New Developments and Old Questions The short "lull" that marked the last six months or three-quarters of the year of our revolutionary movement, in comparison with its previous rapid and stormy development, seems to be coming to an end. No matter how briefly

STALIN'S FAILED "HEIR"

A few years ago I was supposed to visit the hospital for old Bolsheviks in Izmailovo, where my friend ended up. In a small ward with four beds next to one of the patients sat a man whose face, it seemed to me, I had seen before. It was Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov, the former prime minister of the Soviet government, Stalin's favorite and even "heir" of many years. He came to Izmailovo to visit his wife Valeria Alekseevna, to whom he owed the start of his career. Malenkov lost a lot of weight, but, although he was old, he did not at all look like a decrepit old man. It was noticeable that he was carefully watching his appearance, and for health. It was strange to realize that a few steps from me was sitting a man who had once sent tens of thousands of those same old Bolsheviks to execution and suffering in cold blood, for the treatment of which this huge hospital in Izmailovo was built. It was even stranger to assume that this man from another era could still sit in the Politburo or head the government in 1980. After all, Malenkov was only a few months older than M. A. Suslov and a few years younger than A. Ya. Pelshe, who were then still influential members of the Politburo. In the early 80s, our leadership was the oldest (in terms of age) in the world, and Malenkov would have found a place among these people, who were also close to him in terms of views and beliefs.

It is difficult to write even the briefest essay about Malenkov. In essence, this was a man without a biography, a figure in special departments and secret offices. He had neither his own face nor his own style. He was a tool of Stalin, and his enormous power meant only the continuation of Stalin's power. And when Stalin died, Malenkov managed to hold on to the leadership of the country and the party for just over a year. Stalin's legacy turned out to be an excessively heavy burden for Malenkov, and he was unable to keep it in his, as it turned out, not very strong hands.

Georgy Malenkov was born on January 8, 1902 in the family of an employee. According to a brief official biography, he volunteered for the front to defend Soviet power and in April 1920 joined the party. He was a political worker of a squadron, regiment, brigade and even the Political Directorate of the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. However, according to unofficial data, he served only as a clerk in the political department and never raised fighters to attack. He was a bad shot and barely kept on a horse, but he was good at keeping records. At the end civil war Malenkov did not return home to Orenburg, but came to Moscow and in 1921 entered the Higher Technical School. In May 1920, he married Valeria Golubtsova, who held a minor position in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the RCP(b). This marriage was the first step in the rapid party career of Malenkov.

Until the beginning of 1925, Malenkov was a student at the Higher Technical School. Many student members of the party of 1923-1924 were fond of Trotsky, and the platform of the Trotskyist opposition often gathered a majority in the student cells of that time. But Malenkov from the very beginning stood on orthodox positions and opposed the Trotskyists and their platform. When, after Trotsky's defeat, a commission was set up to test student members of the party who supported the opposition, the twenty-two-year-old student Georgy Malenkov also joined it. His activity was noticed. On the advice and insistence of his wife, Malenkov left the institute just before graduation for the post of technical secretary of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b). He proved to be an excellent clerk. Two years later, Malenkov became the technical secretary of the Politburo.

When Malenkov was 50 years old, the greeting of the Central Committee spoke of him as a "disciple of Lenin" and "companion of Stalin." Malenkov was not, of course, a "student of Lenin", whom he could only see from afar. But he met with Stalin often, like any technical worker of the Politburo apparatus. Young Malenkov was not the main person in this small technical apparatus, he was subordinate to Stalin's personal secretary A. Poskrebyshev. However, Malenkov did not stay too long in purely technical work.

In the late 1920s, Stalin achieved the removal of N. A. Uglanov from the post of first secretary of the MK party. The entire bureau of the metropolitan organization, accused of belonging to the so-called "right" deviation, was also replaced. At first, Molotov stood at the head of the Moscow organization, but in 1930 L. M. Kaganovich was elected the "leader" of the Moscow Bolsheviks. It was he who nominated Malenkov to a more responsible job. Malenkov became the head of the organizational department in the Moscow Party Committee. In fact, it was the personnel department, with the help of which all appointments were made in the Moscow district committees, and the secretaries of all major primary party organizations were also approved. At this time, Malenkov met many party leaders and young nominees, such as N. S. Khrushchev. From the point of view of Kaganovich, and Stalin, Malenkov carried out the work of “cleansing” the Moscow party organization from former oppositionists (then it meant only expulsion from the party or demotion, and only in extreme cases - arrest) very well. Meanwhile, immediately after the 17th Party Congress, Stalin began to rebuild the entire apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, preparing it for the upcoming new and more brutal "purges". He needed fresh shots. Stalin had known Malenkov before. In addition, Kaganovich had a better opinion of Malenkov. And when the question arose of appointing a new head of the department of leading party organs of the Central Committee, Stalin's choice fell on Malenkov.

Almost simultaneously with Malenkov, Stalin nominated N. I. Yezhov to the most responsible posts in the party apparatus. Yezhov became secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and replaced Kaganovich as chairman of the Party Control Commission. Between Yezhov and Kaganovich, a latent enmity began because of the influence on Stalin, which the latter only encouraged. Malenkov, although not yet a member of the Central Committee, took Yezhov's side and soon became one of his closest friends, while he now developed extremely hostile relations with Kaganovich. Under the leadership of Yezhov and with the active participation of Malenkov, in the first half of 1936, party documents were checked in the country. In fact, it was another "purge" of the party and the clerical preparation of terror. A very detailed "personal file" was kept for each party member.

If Stalin was the main organizer and inspirer of the mass terror of 1937-1938, then Yezhov was the main executor of this terrible bloody campaign. It was Yezhov who was appointed in 1936 People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, headed the punitive bodies, which were given emergency powers to identify, isolate and destroy those people who were now called "enemies of the people." Malenkov acted in the shadows, but it was he who, under the leadership of Stalin, set in motion the most important secret springs of terror. In the book “The Collapse of the Generation”, I. Berger, however, wrote: “Malenkov, unlike Molotov and Kaganovich, did not bear direct responsibility for the Stalinist terror of the 30s” (Berger I. Collapse of the Generation. S. 294.). This opinion is wrong. Formally, Malenkov was not a member of any governing state bodies at that time. He was present as a delegate at the 17th Party Congress, but was not elected either a member or a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he did not enter the commissions of party and Soviet control, and even the Central Audit Commission. Formally, he did not participate, therefore, even in the Plenums of the Central Committee, including the February-March Plenum of 1937. And yet, being at the head of the department of leading party organs of the Central Committee, Malenkov played no less important role in the events of 1937-1938 than Yezhov, Beria, Kaganovich and Molotov. Endowed with emergency rights, Malenkov led the repressions not only in the quiet of his office, but also directly on the ground, in various republics and regions. There were many cases when he was personally present at the interrogations and torture of arrested party leaders. So, for example, Malenkov, together with Yezhov, traveled to Belarus in 1937, where a real defeat was committed for the party organization of the republic. In the autumn of the same year, Malenkov and Mikoyan visited Armenia, where almost the entire party and Soviet activists of this republic were also repressed. With the participation of Malenkov, a plan of repressions was drawn up in all regions of the RSFSR, then in his department they selected new candidates for the secretaries of regional committees and city committees to replace those arrested and shot.

In order to disguise the scale of terror, in January 1938, a Plenum of the Central Committee was held in Moscow, which considered the issue "On the mistakes of party organizations in the exclusion of communists from the party ...". This Plenum was attended by only 28 of the 71 members of the Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress. Only a few people have since died, while almost forty people have been arrested by that time. Characteristically, the Plenum discussed the report of Malenkov, who was not formally a member of the Central Committee. The January Plenum of the Central Committee did not stop the mass repressions that raged throughout the country for many more months.

In 1937-1938 Malenkov worked in constant contact with Yezhov. In the journal "Party Construction", which was edited by Malenkov for some time, we can find many praises of Yezhov - "Stalin's people's commissar", "the faithful guardian of socialism." But Malenkov did not share the fate of Yezhov and from the end of 1938 began to work closely with L.P. Beria, who replaced Yezhov as head of the NKVD.

