areas as well. Yes, the leader's task is not to manage everything himself, but to select leaders of the highest standard for all posts. But can one person succeed in principle, even such a person as Stalin? Stalin succeeded in the selection of generals, more or less - in the selection of leaders of the military industry. Although there were punctures. So, for example, the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik in 1940 ordered the People's Commissar for Armaments B.L. Vannikov to put a 107-mm cannon on tanks instead of 7b-mm. Kulik supported A.A. Zhdanov. Putting a gun almost one and a half times larger in caliber on the same tank was in principle impossible, but Stalin supported Zhdanov and Kulik. As a result, Vannikov was arrested and miraculously not repressed (Nekrich A.M.S. 112 113).

But in the sense of selecting the leaders of the economy as a whole, he did not always succeed. In the field of science management, he did not succeed at all - the most promising industries were defeated by him.

And the creation of an atmosphere of a cult of personality around a sole dictator cannot pass without leaving a trace. To Stalin's credit, it must be said that he succumbed to the incense that was smoked in his honor much less than Hitler (for this, see: Suvorov V. Suicide. S. 75–78, 82–89, 101–103), but all - I couldn't resist at all.

But back to the question of the balance of power. Stalin, however, had a numerical superiority over the armies of the allies in Europe - 6 million against 4.6 million, but only in Europe. The ground forces of the United States, Britain and the colonies and dominions of the latter by 1945 totaled 22.65 million people. (my calculations according to: World History. Vol. 10. S. 433–444, 524, 566 - D.V.) - significantly more than that of the USSR (11.4 million), and the allies had a degree of exhaustion of human resources, undoubtedly much lower than that of the USSR.

Here is an excerpt from Goebbels' diary dated March 3, 1945. The entry is not for propaganda and not for publication, and in general Goebbels very, very highly appreciates the military power of the USSR (we have already talked about this, see: Suvorov V ... Cleansing. P. 3 -20). But here is the Soviet manpower record of March 3, 1945: “Their troops are extremely well armed, but they suffer more and more from a lack of men. Their attacking infantry consists for the most part of Eastern workers and Poles detained in our eastern regions". And there is nothing to object to. Our people did not know how to protect and did not want to. The war ruined the peasants (The Last Republic, p. 331).

Army General ML Moiseev admitted (Pravda, July 19, 1991) that during the years of the Great Patriotic War, 29.4 million soldiers were mobilized into the Red Army, not counting those who were already there (quoted from: Den-M S. 153) - that is, no less than 35 million in total. Of these, by 1945, 1,112 million remained. I think it would not be a big exaggeration to say that in a new war, if it began, Stalin could only count on regular conscription contingents reaching 19 years of age. And taking into account the fact that opponents were also to appear in Asia (this will be discussed in the next chapter), the USSR should soon begin to yield to its opponents in numbers.

As for the ratio of economic potentials, then in general, if we take the military production of Britain in 1941-1944. per unit, German military production will be 0.9, Soviet - 1.4, and American - 4.3 (Harrison M. Soviet military production 1941-1945, p. 493). According to other sources, American military production accounted for two-thirds of the total military production of the allies, Soviet - one-fifth, and British - one-seventh (Pozdeeva L.V. Lend-Lease for the USSR: the discussion continues // World War II. Actual problems. S. 329). At the same time, one should not forget that the degree of mobilization of the American economy was significantly lower than that of the British, not to mention the German and Soviet ones: the United States by no means rebuilt its entire economy on a war footing: the production of consumer goods during the war years increased by 83%, while in 1944, at the time of the highest growth of military production, 700,000 unemployed remained in the country (World History, vol. 10, p. 434). Here is the conclusion of Heinrich Mann: America fought the war in jest. If she strained her powers, the world would tremble.

