Topic 1. The subject of study of institutional economics

1. The role of institutions in the functioning of the economy

2. Institutionalism and neoclassical economics

3. Old and new institutionalism

4. The main currents of modern neo-institutionalism

The role of institutions in the functioning of the economy

In an effort to compensate for their own imperfection, people develop stereotypes of behavior based on past successful experience and thereby save on decision-making costs. Stable stereotypes (routines) and values ​​inherent in people form their mental models - models of perception of the surrounding world, which is too complex to perceive in all its diversity. In the process of interaction, people have to correct these models, developing common ideas about basic things (general mental models). They form the culture of society, within which norms of behavior are formed.

The norms of behavior are reflected in the structures that streamline human activity. These structures, that is, rules that are supplemented by enforcement mechanisms, are commonly called institutions.

The institutions that exist in society create incentives that influence people's behavior. They reduce the costs of choice in conditions of uncertainty, allow you to structure the costs of functioning within the system. The formation of these institutions is connected with the experience of interaction between people and their common history.

Attempts from outside to introduce alien rules will fail if they go against the culture of the society and existing informal practices. On the contrary, the formal consolidation of existing practices can be very successful. Institutions are extremely inert due to cultural and historical factors, but still they change. This happens as the experience of those agents who make decisions accumulates. Experience allows them to correct existing mental models, opens up new opportunities for innovative behavior that contributes to the emergence of new practices and the formation of new institutions. An important factor here may be changes in relative prices in the political and economic markets.

to institute (eng) - to establish, establish.

The concept of institution has been borrowed by economists from sociology, political philosophy, and social psychology.

An institution is a set of roles and statuses designed to meet a specific need.

John Rawls book "Theory of Justice": an institution is a public system of rules that define the position and position with the corresponding rights and duties, power and immunity. Examples include games, rituals, courts and parliaments, markets and property systems.

In economic theory, for the first time the concept of institution was included in the analysis Thorstein Veblen.

Institutions are a common way of thinking; the system of life of society, the prevailing spiritual position or the widespread idea of ​​the way of life in society.

Veblen also understood institutions as:

Habitual ways of responding to stimuli;

The structure of the production or economic mechanism;

The currently accepted system of social life.

John Commons defines an institution as follows:

An institution is a collective action to control, liberate and expand individual action.

Wesley Mitchell gives the following definition:

Institutions are dominant, standardized, social habits.

At present, the most common interpretation of institutions Douglas North:

Institutions are the rules, the mechanisms that enforce them, and the norms of behavior that structure the repetitive interactions between people.

The economic actions of an individual do not take place in an isolated space, but in a certain society. And therefore has great importance how society will respond to them. Trades that are acceptable and profitable in one place may not be profitable elsewhere. For example, the restrictions imposed on the economic behavior of a person by religious cults.

Within the framework of economic and social orders, schemes or algorithms of behavior are developed that are most effective under given conditions. These schemes and algorithms or matrices of individual behavior are called institutions.

Institutionalism and neoclassical economics

There are several reasons why neoclassical theory (of the early 1960s) no longer met the demands placed on it by economists:

1. Neoclassical theory is based on unrealistic assumptions and limitations, and therefore it uses models that are inadequate to economic practice.

2. Economic science expands the range of phenomena (for example, such as ideology, law, norms of behavior, family) that can be successfully analyzed from the point of view of economic science.

3. Within the framework of neoclassicism, there are no theories that explain dynamic changes in the economy.

The premises of neoclassical theory that constitute the hard core according to Imre Lactos are:

1. stable preferences that are endogenous (internal) in nature;

2. rational choice (maximizing behavior);

3. equilibrium in the market and general equilibrium in all markets.

Protective belt:

1. Ownership rights remain unchanged and clearly defined;

2. The information is completely accessible and complete;

3. Individuals satisfy their needs through exchange, which occurs without cost, taking into account the initial distribution.

The research program on Lakatos, while leaving the rigid core intact, should be aimed at clarifying, developing existing ones or putting forward new auxiliary hypotheses that form a protective belt around this core.

If the hard core is modified, then the theory is replaced by a new theory with its own research program.

The evolution of institutionalism

Institutionalism, as an economic trend, arose at the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. He was associated with the historical trend in economic theory (List F., Schmoler G., Bretano L., Bucher K.).

Institutionalism was characterized by the advocacy of the idea social control and the intervention of society, mainly the state, in economic processes. The most prominent representatives of the "Old Institutionalism" are: Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, Wesley Mitchell, John Galbraith.

T. Veblen rejected the concept of rationality and the principle of maximization corresponding to it as fundamental in explaining the behavior of economic agents. The object of analysis is institutions, and not human interactions in space with restrictions that are set by institutions.

The works of the old institutionalists are distinguished by their interdisciplinarity - the continuation of sociological, legal, and statistical studies in their application to economic problems.

Modern neo-institutionalism originates from the works of Ronald Coase "The Nature of the Firm", "The Problem of Social Costs".

Neo-institutionalists criticized the following provisions of neoclassicism.

1) First, the premise that exchange occurs without cost has been criticized. In a real economy, any act of exchange is associated with certain costs. Such exchange costs are called transaction costs. They are usually interpreted as "the costs of collecting and processing information, the costs of negotiation and decision-making, the costs of monitoring and legal protection of the performance of the contract."

Concept transaction costs contradicts the thesis of neoclassical theory that the costs of the functioning of the market mechanism are equal to zero. This assumption made it possible not to take into account the influence of various institutions in the economic analysis. Therefore, if transaction costs are positive, it is necessary to take into account the influence of economic and social institutions on the functioning of the economic system.

2) Secondly, recognizing the existence of transaction costs, there is a need to revise the thesis about the availability of information. Recognition of the thesis about the incompleteness and imperfection of information opens up new perspectives for economic analysis, for example, in the study of contracts.

3) Thirdly, the thesis about the neutrality of distribution and the specification of property rights has been revised. Research in this direction served as a starting point for the development of such areas of institutionalism as the theory of property rights and the economics of organizations. Within the framework of these areas, the subjects of economic activity "economic organizations have ceased to be considered as" black boxes ".

Representatives of neo-institutionalism consider institutions through their influence on decisions made by economic agents. Some representatives of modern institutionalism question the very premise of the utility-maximizing behavior of economic man, suggesting its replacement by the principle of satisfaction.

The main representatives of neo-institutionalism are: R. Coase, O. Williamson, D. North, A. Alchian, Simon G., L. Thevenot, K. Menard, J. Buchanan, M. Olson, R. Posner, G. Demsetz, S. Pejovich, T. Eggertsson.

Coase theorem

The use of property by one person may have negative or beneficial effects on other people. If the actions of one party affect or can, with a certain probability, affect the change in the well-being of the other party, then in this case it is said that the actions of one party create an external effect for the other party.

External effects can be very diverse: positive, i.e. beneficial to the other side, and negative - causing harm to the other side. External effects can occur both at the moment when the party that creates them performs some action, and in the future, when the action has already ceased; they may affect a single party or a large number of parties. Several classic examples of externalities can be cited.

Causing inconvenience. When a person creates a nuisance for his neighbors: makes a loud noise, allows his dog to run around, unpleasant smells come from his home, he creates negative externalities that occur at the time of this activity and, as a rule, affect a small number of people.

Pollution environment. When an enterprise emits harmful substances into the air or pours them into a river, there is a decrease in the utility of those who breathe this air or fish in this river. This is a negative externality that can manifest itself immediately or in the future and usually affects a large number of people.

Dangerous behavior with the risk of an accident. Certain behaviors under certain circumstances can cause harm to other people, for example, reckless driving of a car is fraught with negative consequences for pedestrians. Insufficient precautions for the harmer create a negative externality for the victim of the accident.

Use of a public resource. When a large number of people use a limited resource (a pasture, a lake where fish are found, an oil field), then there are externalities that lead to the depletion of the resource. Each person who decides to use this resource creates externalities that cause damage to other people. For example, an extra cow brought to a common pasture reduces the amount of meat that can be obtained from each cow grazing in the meadow. This is a negative externality that occurs at the moment of activity or manifests itself later and affects a large number of people.

useful activity. A person's actions can benefit not only himself, but also other people. For example, a beekeeper's bees pollinate his neighbor's fruit trees, so keeping the bees creates a positive externality.