In fact, only in 1939 did Malenkov begin to leave the secret offices of power and appear on the open political arena. At the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Malenkov headed the mandate commission and made a report on the composition of the congress at the fifth meeting of the congress. He was elected a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and at the Plenum of the Central Committee on March 22, 1939 - Secretary of the Central Committee. This Secretariat, headed by Stalin, also included A. A. Andreev and A. A. Zhdanov. Since then, Malenkov has always been a member of this organ of the Central Committee, which in the day-to-day practical leadership of the party under Stalin played, perhaps, even a greater role than the Politburo. Malenkov was also elected a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee. The department of leading party bodies of the Central Committee was reorganized into the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Malenkov.

Gradually, the circle of problems began to expand, which Malenkov now dealt with as secretary of the Central Committee. He was instructed, for example, to supervise the development of industry and transport. When the XVIII All-Union Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place in February 1941, devoted to economic problems and the results of the implementation of the first years of the third five-year plan, Malenkov made the main report on the tasks of industry and transport. At the same time, the Plenum of the Central Committee took place, at which Malenkov was elected a candidate member of the Politburo. From now on, he took a firm place in Stalin's inner circle.

When the Patriotic War began, Malenkov, to the surprise of many, entered the very first composition of the State Defense Committee, although he was not yet a full member of the Politburo at that time. In the first two years of the war, Malenkov had to travel at the head of special commissions to sectors of the front where a threatening situation was created. In August 1941, he was in Leningrad, in the autumn of the same year - at the front near Moscow, in August 1942, as a member of the State Defense Committee, he arrived in Stalingrad - to help organize the defense of the city. But gradually Malenkov ceased to take part in solving purely military issues and focused on individual problems of military defense production. His main task was to equip the Red Army with aircraft. As you know, after the huge losses of Soviet aviation in the first weeks of the war, the German army had air superiority until the end of 1942. However, the balance of power began to change in 1943. Soviet industry was able to provide domestic Air Force big amount modern machines, and by the time of the battle on Kursk Bulge air superiority began to pass to the Red Army. Malenkov also had certain merits in establishing the production of aircraft, in connection with which he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor in September 1943. In the autumn of the same year, Malenkov headed the Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from occupation.

In 1944, when the victory of the USSR over Germany was completely determined, a special ideological conference was held in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks under the leadership of Malenkov. At this meeting, the question was raised of revising the attitude towards the German classical heritage. In particular, a decision was made “On shortcomings and errors in the coverage of the history of German philosophy at the end of the 18th – early XIX centuries. The meeting went on for several days. Just then, Stalin expressed his suggestive in form, but absurd in content, idea that German classical idealist philosophy was a conservative reaction to French Revolution. Stalin also added that the German philosophers were characterized by the apology of the Prussian monarchy and the treatment of the Slavic peoples. It was decided to keep the previously awarded Stalin Prize only for the first two volumes of the History of Philosophy and to withdraw the third volume, devoted to German classical philosophy.

In the autumn of the same 1944, Stalin convened an extended meeting in the Kremlin, to which members of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the first secretaries of the republican and regional party committees, heads of the defense industry, the army and state security were invited. It was about the "Jewish problem". In his introductory remarks, Stalin - albeit with some reservations - spoke in favor of a "more cautious" appointment of Jews to leading positions in state and party bodies. Each of the participants in the meeting understood, however, that what was at stake was the gradual displacement of persons of Jewish nationality from responsible positions. The most detailed speech at this meeting was by Malenkov, who substantiated the need to "increase vigilance" in relation to Jewish cadres. Soon after the meeting in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, party committees at various levels received a directive letter signed by Malenkov, which was then called the "Malenkov circular" in party circles. It listed positions to which the appointment of people of Jewish nationality was undesirable. At the same time, some restrictions were introduced on the admission of Jews to higher educational institutions.

Immediately after the war, Malenkov headed the Committee for the Dismantling of German Industry. His work in this post was not easy and was criticized, as many powerful departments fought to get as much equipment as possible. During this period, disputes arose and personal relations deteriorated between Malenkov and the chairman of the State Planning Commission, N. A. Voznesensky. A commission headed by Mikoyan was created to consider the conflicts. She made an unexpected decision - to stop the dismantling of German industry altogether and to organize the production of goods for the USSR in Germany as a reparation. This decision was approved by the Politburo, despite the objections of Kaganovich and Beria.

The repressions of the 1930s led to the death of hundreds of thousands of experienced leaders and to the promotion to high positions of hundreds of thousands of new people who did not have sufficient leadership experience. However, the Patriotic War that began soon brought not only enormous human and material losses. The war brought forth new statesmen, talented commanders, business executives, whose merits and achievements could not be ignored even by Stalin. One of these groups were former party and economic workers of Leningrad, they were also patronized by A. A. Zhdanov, whose influence on Stalin, especially in the field of ideology and leadership of the communist movement, clearly increased.

After the war, Malenkov became a full member of the Politburo. He became a member of the Politburo and Beria, with whom Malenkov established quite trusting and close to political union relations. But among the new members of the Politburo was N. A. Voznesensky, who now played a greater role in the management of the economy than Kaganovich, Mikoyan or Malenkov. A. A. Kuznetsov was also elected Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who not only headed the Personnel Department, but also began to oversee the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security. This weakened Malenkov's position in the apparatus of the Central Committee. Zhdanov and Voznesensky now clearly dominated in the field of ideology and social sciences, where neither Beria nor Malenkov ever felt particularly strong. Meanwhile, already in the second half of 1948, Stalin began to get sick often, in 1949 he suffered, apparently, the first hemorrhage in the brain. All this intensified the struggle for power among Stalin's inner circle. For a short time, even before Stalin's illness, Malenkov himself became a victim of this struggle. Not without the participation of Stalin's son Vasily, a provocative case was created about the low level of the Soviet aviation industry. As a result, the commander of the Air Force of the Red Army, Chief Marshal of Aviation A. A. Novikov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A. I. Shakhurin, who worked during the war years as the People's Commissar of the aviation industry of the USSR, as well as many other workers in the aviation industry and military aviators, were arrested. All these arrests were reflected in Malenkov. He was released from work in the apparatus of the Central Committee and sent to Tashkent. This "link" did not last long, however. Beria made especially great efforts for the complete rehabilitation and return to Moscow of Malenkov.

Beria at this time led a complex intrigue aimed at compromising Zhdanov, Voznesensky and their inner circle. Malenkov began to help Beria. Extremely hostile relations have long existed between Zhdanov and Malenkov. Zhdanov and his closest friends considered Malenkov an illiterate nominee and in their circle called him Malanya - this was an allusion to an effeminate appearance obese Malenkov. Beria and Malenkov managed to convince Stalin, who was already irritated by the theoretical claims of Zhdanov and Voznesensky, of the "separatism" of the Leningrad party organization and the nominees from Leningrad. This is how the “Leningrad case” arose, the victims of which were all the leaders of the Leningrad party organization, headed by P. S. Popkov. The repressions then spread downwards and embraced hundreds and thousands of party and Komsomol workers of Leningrad, scientists, workers of the national economy. They also moved upward, leading to the arrest and death of N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Kuznetsov, M. I. Rodionov and other senior officials of the party and Soviet apparatus. Malenkov took upon himself the defeat of the Leningrad party organization, for which he left for Leningrad. Beria led the repressions in Moscow. Zhdanov, who recently himself led the pogrom ideological campaigns, was actually removed from the leadership and died at his dacha at the age of 52 under circumstances that are not completely clarified.