Further, the USSR would hardly have been able to mobilize practically the entire able-bodied population either into the army or into the military industry if it had not received from the allies huge supplies of food capable of feeding the entire army and half the country, raw materials, various equipment (and logistics and medical services, communications, managed to organize in a modern way only thanks to American supplies; more details have already been said about the size of the supplies of the allies, about 7-8 million additionally mobilized thanks to them - too).

Almost all known facts allow us to conclude that the Soviet economy, like the German one, was designed for a blitzkrieg, and not for a protracted war. Few people ask the question: why, having such a powerful military machine, did Stalin start such a complex combination with an “icebreaker” instead of simply conquering all of Europe? Yes, precisely because he was afraid of a protracted war with the whole world!

But that's not all. The occupation of Western Europe by Soviet troops and the beginning of "socialist transformations" would inevitably provoke resistance in Europe. Recall that Bandera and the "forest brothers" on the annexed in 1939-1940. territories, cut off from the whole world, resisted for a decade and a half! The same thing would have happened - on an immeasurably large scale - throughout Europe, only the Allies would, of course, have provided assistance to European resistance in war conditions.

For some reason, many of my opponents are sure that in Europe the Red Army would have been greeted with flowers as a liberator no longer from Hitler, but from the "Anglo-American imperialists." With those who hold such views, it seems that there is nothing to discuss at all, but it is necessary. The word is again to the personal driver of Marshal Zhukov A.N. Bunin. The action takes place in Poland at the end of January 1945, during the Vistula-Oder operation: “Taking at face value the talk of almost the love of the local population for us, at first we were in a hurry to smile, stretch out our hands, and so on. The reception was usually lukewarm. Once, with a friend, we were driving a Willis through Gniezno and heard loud music coming from a large house. Stopped and entered. Polish youth danced in the hall. But we didn’t manage to dance, the young ladies huddled, looked at us like we were animals” (170,000 kilometers with G.K. Zhukov, p. 126).

Well, let's say that the Poles had no particular reason to love the USSR after 1920 and especially 1939 (and even more early history also did not differ in special warmth of relations). But after all, we came to Poland as liberators from Hitler, and we had to come to Western Europe as invaders.

And finally, the allies, dominating the seas and oceans, could threaten with a landing at any point on the coast of the USSR and the territories occupied by it. How many millions of soldiers would have to be kept to guard them? Let me remind you that during the Crimean War, when the mobility of the fleet and its ability to land army landings were incomparably lower than in the 1940s-1950s, Russia was forced to keep 270,000 soldiers on the coast of the Baltic Sea to protect against the British squadron from 12 -thousands of troops on board.

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Why did World War II become inevitable?

Suvorov claims that Stalin unleashed the Second World War. How did the "Kremlin mountaineer" manage to do this? This is a pretty rare occurrence! - Suvorov condescends to explanations. It turns out that "Stalin's plan is simple: to force France and Britain to declare war on Germany ... or to provoke Germany into such actions that will force France and Britain to declare war on Germany ... Delegations of France and Britain [at the Moscow talks in the summer of 1939], wanting to prove the seriousness of their intentions , informed the Soviet side of information of extreme importance: if Germany attacked Poland, Britain and France would declare war on Germany. This was the information that Stalin was waiting for. Hitler believed that the attack on Poland would pass with impunity, like the capture of Czechoslovakia. And Stalin now knew that Hitler would be punished for this. So the key to the start of World War II ended up on Stalin's table. Stalin had only to give the green light to Hitler: attack Poland, I won't interfere with you ... (Viktor Suvorov, "M Day", chapter "Prologue at Khalkhin Gol).

Suvorov here again uses his favorite method - impudent lies. As Comrade Stalin said in such cases - "Not so it was. Absolutely not so."