Handling rental items. A person renting a plot of land can create negative externalities for the land owner, for example, by eroding the soil, but can also create positive externalities by fertilizing the land.

Externalities are not just costs incurred by one party that must be borne by the other party. In almost all cases, the existence and magnitude of externalities depends on the decisions made by both parties. Coase's statement about the reciprocal nature of the problem of externalities, which he makes at the very beginning of the article "The Problem of Social Costs", removes the atmosphere of guilt, moral condemnation of one of the parties and allows you to focus on how to find a solution to the problem that would lead to maximum efficiency. resource usage. The concept of "harmmaker" "...we can apply only with caution in Coase's world of mutual causation, in which each side of any unfortunate interaction occupies the same position in terms of causation" .

I wouldn't be coughing if the factory next door to my house wasn't throwing sulfur dioxide into the air. But the plant wouldn't hurt me if I didn't live near it. This joint decision - the plant to pollute the air, and mine - to live next to the plant, and creates external effects. If a plant is not responsible for pollution, then its decision to pollute creates a cost for me. If the factory is responsible, then my decision to live near the factory creates a cost for it. He must either pay compensation or install filters. The traditional solution to this problem has been to tax the factory in proportion to the external costs it generates, thus allowing the externalities to be internalized. Internalization of external effects means the transformation of external effects into private costs, which the economic agent is forced to take into account when making decisions.

But suppose that the damage to residents from the plant is 200 thousand dollars a year. It can be eliminated by spending $100,000 a year on cleaning equipment. Suppose further that the cost of relocating residents is $50,000 per year. If we impose a $200,000 pollution tax, the factory will stop emitting emissions and install filters at a cost of $100,000. If we don't impose a tax, the factory continues to pollute. Residents are relocated, and the cost of this option is $50,000. The result without the tax is more efficient: the problem is fixed at the lowest cost. It turns out that in this case the result of the decision to introduce a tax is inefficient.

Externalities are the cause of market failure.* Market failure can be eliminated with the help of the state. The state imposes a tax on persons creating externalities, the amount of which would be such that after its payment, the private costs of the party creating the externality would be equal to the social costs of its activities.

Coase suggested that another solution to this problem is possible - private settlement of disputes over externalities.

In some cases, the conflict between the parties arising from the sharing of a resource can be resolved through negotiations between the parties and the conclusion by them of a mutually beneficial agreement.

Let us use the court case Sturges v. Bridgman (1879), with which Coase explains his approach in the article "The problem of social costs" [Coase, 2007c, p. 100-101]. In this process, the confectioner used two mortars and pestles for his business. A doctor moved in next door who, eight years after moving in, built a reception room at the end of his garden, directly opposite the pastry chef's kitchen, and then found that the noise and vibration generated by the pastry chef's equipment prevented him from using the new reception area. The doctor went to court to force the confectioner to refrain from using his equipment, the court granted the doctor's claims and ruled that he had the right to prohibit the use of the confectioner's equipment. Assume that the costs and benefits of using the equipment are as follows.

We assume that each additional hour of mortar operation generates more external costs than the previous hour. These costs for the doctor are manifested in a decrease in his income. Before the doctor sued the confectioner, the confectioner operated the equipment for 8 hours. At this point, the confectioner's marginal net benefit (MNB line) drops to zero, and the confectioner's maximum profit is 56. However, the optimum noise level is 4 hours. Up to this point, the marginal net benefit exceeds the marginal external cost (MEC line) that results in a decrease in the doctor's income (at this point, the marginal net social benefit from (MNSB line) the work of the mortar is zero). If an extra hour of noise adds more to the benefit than to the cost, then the inconvenience created will be effective.

Coase theorem

If property rights are clearly defined and the entitlements arising from them can be freely exchanged, and if transaction costs (including costs of information gathering, negotiation costs, and rights enforcement costs) are zero, then the allocation of resources will be efficient and unchanged, whatever the initial distribution of property rights.

The Coase theorem contains two basic conditions that must be satisfied for the legal system to have no effect on the allocation of resources and the efficiency of production. The first of these is a clear specification of property rights. The exchange of powers must be preceded by a determination of who owns the contested power. Schematically, this can be represented as follows:

Specification --------> Transactions ---------> Final

and initial exchange distribution

distribution of powers

powers

Coase drew attention to this condition in the article "The Federal Communications Commission" (1959), which preceded the article "The Problem of Social Costs". In it, Coase put forward the idea of ​​the possibility of creating a broadcasting market. It was believed that without state control, broadcasting stations would operate on the same frequencies, creating interference for each other. The reason for the introduction of state regulation in this area was the chaos that arose as a result of the laissez-faire system in this area. In 1927, the Federal Radio Commission was created to regulate the use of broadcast frequencies. Coase believed that the state should not regulate the allocation of radio frequencies, but introduce private ownership of electromagnetic waves of different frequencies, as a result of which a market for these frequencies would arise and the need for state control would disappear. Coase stated that the chaos in the radio air was not the result of competition, but due to the fact that property rights for electromagnetic waves of different frequencies were not established. The idea of ​​establishing property rights and creating a market for physically unobservable objects - electromagnetic oscillations- was unfamiliar, but became real when a group of scientists, including three economists, one lawyer and one physicist, proposed a model of electromagnetic spectrum property rights that was applied to the privatization of the electromagnetic spectrum in New Zealand, Australia and some countries Latin America. Establishing property rights in the field of the electromagnetic spectrum means that each user of the spectrum is allocated a certain time, place and frequency, which they can use as they wish. The spectrum is not divided into blocks, and broadcasting technical parameters are not set. Property rights must achieve certain goals. They must be exclusive, predictable, exchangeable and protectable, divisible and flexible. If they meet these requirements, then they can solve the radio interference problem.

The main significance of this article was that in it Coase stated that the market cannot function without a clear specification of property rights: “... the definition of property rights is a necessary prelude to market transactions; but the end result (which maximizes the value of production) does not depend on legislative decision.

Confirmation of this idea can be found in the system of private lighthouses in England described by Coase. Traditionally in economic theory, the light of a beacon is seen as an example of a public good. The information transmitted by the light of the beacon is distributed over long distances, so those ships that use this information can do so without paying for it. This was also noticed by J. St. Mill: "It is impossible to force vessels at sea and using the services of lighthouses to pay a fee for them." Coase showed that a system of private lighthouses operated in England for some time [Coase, 2007a]. The state could not cope with meeting the needs of ships in lighthouses, i.e. there was a "failure of the state", and the owners of the ships turned to the king with a petition that he allowed private individuals to build lighthouses and impose a fee on ships that used the light of the lighthouses. The state granted private individuals an exclusive franchise to build and operate lighthouses and royal authority to collect tolls from all ships that used the lighthouses. The costs of building lighthouses were enormous, and the operation of lighthouses was no less risky. It happened that during a storm, both the lighthouse itself and the owner, along with the lighthouse operator, were washed into the sea. For a private lighthouse system to function, it was necessary to create conditions under which the private benefits of building and operating lighthouses were greater than the private costs. The role of the state was limited to the establishment and protection of property rights to lighthouses and the right to collect fees for the use of lighthouse light. In addition, the state established a fixed scale of fees and assisted in the collection of these fees*. The collection of duties was carried out in ports by special agents who could represent the interests of several lighthouse owners at once. The amount of the fee depended on the location of the lighthouse and the size of the ship. The ship paid for every lighthouse it passed. Books were published that determined the lighthouses for each route and the amount to pay for them. The system of private lighthouses ceased to exist only in the 30s of the XIX century.

The second condition of the Coase theorem is zero transaction costs, which will not prevent the conclusion of a mutually beneficial deal between the parties to the conflict.

Solving the problem of externalities through the conclusion of mutually beneficial agreements may be hindered by high transaction costs. In this case, the decision of the court on which of the parties to the conflict to transfer the appropriate power (the right to create an external effect or the right to prohibit activities that create an external effect) will affect the allocation of resources and it may turn out to be ineffective.

When transaction costs block negotiation and prevent agreement, the efficiency of resource use will be determined by the initial distribution of property rights.