Recently, the materials of the "Leningrad case" were again considered by the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU. The published conclusion unambiguously states: “The question of the criminal role of G. M. Malenkov in organizing the so-called “Leningrad case” was raised after the June (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. However, G. M. Malenkov, covering the traces of crimes, almost completely destroyed the documents related to the “Leningrad case”. The former head of the secretariat of G. M. Malenkov, A. M. Petrokovsky, informed the CCP at the Central Committee of the CPSU that in 1957 he made an inventory of documents seized from the safe of G. M. Malenkov’s arrested assistant, D. N. Sukhanov. In the safe, among other documents, a folder was found with the inscription “Leningrad case”, which contained notes by V. M. Andrianov, personal notes by G. M. Malenkov dating back to the time of his trip to Leningrad, more than two dozen scattered sheets of draft resolutions of the Politburo Central Committee concerning the expulsion of N. A. Voznesensky from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, abstracts of G. M. Malenkov’s speeches in Leningrad and notes made by him at the bureau and plenum of the Leningrad Regional Committee and the City Party Committee. During the meetings of the June (1957) Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, G. M. Malenkov several times looked through the documents stored in the safe of D. N. Sukhanov, took many with him, and after he was removed from the Central Committee of the CPSU, did not return the materials from the “Leningrad business” folder, stating that he had destroyed them as personal documents. G. M. Malenkov at a meeting of the CPC at the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed that he had destroyed these documents ”(Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 2. P. 133-134.).

More recently, Malenkov's son questioned the fact of his father's direct participation in repressions (See: From the editorial mail // Horizont. 1988. No. 12. P. 16.). The conclusions of the CPC, however, make it possible to clarify this issue as well: “In order to obtain fictitious testimony about the existence of an anti-Party group in Leningrad, G. M. Malenkov personally supervised the course of the investigation into the case and took direct part in the interrogations. All those arrested were subjected to illegal methods of investigation, painful torture, beatings and tortures” (Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 1989. No. 2. P. 130.).

After the death of Zhdanov, Malenkov also took over his functions in the field of ideology. Under his leadership, the anti-Semitic campaign gained momentum. Malenkov took an active part in the creation of the falsified "case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee", according to which in the spring of 1952 the head of the Sovinformburo and the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. A. Lozovsky, writers I. Fefer, P. Markish, L. Kvitko and other well-known figures of science and culture.

The chairman of the military collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Lieutenant General of Justice A. A. Cheptsov, who was forced to sign an unfair sentence, after the June Plenum of the Central Committee of 1957, at the request of G. K. Zhukov, gave a written explanation in which he wrote:

“I called him (Malenkov. - R. M.) on the phone, asked him to accept and listen to me ... A few days later I was summoned to Malenkov, who also called Ryumin and Comrade Ignatiev (Deputy Minister and Minister of State Security. - R. M. .).

I believed that Malenkov would support me and agree with my arguments ... However, after listening to my message, he gave the floor to Ryumin, who began to accuse me of liberalism towards the enemies of the people ... accused me of slandering the bodies of the USSR Ministry of State Security and denied the use of physical measures of influence. I reiterated that Ryumin was doing lawlessness, but Malenkov literally stated the following: “You want to put us on our knees before these criminals, because the verdict in this case has been approved by the people, the Politburo of the Central Committee has dealt with this case 3 times, follow the decision of the PB.”

... We, the judges, as members of the party were forced to obey the categorical instructions of the Secretary of the Central Committee, Malenkov ”(Quoted by: Vaksberg A. Honored Worker // Literaturnaya gazeta. 1989. March 15.).

When Malenkov learned that, at Stalin's request, his daughter Svetlana divorced her husband, in whom the "leader" saw a Jew, he ordered his daughter Volya to do the same, for his son-in-law was a Jew.

After the death of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov, as well as after the death of Zhdanov, Malenkov's influence in the party and state leadership increased significantly. As Stalin alienated such old comrades-in-arms as Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Mikoyan, he drew Malenkov closer and closer to himself. When, in December 1949, Pravda began to publish large articles by members of the Politburo dedicated to Stalin's 70th birthday, Malenkov's article was published first, and only then Molotov's. For anyone who understood the meaning of such things, this was a sign of special trust.

Malenkov did not disdain petty servility either. On his instructions, on the eve of Stalin's 70th birthday, a gift was being prepared - a translation of the leader's youthful poems from Georgian into Russian. The translator (the famous poet Arseny Tarkovsky) hastily fulfilled Malenkov's order, but Stalin's poems were never published. This time the instinct changed Malenkov - the glory of the leader did not attract the poet.

In 1950-1952, Malenkov was by far the second most important person in the party. Malenkov's influence also increased thanks to his friendship with Beria. Stalin brought two more people closer to him at that time - Khrushchev and Bulganin, but their importance in party and state affairs was much less.

Malenkov was silent and cautious, but his intellect and even his role in the party were often exaggerated by Western authors and contemporary diplomats. Georg Bartoli claimed that Stalin trusted Malenkov with all his secrets and therefore the latter "knew everything about everyone." Bartoli wrote about Malenkov:

“He is smart and careful, like a wild cat. A French politician who met Malenkov during his rise told me: "He reminded me of the young Laval." Like the latter, he combined a sharp mind with the greatest self-control and discretion. Djilas, who met him earlier, expressed this about him in the following way: “He gives the impression of a secretive, cautious and sickly person, but under the folds of oily skin, it would seem that a completely different person should live, alive and clever man with intelligent, penetrating black eyes ”(Bartoli G. When Stalin died. Stuttgart, 1974. S. 96-97.).

In A. Avtorkhanov's book “The Technology of Power” one can read: “The current CPSU is the brainchild of two people: Stalin and Malenkov. If Stalin was its chief designer, then Malenkov is its talented architect ”(Avtorkhanov A. Technology of Power. 2nd ed. Frankfurt am Main, 1977. P. 634.).

One cannot agree with such a statement. It would be a mistake to call Malenkov an "architect", and even more so a "talented architect" of party building. At best, he was one of several "foremen", and far from the most capable. Perhaps this was precisely what gave Stalin a reason to make Malenkov his favorite. Stalin did not tolerate the presence of truly talented people near him.

In the early 1950s, Malenkov controlled not only the party apparatus on behalf of Stalin. As a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, he intervened in the development of industry and transport. However, first of all, he was entrusted with the leadership of agriculture - just at that time, with great propaganda hype, the implementation of the so-called "Stalinist plan for the transformation of nature" began. Great importance attached to the "three-year plan" for the accelerated development of animal husbandry. Malenkov could not cope with such huge projects, if only because they proceeded from erroneous ideas about the real state of Soviet agriculture by the beginning of the 50s.

After the death of Zhdanov, Malenkov also dealt with some ideological problems.

Occasionally, he had to deal with issues related to ideology and culture before. So, for example, even during the war, Malenkov analyzed the case of the poet Selvinsky. In 1942, Ilya Selvinsky wrote the poem "Russia", which contained the following lines:

Itself, like Russian nature, the soul of my people - it will warm even the freak, like a bird comes out of it ...

A year later, in the words about the "freak" someone managed to subtract the hidden meaning. Selvinsky was summoned from the front to Moscow. His diary entry has been preserved: “The meeting of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee was chaired by Malenkov. "Who is this freak?" he asked in a metallic voice. I started to explain to him the meaning of this quatrain, but he interrupted me: “Don’t beat us up here. Tell me directly and frankly: who is this freak? Who exactly did you mean? Name?" - "I meant holy fools." "Not true! He knew how to steal, know how to keep an answer! Suddenly I realized that Stalin was meant here: his face was pitted with smallpox, they say, the Russian people warmed the freak ...

It is not known how and from where Stalin appeared in the room. Carrying, as usual, one arm in a half-bent state, as if it were hanging in a sling, he went up to Malenkov and began talking quietly about something with him. As far as I could tell, it wasn't about me. Then Stalin moved away from Malenkov, apparently intending to return to his place, and then looked at me: “This man must be treated with care - Trotsky and Bukharin loved him very much ...”

I realized that I was drowning. Stalin was already leaving. "Comrade Stalin! I hurried after him. “During the period of the struggle against Trotskyism, I was still non-partisan and did not understand anything in politics.” Stalin stopped and looked at me with a tense look. Then he approached Malenkov, touched his hand with the edge of his hand and said: “Talk to him well: you need to ... save a person.”

Stalin went through some inconspicuous door, and everyone followed him with their eyes. Malenkov turned to me again: “Well, you see how Comrade Stalin regards you! He considers you a completely insufficiently seasoned Leninist. “Yes, but Comrade Stalin said that I had to be saved.” This phrase aroused such Homeric laughter that it was no longer possible to speak seriously about my "crime."

