In the picture: Lenin sets the task of stealing everything useful from all over the world, and pulling it to Russia :)

In the years of the formation of Soviet power, in the most severe conditions of industrialization, in the harsh war years, the country had no time for science. But for quick implementation of plans economic development and defense required advanced technology. And then scouts came to the aid of scientists.

Scientific and technical intelligence

In the USSR, scientific and technical intelligence (NTR) was carried out on an industrial scale. Every year, ministries and departments sent applications to the Council of Ministers (since 1999 to the Military Industrial Commission) for information of interest to the authorities in the field of foreign technologies. A list of the necessary topics and directions was compiled, and the scouts mined them. The sphere of interest was huge: from the development of strategic weapons to the manufacture of artificial fur.

The materials obtained by scouts were widely used by scientists. Ideas and technologies adapted to Russian realities made it possible to significantly reduce the funds for their development. Only on the nuclear program due to the information obtained, it was possible to save up to 250 million rubles.

GOELRO plan: from Ilyich's light bulb to victory

In 1922, military intelligence was given the task of obtaining technology for the production of tungsten. This metal was used in incandescent lamps and in a number of military products. Tungsten filament was purchased abroad for 200-250 thousand gold rubles. Metal deliveries could stop at any moment, and in order to implement the GOELRO plan, it was necessary to launch the production of our own light bulbs.

The most suitable object of implementation was the Osram concern, at whose plants a full range of tungsten processing was carried out: from ore dressing to incandescent filaments. Through its channels, intelligence contacted the military department of the Communist Party of Germany. Yu. Hoffman, a communist worker at the Osram plant, received a party assignment and for a number of years passed on information to Soviet intelligence about the technologies used at the plant. Particularly valuable was information about new superstrong materials - cermets and an alloy of tungsten carbide with cobalt vidia - in the manufacture of which the method of powder metallurgy was used.

However, in 1924, after an unsuccessful attempt at revolution, Hoffman and several of his comrades had to flee to the USSR. Other "secret" communists took their place, and the agent network was restored.

In the USSR, it was possible to recreate video technology under laboratory conditions with some variations. The new metal was called win. However, the production stage was still far away. Only in 1929, the engineer of the Moscow Electric Plant, Grigory Meyerson, managed to get more detailed information about the technology for the production of alloys with tungsten in the USA. He ingratiated himself with the engineer Thomson, who led the future director of the Moscow Experimental Tungsten Plant through the shops. From time to time, going to the toilet, Meyerson took notes of everything that he managed to remember.

On the basis of his notes and materials obtained by intelligence in Germany, Meyerson developed a technological scheme and set up an industrial production of Pobedon. Already in 1930, about 4 tons of this alloy were produced.

Secrets of the Atomic Bomb

In July 1945, during the Potsdam Conference, American President Harry Truman received the news: The baby is born - “The baby is born.” It was a sign that a nuclear bomb was ready. The head of the United States, during a break between meetings, approached Stalin and, as if by the way, said the following: "We have a new weapon of extraordinary destructive power." He watched closely with Churchill to see how the Communist leader would react. “I hope you can use it well against the Japanese,” Stalin replied indifferently.

The American President and the British Prime Minister did not know that the Generalissimo was well aware of the Manhattan and Tube Alloys (Pipe Alloy) projects.

In the autumn of 1941, Klaus Fuchs, a German communist who had fled the Nazi regime for Great Britain, approached the Soviet embassy in London. He said that, being a theoretical physicist, he was working on the Tube Alloys project, the purpose of which was to build a uranium bomb plant in England. Ruth Kuczynski, a Soviet intelligence officer, worked in contact with the physicist Fuchs. Periodically, they met, and Klaus brought her information, but only his own developments. Fuchs was driven by ideological considerations - he wanted to be useful to the country at war with Hitler.

At that time, in the United States, an experienced intelligence officer Semyonov and Vice-Consul Kheifets "worked out" the physicists participating in the Manhattan project. The American physicist Robert Oppenheimer, whom Heifets met, did not make contact, but Semenov received a message from a student of the famous physicist Enrico Fermi, the Italian B. Pontecorvo, that his teacher had carried out a controlled nuclear reaction process for the first time.

Also, information came from the scouts about the involvement of all prominent physicists in the creation nuclear weapons, for which up to a quarter of the total US spending on military-technical research was allocated. However, the task of communicating with them was complicated by the fact that all the employees who worked on the Manhattan project were transported to Los Alamos under the hood of secret intelligence services, including Klaus Fuchs, who arrived in America. The location of scientists, engineers and technicians was kept secret, so that even close people did not know where their relatives had gone.

The atomic problem was taken up by a group of Soviet foreign intelligence under the code name Enormoz. The task of the group was to determine the countries where work is being done with the uranium bomb and the extraction of scientific and technical information for Soviet atomic scientists.

I. V. Kurchatov highly appreciated the data obtained by intelligence, which "indicate the technical possibilities of solving the entire problem in a much shorter time than our scientists think."

In 1944, Fuchs appeared again in the field of view of Soviet intelligence. Over the course of several years, he handed over a number of materials, including a circuit diagram hydrogen bomb, according to the theoretical ideas of scientists from the USA and Great Britain.

Speaking of the nuclear program, one cannot fail to mention the Rosenberg couple, who were executed in the United States on charges of transferring information about atomic weapons to the USSR. The materials of the classified case took up several volumes, however, only the fact of the transfer of a sample of a radio fuse and documentation for it to Soviet intelligence is known for certain.

The execution of American communists caused a wave of indignation around the world. Moreover, Klaus Fuchs, who was exposed in 1953, received 14 years in prison in Britain, since the court considered that he was passing information not to an enemy, but to an ally.

Summing up the results of the atomic program, taking into account the timely received intelligence about the American bomb, Stalin remarked: "If we were late for one to a year and a half, then we would probably try this charge on ourselves."

In the mid-1980s, another party conference was held in the conference hall for 800 seats at the headquarters of the PGU KGB in Yasenevo. The presidium was attended by intelligence leaders and a representative of the Central Committee of the CPSU who supervised it. The next head of the scientific and technological revolution, but not its true leader, cheerfully reported on the achievements. There was a lot to report on. But for some reason, he singled out the work on the special task of the Central Committee of the Party to obtain technology for the production of high-quality ice cream.

Tired of idle chatter, the scouts dozed or quietly discussed their affairs. After the announcement of the successful completion of the "special task for ice cream", the hall burst into violent applause.

And why do we need scientific and technical intelligence of modern Russia? To extract the secrets of the production of consumer goods? So after all, those who produce it - private companies - should do it. Let them steal, as is customary all over the world. If we take mechanical engineering, then here most of the manufacturers are non-state companies or are on the verge of bankruptcy. It is unlikely that Western technology will help them. We need appropriate equipment, highly qualified personnel, time and money. And none of the above, most likely, they do not have. What remains is the military-industrial complex. The position of the state, which produces something and even sells abroad, is strong here. True, the scale and capabilities are no longer the same as in the USSR.

However, to say that with the collapse Soviet Union and radical changes in the sphere of the domestic military-industrial complex, the role and necessity of domestic military-technical intelligence has become minimal - not entirely true. The fact is that Russia has always used the scientific potential of other countries to make a breakthrough in certain science-intensive areas. Suffice it to recall the era of Peter I, the beginning of the 20th century, or the period of industrialization. In the Soviet Union, when there was a need to urgently reanimate the domestic military-industrial complex, in addition to investing in science and production, the “knights of the cloak and dagger” were mobilized.

CIA Director W. Webster stated in February 1990 that the KGB continues to expand its intelligence activities, "especially in the United States, where there has been an increase in attempts to recruit people with technical knowledge or access to technical information."

In Western Europe, T managed to obtain data from Italy on Katrin tactical avionics systems developed for NATO in the early 1990s, as well as to use a group of West German hackers to break into the Pentagon database and other research and military -industrial computer systems.

In the early 1990s, Line X tried hard to penetrate Japan and South Korea, concentrating all efforts on this region.

It should not be forgotten that the scientific and technological revolution did not stop its activities even during the years of market reforms. Of course, the scale of operations is not what it used to be, and resources are limited, but the system continues to work. This mode can be loosely called "autosave", but at any time it can be activated and run at full capacity.

Moreover, according to Article 5 of the Federal Law of January 10, 1996 No. 5-FZ “On Foreign Intelligence”, the following goals of intelligence activities for the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation are defined:

Provision of the President Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly and the Government of the Russian Federation with the intelligence information they need to make decisions in the economic, defense, scientific and technical fields;

Assistance to economic development, scientific and technological progress of the country and military-technical security of the Russian Federation.

Article 11 of this law defines the areas of activity of each of the intelligence services. For the SVR, among others, economic, military-strategic and scientific-technical spheres are indicated. And for the GRU - the military-technical sphere.