Transaction costs are key to the operation of the market. If transaction costs are negligible, then externalities can be eliminated through the mechanism of the market without government intervention. The inefficient distribution of property rights will be corrected by the market exchange of these rights. However, if transaction costs are high and prevent the conclusion of market transactions between the parties, then the initial distribution of property rights will have an impact on the allocation of resources and production efficiency.

Topic 6 Theory of contracts

1. Concept and types of contract

2. Adverse selection and ways to prevent it

3. Moral hazard and how to prevent it

Concept and types of contract

Contracts are the legal form of economic transactions.

A contract in the legal sense is an agreement, an agreement that establishes the civil rights and obligations of the parties and specifies the terms of the agreement.

A contract also means a civil legal relationship arising from an agreement and a document that sets out the content of a contract concluded in writing.

Contracts in economic theory are considered not only as purely market contracts that dominate the market of perfect competition, but also as a "relationship". Agreements can be implicit, implied, not expressed in words and not fixed in a document, behind which there is the force of law.

A perfect contract is a contract in the world of perfect (complete) information, where there are no lengthy transactions, where everything can be done at once. In all cases, the contracts will be executed at the same time, because they completely coincide with the physical movement of objects.

The world of perfect information implies the following conditions:

1. absolute rationality;

2. complete information (perfect information);

3. absolute computing abilities (instant calculation).

In the real world, these conditions are absent, so our contracts are imperfect.

The reasons for the incompleteness of the contract are the limited foresight of a person, the inability to foresee all possible contingencies, the too high costs of calculating the allocation of risk in contracts, the lack of an accurate and sufficient rich language to describe all possible circumstances and the allocation of responsibility, and the impossibility of verifying information by a third party.

Even if some contingency can be foreseen and planned in the contract, and the contractual relationship is reliably protected, other difficulties may arise, both during the period of the conclusion of the contract, and in the process of its execution. One of the parties to the contract may have important private information both at the ex ante stage, before the conclusion of the contract, when negotiations are still underway to conclude it, and at the ex post stage, i.e. after the conclusion of the contract, when the available information is insufficient to assess whether the terms of the agreement are being followed or not. Information asymmetry means that the buyer and the seller know a different amount of information relevant to the transaction. The party with more information can benefit from its information advantage.

There are three types of opportunistic behavior that correspond to different types of information asymmetry:

1. the buyer does not know the qualitative characteristics of the good, there is an asymmetry of information, called "hidden characteristics" (hidden characteristics), which can lead to adverse selection (adverse selection)*;

2. hidden actions/hidden information** that result in moral hazard for the party that has the information;

3. hidden intentions (hidden intentions) of the partner in the transaction are fraught with the danger of the third type of opportunistic behavior - extortion (hold-up).

The threat of opportunism raises transaction costs on both sides. Reducing the opportunities for opportunistic behavior would allow them to be directed towards productive ends.

neoclassical contract

Not every deal fits into the classical contract scheme. If the transaction is implemented in conditions of uncertainty and its execution takes a long time, then it is too difficult, expensive or even impossible to foresee all future circumstances and fix them as terms of the contract. In this case, a contract of the neoclassical type is concluded.

The neoclassical contract is a long-term contract under conditions of uncertainty, which is more like an agreement on the principles of cooperation. In the neoclassical contract, the parties are not faceless, personal relationships play important role, the parties are interacting with each other. In these contracts, the source of additional value is the continuity of the transaction.

The longer the relationship between the parties and the more complex the subject of the transaction, the less value attached to the price and quality characteristics at the stage of concluding a contract, and the more attention is paid to the rules that will regulate the relationship of the parties, the adaptation of the parties to unforeseen circumstances, as well as the termination of their relationship. There are no fixed prices, but flexible pricing rules. These rules can be quite simple, such as following or indexing prices to rising costs of living, or more complex, such as the “cost plus” rule or setting the price as a percentage of sales, which is used in shopping center leases. A clause of the contract is possible, which can be attributed to the rules governing adaptation to unforeseen circumstances: “If, for any reason, a decrease in output occurs, then this decrease will be evenly distributed during deliveries to various customers.”

Comparing some empirical studies regarding the relationship between the degree of specificity of resources and the type of contract, Menard identified four characteristic features of a long-term neoclassical contract: 1. a neoclassical contract can determine a mechanism for adapting to unforeseen circumstances (in particular, the creation of a joint committee); 2.neoclassical contract can create some zone of tolerance, i.e. area where risk sharing takes place. For example, a contract concluded between a power plant and a coal mining enterprise may provide for a certain zone (± 10%) in which the prices at which coal is supplied remain unchanged, despite market changes in coal market prices; 3). The contract may provide for disclosure of information, such as unexpected changes in costs. In the 1930s, G. Ford entered into contracts with suppliers in which the price was determined on the basis of the “cost plus” rule, i.e. based on costs plus a certain percentage of profit. The use of this rule is based on trust in the supplier or on the ability to control its costs. Ford's contracts with suppliers included a clause that Ford controlled suppliers' costs; 4. The neoclassical contract contains conditions that provide for an appeal to an arbitrator, and not to the court. That is why Williamson points out that the neoclassical contract from the very beginning is tripartite, since it includes an agreement on an arbitrator [Williamson, 1996, p. 136-137]. For example, in the case of construction contracts, this could be an architect.

The parties may assess the situation differently, while both may behave in good faith and their opportunistic behavior may be "involuntary", i.e. they violate obligations, not wanting to be dishonest in relation to a partner. However, such “unwitting” opportunistic behavior is no less damaging to the deal than outright deceit, because it destroys the reliability of promises, leads ex post to transaction costs in resolving disputes, and ex ante to underinvestment in specific resources. Therefore, a dispute resolution mechanism must be chosen. Due to the incompleteness of the contract, disputes under the neoclassical contract arise more often and are more difficult to resolve.

However, the parties to a neoclassical contract may provide for the possibility of disputes in the contract. Yes, in America usual condition Collective agreements between the employer company and the trade union representing the interests of the company's employees are subject to the "no strikes" clause. In parallel, the condition "no lockouts" is often adopted. These conditions are accompanied by the procedures for expressing dissatisfaction provided for in the contract and the settlement of labor conflicts with the help of an arbitration court.

Why, in a neoclassical contract, do the parties turn to an arbitrator, and not to the court? In the event of litigation, the continuation of the relationship between the parties is unlikely. Any relationship cracks if the dispute is taken to court. In addition, litigation is time-consuming and costly. Courts generally cannot force parties to act in accordance with written contracts, the main remedy they use is damages for the party harmed by a breach of contractual obligations. Judgments to enforce a contract are a less common measure, and in transactions using neoclassical contracts, it is the continuation of business, and as soon as possible, that is more important than compensation for damages. Moreover, the resolution of a dispute in court is associated with great difficulties if it is necessary to control the quality of goods, especially complex ones, or if specific investments have been made.

When the court is faced with a problem that it is unable to solve, it chooses a "passive" strategy - it enforces the formal terms of the contract. The court may, for example, release a party from the performance of a contract that has become physically impossible as a result of some unforeseen event, such as a fire that destroyed the building of a department store for which a special elevator was produced that was unsuitable for use in other buildings. In this case, the information on the basis of which the court makes a decision can be observed and controlled by a third party - the court. But in another case, the court will confirm the contract, despite the fact that for one of the parties, as a result of external events, the fulfillment of the terms of the contract has become too costly. In this case, the court will not amend the terms of the contract, because the information on production costs cannot be reliably confirmed.

In the economic theory of contracts, a distinction is made between information that the parties can observe (observable information) and information that can be controlled by a third party (verifiable information). This distinction is made because the costs of proving to a third party that a certain state of affairs existed, or certain actions were performed, may outweigh the benefits of doing so. For example, an employer knows whether his employee is shirking or not, but the costs of proving shirking before an arbitrator or in court can be quite high, i.e. employee shirking is observable but rarely provable. Therefore, if dismissal is possible only if there are good reasons for this, then the best strategy for the employer is to limit the dismissal to cases of egregiously poor performance and take into account the usual shirking in salary or when deciding on the promotion of an employee.

Thus, we can say that information is observable if the collection of this information is economically justified, but the costs of proving it to a third party outweigh the benefits; information is verifiable if it is observable and it is economically justifiable to prove it to a third party.

Institute as a basic concept of institutionalism.