Shortly after Munich, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov received the French ambassador Coulondre. Litvinov, in particular, said: “We consider what happened a catastrophe for the whole world. One of two things: either England and France will continue to satisfy all the demands of Hitler and the latter will gain dominance over all of Europe, over the colonies, and he will calm down for a while, to digest what they have swallowed, or England and France will realize the danger and begin to look for ways to counteract further Hitlerite dynamism, in which case they will inevitably turn to us and speak to us in a different language. (Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M.M. Litvinov with the French Ambassador to the USSR R. Coulondrom. October 16, 1938, "Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War", vol. 1, p. 248).

The People's Commissar's forecast turned out to be correct not in everything and did not begin to come true right away. At first, the British and French were quite satisfied with their remarkable diplomatic victory. Well, maybe only French Prime Minister Daladier was a little bit jealous of Hitler for Chamberlain. After all, the British Prime Minister in the same place, at the Munich conference, together with the German Fuhrer, managed to sign the Anglo-German declaration that from now on they will resolve all issues without war and without fail through consultations. However, the French did not suffer long. In December, Ribbentrop arrived in Paris and, to everyone's delight, waved a similar Franco-German declaration.

Not that Hitler didn't bother Chamberlain and Daladier at all. But for a completely incomprehensible reason, the leaders of the Western countries were sure (or hoped?) that Hitler's further expansion would unfold in the direction of the USSR. Discussions about Transcarpathian Ukraine became incredibly popular for a while. Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Germany G. Astakhov reported to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in December: "According to correspondents of The Times and the New York Herald Tribune, the topic of Ukraine is now one of the most fashionable in Berlin." ("The Year of the Crisis 1938–1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., p. 144.) At the same time, the French Charge d'Affaires J. de Monba reported to Paris: "According to some foreign sources, Hitler's plan for Ukraine consists in to try to create, if possible, with the help of Poland, which will be offered a kind of condominium, something like the European Manchukuo, placed in more or less close vassalage. (Ibid., p. 137).

Without asking at all about the degree of feasibility of the "Carpathian-Ukrainian" plans (at least from the point of view of geography!), quite officials stubbornly developed this topic in conversations with Soviet diplomats. Thus, for example, Sir Horatio Wilson, the chief adviser to the British government on matters of industry (and trusted political adviser to Chamberlain), Sir Horatio Wilson, told the somewhat dumbfounded Soviet plenipotentiary Ivan Maisky: “Hitler has now taken as the next stage the strike line to the east, towards Ukraine ... Ukraine a large separatist movement and play this card in approximately the same spirit as the Czechoslovak card was played. Again the slogan of "self-determination" will be used. In this plan, Hitler expects big war". (Ibid., pp. 119–120).

Maisky, of course, ridiculed Sir Horatio. Let us ask ourselves, however, what should Moscow have thought about such arguments of Western diplomats? The conclusion was obvious - there is a large-scale provocation by England and France, which, without assuming any obligations, want to draw the USSR into a conflict with Germany. It was with this assessment of the "Ukrainian theme" that Stalin spoke on March 10, 1939. He spoke from the highest podium, devoting a few words to this topic in the Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the XVIII Congress. Stalin, in particular, said: “The noise that the Anglo-French and North American press raised about Soviet Ukraine is typical. The leaders of this press shouted hoarsely that the Germans were going to Soviet Ukraine, that they now had in their hands the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. , numbering about 700 thousand people, that the Germans will annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has more than 30 million inhabitants, to the so-called Carpathian Ukraine as soon as this spring. It seems that this suspicious noise was intended to raise the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison atmosphere and provoke a conflict with Germany for no apparent reason ... "(Ibid., pp. 261-262.)