Another important point is the list of those who are provided with information obtained by intelligence. This list is contained in the 14th article of the Law:

“Intelligence information is provided to the President of the Russian Federation, the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the Government of the Russian Federation and federal executive and judicial authorities, enterprises, institutions and organizations designated by the President of the Russian Federation. Intelligence information may also be provided to federal executive bodies that are part of the security forces of the Russian Federation.

The heads of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation bear personal responsibility to the President of the Russian Federation for the reliability, objectivity of intelligence information and the timeliness of its provision.

Heads and other officials of federal legislative, executive and judicial bodies, enterprises, institutions and organizations, members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma, who are provided with intelligence information, bear responsibility established by the Federal Law for disclosing information contained in it that constitutes a state secret or reveals sources of said information.

Thus, the heads of enterprises can receive information of interest to them on scientific, technical and military-technical topics.

First Deputy Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service A. A. Shcherbakov said: “We are in close contact with Russian ministries and departments, and not only with the leading ones. We have cooperation agreements with some of them. Forms - participation in interdepartmental meetings and special government commissions, expert opinions bills, participation in seminars and conferences, regular provision of relevant information to departments”.

And here is what one of the heads of the Department of Scientific and Technical Intelligence of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation said about the role of his unit: “One of the tasks of the scientific and technological revolution is to monitor trends and achievements of foreign science and technology in terms of threats from the emergence of the latest means of armed struggle, primarily weapons of mass destruction, and as a consequence of this - a violation of the existing balance of forces in the world. Now NTR pays serious attention to the research of developments in the field of "critical technologies". This direction of ours is consonant with the activities of the Institute for Critical Technologies, organized in 1991 under the Office of Science and Technology Policy of the US White House.

The scientific and technical revolution analyzes completed foreign research and development work (R&D) of a military-applied nature, identifies promising features of promising samples, impartially evaluates the strengths and weak sides foreign weapon systems, keeps track of technical innovations, advanced engineering solutions, etc. Special attention given to production technology.

The importance of this work, I hope, is clear. Having created a new weapon, our designers must be sure that it is able to perform its functions and will be more effective than foreign ones. In peacetime, it is possible to compare the quality of domestic and foreign weapons only with the help of intelligence ...

… Approximately since 1987, we started having difficulties with the currency. There have been big changes in the structures on which we are based. Therefore, one can say this: present period The scientific and technological revolution is intensifying its activities to analyze the prospects of certain technologies for Russian industry in the light of its restructuring. In a number of areas, we are reducing activity, primarily in the extraction of samples new technology. This is due to financial problems and the lack of specific development programs for some industries.”

It follows from this that there is a need for a body that would coordinate the efforts of the mining organizations - the SVR and the GRU and the transfer of the information received to interested parties. In the Soviet Union, these functions were performed by the State Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, but in 1991 it ceased to exist.

Let's start with the fact that by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of June 22, 1999 No. 665, the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on military-industrial issues was organized. It can be argued that, to some extent, it is a revived military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union, but solving many problems that were unusual for its predecessor.

According to the “Regulations on the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation on military-industrial issues”, this is a permanent body that ensures interaction and coordination of the activities of federal executive bodies in order to develop proposals for the implementation of state policy on military-industrial issues and ensuring defense and state security.

In its activity this organization"is guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as these Regulations."

The main tasks of the Commission:

“a) preparation of proposals for the implementation of a unified state policy in the field of defense and state security, for the development of the defense industrial complex, military-technical cooperation and the implementation of international treaties of the Russian Federation on the reduction and limitation of arms;

b) development of proposals for the preservation and further improvement of the military-industrial potential of the country;

c) organization of effective interaction and coordination of the activities of federal executive bodies, interested organizations on issues of ensuring defense and state security;

d) development of proposals for balanced material and technical support of the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies, as well as equipping them with weapons and military equipment.

The Commission, in order to implement the tasks assigned to it:

“a) determines priority areas in the field of defense and state security;

b) considers issues of interaction between federal executive bodies and interested organizations on issues of ensuring defense and state security;

c) considers projects of the state armament program, federal targeted programs armaments and military equipment, as well as proposals for the development, restructuring, conversion of the defense industrial complex and its scientific and technological base, operational equipment of the territory of the Russian Federation for the purposes of national defense;

d) considers and develops proposals for the draft federal budget related to the determination of expenditures for ensuring defense and state security;

e) considers the draft state defense order and disagreements between the federal executive authorities that arose during its formation, as well as proposals for its adjustment;

f) considers and develops proposals for spending funds from the reserve of the Government of the Russian Federation, created within the framework of the state defense order to finance unforeseen work;

g) considers proposals for the development of military-technical cooperation, the implementation of international treaties in the field of arms reduction and limitation, issues of organizing work on the disposal and elimination of weapons and military equipment, control over the export of arms and military equipment, strategic materials, technologies and dual-use products;

h) considers proposals on plans for the transfer of federal executive authorities, executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local authorities and the country's economy to work in wartime conditions, as well as plans for the creation of reserves material assets state and mobilization reserves;

i) interact in accordance with the established procedure with the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, federal executive authorities, state authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, as well as with organizations and officials on issues within the competence of the Commission;

j) considers the implementation of decisions of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation on military-industrial issues and provides. the care of defense and security”.

You can assess the real possibilities of the Commission of the Government of the Russian Federation if you carefully look through the list of its members. Here's who was in it in June 2000:

Kasyanov M. M. - Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (Chairman of the Commission),

Klebanov I. I. - Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation (Deputy Chairman of the Commission),

Kudrin A. L. - Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation - Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation (Deputy Chairman of the Commission),

Adamov E. O. - Minister of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy,

Gazizullin F. R. - Minister of Property Relations of the Russian Federation,

Gref G.O. - Minister of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation,

Grigorov S. I. - Chairman of the State Technical Commission of Russia,

Dondukov A.N. - Minister of Industry, Science and Technology of the Russian Federation,

Kantorov V.F. - Head of the Administrative Department of the Government of the Russian Federation,

Kvashnin A.V. - Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces - First Deputy Minister defense of the Russian Federation,

Yu. N. Koptev - General Director of Rosaviakosmos,

Kudelina L.K. - Deputy Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation,

Kushal M. L. - Deputy Director of the FPS of Russia,

N. P. Laverov - Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (as agreed),

Matyukhin V. G. - General Director of FAPSI,

Mikhailov V. A. - Head of the Department of the Defense Complex of the Office of the Government of the Russian Federation (Executive Secretary of the Commission),

Mikhailov N. V. - Secretary of State - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation,

Moskovsky A. M. - Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (as agreed),

Nelezin P. V. - Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation,

Nikolaev A. I. - Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense (as agreed),

Nozdrachev A. V. - General Director of RAV,

Pak 3. P. - General Director of Rosboepripasov,

Pospelov V. Ya. - General Director of Rossudostroenie,

Pronichev V. E. - First Deputy Director of the FSB of Russia,

Reiman L.D. - Minister of the Russian Federation for Communications and Informatization,

Renov E.N. - First Deputy Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation,

Sergeev I.D. - Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation,

Simonov V. V. - Director General of RASU,

Tsarenko A. V. - head of the GUSP,

Shaposhnikov E. I. - Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation (as agreed),

Shcherbakov A. A. - Secretary of State - First Deputy Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia.

If we talk about those who work directly with agents (“in the field”), then for obvious reasons this topic remains closed for discussion on the pages of open publications. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the real number of foreign intelligence officers employed in the field of scientific and technological revolution in a single Western European country.

Although the pages of open publications expressed many opinions on this matter. Let's just give one. According to the former KGB officer O. Gordievsky, four Russian special services can work in Estonia: foreign intelligence (SVR), military intelligence (GRU), counterintelligence (FSB), electronic and radio intelligence (FAPSI). Gordievsky gives an approximate "staffing": four people for political intelligence, three for counterintelligence, two for technological intelligence and one for economic intelligence. In addition, there must be an agent for servicing spies who come to the country incognito or with forged documents, a computer officer and an employee in charge of radio intelligence, as well as a driver, a cipher clerk and an agent for sending coded messages. Gordievsky estimates the number of GRU employees in Estonia at 11-12 people. In total, it turns out about 30 Russian intelligence officers in Estonia. Gordievsky also believes that the main base of intelligence operations is the Russian embassy, ​​as it is "the safest place." But there is not enough room for all the agents. Those who do not work at the embassy will have to come to the country, hiding behind business trips. In Western European countries, this figure can be increased, for example, one and a half to two times.

It is still too early to talk about most domestic intelligence operations conducted after 1985. We restrict ourselves to just a few examples.

A few years ago, the Gulfstream-II aircraft was purchased by the Siberian Oil Company (Sibneft), but after some time it ended up in one of the hangars of the Air Force Research Institute. It is known that this machine is not intended for operation in the harsh Russian winter and requires a specially equipped warm hangar for storage.