I returned home completely broken: I went to the Orgburo as a young man, and came out of there as a decrepit old man. My God! And these people lead our culture ”(Quoted from: L. Ozerov. Return // Book Review. 1988. No. 38.).

As one of the leaders of the "ideological front", Malenkov appointed and dismissed chief editors of magazines. In 1950, A. T. Tvardovsky was unexpectedly offered to head the Novy Mir magazine. Together with Fadeev and Simonov, Tvardovsky was invited to Malenkov, on whose table lay a blue book of Novy Mir. Malenkov asked: “Do you know how a thick magazine differs from a thin one?” Tvardovsky was silent, and Malenkov, after a pause, didactically said: "A thick magazine prints things with sequels." In one of the magazines, instead of the phrase "The countries of people's democracy are moving from capitalism to socialism," the leading article read: "The countries of people's democracy are moving from socialism to capitalism." The issue of this error, which some considered an "ideological sabotage", was dealt with personally by Malenkov. This time he showed "indulgence", and the case went without arrests. The perpetrators escaped with only strict party penalties.

Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev were regulars at Stalin's nightly dinners. Stalin himself now often lost his usual moderation in eating and drinking. He very often soldered Malenkov as well. Already in the morning, the guards brought Malenkov home, and two or three people brought him to his senses in a large bathroom. Only towards the middle of the day did he acquire the ability to work.

In the early 50s, a two-part film " Battle of Stalingrad". One of his episodes shows how Malenkov, who allegedly arrived with special powers on the Stalingrad front, speaks to the soldiers leaving for battle and tells them about Stalin. It was a feature film, where the roles of leaders were played by famous artists. It was no secret that the picture was viewed and edited several times by Stalin himself. Therefore, the appearance of Malenkov in the film was regarded as a sign of special trust.

After the war, neither a congress nor an All-Union Party Conference was held in our country, which was a clear violation of the Rules. However, the need to convene the next party congress became more and more urgent. It was not only a matter of reporting on the work done since 1939. It was necessary to update the party leadership and elect a new composition of the Central Committee. A whole historical period has passed since the 18th Congress. War, post-war construction, new international politics and new repressions significantly changed the nature of the party and state leadership. Some of the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were arrested or even physically destroyed, some of them died or retired from active work. On the other hand, many new people came forward who led the largest ministries, departments, regional and even republican party organizations, but who were not members of the Central Committee.

The preparation of the new congress was carried out by a special commission of the Central Committee, headed by Malenkov. It was to him that Stalin instructed to make a report at the congress. Of course, this was also a sign of special trust. Stalin himself at that time was already too weak and old to deliver the Report for three or four hours in front of a large audience. But no one knew this circumstance, except for the closest circle. And that wasn't the main reason. Stalin's personality cult reached such proportions in that period that it would be strange to put him before the need to report to the party and the people in some way and listen to any critical remarks of the congress delegates. The post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was abolished. Stalin remained in the party only as a secretary. Highest value acquired, as in the time of Lenin, the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which was held by Stalin. The role of the party was generally reduced. The party could not, for example, control the activities of the punitive organs, which were directly subordinate to Stalin. Under these conditions, Stalin did not at all consider it his duty to read the Report at the forthcoming Party Congress. In addition, shortly before the congress, his new work “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR” appeared in the press, which was immediately declared “brilliant” and “classic”. It was supposed to serve as the basis for the work of the upcoming congress, while the Report Report seemed to be only a protocol necessity. Such was the situation in our country before the 19th Party Congress.

Avtorkhanov claims that before the congress there was some kind of behind-the-scenes struggle between Stalin and Malenkov, in which Malenkov "dared to openly object to Stalin" and even won a political victory over him. “Already by the death of Stalin,” writes Avtorkhanov, “the party and its apparatus were actually in the hands of Malenkov ... In 1952, at the 19th Congress, Malenkov delivered the Political Report of the Central Committee of the Party, which, in fact, was supposed to be done by Stalin himself. After that, it was clear to everyone - either Stalin endlessly trusts him and is preparing his successor in his person, or Malenkov has become such a force for Stalin to be reckoned with. In the light of the events that followed the death of Stalin, I consider the last assumption correct ”(Avtorkhanov A. Technology of power. S. 641-642.).

All this is pure conjecture. During Stalin's lifetime, Malenkov never dared to object to him, let alone enter into any kind of struggle with him. Only complete obedience to Malenkov and his unconditional loyalty could be the basis of that trust, thanks to which Stalin instructed Malenkov to write the Political Report at the 19th Congress. But this did not mean at all that he was identified as Stalin's "successor". Stalin did not think about death, he was going to live and rule the country for a long time. Moreover, he then planned to conduct a new round of repressions, and the party congress was to serve as one of the preparatory steps for them.

There is no need to dwell in particular on the content of the Report presented by Malenkov at the 19th Party Congress. His scheme could easily be outlined in advance. Malenkov did not begin to talk about the events of the Patriotic War or about what preceded it, although this was the main thing between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses. Malenkov devoted the first section of his report to the theme of the weakening of the world capitalist system as a result of the world war and the aggravation of the international situation, a manifestation of which was the war in Korea that was going on at that time, as well as “ cold war between two world systems.

Considerable attention in the report was devoted to various aspects of the struggle for peace, as well as to relations between the USSR and its friendly countries. Malenkov noted the successes of industry, spoke in extremely embellished tones about the state of agriculture. For example, he cited very inflated and untrue data on large grain harvests and, to thunderous applause, declared that “the grain problem, previously considered the most acute and serious problem, has been successfully resolved, finally and irrevocably resolved” (Pravda. 1952. 6 Oct.).

In less than two years, it was established that there was an extremely acute shortage of grain in the country, agriculture was going through a severe crisis, and the data on gross grain harvests, which Malenkov cited in his report, were based on falsification. As you know, the grain problem in the USSR has not been resolved to this day, it remains "acute and serious" to this day. In the section of the report on the strengthening of the Soviet state and social system, Malenkov repeated the well-known Stalinist thesis about the need to strengthen and strengthen the state apparatus in every possible way, including punitive organs. Speaking about party building, Malenkov fully justified the mass repressions carried out before the war. According to him, in the 1930s, “geeks”, “capitulators”, “vile traitors”, “traitors” were exterminated in our country, who supposedly were only waiting for a military attack on the Soviet Union, hoping to inflict a “stab in the back” in difficult times. for the sake of our enemies." Malenkov said:

“Having defeated the Trotskyist-Bukharin underground, which was the center of attraction for all anti-Soviet forces in the country, having cleansed our party and Soviet organizations of the enemies of the people, the party thereby timely destroyed any possibility of the appearance of a “fifth column” in the USSR and politically prepared the country for active defense” (There same.).

As expected, in the section on ideological problems, Malenkov referred primarily to Stalin's recently published work, The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.

Malenkov also touched upon the problems of literature. He complained that in our literature and art there are still no such types of works of art as satire.

“It would be wrong to think,” said Malenkov, “that our Soviet reality does not provide material for satire. We need the Soviet Gogols and Shchedrins, who, with the fire of satire, would burn out of life everything negative, rotten, dead, everything that hinders progress” (Pravda. 1952, October 6).

Of course, that statement was pure demagogy. Any satire after the 19th Congress continued to be regarded as slander or slander. A year after the congress, when Stalin was no longer alive, the satirist Yuri Blagov wrote an epigram about Malenkov's statement:

We are for laughter, but we need
Kinder Shchedrina
And such Gogols
To not touch us.

Malenkov even tried to give some theoretical definitions. So, for example, he devoted several minutes in his report to the "Marxist-Leninist" definition of the concept of "typical", "typical". “Typicality,” Malenkov declared, “corresponds to the essence of a given socio-historical phenomenon, and is not simply the most common, frequently repeated, or ordinary thing” (Ibid.).