The paradox is that Stalin was not quite right. Now, after studying the documents, it becomes clear that, firstly, Hitler really considered various plans related to Transcarpathian Ukraine - first of all, meaning to get leverage on Poland (Polish politicians were terribly afraid of creating an “independent” Transcarpathian Ukraine , knowing that this would cause unrest in the Ukrainian regions occupied by Poland). And, secondly, it becomes quite obvious that the politicians of the West so passionately desired the emergence of the Soviet-German conflict that they diligently deceived themselves. IN the highest degree A telegram from British Ambassador to Germany Henderson to British Foreign Secretary Halifax is characteristic. Sir Neville Henderson wrote to Lord Halifax: “As regards the Ukraine, although I find the idea of ​​conquest improbable, it nevertheless seems to me inevitable that Germany will be willing to attempt to wrest this rich country from the vast state which she regards as her main enemy. In her own interests she would naturally prefer that the Ukraine be independent and serve as a buffer state between her and that enemy, and it is quite obvious that she would like to enjoy the prevailing economic and political influence there.I do not think that the USSR would dutifully submit to the German intrigue to such an extent, and it seems to me that the less we take sides in this conflict, the better ... Hitler made it clear in Mein Kampf that "living space" for Germany can only be found in expansion into East, and expansion to the East means that sooner or later a clash between Germany and Russia is very likely." (Documents on British Foreign Policy…Third series. Vol. IV. P. 213-217., cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., pp. 257-258).

The most remarkable thing about this telegram is not the British diplomat's naive hopes of a "clash between Germany and Russia", but the date (March 9, 1939) and a postscript: "the telegram was written before the current crisis in academic interest.

Indeed, Sir Neville had no time to send his wise analysis to the British Foreign Office, and the Slovak separatists financed and led by Berlin began to portray something like "mass riots." They portrayed, however, not very convincing. As Coulondre, who by that time had been transferred to the post of French ambassador to Germany, noted, “if we exclude Bratislava, where the unrest was fomented by the German self-defense service and Glinka’s guards, who received weapons from Germany, order was in no way violated either in Slovakia, or in Bohemia, or in Moravia, for example, the English consul, in a report to his envoy in Prague, stated that in Brunn, where, according to the German press, German blood flowed like a river, absolute calm reigned. (Letter from Coulondre to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France J. Bonnet., "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials. Vol. 1., p. 284). Nevertheless: “Starting from [March] 12, the tone of the Berlin press became even more frantic… Within 24 hours the accents shifted. allegedly became Czechoslovak Germans (immigrants from the Reich) or representatives of an ethnic minority.If you believe the newspapers of the Reich, which spoke not only in the same language, but also in the same expressions as in September 1938, then the life of 500 thousand Czechoslovak Germans was hung over the most terrible danger." (Ibid., p. 284).

When urgent reports about the Czechoslovak events came to London, Prime Minister Chamberlain declared, speaking in Parliament: “The occupation of Bohemia [Czech Republic] by the German armed forces began today at six o’clock in the morning ... The Slovak Parliament declared Slovakia independent. This declaration puts an end to the internal disintegration of the state, the boundaries of which we intended to secure, and His Majesty's Government cannot therefore consider themselves bound by this obligation." The British Prime Minister has officially declared null and void the very guarantee he used to justify Munich agreement. And that's all. Chamberlain considered this topic exhausted. Churchill's testimony: "Chamberlain was due to speak in Birmingham two days later ... Having received energetic presentations about the opinion of the House, the public and the Dominions, he put aside a long-written speech on domestic affairs and social services and took the bull by the horns ... "We are now told that this seizure of territory was dictated by the riots in Czechoslovakia ... If there were riots, were they not inspired from outside? .. "(Winston Churchill, World War II, vol.