On August 8, 1999, the German Prosecutor General's Office confirmed the arrest of two of its citizens on suspicion of intelligence activities in favor of the Russian Federation. The official representative of the Prosecutor General's Office in Karlsruhe (Baden-Württemberg), Eva Schuebel, said that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (counterintelligence) detained a 52-year-old engineer from Lenkflugkerper-Süzteme GmbH and his 39-year-old accomplice, who allegedly handed over secret documents to Russian intelligence . According to the Munich magazine "Focus", the Germans obtained secret data for Moscow on the rocket technology used in the development of the ultra-modern EF-2000 Eurofighter fighter.

One of the latest trophies - fighter EF-2000 "Eurofighter"

On February 20, 2001, reports came from Sweden of the arrest of a man suspected of spying for Russia and another unnamed country. For now, the case is shrouded in mystery. The journalists were unable to find out the name or even the nationality of the alleged spy.

The public relations director of the world's largest Swedish-Swiss electrical concern ABB Power System confirmed that the detainee worked at their enterprise. According to the Swedish public service security (SEPO), immediately after the arrest, the Swedish Ministry of Defense was notified that the activities of the suspect were not related to the military sphere.

The press service of the concern did not give the name and position of the detainee, they only said that he worked in Sweden and, in all likelihood, has Swedish citizenship, and that the company's management had long suspected their employee of espionage.

In an interview with one of the local newspapers, Nua Ludvik Teed-ning, ABB Power System security chief B. Flint confirmed that a man who worked at one of the concern's enterprises in the Swedish city of Ludvik had been detained. Other newspapers: "Dagens Nyukheter", "Aftonbladet" and "Expressen" wrote that the spy suspect worked in favor of the USSR, and then Russia for 22 years.

T. Lindstrand, the head of the prosecutor's office of Stockholm, who is conducting the case of the suspected espionage, appealed to the Stockholm court with a request to provide the detainee with a lawyer. At the same time, as reported in the court, the petition did not say anything about the country in favor of which the employee of ABB Power System worked. It only says that the detainee is suspected of espionage in the period from 1979 to February 18, 2001.

SEPO and prosecuting prosecutor T. Lindstrand declined to comment and did not provide any details about the identity of the detainee.

The head of the Swedish security service SEPO, J. Danielson, only confirmed that a preliminary investigation had begun. So far, it is in the initial, in the words of the head of the special service, "extremely sensitive" stage, in order to report some of its details. It is known that the first interrogations have already been carried out in the presence of a lawyer. The news of the spy's arrest appeared just a month before Vladimir Putin's planned visit to Sweden for the Council of Europe summit. The Swedes still have time to spin the scandal to the necessary boiling point.

Western agencies note that the espionage scandal starting in Sweden, in which Russian special services may be involved, is the first since “ cold war”: in 1979, the Swede S. Bergling was sentenced to life imprisonment for spying for the USSR. But this does not mean that Russian intelligence officers have not been arrested in Sweden since then. So, three years ago, from the annual report of SEPO, excerpts from which got into the press, it became known that in 1997 the Swedish authorities expelled two citizens of Eastern Europe for espionage. One of them turned out to be a Russian citizen. But no scandal followed: the expulsion was carried out without publicity, because the Swedish side did not want complications with Moscow.

And soon the first details about the detained employee of ABB Power System in the city of Ludvik became known. The profession of the suspect (he was engaged in technical developments in the field of power transmission) suggests that we are talking about industrial espionage. According to the Expressen newspaper, he began working for Russian intelligence as early as 1979, and has been under active surveillance for the past few months. Due to the nature of his activity, the detainee had access to various secret documents of the concern, traveled a lot around the world and could well transfer information of a technical nature to the Russian special services.

ABB Power System supplies the world market with generating sets and equipment for power transmission over long distances. Recall that power supply systems have always been considered strategic objects.

But a SEPO spokesman told the press that suspicions of espionage by a concern employee do not concern defense issues and military secrets in Sweden. It is still unknown which state the suspect worked for. On the evening of February 20, the leaders of all parliamentary parties were informed about the emergency, after which the leader of the Christian Democratic Party A. Svensen and the secretary of the Left Party - the Communists of Sweden G. Schuman told the press that it was about espionage in favor of Russia. This statement provoked an immediate rebuke from Minister of Justice T. Budström, who noted that party leaders should not make rash statements without accurate information.

Some observers point out that the ostentatious capture of the spy was carried out as if in continuation of the recent SEPO report, which claimed that the scope of Russian industrial espionage in Sweden is increasing year by year, despite the absence of a military threat to Russia from Sweden.

On February 22, a suspected employee of the industrial concern ABB Power System, whose name and position were not disclosed, was released. According to his lawyer, the prosecution "had not enough evidence." And the head of the prosecutor's office of Stockholm, T. Lindstrand, made a statement to the press, in which he noted that the investigation against this person would continue.

Representatives of the Swedish secret police confirmed that the man was detained on suspicion of espionage, which caused serious damage to the security of the state. If proven, he faces a life sentence.

As T. Lindstrand stated, “in the interests of the investigation, it was decided not to disclose any additional data for the time being.” Nothing new was said at the enterprise where the arrested person worked, however, as well as in all other departments in Russia and Sweden, which could be familiar with the case. The lawyer of the arrested person was forbidden to make public these investigations.

But the name of the detainee was soon named in the press - C. Nordblom. The representative office of ABB Power System confirmed that “SEPO representatives indeed detained an employee of the concern Ch. Nordblom on suspicion of industrial espionage, according to some reports, he really worked for Russian intelligence”, but “it is too early to give any assessment of what happened.”

And on February 18, 2001, an FBI agent was detained in Washington, accused of having collaborated with Russian intelligence for the past ten years.

FBI agent R. Hanssen was arrested Sunday at his own home after leaving a "package" for a contact in a nearby park. According to investigators, he could provide Russia with information regarding the methods of US electronic surveillance. He may also have corroborated information provided by another Russian agent, CIA operative O. Ames. Recall that Ames reported information about people who collaborated with US intelligence services around the world.

What is Robert Hanssen officially charged with? The following is a translation of the sworn testimony of FBI officer S. Plut in the trial against R. Hanssen.

“The results of this investigation to date indicate that there are reasonable grounds to believe that US citizen Robert Philip Hanssen, from 1985 to the present day, along with agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its successor, the Russian Federation, carried out espionage activities against the United States in favor of a foreign state, namely the Soviet Union and Russia.

Evidence collected shows that from 1985 until this year, Hanssen, whom the KGB/SVR called Agent B, did the following: he turned over several US intelligence informants. Three such informants were betrayed by Hanssen and former CIA officer Aldrich Ames, which led to the arrest of informants, their imprisonment. Two were shot.

Hanssen betrayed these people in order to strengthen his own security and continue spying against the United States.

He handed over to agents of a foreign state a large number of secret US documents, including the MASINT program 4 (electronic and radar intelligence) - stamped "top secret", the US program on double agents - stamped "secret", the FBI program on double agents - stamped "top secret". classified, a guide to the future needs of the US intelligence services - classified "top secret", a report on KGB recruiting operations against the CIA - classified "secret", a report on the activities of the KGB to collect information on certain US nuclear programs - classified "top secret", a CIA report on the first KGB department - classified "secret", a classified report analyzing foreign threats from one of the secret US government programs - classified "top secret".

He transmitted information about the technical aspects of the activities of the US intelligence services. This included electronic tracking technology and descriptions of targets by US intelligence agencies.

He also passed on information about an entire technical program of great importance to the United States. On other occasions, he passed on information about the capabilities of US intelligence agencies, including descriptions of individual objects.

He passed on a large amount of data on FBI activities, operational technology, sources, methods and activities against the KGB/SVR. He advised the KGB/SVR on methods to protect against FBI surveillance and warned the KGB/SVR about the inadmissibility of activities, b. observed by the FBI.

He handed over to the KGB the materials on the secret investigation of the FBI agent F. Blok. As a result, the SVR warned Blok about the ongoing investigation, which made it impossible to continue it. Hanssen's activities continue at the present time. Hanssen continues to monitor the SVR signal cache. many times in December 2000, January and February 2001. A recent search of his car revealed a number of secret documents, details of a recent investigation and items from signal caches.

We also found that Hanssen is still trying to determine if the FBI has become interested in him. He checks the FBI's registers, looking for his name, address, and directions to hiding places.

In the course of his espionage activities, Hanssen had many contacts with KGB/SVR officers. This conclusion cites 27 letters he sent to the KGB/SVR. A description is given of 33 bundles that the KGB/SVR officers left for Hanssen in hiding places, as well as a description of 22 bundles that Hanssen left in hiding places for the KGB/SVR officers.

This document contains recordings of two telephone conversations that Hanssen had with KGB officers. It describes the contents of 26 floppy disks that Hanssen handed over to the KGB/SVR, as well as 12 floppy disks that the KGB/SVR handed over to agent B. Hanssen provided the KGB/SVR with more than 6,000 sheets of documents.