In the second edition of his book on Gogol, the critic and literary scholar V. Yermilov hastened to note that Malenkov’s statements about the typical have the value of a paramount scientific discovery: accuracy, breadth of view on the art of the position of the report of comrade. G. M. Malenkova on the relationship between typicality and exaggeration, sharpening artistic image... The provisions of the report of comrade. G. M. Malenkov calls the artist to creative courage, breadth, wealth, variety of artistic ways of penetrating into the essence of our reality, artistic forms and means of expressing the typical ”(Ermilov V. N. V. Gogol. 2nd ed., add. M ., 1953. S. 437.).

However, other literary scholars, turning to the same problem, found with some embarrassment that Malenkov's definition almost completely coincides with that given in the first edition. Literary Encyclopedia” in the article “Type”, signed by the pseudonym P. Mikhailov (in fact, it was written by the writer D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, who was repressed in the late 30s and died in camps).

The XIX Congress elected a new composition of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the list of which was prepared by the Secretariat of the Central Committee and approved by Stalin. However, the results of the first Plenum of the new Central Committee, at which the leading bodies of the Central Committee were to be elected, were unexpected. Opening the Plenum, Stalin proposed to elect not the Politburo, but the Presidium of the Central Committee, as was now determined by the new Rules. Stalin himself read out the list of the new Presidium of the Central Committee of 25 members and 11 candidates. The list included people who had never been in Stalin's entourage, and some of them he had never even met. Stalin's proposal was approved, although it caused bewilderment among many members of the recent Politburo. Khrushchev wrote about this in his memoirs:

“He (Stalin. - R. M.) could not have compiled this list himself. Someone made it for him. I must confess that I suspected that Malenkov had done this, but he hides it, does not tell us. Then I interrogated him in a friendly way. I say, listen, I think that you had a hand ... He says, I assure you that I had absolutely no participation. Stalin did not involve me and did not give any instructions, and, consequently, I did not prepare any proposals. Well, then we were even more surprised ... "(Khrushchev N. S. Memoirs. Selected excerpts. S. 103-104.)

The Bureau of the Presidium of 9 people was also elected. But from this Bureau, after the Plenum, Stalin chose the "five" to lead the party. It included: Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin. The Secretariat of the Central Committee of 10 people was also elected, in which Malenkov was to play the leading role.

The question of Stalin's successor arose immediately after members of the country's top leadership learned of his hopeless condition. At the bedside of the dying leader, careful negotiations took place between his closest associates on the distribution of power. Malenkov talked about this with Beria, and Khrushchev with Bulganin. In fact, everyone agreed that it was Malenkov who should take the most important post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at that time. This proposal was made by Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin agreed with him. However, at the same time, it was decided to release Malenkov from his duties as secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and form a narrower Secretariat of five people: S. D. Ignatiev, P. N. Pospelov, M. A. Suslov, N. S. Khrushchev and N. N. Shatalin. None of these five men was considered "First Secretary", only Khrushchev was a member of the new, narrower Presidium of the Central Committee, and therefore he presided over the meetings of the Secretariat. Nevertheless, it was Malenkov who, in the first months after Stalin's death, turned out to be the first person not only in the leadership of the state apparatus, but also in the party. He chaired the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, it was necessary to coordinate all decisions of a directive nature with him.

At Stalin's funeral, Malenkov was the first to give a short speech. In form, it resembled the famous "Oath" of Stalin, that is, his speech of January 26, 1924 at the II All-Union Congress of Soviets. Only instead of the words repeated by Stalin: “We swear to you, Comrade Lenin,” Malenkov repeated the words: “Our sacred duty is ...”

A photograph appeared in Pravda showing Stalin, Mao Zedong and Malenkov. All other politicians standing nearby were removed by a skilled retoucher. Stalin, Mao Zedong and Malenkov were captured during the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. It was a fake. The fact is that these statesmen have never been photographed together. Such a montage had an obvious goal - to glorify and strengthen the authority of the new Soviet leader. In the photograph, Stalin and Mao Zedong seemed to be attentively listening to Malenkov...

Malenkov took steps to move towards the pinnacle of power, and for the first time after Stalin's death, his word on all major issues remained decisive. And he also took a fairly active position in the criticism of the cult of personality. At the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 10, 1953, held under the chairmanship of Malenkov, the "ideologists" P. N. Pospelov, M. A. Suslov, Chief Editor"Pravda" D. T. Shepilov. As Pospelov recalled, during the meeting, Malenkov sharply criticized the editorial office of the newspaper, noting that the nature of many of the abnormalities that had taken place in the history of Soviet society lay in the cult of personality. Emphasizing that the country faces the task of deepening the process of socialist construction, Malenkov noted: “We consider it obligatory to stop the policy of the personality cult” (See: Openkin L.A. At the historical crossroads // Issues of the history of the CPSU.1990. No. 1. P. 110. ).

Of course, after the death of Stalin, Malenkov faced many difficult problems. He could not, and did not want to solve them alone. But how can one allow any member of the Presidium of the Central Committee to take upon himself the solution of important political and organizational questions? On this basis, Malenkov began to have conflicts with Beria, who made a number of important reshuffles in the Ministry of Internal Affairs - the MGB and began to behave as if he was sure in advance that Malenkov would approve all his actions. Malenkov was considered a friend of Beria, but he was not going to be a pawn in his hands. This led to the rupture of their political friendship and to a secret collusion with Khrushchev, as a result of which Beria was removed and arrested.

In the summer of 1953, Malenkov spoke at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR with important proposals on economic problems. One of them was a significant reduction in taxes from the peasantry and the cancellation of all previous debts of collective farms and collective farmers. Malenkov also said that from now on the party can pay more attention to the development of Group B industry, that is, consumer goods. According to Malenkov, the pace of development of the production of means of production can be somewhat reduced, and the released funds can be directed to the production of consumer goods needed by the population. These proposals ensured Malenkov's popularity among the population and especially among the peasantry for a long time, for the village for the first time in many years felt some relief. Among ordinary people, a rumor appeared and stubbornly held that Malenkov was the “nephew” or even the “adopted son” of V. I. Lenin. The main reason for such a legend was probably the fact that Malenkov's mother bore the name of Ulyanov. She worked in the first half of the 50s as the director of a sanatorium at the Udelnaya Kazanskaya station. railway. She helped free many illegally repressed people until her son told her not to interfere in other people's affairs.

Malenkov worked a lot, but even then he kept not only modestly, but also closed. He was inaccessible even to highly responsible workers; for example, the chairman of the KGB, I. A. Serov, often could not get an appointment with him for a long time. Malenkov was extremely intolerant of drunkenness, which in last years Stalin's rule became commonplace at the top of the party. Stalin's memories of drinking apparently disgusted Malenkov. By his order, many pubs and drinking houses were closed, which soon led to a glorious tradition of drinking "for three" in doorways and porches. Several times Malenkov met and talked with prominent economists, one of whom he asked to make "any suggestions" that could improve the situation in the economy. At the same time, Malenkov tried to gain a foothold in the leadership of the country, intending to carry out some movements for this purpose. So, for example, he developed a very bad relationship with Suslov and, accordingly, with his close friend - the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania A. Yu. Snechkus, whom Malenkov wanted to replace with another leader. A special commission of the Central Committee of the Party, headed by Yu. V. Andropov, a senior official of the Central Committee apparatus, was sent to Lithuania. However, the commission did not find sufficient grounds to recognize the work of the Lithuanian party leadership as unsatisfactory. At the meeting of the Politburo, the commission's report was approved, as was the speech of Snečkus himself. Under these conditions, Malenkov did not dare to put forward his proposal to remove Snechkus. After the meeting, Malenkov approached Andropov, took him by the elbow and quietly said: “I will never forgive you for this” (This and some other statements of the author are disputed by the son of G.M. 16.). Indeed, Andropov was soon released from work in the apparatus of the Central Committee and sent as ambassador to Hungary. He returned to the Central Committee already in 1957.

The intelligentsia, in contrast to the peasantry, which, of course, knew nothing about all of Malenkov's previous activities, treated him with distrust or even hostility. In the poem "On Russia", reflecting these sentiments, the poet Naum Korzhavin then wrote:

In the heavy, cloudy look of Malenkov Is it really your whole fate now? ...