THEME 2

INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The central category of institutional economics is the concept of "institution". There are many approaches to the definition of this concept, from which the most complete idea of ​​its content is formed.

According to the founder of institutional economics, T. Veblen, institutions are certain rules of conduct, customs that determine economic relations and the entire socio-economic development of society. Veblen refers to institutions, first of all, the rules that have developed in society that govern human behavior. Human activities will be successful only if institutions are in harmony with the basic innate instincts of human behavior.

One of the leading institutionalists, D. North, considers institutions as a set of rules and norms of behavior that structure and facilitate interactions between people. He interprets institutions as "rules of the game", man-made bounding boxes that organize human relationships.

One of the early American institutionalists, J. Commons, approaches the definition of an institution from the standpoint of the collective actions of people. He believed that at the center of economic activity is a "working collective institution" that corrects the habits and ideas of each individual. Hence, J. Commons defines the institution as a collective action to control, liberate and expand individual action.

W. Hamilton defines an institution as a widespread and unchanging way of thinking or acting, which is rooted in the habits of a group or in the customs of a people.

In economics, a broader interpretation of institutions is also used, according to which they can be divided into two groups: as norms and rules of behavior accepted in society and as established forms of collective action, such as an enterprise, household, state. From point of view scientific analysis this is important, as it makes it possible to reveal the institutional nature of economic entities both at the level of micro- and macroeconomics.

Modern Russian economic science shows a deep interest in the institutional problems of society. New scientific works and textbooks appear, the authors of which consider the institutional aspects of the modern Russian economy.

There are certain differences in the approaches of Russian authors to the concept of "institution". So, S. G. Kirdina believes that ““institutions” are steadily reproducing models of interaction between people and organizations, rules and norms of social life that manifest themselves even when no one forces them to be observed.”

IN AND. Cushlin defines institutions as “man-made bounding boxes on the basis of which human relationships are organized. There are formal institutions that exist in stable forms, such as bodies and organizations, laws, and other established rules. There are also informal ones - these are unwritten rules, customs, traditions and principles. Developing this position, a number of authors interpret institutions as a set of game rules and control rules.

A rather capacious definition of an economic institution is given by A. E. Shastitko, characterizing it as “a set of rules that perform the function of restricting the behavior of economic agents and streamline the interaction between them, as well as appropriate mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules” .

Summarizing all the noted approaches, we give the following definition of an institution. An institution is a man-made system of rules and norms of behavior that organizes the relationship of people.

The very concept of "institutionalism" comes from the Latin word institutuo (institution or institution), which means a way of action, a custom, an indication, a tradition.

Institutions define the framework of behavior, harmonize relations between individuals, their groups and society as a whole. Institutions contribute to the resolution of contradictions between subjects and the achievement of harmony in society. The study of institutions and their influence on people's activities is the main task of institutional economics, the subject of its study.

So, the subject of institutional economics is the study of institutions and their impact on human economic behavior. By institutions, we mean norms, customs, traditions, laws, as well as enterprises, the state, households and other forms that influence the economic activity of people.

Institutions as a system that determines the relationship of individuals perform the following methodological functions:

1) organizing - institutions reduce uncertainty in relationships, allow achieving unity and agreement in views, help overcome conflicts and opportunism in the behavior of partners;

2) restrictive - institutions limit the activities of people, establishing formal (law, code, rules) and informal (tradition, custom, social norm) framework, for the violation of which a system of punishments is provided;

3) coordinating - if institutions in the form of legally enshrined norms and rules of conduct are built on the basis of generally recognized traditions and customs, then conditions are formed in society that help reduce transaction costs associated with the conclusion of market transactions;

4) information - effectively functioning institutions increase the awareness of participants in transactions about the state of the market and the economy as a whole and thereby reduce the costs of searching for information, rationalize the activities of individuals;

5) regulatory - institutions as carriers of rules and norms regulate legal relations in society and thereby create an atmosphere of security and confidence of a person in the guarantee of his rights and freedoms. As a result, the material and intellectual resources of people are released for their use with maximum efficiency;

6) distribution - institutions have a direct impact on the distribution of economic resources. Thus, effectively functioning market infrastructure institutions (exchanges, banks, tax system) not only save resources, but also direct them to those areas where they can be used with maximum effect;

7) stimulating - compliance with laws, norms and rules in the relationship of people is a guarantee and incentive to improve the efficiency of activities, creates favorable conditions for maximizing their income.

Research methods of institutional theory as a science that grew out of neoclassicism are in many respects common with the methods of economic theory. However, their use in institutional research has its own specifics. In addition, institutional theory has its own research methods, different from neoclassical ones. The main method of research remains the dialectical approach, which considers institutional processes in their constant motion. Like neoclassicism, institutional theory uses the method of scientific abstractions, thanks to which the entire categorical apparatus of institutionalism was formed. In using this method, T. Veblen preferred the principle of empirical observations of various forms of human activity, rather than the construction of abstract schemes. This distinguishes the institutional use of the method of scientific abstractions from the neoclassical one.

The method of analysis and synthesis finds wide application in institutional theory. Analytical Methods research includes quantitative, qualitative, functional and other types of analysis. The method of comparative analysis is especially often used, which, without claiming absolute accuracy, makes it possible to identify trends in the development of institutional structures. Thus, by analyzing the data of financial statements, one can compare the levels of efficiency of a particular form of entrepreneurial activity. Comparison of transaction costs underlies the ordinalist theory, which uses the method of expert assessments of these costs for different forms of enterprises. Other methods are of little use here, since transaction costs cannot be accurately measured and have no monetary value. Analysis in all its forms makes it possible to study the individual aspects of this phenomenon, and then, on the basis of synthesis, all the knowledge gained is combined into a single whole. W. Hamilton pointed out the role of synthesis in institutional research: "...institutionalism is the only theory that can unite economic science, because it shows how the individual parts of the economic system relate to the whole" .

Like neoclassicism, institutionalism uses the principle of historicism, which makes it possible to further come to important logical conclusions. Thus, for the institutional theory, the method of correlation of the historical and logical principles of cognition is applicable.

An important place in institutional research belongs to the method of induction and deduction. The method of induction is characteristic mainly of the old institutionalism, which proceeded from special cases to generalizations. At that time, this method was the only correct one, as it contributed to the formation of institutional theory. Neo-institutionalism, on the contrary, mainly uses the method of deduction, that is, it studies institutions on the basis of an already formed unified theory.

Like neoclassicism, institutionalism uses positive and normative research methods, thereby determining the possibility of transition from existing institutional forms to more advanced ones. There are different opinions about which institutions are the most perfect, that is, a single regulatory framework for institutionalism has not yet developed.

great attention is given to a multilevel research method, primarily to the study of institutional problems at the level of micro- and macroeconomics. These two levels are inherent in the very nature of institutions, in the definitions of which the concepts of both the micro- (customs, habits, traditions) and the macro-level, represented by the main subjects of macroeconomics, can be traced.

The evolutionary principle of research plays a fundamental role in institutionalism. He views the economy as an open, evolving system involved in vast social, cultural, and political relationships. This gives institutionalism the opportunity to use data from other sciences - sociology, psychology, political science.

Institutionalism, to a greater extent than economic theory, uses the method of social psychology, which, through sociological surveys, questionnaires, expert opinions allows you to determine the psychological mood of society in relation to ongoing institutional changes.

The most important method of institutionalism, in contrast to neoclassicism, is the use of game theory. Neoclassicism, based on its scientific paradigm, most often uses mathematical methods of research as the most accurately characterizing the situation of macroeconomic equilibrium. Institutionalists consider such a situation abstract, unrealistic, but recognize the existence of various types of partial equilibrium. To characterize them, game theory is used, which makes it possible to determine various types of strategies of individuals in repeated games. The methodological basis of institutionalism as a young science has not yet been fully formed, it is in the process of its development and improvement.

At the beginning of the XX century. US economists, having activated the analysis of the intensified monopolistic tendencies in the economy and promoting the "antitrust" policy of their own country, have gained the status of leaders in the concept of social control over the economy, carried out by various methods. Their theories laid the foundation for a new direction of economic thought, which is now called social-institutional or simply institutionalism.