In other words - by no means fulfilling the duty of the guarantor of the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia and not realizing the real and imminent danger of Hitler's aggression, but only public opinion, outraged by the tragic results of the protracted policy of "appeasement", made Neville Chamberlain resolutely condemn the occupation of Czechoslovakia and think about how to put an end to the Nazi invasion? That Chamberlain's wrath was primarily aimed at the public is evidenced by the calmness with which British (and French, of course) leaders reacted to another small capture of Hitler that followed just a few days later. On March 20, the German government demanded an ultimatum from Lithuania to transfer the Memel region (Klaipeda region) to Germany. The status of Memel, as an integral part of Lithuania, was enshrined in the Klaipeda Convention of 1924. Britain and France were the guarantors of the convention, but there was no reaction from them. More precisely, there was no reaction to rebuff the aggressor. According to N. Pozdnyakov, temporary charge d'affaires of the USSR in Lithuania, N. Pozdnyakov, in a private conversation, the head of the office of the Lithuanian cabinet told him that the British ambassador "openly became indignant when the Lithuanian government hinted at resistance in Klaipeda." ("The year of the crisis 1938-1939". Documents and materials. Vol. 1, p. 319).

At that time, a British representative, R. Hudson, Minister for Overseas Trade of Great Britain, was in Moscow. Hudson's mission was twofold: on the one hand, he conducted trade negotiations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade, Mikoyan, and on the other, he probed the ground for joint action to curb Hitler. In a conversation with Maxim Litvinov, Hudson said that he "came with an 'open mind' and is ready to listen to how we [the USSR] think of cooperation and what ways we propose for this." (Recording of the conversation of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov with the Minister for Overseas Trade of Great Britain R. Hudson, "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Vol. 1, p. 319). "There will be no second Munich," the British minister assured. It was March 23 - the very day when, having lost any support and assistance from the Anglo-British "guarantors", the Lithuanian government was forced to capitulate. On the same day, Hitler entered the port of Memel aboard the battleship Deutschland.

All that was happening contributed very little to the serious attitude of the Soviet government towards the beginning of the "new era" of British diplomacy - attempts to stop the gangrene of Hitlerism with the help of a collective security system.

And still " new era", indeed, began. Even Chamberlain finally realized that Hitler took the theoretical constructions of his work "Mein Kampf" quite seriously. And there it is very clearly formulated that, before proceeding with the development of "living space" in the East, it is necessary first destroy France and deprive England of any influence on the continent. After the capture of Czechoslovakia, understanding came to many Western politicians and diplomats. On March 19, 1939, the French ambassador to Germany, Coulondre, wrote about this to his minister. Kampf" is identical to the classical doctrine of the German General Staff." ("The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials. P. 301).

In a word, as the Soviet People's Commissar Litvinov suggested, the leaders of England and France had only two choices. The first to give up their countries and peoples of their countries as a sacrifice to Hitler in fulfillment of the theoretical doctrines of "Mein Kampf" and the strategic developments of the German General Staff. The second is to resist the aggressor. At least try. However, there was very little time to maneuver. Hitler was deeply convinced that the age of his precious person was the determining factor in military operations, and therefore he was in a hurry. Chamberlain had to hurry too. On March 31, 1939, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that Great Britain was providing guarantees to Poland. On April 13, British guarantees to Greece and Romania were announced, as well as French guarantees to Greece, Romania and Poland.

Suvorov claims that at the Moscow talks the representatives of France and England provided Comrade Stalin with "information of extreme importance." And he specifies which ones: "if Germany attacks Poland, Britain and France will declare war on Germany." This is an incredible discovery! Well, just "Protocols of the Elders of Zion"! It is very strange that Mr. Suvorov, this "great dissident" in the class of military history, for some reason does not know that this very "information of extreme importance" was announced loudly from the rostrum of the British Parliament! The whole world knew about the English and French guarantee to Poland! And Comrade Stalin knew, and Hitler. Hitler even, having learned about the announcement of the guarantee, was terribly upset. According to Admiral Canaris, Hitler rushed around the room, banged his fists on the marble top of the table, his face twisted with anger, he constantly shouted threats to the British: "I will cook them such a roast that they will choke!" (William Shearer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, Vol. 1, p. 502).