However, the diplomats continued to sympathize much more with Malenkov than with the energetic and gruff Khrushchev, who often shocked them with his questions and behavior. The American ambassador Charles Bohlen wrote in his memoirs:

“I first met Malenkov at a Kremlin banquet during the war, but I did not have the opportunity to talk to him. He always seemed to be standing quietly in the background. During this period, he gave the impression of a robot, the most sinister prototype of Stalin, with a large, gloomy, almost sadistic face, with a bang of black hair on his forehead, with an awkwardly full figure and a reputation as a villain during the purges of the thirties. Although, of course, all Stalin's assistants, including Khrushchev, had a hand in these purges. It was impossible to avoid it.

But when I was ambassador, I significantly improved my opinion of Malenkov, which was facilitated by our meetings at the Kremlin banquets. His face became very expressive when he spoke. A smile at the ready, sparks of laughter in his eyes and freckles on his nose made him look charming ... His Russian was the best that I heard from the lips of Soviet leaders. It was a pleasure to listen to him speak. Malenkov's speeches were well constructed, and logic was visible in them. He seemed to be in a low, slightly high voice, and the accent indicated the education of this person ... More importantly, Malenkov thought, in my opinion, to the greatest extent in comparison with other Soviet leaders in a Western manner. He, at least, understood our position, and although he did not accept it, nevertheless, I felt, understood it. With other leaders, especially with Khrushchev, there were no points of contact, no common language…” (Bohlen C. Witness to History, P. 369-370.)

The removal of Beria indirectly led immediately to the weakening of Malenkov's power and influence: an important ally disappeared from the leadership. Meanwhile, neither Molotov, nor Kaganovich, nor Voroshilov, nor Mikoyan had any sympathy for Malenkov and were inclined to support the simpler and more outspoken Khrushchev. Many of the accusations that were put forward by the USSR Prosecutor's Office against Beria also offended Malenkov. This primarily concerned the "Leningrad case". In addition, Beria himself, while under investigation, tried to write various notes to Malenkov, which forced the latter to somehow justify himself to other members of the Politburo. There was also the simple fact that Malenkov, accustomed to being on the sidelines under Stalin, did not have a strong enough character to now play the first role in the party. He was afraid to make important decisions, showing hesitation and uncertainty. Faced with objections, he could not insist on his own. Staying in the party apparatus could not develop in Malenkov those qualities that Khrushchev developed thanks to ten years of independent work in Ukraine. In addition, Malenkov, as it turned out, did not know the problems and the state of the national economy, and especially agriculture, very well. Malenkov did not even pretend to be in charge of agriculture and with relief handed over the preparation of all major reforms in this area to Khrushchev, who not only actually, but also formally headed the Secretariat of the Central Committee, becoming First Secretary.

The arrest of Beria and his trial, which ended with the death sentence, were accompanied by changes in everything personnel punitive organs, headed by the closest supporter of Khrushchev, General Serov. At the same time, the functions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - MGB were significantly curtailed, their task was no longer to control the activities of party bodies, but, on the contrary, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - MGB were placed under the firm control of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and above all the Secretariat of the Central Committee, that is, Khrushchev. Malenkov could no longer use, like Stalin, the punitive organs as a pillar of his power.

These factors by the autumn of 1953 significantly weakened the role of Malenkov. The highest party apparatus more and more confidently and firmly took control of the state and public organizations, and the first person in the party was no longer Malenkov, but Khrushchev. No important decisions or appointments were made without Khrushchev's approval. In 1954, it seemed that only Khrushchev knew what had to be done to keep the bulky ship of Soviet control moving forward. It was Khrushchev who put forward most of the important proposals in the internal and foreign policy. Malenkov simply could not keep up with his energetic and active colleague. And most importantly, he did not have supporters in the leadership who would see him as their boss and patron, who would owe him their nomination and are ready to carry out his instructions without reservation. Under these conditions, the question of removing Malenkov from the post of head of government became only a matter of time. When the rehabilitation of all the victims of the “Leningrad case” began, and the responsibility of Malenkov for bad condition agriculture, the severe crisis of which was hidden by falsified data, Malenkov did not even fight to maintain his power and leading position in the party and state elite. On January 24, 1955, Pravda published an article by D. T. Shepilov “The General Line of the Party and the Vulgarizers of Marxism”, which contained critical remarks about Malenkov. And although the last name was not mentioned, the addressee of these accusations was easily read.

The next day, January 25, the Plenum of the Central Committee decided to release Malenkov from his duties as head of government. His statement was read, acknowledging his mistakes and responsibility for the poor state of agriculture. Malenkov referred in the latter case to his "lack of experience." At the Plenum, Malenkov was criticized by some of the members of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Committee, including Molotov. However, the criticism was not too harsh. A few days later, the transcript of the January Plenum was read out in all party organizations. Soon, the decisions of the Plenum were formally approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, which appointed Malenkov Minister of Power Plants of the USSR.

On the day of the Plenum of the Central Committee, many relatives and friends of Malenkov gathered in his mansion. Such mansions in the area of ​​Mosfilmovsky streets were only recently built for members of the Politburo on the initiative of Malenkov himself. Everyone was worried and waiting for the owner of the house. He arrived very late. Entering the living room and seeing relatives and friends, Malenkov said with obvious relief: "Everything remains the same." He was immediately understood. No one expected that Malenkov would continue to be the head of government. “Remaining as before” meant that Malenkov continued to be a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, that he would not only be a minister, but also one of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And this, in turn, confirmed all the previous privileges: that he would live in the same mansion and that he and his immediate family would receive the same special services.

It would be wrong, however, to think that Malenkov accepted the changes that had taken place so easily. Outwardly, he maintained the best relations with Khrushchev, even visited all his family holidays, made gifts to his relatives. But at the same time, Malenkov dreamed of the return of power. According to Edward Crankshaw, who met and talked with Malenkov in England at the end of 1956, Malenkov, usually very silent (especially with foreigners), unexpectedly and angrily declared: "I'll be back."

Instead of Malenkov, N. A. Bulganin was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Maybe Malenkov would have been content with his more modest role, but Khrushchev's policy of further debunking Stalin's personality cult and a deeper and more thorough investigation of his crimes frightened Malenkov. He spoke out against the raising of these problems at the 20th Party Congress, but could not prevent Khrushchev from reading his famous report. Malenkov himself, speaking at the congress, said only a few phrases about the dangers of the "cult of personality", that this perversion inevitably leads to a belittling of the role of the party and its leading center, to the suppression of creative activity party masses, to peremptory individual decisions, to arbitrariness. He devoted the main part of his speech to the problems of the electrification of the USSR.

The exposure of the cult of Stalin inevitably raised the question of the responsibility of Malenkov, as well as other close associates of the leader, for the repression and death of innocent people, among whom were many prominent figures of the party and state. True, in 1956, not all illegally repressed people were rehabilitated. Already in 1957, Khrushchev insisted on the rehabilitation of a large group of military figures headed by Tukhachevsky and Yakir, whose arrest and execution was authorized in 1937 by the Politburo (Khrushchev himself was not yet a member of the Politburo at that time). An investigation was launched that cast doubt on the legality and validity of sentences in such falsified political trials of the 30s as the trials of Zinoviev-Kamenev, Radek-Pyatakov, Bukharin-Rykov, as a result of which dozens of Lenin’s most prominent associates, figures October revolution and the Civil War. All this overflowed the patience of the majority of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. They were united by the fear of responsibility. Molotov and Kaganovich were the organizers of the factional group, but Malenkov immediately joined them. The defeat of this group was the end of Malenkov's political and state career. He was expelled from the Presidium of the Central Committee and from the Central Committee of the CPSU and removed from responsible work in the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Malenkov was appointed director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power station, built in the upper reaches of the Irtysh. Soon he was transferred to the director of the Ekibastuz State District Power Plant. Just like Kaganovich, Malenkov was a very liberal director, and he was once reprimanded by the regional party committee "for familiarity with the workers."