For his services to the KGB/SVR, Hanssen received over $600,000 in cash and diamonds. Over the past two years, the KGB / SVR informed Hanssen that he had about 800 thousand dollars in his deposit account in one of the Moscow banks.

The suspicion that Hanssen was collaborating with Russian intelligence arose after an internal investigation discovered the presence of a spy among FBI employees. Somewhat later, a secret Russian document came into the possession of the US intelligence services, which strengthened these suspicions.

Prior to his arrest, Hanssen worked at FBI headquarters in Washington, DC, monitoring the Russian embassy. Previously, he was supposed to monitor Russian government delegations in New York. Also, his main duties, in particular, included the delivery of classified documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the US State Department and vice versa. According to former and current employees of the US State Department, Hanssen oversaw the delivery of such documentation from 1995 to January 2001. This gave him the opportunity to get acquainted with information about all possible counterintelligence agents operating in the United States and with other secret documentation. As one of the former employees of the State Department stated, R. Hanssen had the capabilities of a person who “is in a candy store, where, apart from him, there is not a soul, and who can take whatever he pleases.” According to the FBI, this is also proved by the find made in the car of the accused. There was found a package marked "secret", addressed to the former director of the intelligence service of the US State Department.

R. Hanssen became the most "computerized" spy that was ever caught in America. FBI officials said that in his espionage activities, Hanssen used flash cards, floppy disks, a Palm Pilot organizer and computer encryption tools to make appointments with his contacts and transfer more than 6,000 sheets of classified documents.

Several times, Hanssen, who was pretty tired of wandering through dirty parks and forests in order to leave the next transmission in the agreed cache, tried to convince his Russian leadership that they should upgrade and switch to more advanced Palm Pilot VII organizers that allow you to maintain wireless.

In this way, Hanssen could send secret documents directly to his contacts, which would save him from unnecessary movements, compromising meetings, unnecessary witnesses and evidence.

In total, according to the FBI, Hanssen handed over 26 floppy disks to the Russian side, using a “very clever trick”: the secret information contained on the floppy disks was recorded in sections invisible to operating systems Windows.

The US FBI has learned the name of an American army officer whom R. Hanssen, a former agent of the bureau accused of spying for Russia, tried to recruit.

In Hanssen's correspondence, found during the investigation of the espionage case and addressed, according to the investigation, to the Russian special services, the agent's "old friend" Lieutenant Colonel D. Hoschauer is twice mentioned as an object of recruitment. According to the FBI, the Russian special services tried to recruit Hoschauer in the early 90s, but he refused the offer made to him and told his leadership about what had happened. According to official sources close to the investigation, the lieutenant colonel was interrogated by the FBI, and Hoschauer himself contacted the bureau shortly after Hanssen's arrest. According to the FBI, the interrogation of Hoschauer showed that the lieutenant colonel, apparently, had nothing to do with the spy scandal.

At the time of writing, the case has not yet gone to trial.

But another scandal, in Japan, has already ended.

On March 7, 2001, the Tokyo District Court sentenced S. Hagisaki, former captain of the 3rd rank of the Japanese Navy, to 10 months in prison. He was accused of passing military secrets to the Russian embassy.

The investigation proved that on June 30, 2000, Khagisaki handed over to the employee of the Russian embassy V. Bogatenkov copies of materials relating to the training system for self-defense forces and the prospects for the development of communications and communication systems. The court recognized these materials as “strategically important”. The indictment states that the defendant's actions undermined the people's confidence in the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

Hagisaki did not deny his guilt and asked for forgiveness for endangering the security of the Japanese. He explained that for official documents he was given not only money, but also materials about the Navy former USSR. The officer wanted to use these materials in his master's thesis.

The hunt for alien technology continues...

Scientific and technical intelligence of the Russian Federation: to be closer to the nuclear industry.

Yu.A. Bobylov, Ph.D., scientific editor of the journal "Management and Business Administration"

Periodically arising espionage scandals involving secret employees of the SVR, FSB and GRU, a striking example of which was the arrest in the summer of 2010 in the United States of a whole group of “illegal immigrants”, arouse great interest in this topic among employees of Russian research institutes and technical universities of the nuclear industry. It is they who sometimes cannot live without information and documentation (and not always secret) of our scientific and technical intelligence. But nuclear science and technology is only part of the breakthrough Russian science.

Foreign intelligence is of great importance for clarifying the priorities for the development of science and technology, as well as accelerating breakthroughs in new areas of scientific and technological progress. Russian practice shows the existing problems in this closed area. Something has to do with technical universities in Russia (for example, MEPhI), since foreign intelligence needs qualified specialists. It is necessary to develop relationships between many ministries and departments, as well as large private companies, with the Foreign Intelligence Service and other special services of Russia.

It seems that the creation in 1999 at MEPhI of its own Institute of International Relations (IMO) is a good bridge to the nuclear countries of the world. We are talking about the "pioneer" training of nuclear scientists in the specialty " International relationships» (federal interdisciplinary educational standard 350200), specialization "International scientific and technological cooperation").

1. On the modernization of Russian industry and the intensification of innovation

Recently, Russia has been actively discussing the directions of economic modernization, meaning the creation of fundamentally new innovative areas of activity, the clarification of development priorities, the radical renewal of the most important industries and technological processes, as well as overcoming institutional and structural barriers.

Thus, in the February (2010) report prepared by the Institute modern development entitled “Russia in the 21st century: the image of the desired tomorrow” (M.: Ekon-Interm, 2010, p. 8) notes: “The task of changing the vector of development is becoming generally recognized - overcoming excessive dependence on the export of raw materials with entry into the knowledge economy, science-intensive industries , high technology and intensive innovation".

The further growth of the raw-material orientation of the Russian economy is worrying. Thus, the direct share of the mineral resource complex (oil, gas, ore, etc.) in Russia's GDP, excluding secondary effects, is about 20%, its share in consolidated budget revenues is 30%, and in federal budget revenues is 50%. However, the raw materials economy of Russia itself, and especially the sphere of oil and gas production and processing, is in dire need of innovations, new equipment, advanced technologies for primary processing of raw materials and further for deeper industrial processing. In this regard, it is not correct to oppose the "innovative economy" and its "raw material orientation".

A large layer of problems is related to the exploration and development of uranium and rare earth deposits in Russia. If in Australia 93.4% of uranium reserves fall into the price category up to $40/kg, and 67.3% in Canada, then in Russia there are no such reserves at all and only 28% of the reserves fall into the price category less than $80/kg, and the rest – to the category less than $260/kg. We can talk about the "uranium failure" of Russian geology.

In general, innovation can be defined as the development and implementation of useful new or improved products and services, processes, systems, organizational structures or business models to solve production problems, improve productivity. improving the commercial results of the activities of organizations and enterprises.

IN last years Russia is 2-3 times behind the developed countries of the world (including the EU) in terms of R&D spending. In Russia, only about 1.1 percent of GDP is spent on these purposes, including defense and security needs. According to this indicator, Russia ranks only 31st in the world. Leading countries - Israel (4.68%), Sweden (3.6%), South Korea(3.47%), Finland (3.46%), Japan - (3.44%), USA (2.68%), France (2.08%). Moreover, in these countries, the share of the state in financing the costs of research and development is much lower than in our country. For example, in Japan in 2007 it was about 16%, in the USA - about 29%, and in Russia - 61%.

The sphere of Russian R&D is still a significant part of the military-industrial complex and structures national security. In turn, the nuclear "technological platform" (TP), like a pyramid, needs to rely on new achievements in related fields for its success. In the ongoing discussions about the essence and problems of such TP, the mission of scientific and technical intelligence is still silent.

Russian corporate and private business(especially oil companies) are not sufficiently motivated to invest in applied research and development.
According to one of the latest ratings of innovative competitiveness in the world, Russia ranks 38th, behind Poland (37th), Turkey (36th), Thailand (35th), Slovakia (34th), Greece (33rd) and others. In the top ten: USA (1st) , Sweden (2), Switzerland (3), Singapore (4), Finland (5), Germany (6), Israel (7), Japan (8), UK (9) and the Netherlands (10) .

In this regard, a significant import of new machines, equipment and materials becomes a source of innovation in Russia.

Today, even for the production of military equipment, Russia makes significant purchases of components. Speaking in March 2010 in the State Duma, Deputy Prime Minister S.B. Ivanov said that the country is in an unfavorable situation with the production of domestic components: “In the defense industry -3 5% of Russian components, and 65% of foreign ones. In the "citizen" - 10% of domestic components, and already 90% of foreign ones.

According to some experts, the military-industrial complex should be considered the main customer of Russian science and innovation. These are the results of a special meeting of the Presidential Commission on Modernization on September 22, 2010 in Ramenskoye near Moscow. In the civil sphere, this position has few supporters.

The analysis shows that many R&D of the military-industrial complex cannot be converted for the production of science-intensive civilian products. Also, the complex military equipment being created (missiles, aircraft, submarines, etc.) is produced in small batches. On the contrary, civilian products (machinery and equipment, means of communication, household appliances, etc.), oriented to the mass market, are produced in batches of hundreds of thousands of items and, due to intense competition, are constantly modernized.