Subject of study

Institutionalism is, in a certain sense, an alternative to the neoclassical direction of economic theory. If the neoclassicists proceed from the Smithian thesis about the perfection of the market economic mechanism and the self-regulation of the economy and adhere to "pure economic science", then the institutionalists also consider spiritual, moral, legal and other factors considered in the historical context to be the driving force of the economy along with material factors. In other words, institutionalism puts forward both economic and non-economic problems of socio-economic development as the subject of its analysis. At the same time, the objects of research, institutions, are not divided into primary or secondary and are not opposed to each other.

The American economist and historian of economic thought Robert L. Heilbroner, arguing that modern economics "has become the queen of the social sciences" and has become the only branch of "social research in which the Nobel Prize is awarded", and saying that "economics has finally come out beyond the narrow limits of its former realm - the realm of production and distribution - and can now lay claim to a vast territory stretching from family relations to sports, from anthropology to state law, ”is, of course, referring to the“ merits ”of institutionalism.

We see something similar in M. Blaug, who writes as follows: “The traditional theory of consumer behavior ... must be rejected in favor of a broad socio-economic theory of consumption. With varying degrees of passion, this kind of criticism is heard again and again from the supporters of the American institutional school, not to mention the Marxists. In addition, in his opinion, the desire of institutionalists "to expand the field of study of economic science" led to "recent interest in cybernetics, operations research, control theory, organization theory and general systems theory."

The economic activity of people has a social character. it is carried out not in an isolated space, but in a certain social environment through individual and collective actions. At the same time, not only the general, but also the specific response of society to these actions is of great importance. Profitable transactions in some processes of socio-economic development may be unprofitable in other processes, even under the same economic conditions. For example, restrictions on human economic behavior due to various religious and cultural habits.

It is possible to achieve coordination of many external factors that affect the success and even the likelihood of making a particular decision within the framework of economic and social orders by developing patterns or algorithms of behavior that are most effective in specific conditions. Such schemes and algorithms, or matrices of individual behavior, are essentially institutions.

Already at an early stage in the development of the concepts of institutionalism, the concepts of "institution" and "institution" are distinguished. For example, the founder of the institutional trend in economics, the American economist T. Veblen (1857-1928), interpreted the essence of institutions as stable habits of thinking that are characteristic of most people, a verbal symbol to better designate a group of social customs. Other research scientists define the concept of institutions as a system of values ​​and beliefs, customs, rituals, elements of magic and mythology, which determine the possibility of organizing human activity. These are the most important elements of the material and spiritual cultures of civilizational development. Considering the identity of each nation, it can be argued that not only knowledge and values ​​are transmitted by the new generation material culture, but also the historical, labor and moral experience accumulated and corrected by centuries of practice, which affects the stereotypes of a person's behavior, lives and creates in a certain society.

On the basis of institutions, institutions arise, is the basic concept of institutional economics. They are at the center of the studies of representatives of institutionalism.

The subject of institutional economic theory is the study of the essence of public institutions, the causes and conditions for their formation, development, functioning, the impact on the distribution of limited (rare) economic resources and income, the disclosure of human behavior in a certain institutional environment in relation to technology and its changes. A systematic study of institutions makes it possible to explain the different historical experience of economies and answer the question of the causes of modern differences in the development and functioning of various economic systems in the context of post-industrial transformations and globalization.

The word institute is of Latin origin, meaning "to establish", "to establish".

Among the many definitions of the concept of institution proposed by the founders of various currents of institutionalism, consider the following.

For the first time in economic theory, the concept of an institution was included in the analysis by the American scientist T. Veblen. In his opinion, institutions are "sustainable habits of thought characteristic of a large community of people." Along with this interpretation, the scientist also uses almost ten others. For example, he considers the essence of institutions as:

Habitual ways of responding to stimuli;

The structure of the production or economic mechanism;

The system of development of public life adopted at the present stage. Another founder of institutionalism, J. Commons (1862-1945)

defined the concept of "institution" as a collective action to control, liberate and expand individual action. He considered such institutions as the family, the trade union, the trade union, the industrial corporations, the state, etc.

W. Mitchell (1874-1948) explained the main category in this way: institutions are the prevailing and most standardized social habits.

The specificity of the definitions of the generic category - institution - influenced its specific directions, founded by the founders of institutionalism (psychobiological, socio-legal, empirical).

The classic definition of the essence of the concept of an institution was proposed by the American theorist of traditional institutionalism W. Hamilton: "The institution is a language symbol for better characterization of a group of social customs. They mean the prevailing and constant way of thinking, has become a habit for a group or a custom for a people ... Institutions set boundaries and forms of human activity. The world of customs and habits to which we adjust our lives is an interweaving and continuous fabric of institutions."

This interpretation is also imperfect, however, in comparison with others, it allows to identify the main institutional features to a greater extent.

First of all, an institution is a linguistic "symbol". Numerous authors rightly draw attention to the versatility of this term. As already noted, the institution includes the state, and the family, and customs, and organizations. And this, of course, is correct for most cases, if the task is to bring micro-phenomena and processes to the macro level. Instinct - habit - custom - law - these are just some of the chains of bringing the particular to the general. According to the modern English scientist J. Hodgson, in order to find out the role of individuals in relation to institutions, one should focus on the micro level. Defining an institution as a socially constructed invariant - or emergent property - is the basis for the study of macroeconomic dynamics and behavior.

Institute - "a group of public morals ...". In institutionalism, the terms "institution" and "organization" are often distinguished. At the same time, the essence of an institution is understood as certain habits and customs, the mental order in society, that is, unwritten rules, are formed "from below" from the micro level, and the concept of an institution is considered as a process of fixing customs and habits at the macro level in the form of law and organization.

Fundamentally important in the definition of an institution proposed by V. Hamilton is that it establishes the "boundaries of the possible" in the activities of economic entities. Belonging to a particular institution and the limited scope of human activity are considered the basis for stratification and obtaining special forms of income. This feature in the interpretation of the concept of an institution for political economy is the most significant, since it shifts the emphasis from the factorial (neoclassical) justification for obtaining specified incomes (rent, profit, wages, interest, entrepreneurial income) to the institutional one.

Entrepreneurial income - income received from entrepreneurial activity. Its main forms are dividend, founding profit, payment for participation in the work of the governing bodies of large joint-stock companies, etc.

In defining the concept of an institution, W. Hamilton pays special attention to the fact that the reality of customs and habits is an interweaving and continuous fabric of institutions. The term "institution" is interpreted as an organic unity of its forms, that is, the conditions of its existence objectively given for the individual - not only next to him, but also outside him.

So, having considered the various meanings of the concept of "institution", we can distinguish its four features. Let's consider them in more detail.

1. The process of using the concept of "institution" indirectly provides for a logical procedure for bringing micro-phenomena and processes to the macro level. The institution is always seen as the result of socialization and social recognition.

2. The term "institution" is associated with the organizational or legal registration of phenomena provided with legitimacy.

3. In economic terms, the main thing is that any institution is a sphere, facets of existence and the basis for obtaining specified, so-called reduced forms of income.

4. In any institution, the property of sociality is dominant, but not devoid of natural, psychobiological foundations. Undoubtedly, this feature in institutional analysis is not straightforward. T. Veblen, choosing institutions (instead of instincts) as the subject of his analysis, fundamentally distanced himself from influential biological reductionism, while paying attention to the possibility of institutions adapting to changing environments.

Recently, within the framework of the new institutional economics, famous representative which A. Williamson is, a view has been formed on the economic nature of the institution, which differs from the position proposed earlier. According to scientists, institutions are considered as mechanisms for managing contractual relations. Therefore, the main economic institutions are firms, markets and relative contracting. This approach focuses on the level of individual transactions covered by institutions and the problem of their minimization.

A. Williamson believes that "the institutional environment is the rules of the game that determine the context in which economic activity takes place."

Among the modern representatives of institutionalism, two positions are quite clearly distinguished in the understanding and definition of the category “institution”, the main category for them. The first is represented by those scientists (J. Hodgson, B. Ostrom, and others) who provide exceptional importance to the elucidation of the category, its formulation, the development of a unified approach in the search for definitions, and the like. Professor of the University of Hertfordshire (Great Britain) J. Hodgson states that in recent years social sciences(philosophy, political science, sociology, etc.) more often use the concept of "institution", and considers this phenomenon as evidence of the growth of the prestige of institutional economic theory. However, the scientist admits that even today there is no unity on the issue of the essence and meaning of this category. Moreover, lengthy discussions around the clarification of the key terms "institution", "organization", etc. prompted some researchers to even abandon the search for definitions in favor of solving practical tasks. But, as J. Hodgson notes, it is impossible to carry out any analysis of the functioning of institutions and organizations without having an adequate idea of ​​their essence.