The problem was that Stalin (and Hitler, too) treated the Anglo-French guarantee with great distrust. There were good reasons for this. And not only "Munich and much more," as Churchill delicately put it. After "Munich" there was also "a lot". So, for example, at the end of July 1939, a terrible scandal erupted in England. It turned out that from 18 to 21 July, at the very height of the Moscow negotiations, other negotiations were going on in London - unofficial, but very intense. It was discussed nothing less than the delimitation of the spheres of interests of Germany and the British Empire. The negotiations were conducted by K. Wohlthath, an employee of the German department for the implementation of the four-year plan, and very significant persons in British politics - Chamberlain's trusted adviser Wilson and Foreign Trade Minister Hudson. Yes, yes, with the same Hudson who had been in Moscow four months earlier and so solemnly declared to Litvinov: "There will be no second Munich!" Moreover, the initiative for negotiations came from the British. Horace Wilson even had a draft agreement prepared, the purpose of which, as Sir Horace explained, was "the broadest Anglo-German agreement on all important questions." At the same time, "Wilson definitely told Mr. Wohlthath that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would give England the opportunity to free itself from its obligations with regard to Poland," the German ambassador Dirksen reported to Berlin. Maybe all these negotiations were independently started by "individual British politicians" at their own peril and risk? In no case. Dirksen elaborates: “Sir Horace Wilson made it quite clear that Chamberlain approved of this program; Wilson suggested that Wohlthath immediately talk with Chamberlain so that Wohlthath would receive from him confirmation of what Wilson had said. However, Wohlthath, due to the informal nature of his negotiations, considered it inappropriate for such a conversation with Chamberlain." (Note of the German Ambassador to Great Britain G. Dirksen, July 24, 1939, cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939". Documents and Materials, vol. 2, pp. 113-117).

Wohltath's talks with Hudson and Wilson broke down as confidentiality was breached (journalists unearthed and published). The scandal was huge. But after all, in addition to "unofficial" negotiations, British diplomats were also quite open. On July 24, 1939, the joint declaration of the governments of Great Britain and Japan (the "Arita-Craigie Agreement") was officially promulgated. In this document, the British government declared that the Japanese troops invading China "have special needs in order to ensure their own security and maintain public order in areas under their control." (Documents on British Foreign Policy… Third Series, vol. IX, p. 313, cited in The Crisis Year 1938-1939, vol. 2., p. 122). Paying tribute to the specific English humor (Japanese troops must be in China to ensure their own security), it must be noted that it was all the same "Munich" policy, only not in Europe, but in the Far East. And this happened at a time when the British representatives were in intense negotiations with the USSR, which, true to its allied duty, fought the Japanese troops in Mongolia!

Stalin's doubts that the British and French (who in fact subordinated their diplomacy to English) really intended to put up an effective rebuff to the aggressor were completely justified. And Hitler, having made a fuss at first, on the same grounds, believed that they would not fight. Later, a week before the attack on Poland, Hitler did not believe either the British Prime Minister Chamberlain (who in an official message warned him that in the event of aggression, England would be forced to "use without delay all the forces at her disposal"), nor the French ambassador Coulondre, who assured the Führer with his word of honor from an old soldier that "in the event of an attack on Poland, France will be on the side of Poland with all its forces." (Message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain N. Chamberlain to the Reich Chancellor of Germany A. Hitler, cited in "The Year of the Crisis 1938-1939", vol. 2, pp. 313-314; William Shearer, "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich", vol. 1, p. 582).

Hitler believed neither the official declarations, nor the personal message of Chamberlain, nor word of honor Coulondra. Asking the question - "How did it happen that Hitler was involved in the" big war "that he so wanted to avoid?", the British military historian Liddell Hart (the same Basil Liddell Hart, whom Suvorov recognizes as a "great" and "outstanding military historian" ) answers very clearly: “The answer should be sought in the support that the Western powers have given him [Hitler] for so long with their accommodating position, and in their unexpected “turn” in the spring of 1939. The “turn” was so sharp and unexpected that the war became inevitable." (Basil Liddell Hart, World War II, p. 21).

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