Rosatom State Corporation has its own interests here.

As a scientific product materializes and enters mass production, the role of industrial espionage also increases, but here the secret purchase of technical documentation and descriptions of technological processes comes to the fore. This is what some competitive sectors of the Russian economy are interested in, even outside the science-intensive defense and nuclear industries.

2. Sources of information about secrets and problems of foreign intelligence

According to the law "On State Secrets" (1993, as amended and supplemented), the activities of Russia's foreign intelligence agencies constitute one of the main objects of Russian state secrets. At the same time, a large number of informed intelligence officers of the former KGB of the USSR, as well as the SVR, FSB and GRU, in the past two decades, asked for political asylum in the USA, Great Britain, Canada, etc., and then in the open foreign press they presented many interesting information that Russia are secret.

Information about the activities and secrets of competing foreign intelligence agencies (especially the United States, China, Israel, etc.) also periodically penetrates into open foreign and Russian sources of information (including voluminous memoirs). The Russian site AGENTURA.RU and its forum are informative here. In scientific terms, the site "Intelligence Technologies for Business" is more important - see: it2b.ru/.

In Russia, high-quality manuals on corporate competitive intelligence have been published, where former intelligence officers describe the methods and techniques of intelligence work: Babets O.A. Experience of military intelligence in the service of a commercial firm // Minsk, HARVEST, 2003; Bogan K., English M. Business intelligence. Introduction of advanced technologies (translated from English) // M., Vershina, 2006; Derevitsky A. Commercial intelligence // St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg, 2006; Doronin A.I. Business intelligence // M., OS = 89, 2003; Melton H.K. Office espionage (translated from English) // M., Phoenix, 2005; Toolkit at the rate of "Competitive Intelligence" Consulting Center "Lex" // 2001; Romachev R.V., Nezhdanov I.Yu. Competitive intelligence. Practical course // M, OS-89, 2007; Ronin R. Own intelligence // Minsk, HARVEST, 1999; Yushchuk E.L. Competitive intelligence - marketing of risks and opportunities // M., VERSHINA, 2006 and others.

At the beginning of 2010, a private commercial project appeared in Russia to publish the journal "Razvedka" ( [email protected]) and the project ended unexpectedly quickly. It was clear that S.V. Chertoprud, the author of a thick book on the scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR (see below), to lead the department of special projects. The circle of authors writing on this topic is very small, but they adhere to the corporate ethics of the secret work of the secret services. Also, foreign intelligence cannot be of a public nature.

At the beginning of 2000, readers were interested in an article by S. Zhakov, a former employee of Directorate “C” (illegal intelligence) of the PGU KGB of the USSR, “Dirty laundry of the “Forest School” of the SVR,” which describes the history of the creation and activities of the secret Foreign Intelligence Academy.

Foreign intelligence is a difficult profession, which certainly requires its own professional technical education, including at the Academy of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which should not be ironic. Taking into account the secrecy of personnel training at this departmental university, S. Zhakov wrote: “The curricula of the university did not correspond to standard curricula, approved by the USSR Ministry of Higher Education, diplomas were issued for fictitious names of specialties, but in a special educational institution, subordinated to the KGB of the USSR, it was impossible to check anything, because even the very fact of the existence of such an institution was secret.

It is also a very risky profession. In the United States, even theft of business secrets is qualified as a federal offense with penalties of up to 15 years in prison and a fine of up to $500,000. It is comforting that valuable secret agents caught are quickly exchanged and returned to their country.

Another quote about the decline in interest in working in foreign intelligence in the first years after the collapse of the USSR: “Graduates of well-known and prestigious Moscow universities (MGIMO, Moscow State University, Moscow State Institute of Physics and Technology, Physics and Technology and the like), who previously constituted the backbone of students of one and two-year CI faculties, ceased to be interested in these prospects: they could now go to work abroad much easier and more efficiently on their own.”

Nevertheless, the defector S. Zhakov recognized the usefulness of effective foreign intelligence for the country.

Obviously, the creation at MEPhI and other technical universities of their IMO can change intelligence technologies in our special services.

Numerous memoirs of former intelligence officers and a number of special journals on information security make it possible to better understand the methods and forms of modern scientific and technical intelligence or industrial espionage, as well as the directions for reforming foreign intelligence.

After the collapse of the USSR and the liquidation of the KGB, the main task Russian Service Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) was the acquisition of business information and advanced technology primarily in the interests of supporting the defense industry.

According to S. Leshchenko, a former KGB officer who was recruited by the Americans, "Service T" (technical intelligence) in the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has three divisions: the operational department manages the activities of agents abroad and in Russia; the analytical department coordinates the collected information, compiles lists of foreign companies and their products; the research department sorts the collected information and sends it to the relevant ministries and research institutes Russian Academy of Sciences (pp. 137-138).

Public information about the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service is available on the website of this federal agency.

Describing the importance of industrial espionage, we can cite the economic losses of Germany from industrial espionage in 2007, which amounted to 2.8 billion euros. The data comes from a joint survey organized by the security company Corporate Trust, the Bureau of Applied Forensics in Hamburg and Handelsblatt. 741 German firms took part in this survey. Approximately 20% of all German companies have already become victims of industrial espionage or have leaked official information of interest to competitors. Leak occurred different ways. In about 15% of cases, competitors hacked into internal databases. In addition, the "wiretapping" was carried out by the special services of competitors. In 20% of cases, there was disloyalty of their own employees. In 18.7% of cases, company employees were recruited by a competing firm or a foreign intelligence agency in order to transfer classified information to them. Sometimes former employees of the company are involved in the sale of information. According to the study, clerks (31.3%), skilled workers (22.9%) and managers (17.1%) are most often seen to be disloyal to their own company.

Large nuclear corporations of the world are just as vulnerable to experienced intelligence officers.

3. Legislative framework for Russian foreign intelligence

According to the author, for a qualified description of the basic principles of organizing foreign intelligence in Russia, one should refer to the basic federal law "On Foreign Intelligence", which was adopted by the State Duma on December 8, 1995 and signed by the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin January 10, 1996 No. 5-FZ (Sobr. Law of the Russian Federation, No. 3, Art. 143).

The law of the Russian Federation has five independent chapters:
1. General provisions(v. 1-9);
2. Organization of activities of foreign intelligence agencies (Art. 10-16);
3. Legal status and social protection of employees of foreign intelligence agencies and persons assisting these agencies (Articles 17-23);
4. Control and supervision over the activities of foreign intelligence agencies (Articles 24-25);
5. Final provisions (art. 26).
Below are the most significant provisions of the law of the Russian Federation "On foreign intelligence".

In Art. 1 “Foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation” notes that this “a set of bodies specially created by the state - foreign intelligence bodies of the Russian Federation - is an integral part of the security forces of the Russian Federation (author's italics) and is designed to protect the security of the individual, society and the state from external threats using methods and means determined by this Federal Law”.

Art. 2 of the law defines the content of "intelligence activities". This is: 1) obtaining and processing information about real and potential opportunities, actions, plans and intentions of foreign states, organizations and persons affecting the vital interests of the Russian Federation; 2) assistance in the implementation of measures taken by the state in the interests of ensuring the security of the Russian Federation.

From the point of view of a Russian economist with experience in the field of commercial and industrial policy and support of national entrepreneurship, especially in the context of Russia's accession to the WTO, the above definitions seem to be very inaccurate in terms of the essence of the goals of our foreign intelligence (see Article 5 of the law "Goals of Intelligence Activities") . Foreign intelligence should only partly be focused on ensuring national security and national defense. Its role in the transition to an "innovative economy" is still underestimated.

In connection with the need to reform foreign economic intelligence (i.e. "competitive intelligence" in relation to foreign competitors), art. 11 "Spheres of activity of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation", which establishes that intelligence activities within the limits of their powers in Russia are carried out by the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (including economic sphere), as well as by the relevant authorities: (GRU) of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (including in the military-economic sphere), FAPSI (including in the economic sphere using electronic means and the Internet) and the FPS. In the course of the administrative reform in 2003, the last two structures were transferred to the FSB of Russia.

The general leadership of the foreign intelligence agencies is carried out by the President of Russia (Article 12), who oversees the block of power ministries and departments of the country.

Intelligence information (Art. 14, 15, 16) is provided to all subjects of the federal government, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations in the manner prescribed by the President of the Russian Federation.

In the light of the arguments given below on the reorganization of Russia's foreign intelligence, attention should be paid to the legal status of foreign intelligence officers (Art. 17, etc.).

The very specifics of this public service (unlike the possible industrial espionage units of large associations and enterprises - while the essence of the names of such units as ONTI, marketing service, etc. is not significant) is expressed in the fact that Russian foreign intelligence officers are mainly "military personnel".