The scientist proposed such abstract definitions of the basic categories of institutionalism. Let's consider them in more detail. Social structures - a plurality of social institutions, including episodic and not subject to rules, as well as their own social institutions. Institutions - a kind of structures related to the social space, they are the content of social life. These are systems of established social rules that structure social interactions. For example, language, money, laws, systems of measures and levers, table manners, firms (and other organizations). Rules, in this context, are normative prescriptions or immanent normative inclinations that operate in society and are stable. Conventions are a special type of institutional rules. Organizations are institutions that have certain characteristics. Habituation is a psychological mechanism by which individuals acquire the ability to behave according to previously perceived patterns.

J. Hodgson considers fair criticism of the so-called behavioral definitions of the essence of institutions in the modern literature on institutionalism. He notes that the definition of the essence of institutions through behavior is surprising, because in this case, the wrong assumption about the non-existence (marriage) of institutions is possible, if behavior is not correlated with them. At the same time, the scientist believes that the well-known definition of the concept of institution, given by W. Hamilton, is more acceptable compared to some later institutional definitions, if habits and customs are interpreted as dispositions, and not just as manners of behavior.

Within the framework of neo-institutional economics, there are discussions about whether institutions should be considered as equilibria, norms or rules. However, it is noted that this conflict of interpretation occurs within the intellectual tradition in which individual preferences or goals are considered established. Institutions have the qualities of balance; after its violations, they are restored and strengthened. Norms and rules are fixed and repeated in the behavior of the individual. "Repetitive, conditional, norm-compliant behavior acquires a normative meaning," says J. Hodgson, "if people adhere to a custom that is somehow morally charitable, which contributes to the stabilization of the institutional balance."

The author of a number of works in the field of modern institutionalism, E. Ostrom, explains the key category as follows: "Institutions are a set of existing rules, on the basis of which they establish who has the right to make decisions in the respective industries, actions are allowed or restricted, which general rules will be used, which procedures must be followed, what information to provide and what not to provide, and individuals benefit from their actions... All rules contain prescriptions that prohibit, permit, or require certain actions or decisions. following which they monitor when individuals choose those actions that they want to carry out ".

The second, opposite position on the question of the essence of the concept of institution is represented by those well-known modern scientists (K. Arrow, V. Efimov, etc.), who are rather skeptical about the current debate about the need to accurately define the basic concepts of institutionalism, primarily the category "institution". Regarding J. Hodgson's attempts to polish the essence of the basic terms of institutionalism, V. Efimov cites the statement of the American philosopher Ch. definitions, you can't learn anything new."

So, until now, the representatives of institutionalism are characterized by a cut "no-aspect - in form and content - the definition of the main category" institution "and its features. In addition, there has been a demarcation between the institutionalists along the line of the meaning attached to these different definitions.

Within the framework of modern institutionalism, the interpretation of D. Port is widespread, which defines institutions as:

- "Rules of the game" in society, or man-made restrictive framework that organizes relationships between people;

Rules, mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and norms of behavior that structure interactions between people, repetitive;

Formal rules, informal restrictions and ways to ensure the effectiveness of restrictions;

Fictional restrictions that structure the interactions of people, their formal (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal restrictions (social norms, conventions and codes of conduct), mechanisms for forcing their implementation. But they determine the structure of incentives in societies and their economies.

Interpreting the essence of the institution as a "stereotype of thought", it is logical that it belonged to the phenomena of culture. In contrast to the rules provided from the outside, institutions in the interpretation of T. Veblen are considered the result of the "mastering" of these rules by individuals. The introduction of such institutions into economic theory is due, in his opinion, to the need to get rid of the hedonistic fallacies of economists, human nature was considered as something given and unchanging, and therefore - for economic analysis - as an intermediate factor and "bracketed". For T. Veblen, on the contrary, "the economic essence of an individual is a cumulative process of adapting means to goals, which cumulative change with the development of the process. Both the individual himself and the environment in which he exists are the product of such a process."

At the level of applied economic analysis, this difference is largely ignored. Whatever the nature of institutions, in modern life they take the form of legal norms, traditions, informal rules and cultural stereotypes. At the same time, traditional institutionalists (the founders and their followers) rely more on cultural norms and traditions, emphasizing that institutions do not limit as much as guide, facilitate and encourage human activity. Although institutions may not meet modern requirements, acquiring, according to T. Veblen, an "archaic" and "ceremonial" character, in general they create such a socio-cultural basis, without which human activity is impossible: institutions form ties between people, eliminate differences in individual behavior and , most importantly, make the individual's behavior understandable and predictable for others. Unlike T. Veblen and his followers, neo-institutionalists (D. North and others) consider the concept of "institutions" as predominantly legal and informal norms, form a framework, restrictions for human activity.

Performing a coordinating function, institutions create conditions for mutually beneficial exchange. At the same time, they simultaneously perform the function of limitation for each of the economic entities, because the world is characterized by a limited (rarity) of resources, it provides for the functioning of the rules for their rational use. Therefore, institutions or rules, which are a way of resolving conflicts caused by limited resources, cannot but include mechanisms for forcing their implementation. The subjects that create mechanisms for enforcement of the rules and play the role of guarantors in the interaction procedure can be both direct participants and a third party, in particular, the state.

The existence of a mechanism for enforcement of the rules provides for the existence of sanctions for their violation. J. Commons distinguishes the following types of sanctions: economic, functioning in monetary form; political - in the form of restriction or expansion of freedom; moral - in the form of moral condemnation.

When it comes to the fact that institutional properties create a "circle", we mean that the fourth and partially the first signs (instincts, habits) indicate a psychobiological position in the methodology of institutionalism; in fact, the first sign (from habits to mentality) - to sociological, the second (law) - to legal, the third (imputed income) - to economic foundations.

The French institutionalist V. Chavans proposed to distinguish three levels of the structure of institutions depending on their significance in the life of society:

1) language, ethics, religion, family, money, property;

2) social conditions, customs, traditions, legal norms, internal rules of the organization, contracts, constitutions, social system;

3) hierarchy, associations, firms, trade unions, employers' organizations, governments, administrative apparatuses, international organizations and agreements.

According to M. Deryabin, institutions should be considered according to their significance in the following sequence:

Private property as the most important institution of a market economy;

Legal regulatory institutions that ensure a clear delineation of property liability (codes, laws);

Institutions responsible for the property of others (accounting regulations, banking regulation, regulation of the securities market and investment intermediaries)

Institutions that structure and provide foresight the behavior of partners in market relations (contract law).

Given the above positions, it can be argued that the economic system is not only a set of institutions defined in a certain way, but a set of socio-economic institutions that is structured and subordinated to certain levels, have different meanings and each play their own role.

Consider the rules that many researchers consider institutions.

Rules - a set of generally recognized and protected requirements that prohibit or allow certain types of actions of one individual (or group of people) in their interaction with other people or groups.

The rules constituting an institution only make sense if they apply to more than one person. From this point of view, any institution is a set of certain rules, while the rules are not always an institution. Therefore, it is advisable to distinguish between these concepts.

Rules can be in a subordination relationship because one type of rule is easier to change than another. According to a number of decisive features (degree of coverage, subjects, etc.), the rules are classified into global and local, constitutional and economic, and the like. Global - rules that directly define alternatives for the formulation of other rules and change at great cost; they shape the institutional environment. In turn, such rules consist of constitutional or political, and economic. Local include bilateral and multilateral contracts concluded by individual economic agents.

The defining property of constitutional rules is that they form the hierarchical structure of the state. Also, these rules determine the order of decision-making, significantly affect the result of voting. With the help of such rules, the implementation of control over the list of issues that are discussed and resolved is fixed.