In 1961, after the XXII Congress of the CPSU, he was expelled from the party. At the congress, they talked about the crimes of Malenkov, about his closeness to Yezhov and Beria, and about many other things. He may have thought he got off too lightly.

After the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Malenkov and Kaganovich were still not allowed to return to Moscow. Kaganovich received such permission only in 1965, and Malenkov - in 1968, after his retirement.

The transition from the world of power and privilege, extremely closed and largely secret, to the general world with all its difficulties and problems was extremely difficult for everyone who was removed from power. But he was especially unbearable for the prim and unadapted to ordinary life Malenkov, who had already found himself in the Soviet "corridors of power" from his youth. Without the support of his wife Valeria Alekseevna, who, as a person, turned out to be stronger and smarter than her husband, it would have been very difficult for Malenkov. He had never been particularly sociable before. He did not offer his memoirs to magazines, did not study in the reading rooms of Moscow libraries. It can be assumed, therefore, that he decided not to write his memoirs.

Malenkov, according to his son, spent most of the year at his mother's house in the village of Udelnaya near Moscow. Previously, he traveled around Moscow and its suburbs only in an armored limousine. Now I had to take tickets for a regular train. On the way, he was silent, sometimes exchanging remarks with his wife. Malenkov lost a lot of weight, and therefore even his peers did not always recognize him. Every summer, Malenkov rested and was treated in privileged sanatoriums.

Once Malenkov accidentally met with the old Bolshevik Yu. Fridman. “But I, Georgy Maximilianovich, it was thanks to you that I spent fifteen years in the camps,” said Friedman. “I didn’t know anything about this before,” Malenkov replied. “But I myself saw your signature on my file,” Friedman objected. Malenkov, not wanting to continue the conversation, quickly stepped aside.

Several times over the past twenty years, Malenkov visited the Ministry of Power Plants of the USSR on some business. In addition to his daughter, he has two sons, both of them scientists, doctors of sciences. I've only heard good things about them.

The lack of sociability and stiffness of Malenkov concealed not so much the significance as the mediocrity of his personality. His crimes will not be forgotten, no matter how hard he prayed for them while he was alive.

Malenkov died in January 1988 at the age of 86. Our press did not report anything about his death, unlike the death of Molotov. The retired prime minister was buried in a narrow family circle at the Kuntsevo cemetery, and there was not a single Western correspondent here, they learned about Malenkov's death only two weeks later. However, most newspapers Western countries, albeit belatedly, commented in detail on the death of the failed "heir" of Stalin. It is difficult for me to speak of Malenkov as a talented statesman whose abilities were only deformed or destroyed by the terrible era of Stalinism. No, he was a person quite adequate to his era, which found and nominated such people.

He was called "Stalin's donkey" and "the battering ram of the revolution", he raised the industry of the USSR to unprecedented heights and opposed Beria.

Paramedic

Sergo Ordzhonikidze was the only one of the "old Leninist cohort" who worked as a doctor. He graduated from the parochial and paramedical schools. At the same time, he performed his work in full accordance with the Hippocratic oath. Even during the Yakut exile, in the difficult conditions of the Far North, he honestly worked as a paramedic, but did not forget about campaigning. Even at the beginning of his career, being a medical assistant in Georgia, Ordzhonikidze printed and distributed rather strange "recipes". Instead of a list of medicines and recommendations, the leaflets contained revolutionary slogans and calls for the overthrow of the king.

"Straight"

In gendarmerie reports, Sergo Ordzhonikidze was given the nickname "direct". His inflexibility is to be envied. He went through exile and prison. Ordzhonikidze fled from exile, in the terrible Shlisselburg prison (where he seriously undermined his health) he independently learned German. He always climbed on the rampage and was one of the most implacable opponents of tsarism. Wrestling was the most organic environment for him, in it he developed, in it his character was formed.

crisis manager

Ordzhonikidze was, in modern terms, an effective crisis manager. He was always sent to the front line, to the hottest spots. He participated in the Iranian revolution, was the Extraordinary Commissar for Ukraine, led the revolution in the Caucasus. When Ordzhonikidze was deporting the Terek Cossacks, Stalin warned his comrade: "Sergo, they will kill you." They did not kill him, although Ordzhonikidze did not recognize half measures in his methods. His faith in the cause of the revolution was unshakable. People saw this and followed Sergo.

Conflict with countrymen

Ordzhonikidze was one of those who participated in the creation of the Soviet Union. The process of creating a new state was problematic. Lenin was afraid of chauvinism and national strife, therefore he was opposed to the formation of a new state under the auspices of Russia. On October 20, 1922, a scandal erupted between Ordzhonikidze and the Georgian leaders. Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) Kabakhidze insulted Ordzhonikidze, calling him "Stalin's donkey", for which he received in the face. The conflict had to be sorted out by the Central Committee of the RCP(b). Lenin, who was ill in October 1922, could not intervene in the conflict, and Stalin appointed a commission to Georgia headed by Dzerzhinsky, who supported Ordzhonikidze and condemned the Georgian "nationalists". In December 1922, Lenin nevertheless intervened in the Georgian conflict and even offered to expel Ordzhonikidze from the party for assault, but Lenin was "no longer the same" and the order was not carried out.

Friend of Stalin

Ordzhonikidze was one of the few who communicated with Stalin "on you". They met in 1907 in cell No. 3 of the Bayil prison in Baku. Since then, they have established an almost friendly relationship. This is evidenced by the fact that after the suicide of Nadezhda Alliluyeva, it was Ordzhonikidze and Kirov, as close friends, who spent the night in Stalin's house. Ordzhonikidze was loyal to Stalin even when he had to confront Lenin, but their relationship deteriorated seriously in the early 1930s. First, Stalin began to purge Ordzhonikidze's henchmen, then Beria, whom Ordzhonikidze did not like (to put it mildly), began to claim the first role in the Transcaucasian party organization. The final stage of the conflict began in 1936, when Ordzhonikidze's elder brother Papulia was arrested. Ordzhonikidze received the news of his brother's arrest in Kislovodsk in October 1936, on his 50th birthday. Strongly offended, he did not go to the celebrations arranged on the occasion of the anniversary.

Mikoyan recalled how, a few days before his death, Ordzhonikidze shared his anxieties with him: “I don’t understand why Stalin doesn’t trust me. I am absolutely faithful to him, I don’t want to fight him, I want to support him, but he doesn’t trust me. they play the intrigues of Beria, who gives Stalin incorrect information, and Stalin believes him. Interesting fact: after the war, Stalin was given for approval a list of prominent party leaders, in whose honor it was planned to erect monuments in Moscow. The leader crossed out only one surname from the entire list - Ordzhonikidze.

"Heavy Industry Commander"

Ordzhonikidze was the strongest organizer. He was called the commander of the heavy industry. He quickly raised the industry of the Soviet Union, fought the bureaucracy, and was at the head of "great construction projects." As far back as 1932, in terms of the gross industrial output of the USSR, it took second place in the world and first place in Europe. From the fifteenth place in the world and from the seventh in Europe in terms of electricity, the USSR in 1935, respectively, came in third and second place. Ordzhonikidze did everything possible to stop the country from buying tractors and other equipment abroad. If they say that Stalin accepted the country with a plow, and left it with atomic weapons, then Ordzhonikidze is the one who deserves the greatest credit for this.

Mystery of death

The official cause of death of Ordzhonikidze, presented by Stalin, was "the heart could not stand it." According to this version, which for a long time was considered the main one, Ordzhonikidze died suddenly from heart paralysis during daytime sleep. Two facts are confusing in this version: firstly, soon everyone who signed this statement was shot, and secondly, Ordzhonikidze's wife told how Stalin, leaving the apartment of the deceased, rudely warned her: "Not a word to anyone about the details of Sergo's death, nothing but an official message, you know me...". Except official version there are three more: poisoning, murder, suicide. All versions have the right to exist, but none has yet been recognized. The body of Ordzhonikidze was cremated, so "an autopsy will show" - not about the secret of this death.

80 years ago, on December 1, 1934, shots were fired in one of the corridors of the Smolny. A member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, Sergei Kirov (Kostrikov), who even then many predicted to be Stalin's successor, died at the hands of a neurotic loser. The crime was solved only three years later.