In Art. 17 states: “The military personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation are subject to federal laws governing the passage military service, taking into account the features established by this Federal Law and other federal laws, due to the specifics of the functions performed by the specified military personnel.

It is important that “information about the belonging of specific individuals to the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies of the Russian Federation, including employees dismissed from these bodies, constitutes a state secret ...” (Article 18).

The nature of the work performed, which directly falls under the norms of the criminal law of foreign states and carries significant threats to the personal safety of foreign intelligence officers, implies appropriate remuneration and social protection which is detailed in Art. 22 of the Law "On Foreign Intelligence". Thus, it provides for compulsory state personal insurance in the amount of a fifteen-year monetary allowance (we are talking about compensation in cases of arrests on the territory of foreign states).

Parliamentary control over the activities of the foreign intelligence of the Russian Federation (Article 24) mainly concerns the implementation of cost estimates. Any direct reporting by the heads of foreign intelligence agencies to the Federation Council and the State Duma is not provided for by law (it is not allowed, for example, to disclose the personnel of intelligence agencies, the goals and methods of their activities, etc.).

This law of the Russian Federation is extensive and allows you to learn a lot "first hand".
In the development strategy of foreign scientific and technical intelligence, however, there are two areas of activity:

1) state, close to fundamental science and the military-industrial sphere, where the criteria for the profitability of work are practically not applied, which is coordinated by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service;

2) commercial, implemented by science-intensive companies themselves outside the military-industrial complex and focused on breakthrough applied R&D and use in the civil sphere (new science-intensive goods for personal and family consumption, especially cars, communications, information technology, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology, etc.).

In the latter case, it becomes necessary to create business competitive intelligence structures at large scientific organizations and companies.

4. Experience in organizing scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR

The belonging of the intelligence community (SVR, FSB, GRU) to the power bloc of the Russian federal authorities, controlled by the President of the Russian Federation, predetermines the “militarization” of the external scientific and technical intelligence of the Russian Federation. This factor complicates the relationship of such intelligence agencies with civilian ministries and individual non-state companies, among which wealthy foreign investors appear. There is also a long tradition of skillful lobbying by the secret structures of the military-industrial complex and national security.

According to a number of experts, in the arms race between the USSR and the USA (and NATO), most important Soviet systems and models of weapons and military equipment was based on Western models and their high technologies. For example, S.V. writes about this in his book. Chertoprud. According to experts, the share of foreign "know-how" in the military innovations of the USSR military-industrial complex was estimated at about 70%. So, Soviet intelligence managed to get some of the drawings of the giant Lockheed military transport aircraft even before the start of its mass production in the United States.

A huge number of the most qualified scientific and technical workers worked in the secret Soviet military-industrial complex (for example, in the research institutes and design bureaus of the Ministry of Electronic Industry and the Ministry of Defense Industry of the USSR there were almost 100 thousand people each). For the sake of fairness, one should point to the achieved scientific and technical priorities of the USSR (for example, nuclear technologies, sea-based missiles, etc.), which the intelligence services of the United States, England, France, Germany, Japan, etc., continue to hunt for. Research institutes and design bureaus made it difficult to directly use foreign documentation. On the other hand, this was offset by greater ingenuity, simplicity and elegance of individual borrowed design solutions. Here were their secret "know-how".

From the beginning of the 1970s, the USSR managed to get 30,000 pieces of advanced equipment and 400,000 secret documents from the West. At the same time, the leading role of the Department "T" of the PGU of the KGB of the USSR was emphasized, in which about 1000 people worked, and 300 of them were abroad. Note that at that time there was no Internet and hacker techniques.

The most generalized data on the scale of the scientific and technological revolution of the USSR, apparently, are given in the book by T. Volton "The KGB in France" (M., 1993), issued to the foreign intelligence of France by a well-informed specialist of the Office "T" V.I. Vetrov. Vetrov long time had access to top-secret information, including documents of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (VPK). So, from the reports of the military-industrial complex (written at the "Technical Center" of the All-Union Institute of Interindustry Information - VIMI, Moscow, Volokolamsk Highway, 77) that he handed over to French intelligence, it follows that in 1979-1981. annually 5,000 samples of weapons and military equipment were improved due to the data of scientific and technical intelligence.

Today it seems that the given indicators are overestimated by 15-20% (there was a practice of embellishing and exaggerating Soviet achievements). It is noteworthy that domestic intercontinental missiles were designed using many components of US technology.

According to the author of the book about the scientific and technical intelligence of the USSR S. Chertoprud, in the 70-80s. The USSR had the most advanced system of state industrial espionage (ch. 14 "System"). At the same time, it is characterized by such features:

1) only custom information was obtained;
2) purposefulness of intelligence actions was ensured;
3) the principle of "diversity" of the buyer was applied;
4) secrecy and centralization of intelligence data were ensured (it is important that the "miners" and "consumers" could not know each other).
According to Pentagon estimates, with such "classic espionage" the USSR saved billions of dollars and years of scientific research by obtaining information about Western technology and technology.

Today, in 2010, the question arises about the future of the Russian special services themselves and their possible not only "scientific and technical", but also "domestic political" contribution to the formation of a new civilized image of Russia.

According to experts, the Russian industry uses no more than 20% of the information obtained, and here the real reserves of the country's economic growth are hidden. See: www.e-edu.by/students/guidance/manuals/0408_PersCapacity.swf, p. 130.

For the operational use of scientific and technical intelligence data, interested companies must have their own sufficiently high R&D potential, as well as funds for investment.

So, despite some excess of foreign exchange funds, the contribution of Russian state and non-state companies in the oil and gas industry to the innovation policy of the fuel and energy complex, the development and implementation of new equipment, technologies and materials is extremely modest.

Speaking on December 25, 2009 at a meeting of the Presidential Commission for the Modernization of Dm. Medvedev expressed regret over the low costs of introducing new technologies by Russian oil companies and Western companies, taking into account such a conditional indicator of industry science intensity as "a company's costs for innovation per ton of reference fuel." This figure was 5.67 in Shell; in ExxonMobil - 3.02; in Gazprom - 0.29; in Surgutneftegaz - 0.39; in Tatneft - 0.72; in Rosneft - 0.06 (this is almost 100 times less than in Shell).

It can be concluded that the general insignificance of R&D and innovation costs in Russia (including the purchase of the latest imported equipment, materials, etc.) in the companies listed above shows their unpreparedness for the effective use of relevant foreign information (i.e., special information). But with regard to our nuclear research institutes, design bureaus, and enterprises, it is no longer possible to say so.

In general, funding for civilian R&D and higher education Russia lags far behind countries with an "innovative type" of national economies and, accordingly, high corporate costs for research and development in the areas of competitive products. According to the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the costs of the business sector for R&D in 2006 amounted to (in % of GDP): Russia - 0.71; USA - 1.84; Japan - 2.62; South Korea - 2.49; Germany - 1.77; France - 1.34; total for the OECD - 1.56.

In part, scientific and technical intelligence helps to quickly reduce this gap in certain strategic areas.

As an expert, I advocate the development of departmental atomic intelligence.

At the same time, the accelerated development information technologies in the world, including the Internet, modifies the methods of foreign intelligence, as it leads to greater availability of even specially protected information. In an open market economy, among the segments of information demand for new technologies, unauthorized access to other people's data of high economic value, as well as illegal (or semi-legal) use of such data, has taken a rather significant place.
The term “hacker” has already entered our speech, which in the “Great Legal Dictionary” is defined as follows:

“HACKER (English hacker) is a person who commits various kinds of illegal actions in the field of informatics: unauthorized penetration into other people's computer networks and obtaining information from them, illegal removal of protection from software products and their copying, creation and distribution of computer “viruses”, etc. The actions of Kh. form various elements of criminal offenses and civil offenses. The term and its derivatives are used in certain by-laws of the Russian Federation” (see: slovari.yandex.ru).

Another definition: “HACKER (from English to hack - successfully manage). In its original meaning, a hacker is a highly professional and very curious programmer, capable of non-trivial solutions ”(Yandex. Dictionaries. Internet, 2001).

Interesting data from surveys of computer security firms in the United States. At the same time, the criterion for evaluating the information security of a company was the minimum set of capabilities that an intruder needs to overcome one or another security mechanism. The results of the assessment vary from company to company, including organizations in the banking sector. The average results for the banking sector and for companies in other industries are shown in Fig. 1. 1.

Rice. 1. Evaluation of the effectiveness of information systems security mechanisms.

In practice, any security system has vulnerable elements, which creates conditions for penetration into databases in networks or individual workplaces and is used in scientific, technical, financial and other intelligence technologies.

Scientific and technical intelligence is not very compatible with the norms of civil law, especially in terms of the creation and use of intellectual property. But this area has its own “business ethics”, largely based on the commercial interest of buyers and interest in the personal income of employees who have access to valuable information (ministries, scientific organizations, industrial companies, etc.).