Economic rules determine the possible forms of organization of economic activity, within which certain individuals or groups cooperate or specific relations arise between them. For example, it is prohibited to merge two companies belonging to the same industry if, as a result of such actions, the value of the concentration index of a predetermined critical level is overestimated. Economic rules also include the establishment of marginal prices for products and resources, which are determined in accordance with the boundaries of exchange in a particular market; introduction of restrictions on imports and exports (through quotas, increased duties, increased requirements for environmental protection, etc.); the duration of patents for discoveries, the ban on the use of certain types of contracts, and the like.

The rules of the economic market game are established by law and organizations that enforce these rules by all economic actors through the use of incentives, rewards, benefits and punishments. These actors include government and non-government organizations, public and private sector enterprises, internal and external agencies operating in an open market economy, financial intermediaries and brokers, and households.

The concept of "contracts" is considered as rules that structure in time and space the relationship between two (or more) economic agents based on the specification of rights and obligations that are exchanged, in accordance with the agreement reached between them.

So, obviously, institutions are heterogeneous. Taken together, as rules of conduct and mechanisms to enforce them, institutions guarantee social order. They are divided into two large groups - informal and formal.

Informal rules are those that, although they are quite severe restrictions on human behavior, are not fixed in writing (generally accepted conventions and codes of conduct) and are protected by other, non-state, mechanisms to enforce their implementation.

Informal institutions arise from information transmitted through social mechanisms. In most cases, they constitute that part of the heritage that is called culture. it can be interpreted as the transfer by learning and imitation from one generation to another of knowledge, values ​​and other factors that influence behavior.

Informal rules were of decisive importance in the early stages of the development of society, when relations between people were not regulated by formal (written) laws. However, informal institutions (restrictions) function in the modern economy. The representative of the neoliberal direction of economic theory, F. von Hayek (1899-1992), considers them as an integral part of the order of cooperation between people, and arises spontaneously. The traditions that became the basis of the extended order of human cooperation, he considers "the product of man's action", but not the product of his mind.

Informal restrictions arise as a means of coordinating forms of human interaction, steadily repeating and are:

Continuation, development and modification of modern rules;

Socially sanctioned norms of behavior;

Internal, binding standards of conduct. In fact, the role of informal institutions is played by economic ethics

or moral practices, the study of which is devoted to many scientific works. Economic ethics raises the level of social, and consequently, economic coordination of the market.

The relationship between ethical standards and the nature of transactions is proved. If the subjects of the economy in their actions rely more on trust than on the possibility of implementing sanctions determined by formal law, then in society agreements will be more regular and complex.

Formal restrictions, rules and institutions arise on the basis of already existing informal rules and mechanisms that ensure their implementation. Formal rules are legal norms, the peculiarity of which is the presence of groups of people who specialize in enforcing them. Such rules are an integral attribute of the state, with the help of formal institutions ensures their protection.

There is a multifaceted relationship between informal and formal rules. Compared to formal rules, informal rules are:

The source of the formation and change of formal rules when systems develop evolutionarily. In this case, the people who created the laws do not invent a new form, but only study and fix it after it has been formed in practice;

The foundation of the expansion, continuation, addition of formal rules, since the circumstances of a particular single interaction are taken into account;

Substitutes for formal rules in case of their imperfection. In the structure of formal institutions, there are:

Political institutions (determine the hierarchical structure of society (state) and the most important characteristics of control over political procedures)

Economic (establish possible forms of organization of economic activity);

Contracting systems (methods and procedures for concluding contracts, regulated by legal norms and laws).

In the scientific literature, formal economic institutions are most often considered in the same context as property rights, because they (institutions) establish property rights, that is, the right to use and receive income from property and alienate other persons from the use of property or resources.

In economics, as a rule, two types of institutions are distinguished:

1) external, with the help of which the basic rules that determine its nature are established in the economic system. For example, the basic institution of property;

2) internal, facilitating the conclusion of agreements between subjects, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk and reduce transaction costs. For example, enterprises, types of contracts, means of payment and credit, means of accumulation.

Institutions in the narrow sense are the rules of the economic game, in this case the market game, established by law and organizations that ensure their observance by all economic entities, using material and moral incentives, rewards and punishments. Among them, there are proper state and non-state organizations, public and private sector enterprises, internal and external agencies operating in an open market economy, financial intermediaries, brokers, and households.

In modern economic literature, the word institution is often used in the sense of "organization" or "structure", for example, state or financial institutions. According to G. Kolodko, they include those who "organize, control and shape economic processes in order to ensure their appropriate action with due regard for the interests of all participants in the process of social reproduction."

In addition, among market institutions, there are: contracts between entrepreneurs and arbitration or judicial procedures; the price of goods or services agreed between the seller and the buyer, and the right to challenge the supply of low-quality products; consumer associations that strengthen market positions in disputes with manufacturers and sellers. Neo-institutionalists have expanded the essence of the concept of institutions, including in their composition:

Procedures and rules of conduct authorized by law or custom;

Legislative and regulatory norms that protect the interests of market entities;

Organizations and administrative/political structures that cater to the needs of various market actors - from government and central bank to securities market commissions, antitrust authorities, commercial banks and commodity exchanges;

Institutions in a broad sense, covering the market culture and mentality. From this point of view, institutions in Ukraine need not only to be created or established, but also to learn from them. Such a learning process (even if the corresponding attempt is extremely large) should be gradual and lengthy, because it is impossible to carry out a radical transformation of the Ukrainian culture and mentality with the help of any political or economic act.

So, the generally recognized institutional components of the socio-economic system are: historical traditions, the spiritual composition of the population, the system of values, the level of legal awareness. All this correlates with the norms, customs and habits that explain the optimal decisions of economic agents.

An institution is a social phenomenon, its core is legal norms that provide clarity and predictability, structuredness, certainty Everyday life. The essence of an economic institution lies in the assimilated value systems, stable social norms, standards of behavior, worldview schemes, and its essential features are characteristic - rational attitudes and a coercive apparatus.

Formal norms and rules form the legal and regulatory infrastructure, form a hierarchy that structures the institutional environment. Formal rules constitute an important, but insignificant part of the totality of constraints that form choice situations. To a greater extent, behavior is determined by unwritten codes, norms and conventions. The practice of everyday activities of an entrepreneur in market conditions is determined by formal institutions and informal rules of conduct.

Formal institutions over informal perform following features: restriction, content, stimulation of neoplasm, public justification, camouflage of informal practice.

Informal institutions are generally accepted habitual stereotypes and norms of behavior that are in the individual and public consciousness, the core of a system of institutions that is changing very slowly.

D. North notes that the upbringing of a consensus ideology (observance of certain rules and norms) occurs when a deal is concluded within an informal framework that makes it look like an ideal with zero transaction vitrates2. those costs incurred by economic entities in the absence of appropriate institutions.

Transaction costs form the demand for public institutions: high transaction costs cause a high demand for institutional regulation that can minimize the costs associated with buying and selling, quality, guarantees of a tool to overcome uncertainty, risk, asymmetry of information, incompatibility of counterparties.

However, in modern conditions, there is a threat of raiding as a result of collective action, which forms the problem of a free rider and causes additional costs. Therefore, systems of control and responsibility for violation of the rules of collective action must necessarily operate.

The most durable and socially expedient institutions are fixed in traditions, informal norms, and then in written law, i.e. legalized.

Important properties of institutions are their relative stability and long-term impact on the processes of reproduction, replication and dissemination of forms and methods of human interaction. Thanks to the effectiveness of institutions in society and the economy, hereditary (in time - vertical, in space, through borrowing - horizontal) transmission of signs is ensured. At the same time, institutions are also characterized by variability, which ensures the adaptation of social and economic systems to changes in the conditions of their functioning and development. This or that relationship between the stability and volatility of institutions is established as a result of the interaction of cycles of negative and positive links.

As a rule, the following most important functions of institutions are distinguished:

Coordination and coordination of actions of economic agents, minimization and compensation of losses as a result of a conflict of their interests in the process of interaction;

Reducing the time, effort and resources associated with obtaining and processing information, substantiating and making decisions, concluding transactions and monitoring their implementation;

Ensuring the stability of social and economic systems, the preservation and hereditary transmission of their essential features;

Formation of motives for human activity and a system of material and moral incentives.