“Oh, cucumber-tomatoes! Stalin killed Kirov in the corridor, ”this ditty appeared the very next day after the murder. But in this case, we are not dealing with impersonal "folk art", the libel has a specific author. The poem was written by Nikolai Bukharin. But the real facts contradict the version of the "Stalinist conspiracy" ...

Upon learning of the death of Kirov, Stalin immediately went to the northern capital. “They had known each other for a very long time and were truly friends, it was a friendship for life. There was warmth in their personal relationship - they were like-minded people and friends above all. This can be understood if you observe people for some time, and I had to observe them from the end of 1929 and almost to last day life of Kirov, ”recalled Stalin’s adopted son Artem Sergeev.

In a conversation with the leader, the killer - an unemployed alcoholic Leonid Nikolaev - was terribly confused in his testimony. And finally, he said that he was "forced to kill Kirov." He admitted that he was a member of an underground anti-Soviet organization in St. Petersburg, which instructed to kill the party leader. But who helped him? Stalin immediately wanted to talk to Sergei Mironovich's security guard, operational commissar Mikhail Borisov, who was obliged to escort him directly to his office, but for some reason did not escort him on the day of the tragedy.

“From the building of the Leningrad department of the NKVD to Smolny, two and a half kilometers in a straight line. The arrested person was accompanied by Chekists Vinogradov and Maliy. Subsequently, they testified that the car suddenly lost control and hit the wall of the house. Borisov, who was sitting in the back, allegedly fell out and suffered a head injury. He was taken to the Nikolaev military hospital, where he died without regaining consciousness, ”says historian Igor Pykhalov. As a result, Stalin had to be content only with what his comrades from the local NKVD told him. That is, information about some small-town conspiracy.

Here, perhaps, it is worth making a digression to say a few words about the leadership of this all-powerful organization (the successor to the Cheka and the OGPU), which is considered to be Stalin's "eyes and ears". The general commissioner at that time was Genrikh Yagoda (aka Enoch Gershonovich Yehuda). His predecessors were two Poles - the "iron Felix" Dzerzhinsky and Vyacheslav Menzhinsky. Both are fiery revolutionaries, crystal clear people. And both died under more than mysterious circumstances. The founder of the Cheka, as Stalin said at his funeral, "burned out at work." On the day of his death, Felix Edmundovich had a tough fight with two party functionaries, Pyatakov and Kamenev. The Chekist accused them of disorganizing the economy, in fact, of sabotage against the Soviet regime. And then he "played in the box." Cautious Menzhinsky preferred not to quarrel openly with anyone. Perhaps that is why he managed to stretch in his post for eight years. But the cause of death again was "illness". And only at the end of the 30s it was established through whose fault the head of the OGPU went to another world.

Heinrich Yagoda himself is a Chekist with experience, in the "bodies" since the early 20s. And at the end of the same decade, Menzhinsky's first deputy became the de facto head of the organization. As the investigation will establish in the future, Vyacheslav Rudolfovich was slowly fed with poison. But they didn’t poison him to death - he was required as the “zitz-chairman” of the OGPU, with whom you can always hide behind. Meanwhile, he was removed from power in the "office" long ago. Although he did not know about it, he even held work meetings while lying on a hospital bed.

The result of the activities of Enoch Gershonovich was more than a strange composition of the OGPU, and then the NKVD. Preference was given to the "repentant": Trotskyists and other former oppositionists - Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks ... These people turned the Lubyanka into an organization completely beyond the control of the authorities. What are the "eyes and ears" of Stalin here ...

People loyal to Yagoda stood at the head of the territorial divisions of the NKVD. So, in Leningrad, the “organs” were headed by Ivan Zaporozhets, a nationalist, a former member of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR). Naturally, also "repentant" - a Bolshevik since 1920. In 1934, Zaporozhets feigned illness, during the murder of Kirov, he lay in bed. “In fact, in 1934 there was no investigation. After all, the investigation was carried out by the perpetrators themselves. And Stalin trusted them. Despite numerous legends about the suspiciousness of the leader, Joseph Vissarionovich did not doubt his associates to the last. And when Yagoda was nevertheless arrested three years later, the leader even sent a letter to the court in his defense,” says historian and writer Sergei Kremlev.

Kirov's murder was only solved in 1937. Following Zaporozhets, Heinrich Yagoda was also placed against the wall, who turned out to be not only one of the leaders of the Trotskyist underground, but also a thief and a debauchee. In his apartment during the search, in addition to large amounts of "unaccounted" currency, a large amount of gold and jewelry, the investigators found a collection of pornography, as well as a dildo. The sexual partners of the chief security officer were also established.

Sergei Mironovich is the first and not the last victim of the Trotskyists. In 1936, they also killed the great proletarian writer Maxim Gorky. His son Maxim Peshkov died at the hands of poisoners even earlier, in May 1934. On litigation Yagoda tried to justify himself that he was in love with his wife, therefore, out of jealousy, he sent the young man to the next world. The perpetrator of numerous poisonings was the personal doctor of the People's Commissar of State Security, Lev Levin, a real killer in a white coat.

Dzerzhinsky, Menzhinsky, there is a suspicion that Mikhail Frunze, Valerian Kuibyshev, Vladimir Mayakovsky - the list of strange deaths in the late 20s and early 30s is very long. Not everything is clear with the suicide of Nadezhda Alliluyeva (1932), the wife of the leader. Prominent party and economic workers, patriotic cultural figures, military leaders were destroyed.

At one time, Dzerzhinsky personally put a lot of effort into returning to Russia Yakov Slashchev, the lieutenant general of the tsarist army, according to contemporaries, the most gifted Russian commander. The authorities “forgot” about his participation in the White movement, the brilliant military leader became a teacher at the Higher Tactical and Rifle School for the Command Staff of the Red Army. Comintern "Shot". Moreover, he repeatedly called for white officers to return to the country and join the Red Army. In the 29th, the fearless general is killed, the case is being investigated by the OGPU. And he lowers everything on the brakes - Lazar Kolenberg, who shot at the commander, is declared insane and released.

The country was clearly going to be bled dry, left without leadership - military, political, Soviet and economic. I had to act quickly and not very correctly. “Unfortunately, a considerable proportion of commanders who were subjected to political persecution in those years suffered innocently. Most of them were soon acquitted and reinstated in the army. On the other hand, the danger created for the state by the military conspirators led by Tukhachevsky was too great, which explains the “excesses” committed during the liquidation of the conspiracy,” Igor Pykhalov believes.

The coup was to take place at the beginning of May 37, the putsch was being prepared by a group of military men led by Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Its provision is many others. “If you carefully read the transcript of the Bukharin-Rykov trial - it was just recently republished, and in full, very interesting discoveries await you. And not only on the question of the guilt of the defendants in the case. The general situation in the USSR in the late 1930s will become clear. All branches of the opposition—both the Trotskyists, and the “rightists,” and the military—joined their efforts. The goal was the overthrow of Soviet power, which is why they postponed inter-factional squabbles for the future, when they win, ”explains Sergey Kremlev. Although the Trotskyists still ruled: the “demon of the revolution”, closely connected (including by family ties) with world banking capital, continued its destructive anti-Russian activities.

Naturally, a quite reasonable question arises - how did Stalin himself manage to survive with such a level of danger? After all, he was undoubtedly the number one target for enemies. The most obvious answer to this is this: thanks to the professionalism and devotion of their guards, led by Nikolai Vlasik. With all the vices, and he was both a drunkard and a womanizer, the former tsarist non-commissioned officer knew his business perfectly. “His main duty was to ensure the safety of Stalin. This work was inhuman. Always the responsibility of the head, always life on the cutting edge. He knew very well both friends and enemies of Stalin. And he knew that his life and the life of Stalin are very closely connected. It is no coincidence that when Vlasik was suddenly arrested a month and a half or two before Stalin’s death, he said: “They arrested me, which means that soon there will be no Stalin.” And, indeed, after this arrest, Stalin lived a little, ”this is also a fragment from the memoirs of Artem Sergeev.