The scientific and technical intelligence of the era of medieval Russia and its role in strengthening the country's defense capability are rarely remembered by most researchers in the history of Russian intelligence. And in vain, because without borrowing in the West the latest technologies would not have been possible for relatively short term to overcome the backlog from the countries of Western Europe in the scientific and technical sphere. According to the author of the book “Scientific and technical intelligence from Lenin to Gorbachev”, historian Sergei Chertoprud, the episode dated 1555 is considered to be the first case of domestic state scientific and technical espionage. specialists123. This fact can be considered the first case of an official invitation of foreign specialists by the Russian tsar. And the beginning of the participation of diplomats in the operations of scientific and technical and military intelligence. This allows us to assert that Ivan the Terrible was the founder of the state "industrial espionage". Note that at the same time this king is considered the organizer of the first special service in Russian state- oprichnina. This is discussed in detail in the first chapter of this book. Although many call Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, nicknamed the Quietest, with his Order of Secret Affairs, or Emperor Nicholas I, who formulated the first task of Russian scientific and technical intelligence. In 1556, in a letter addressed by the tsar to the Novgorod clerks, it was said that German captive masters should not be sold to Lithuania or Germany, but sent to Moscow. A bonus was awarded to anyone who reports a violation of this requirement. The culprits were ordered to be taken into custody and kept in prison until a special royal order. Thus, an attempt was made to use the prisoners more rationally than just getting a ransom for them. In 1567, a doctor, a pharmacist, an engineer with an assistant, a goldsmith and several other specialists arrived in Moscow from England124. This case can be considered one of the first episodes of poaching specialists. Not everyone would dare to go to an unknown distant country. Another thing is the captured masters. They just didn't have a choice. One of the features Russian army of that period there were a large number of "mercenaries" from all over Europe. And therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that a certain "soldier of fortune" Colonel Leslie contracted to recruit craftsmen for a new cannon factory organized in Moscow by another foreigner - Coet. The production was located on the banks of Pogany Pond, near the Neglinnaya River, and specialized in the manufacture of cannons and bells. The practice of inviting foreign masters was interrupted due to the events of the Time of Troubles. Foreigners either died or fled from Russia, so it was necessary to revive the declining economy. In 1579 over 400 foreigners lived and worked in Moscow. Two years later, their number exceeded 1200 people. So said the British diplomat John Garcea. His compatriot reported to London other data: 4300 people. Of these, 4000 Poles; Dutch and Scots - 150; Greeks, Danes and Swedes - more than a hundred125. In the thirties of the 17th century, when Russia recovered from the consequences of the Time of Troubles, the policy begun under Ivan the Terrible became more active and purposeful. In 1630, the velvet master Fimbrand went abroad to hire people. A year later, it was announced in Europe that Russia needed ten jewelers. And therefore there are vacancies for these masters at the royal court. Jeweler Ivan Martynov was already working in Moscow, but he could not cope with the available volume of work. In 1634 H. Golovei, a watchmaker, came to Russia. In the same year, special messengers went to Saxony to hire copper-smelters. Maybe among them were the translator Z. Nikolaev and the goldsmith P. Elrendorf, who were instructed to find specialists in copper smelting abroad. The list of specialists who went to Russia began to grow rapidly127. In the summer of 1640, the Swede Anton Kust traveled from Moscow abroad “to hire artisans in the glassware business”128. Even the head of the Foreign Order, I.D., was engaged in the recruitment of foreign technical specialists. Miloslavsky. In 1646 and 1658 he traveled to England, Denmark, Holland and northern Germany to recruit specialists. At the same time, he demanded that candidates have a diploma and recommendations from their previous place of work. Plus, the biography of the candidate and his moral qualities were checked129. True, invited foreigners did not always contribute to the development of domestic industry. For example, in one of the reports addressed to the Swedish king in 1648, Kommerinnig, the ambassador of this country, wrote: Peter Marselis (owner of a mining plant) of a bad blacksmith"130. In 1645, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, nicknamed the Quietest for his kind character, organized the Order of Secret Affairs. Despite the formidable name, this institution engaged in the service of the king and members of his family. His tasks included solving a wide range of issues, from organizing the falconry of the king to the distribution of alms. In addition, the employees of the order ensured the safety of the king by tasting all the dishes before they get to the royal table. Also, its employees were engaged in the manufacture of medicines and drinks for royal family and the fulfillment of various secret orders of the king. For example, among the royal letters stored in the archive, there is one ordering the Astrakhan governor, Prince Odoevsky, to send to Moscow "Indian artisans" who own the secrets of making and dyeing light fabrics. The Astrakhan governor reported to the tsar that there were no such people in Astrakhan, but he managed to find one. It was a “resident of the Bukhara court”, a dye master named Kudaberdeyka. Ivan Gebdon, an Englishman by origin, began his career in Russia as an interpreter for English merchants. Then he regularly made trips to Venice and Holland, carrying out personal assignments for Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. It should be noted that this person had his proxies in various European cities: in Lübeck - von Horn, in Amsterdam - Piotr Lyuttsyn and the Berkartsy brothers, in Krolevets - Just Fanderslus, in Mitau - Jagan Donarson and others. All these people, as “secret informants of Moscow”, were regularly paid for their work for the benefit of the Russian state131. Among the merits of Ivan Gebdon is the invitation to Russia of two masters of “comedy making”. Thus, scientific and technical intelligence stood at the origins of the creation of the theater in Russia. At that time, people in Russia already knew how to make colored window glass, but problems arose in the manufacture of glassware. Therefore, under the Order of Secret Affairs, there were two glass factories, where, under the guidance of craftsmen sent from Venice, various dishes were made. For example, amusing glasses - “a quarter of a bucket and more” and “a tsar-glass a sazhen in size”132. And in the exemplary royal nursery in the village of Izmailovo near Moscow, various outlandish plants were successfully grown: Russian grapes, Bukhara and Turkmen melons, watermelons, Caucasian dogwood, Hungarian pear, and even tried to grow date palm. Seeds for this nursery were commissioned to produce Russian ambassadors in England. In 1626 regular sea communication with Stockholm was organized. By 1641, in this city, Russian merchants already had 33 barns, a slipway for ship repair and a pier for mooring. Of course, they were engaged in Sweden not only in trade, but also in scientific and technical intelligence. In particular, they managed to take out a firearm novelty of the 17th century. - pistol 133. In 1663, Yuri Nikiforov, clerk of the Order of Secret Affairs, was sent to the Russian ambassadors Ivan Zhelyabuzhsky and clerk Ivan Davydov, who were in England. He not only delivered to London the order of the Russian Tsar to his diplomats to go to Venice and Florence, but also had to perform an important task. Yuri Nikiforov was instructed to take out of England "birds, horses and all kinds of goods painted from the Order, as well as recruit skilled people." In the same year, his colleague clerk Kirill Demidov “was sent with a large stock of goods to Persia, where he was supposed to exchange them for Persian goods; he also had to bring experienced silkworm breeders, miners, morocco craftsmen, etc.”134.

Thus, the United States, which is prone to delivering preventive large-scale military strikes against its geopolitical adversaries, including nuclear and biological ones, ranks first in the world in terms of state funding of science, ahead of Japan and China. At the same time, it is planned to double the state's contribution to the financing of physics and mathematics in the next 10 years. Of course, the development of fundamental science in the United States contributes to the emergence of advanced "double" technologies, strategically and commercially profitable. But such facts may have a different interpretation: government funds are being mobilized for covert financing of the development of new military equipment.

The most ambitious project in the new program$459 billion in US defense spending - Falcon. This is a reusable supersonic aircraft capable of moving at six times the speed of sound and delivering more than 6 tons of bomb load, including combat viruses, to anywhere in the world in a few minutes. The destructive effect of the bombs will be enhanced by the force of the earth's gravity, as a result of which they will fly towards the target at a speed of 25 times the speed of sound. It is impossible to escape from such bombs. They are especially promising for delivery and spraying in the air over major cities and densely populated areas of carriers biological weapons new generation. Information about the cost of the aircraft was not disclosed, but a representative of the Pentagon Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) said that the first test flight is scheduled for 2008.

This example of organizing the financing of military developments shows how large projects are skillfully hidden behind relatively small numbers.

Russian experts are also concerned about the growth in military spending in neighboring China (about $100 billion a year). The Chinese economy, and above all in terms of energy and agriculture, has already reached its barrier. The PRC urgently needs new development resources - oil, gas, drinking water, timber, ores, etc.

Meanwhile, about 1% of GDP is spent on science in general in Russia. This is two times lower than in the US and three times lower than in Japan. In absolute terms, spending on science in Russia is several dozen times less than in the United States.

Much in Russian science, technology and defense policy depends on the supporting and coordinating role of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. This necessitates deep reforms in academic science.

According to the author, one of the "delicate" problems of such a reform is the activation of scientific and technical intelligence and industrial espionage, as well as the new role of scientists in this "delicate" information process.