So, together, institutions structure human interaction while limiting the choice of individuals. In general, the institutional infrastructure (institutions formed by society, formal and informal rules) also determines the superstructure of the functioning of the economic mechanism, the procedure for the operation of economic agents and organizations. These rules include: pricing rules, taxation, antimonopoly regulation, social insurance, methods of macroeconomic regulation, etc.

The system of institutional rules of modern society provides and at the same time limits the possibility of maximizing personal gain through economic and political exchanges (which is inevitable due to limited resources). In this case, the rules that provide the structuring of relations between people acquire the form of law, if considered from the standpoint of an individual, the possibility of realizing her desires.

According to D. North, the set of rules is formed under the influence of political and economic interests. Therefore, most rules are created in the interests of private rather than public welfare. If we are talking about formal rules, then they arise on the basis of personal interests and are created in order to satisfy the interests of those who can influence the formation of new rules.

Recognition of this fact Neoinstitutionalists gives reason to talk about the dual nature of institutions: they reduce the uncertainty of choice and ensure the predictability of the results of a set of actions, facilitate the process of interaction between people (coordinating function); as rules restricting access to resources, both economic and political, they have an inherent distributional effect. It is no coincidence that there is a struggle in society to change the rules, that is, to change the possibilities of access to limited resources.

In D. North's classification, political institutions, in fact, as rules, are of decisive importance. With the help of political decisions, they naturally form rules (determine, among other things, property rights and individual contracts). So, in order to change the rules, including economic ones, you need to have power. This determines the significance in the analysis of the trajectory of institutional changes of the problems of power, including over social choice and human values.

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1 Topic 1. The subject of study of institutional economics and its place in modern economic theory 1.1. What does institutional economics study? 1.2.Methods and principles of institutional economics Institutions and their types What does institutional economics study? Institutional economics is a scientific direction of modern economic thought that studies the problems of economic theory in their interdependence with institutional changes. The term "institutional economics" was first used by Hamilton W. at a meeting of the American Economic Association in 1918. Hamilton W. noted that "institutionalism is the only theory that can unite economics, because it shows how the individual parts of the economic system relate to the whole." The founder of institutionalism is the American economist T. Veblen, who in his works “Why economics is not an evolutionary science” (1898), “The theory of the leisure class: an economic study of institutions” (1899) laid the fundamental and methodological foundations of institutional economics. J. Commons developed T. Veblen's theory of the evolutionary selection of institutions. A certain contribution to the formation of the foundations of institutional theory was made by W. Mitchell J. GalbraithG. Myrdal, K. Ares and others. As a special scientific direction, institutionalism took shape at the end of the 19th century. The emergence and development of this direction was due to the growing need of the market economy for a more versatile legal regulation of the economic environment and streamlining both its internal and

2 specialized institutions of legal regulation, which in turn was the result of a turning point in the development of a market economy. Representatives of institutionalism denied the principle of optimization and criticized the neoclassical approach to the economy as an equilibrium system, they proceeded from the fact that market entities operate in conditions of incomplete market information, which causes the inevitable emergence of the category of transaction costs. In addition, the institutionalists considered the state as "a necessary element of knowledge of the patterns of functioning and development of the market system, as well as an active factor in the functioning of this system." The following main areas of research within the framework of the new institutional economics are distinguished: 1. The theory of property rights. Its founders are A. Alchian, R. Coase, J. Barzel, L. de Alesi, G. Demsets, R. Pozner, S. Pejovic, O. Williamson, E. Fyurobotn. 2. The theory of transaction costs. Main representatives: R. Coase and O. Williamson. 3. Economics of law. Representatives: R. Coase, R. Posner, E. Ostrom. 4. The theory of public choice. Main representatives: J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch, K. Arrow, M. Olson, D. Muller. 5. New economic history. Representatives: D. North, R. Vogel, J. Wallis, A. Grif, J. Mokyr. V.V. Volchik identifies the following fundamental questions of institutional economics: 1. Why do societies develop in accordance with a unique institutional trajectory? 2. Why do societies often fail to adapt to the institutional structures of more successful countries?

3 3. How can we explore the relationship between the implicit and informal aspects of social institutions, on the one hand, and their explicit and formal aspects, on the other? At the same time, he points to the following possibilities of institutional economics: 1) brings economic models closer to reality by including the influence of the institutional environment in the analysis. Typically, the models used by institutionalists are less formalized than neoclassical ones; 2) explains the qualitative economic dynamics, in particular, the features of the institutional transformation of economic systems, as well as evolutionary economic and technological processes; 3) provides a more complete understanding of the role of individuals in the formation of institutional structures. 1.2.Methods and principles of institutional economics. The institutional theory is characterized by the following methods and main analytical tools: 1. empirical methods (description and identification of relevant institutions); 2. methods of classical and evolutionary theory games; 3. microeconomic modeling in the spirit of neoclassical economics (equilibrium analysis methods); 4. comparative (comparative, that is, based in the analysis on the comparative study of space-time interactions) method; 5. historical method(study of the role of history in the formation, preservation and change of institutions). Institutional economics is guided by the following principles:

4 1. The principle of institution-centrism is that any phenomenon in society occurs in an environment of reflexive norms, that is, under the influence of institutions; 2. The principle of irreducibility states that the social sphere and the natural sphere are irreducible, that is, "the joint activity of people can and should be studied either only as a natural-technical, or only as a social system." 3. the principle of methodological socialism (methodological collectivism) indicates that the starting point of the scientific analysis of the social system should be a reflexively normalized joint activity, and not an individual; 4. the principle of unity says that “there is no “matter of social life” with independently developing “relations” in it that could be presented separately from the rules of law and other institutions”; 5. The principle of historicism considers the social system as a specific historically developing integrity. Institutions and their types. The central concept of institutional economics are institutions, which are considered as key elements of any economic system. The definition of an institution can be found in works of sociology, political philosophy, and social psychology. For example, Smelzer N. defines an institution as a set of roles and statuses designed to meet a specific need. In economic theory, the concept of institution was first included in the analysis by Thorstein Veblen in The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study on Institutions, where he pointed to institutions as various rules and stereotypes.

5 behaviors, some of which are enshrined in the form of legal norms and public institutions. . Currently, within the framework of modern institutionalism, the most common interpretation of institutions is Douglas North: Institutions are rules, mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and norms of behavior that structure repetitive interactions between people. . Institutions can be divided into two large groups - informal and formal. Informal institutions arise from information transmitted through social mechanisms, and in most cases, are part of the heritage that is called culture. In fact, the role of informal institutions is performed by economic ethics or moral practices. Formal restrictions, rules and institutions usually arise on the basis of already existing informal rules and mechanisms that ensure their implementation. In the structure of formal institutions, political institutions stand out; economic institutions; contracting systems (methods and procedures for concluding contracts, regulated by legal norms and laws). Formal economic institutions in the scientific literature are most often considered in the same context as property rights, since they "establish property rights, that is, a bundle of rights to use and receive income from property, and the alienation of other persons from the use of property or resources" Gutnik V. highlights two types of institutions: 1) External establishing the basic rules in the economic system, ultimately determining its nature. For example, the institution of property. 2) Internal, which make transactions between entities possible, reduce the degree of uncertainty and risk, and reduce transactional

6 costs (enterprises, types of contracts, means of payment and credit, means of accumulation). Institutions have the following three main functions: 1) regulation of people's behavior in such a way that they do not harm each other, or that this damage is somehow compensated. 2) minimizing the efforts that people spend on finding each other and agreeing among themselves. The Institute is designed to facilitate both the search for the right people, goods, values, and the ability of people to come to an agreement with each other. 3) the organization of the process of information transfer, or learning Thus, the development and complication of socio-economic relations depends on the institutions accepted in society and on their evolution, therefore one of the main tasks of an economist is to study institutions and the processes of their preservation, renewal and change. Literature: 1. Veblen T. Theory of the leisure class. M., Volchik V.V. A course of lectures on institutional economics. Rostov-on-Don: Publishing House of the Russian State University, Lecture Gutnik V. Market institutions and the transformation of the Russian economy // MEMO Institutional Economics: Textbook / Under the guidance of. Acad. D. S. Lvova.- M.: INFRA-M, North D. Institutions and economic growth: historical introduction// Thesis. T.1. Issue 2. M., Smelzer N. Sociology. M., Tarushkin A. B. Institutional Economics. Textbook.- St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg, 2004

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