Of interest are the results of the study “Assessment of the State of the Russian Academy of Sciences” commissioned by the Center for Strategic Research of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia (end of 2005) and its “cardinal” reform recommendations, partially implemented in 2007, when, according to the new charter, this structure became State Academy Sciences.

Among the structural problems of Russian science named in the report was the lack of regulation of the legal regime for the secrecy of scientific developments, which could lead to curtailment of work in many important areas.

The scientists' arguments traditionally boil down to the fact that the secrecy regime itself prevents the integration of Russian science into the global one, and there is no alternative to such integration. Therefore, the circle of classified developments supposedly needs to be reduced to the really necessary minimum, since in Soviet time the sphere of secrecy was disproportionately inflated, and this regime continues to this day.

According to a number of experts interviewed, the preservation of today's disproportionately expanded and legally undefined regime of secrecy even leads to the curtailment of important scientific areas and the departure of scientists abroad (cited concrete examples). However, such "experts" do not take into account that the RAS is financed - directly or indirectly - mainly taking into account the applications of the Russian Ministry of Defense and other power structures, and not the industrial sector of the economy, which is typical for the United States, the EU countries and, moreover, weakly militarized Japan and the Republic of Korea .

In addition, these "experts" noted that funding for certain necessary developments classified as secret is not carried out in Russia, so the dilemma is either to develop these areas with the involvement of foreign funding, or simply lose the relevant scientific developments and schools ( or facilitate the departure of these schools abroad).

A number of private opinions can be cited as an illustration.

“We need fruitful and effective cooperation with Western science, it must be continued, unless, of course, it is complicated by an unfavorable political situation and cases like the “Danilov case” (physicist, Moscow, interview).

"Russian science can lag far behind thanks to 'law enforcement officers' who monitor state interests, as in the cases of V. Danilov and O. Kaibyshev" (physicist, Moscow, interview).

“Fundamental science cannot be closed, if it is closed, it will simply begin to rot. We have heard the echoes of the processes that are taking place in Russia, the processes against environmentalists. Aviv, interview).

"The most important task Russian physicists now is the end of the outrageous booth that the so-called "law enforcement officers" have spread around Valentin Danilov. He was imprisoned for 14(!) years on an absolutely false charge" (physicist, media).

Naturally, the overdue reform of science may have "alternative options", but in any case, the interests of ensuring Russia's national security should be taken into account more fully, since various external threats are clearly growing, and Russia's overall military-industrial potential is weakening every year.

It is obvious that the established network of scientific organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and partly of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (for example, the creation of the Center in Pushchino) bears the stamp of the past Soviet arms race. This network is unsuitable for solving many very important new problems for Russia's survival. Alarming, for example, are the forecasts for the development of nanotechnologies in Japan for the military and special services, or the prospects for a transition to genocidal wars based on a new genetically engineered generation of biological weapons actively created by the United States.

Undoubtedly, Russian science in new promising areas, including "dual-use" biotechnologies, needs more funding.

The overdue modernization in industry and other sectors sets its own requirements, which puts forward the task of better organizing the commercialization of R&D results. We are talking about taking into account the justified requirements of modern innovation management, which is still poorly understood in the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. Hence the need for significant investment with the purchase of equipment and materials abroad, as well as the reform of scientific and technical intelligence through the SVR and the GRU.

Is it necessary to say that modern science in many cases it is impossible without classification and state secrets, as well as the possession of a "real scientist" methods and technologies of external scientific and technical intelligence. But this is not yet taught in our high school and graduate schools.

Today it is extremely difficult to be a major or even a novice scientist of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences without access to secret works and documents, including foreign scientific and technical intelligence data. But this is not the most "terrible" thing in the life of our scientist. A modern scientist of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences must also be a qualified secret spy. Finally, the third specificity is the mastery of the art of "scientific and technical intrigue" or the intrigue of "special operations".

"Secret games" in fundamental and applied science is an urgent need. There are, in particular, instructive examples of scientific disinformation using reputable, highly cited scientific journals.

A new, not always experienced, manager in the Russian federal structures of power (especially outside the defense industry), not motivated to strengthen national security and civilized application of legislation on state secrets and its protection, is often unknowingly inclined to choose imperfect management technologies and ineffective economic decisions .

A negative situation has developed in the sphere of Russian science. In recent years, our scientists have lost incentives for classified activities, especially in the traditionally open science of "civilian" sectors of the economy. The possible and often justified departure of scientists and engineers for work abroad and even for permanent residence significantly affects their reluctance to have access and conduct classified R&D. Moreover, according to opinion polls, up to 80% of Russian scientists still dream of emigrating from the country.

Obviously, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences could make a greater contribution to the scientific and technical intelligence of the Russian Federation, but external "competitive intelligence" is expensive. Hence the question must be raised: how should such dangerous and delicate activities be organized and financed within the structures of our science? Another question for an individual scientist: is it possible to earn some extra money in this way and how to do it?

Of great interest is the question of the relationship between the scientific and intelligence activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and, in general, scientists working in "breakthrough" areas of scientific research.

The sphere of academic fundamental and applied science (as well as other large scientific and organizational specialized structures of a number of knowledge-intensive industrial ministries and departments) presupposes the existence of a specific scientific community, a set of scientific schools with complexes of developing theories and scientific methods, various organizational forms of activity of scientific organizations and individual researchers and developers, as well as an expensive system of material and technical (instruments and equipment for scientific research, materials, etc.), information and other support.

The specifics of science (in addition to painstaking rough work in scientific laboratories using complex experimental setups) is a purposeful communication process, which is part of the scientific search of scientists.

In this process, the following tasks are solved: periodic creation of intermediate scientific reports in the form of scientific publications, as well as references and reports for the customer of the work; organization of personal information activities, including the necessary protection against unauthorized access by unwanted competitors due to the requirements of state or commercial secrets, as well as general scientific ethical requirements (providing scientific leadership, etc.); the use of mechanisms for enabling or limiting external communication processes, taking into account the created scientific potential and the requirements for accelerating scientific research, as well as transferring data to third-party users for commercialization in science; development of a modern material and technical base of the scientific process using paper and electronic media, its operational processing and selective (targeted) distribution, etc.

Stage by stage, such work can be of great interest for scientific and technical intelligence.

With all the heuristic creative character scientific activity(especially when conducting fundamental research), with the evolution of new forms and methods (channels) of scientific communication, the primary source of information remains the array of primary scientific information in the form of specialized scientific reports, journal publications, registered scientific discoveries and patents, as well as scientific literature. At the same time, an important supporting role belongs to the system of secondary information on the basis of translation, abstract, review and analytical educational and advertising (popularization) activities of scientific support personnel of scientific organizations.

The first object of foreign intelligence of a competing country is scientific information and documentation, which can be secretly microfilmed or compactly copied for transfer to an interested analytical service and then to a competing scientific organization. A rarer case is the theft or copying of product elements, materials and even prototypes.

Obviously, the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences have well-known resources for legal intelligence work.

Thus, about 30,000 Russian scientists work in foreign countries, of which no more than 300 have taken leading positions, in particular in US universities. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, from 1992 to 2001, about 43,000 Russian citizens working in the field of science and education received permission to leave for permanent residence. Many went temporarily to work abroad on contracts and internships, but did not return.

Here's another interesting statistic. Abroad, 40% of the departed scientists participate in conferences; 18% - carry out stages of joint research; 12% work on individual grants; 8% each give lectures and train (Yurevich A.V., Tsapenko I.P. Globalization of Russian Science - "Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences", 2005, vol. 75, No. 12 (p. 1099).

At any given moment, fundamental and applied science (according to the areas of scientific research) has a typical information array:

a) textbooks (sometimes classified) describe general characteristics scientific level already achieved by this scientific discipline;

b) monographs present the results of a systematic review of the largest or most promising scientific problems;

c) analytical reviews characterize current scientific problems, the most intensive directions and methods of scientific research, as well as the results achieved;

d) scientific articles contain descriptions of objects, methods and methods scientific research and concrete results obtained;

e) scientific communications (letters to the editors of journals, speeches at scientific conferences etc.) inform the scientific community about new scientific facts that require additional verification and reflection, about the emergence of new areas of scientific research, controversial hypotheses and even new theories.

An important strategic feature of the communicative scientific processes of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences is that a legal formal array of available scientific information, for example, in the field molecular biology and medicine, creates the foundation for scientific research, but it turns out to be insufficient for scientists working in rapidly developing and strategically important areas of fundamental and applied (especially military-oriented) research and, moreover, technical and technological developments. In many cases, in this situation, the results published in the press are "stale bread".

Obviously, science itself is partly a typical intelligence activity, which, however, is not fully realized at the level of the leadership of the now reformed RAS and RAMS.

It is in this aspect that I would raise, for example, the question of strengthening ties academic science with the SVR RF and the GRU. It seems that there would be a certain effect from the creation in academic research institutes of special departments for external communications and foreign information of dual subordination: the Russian Academy of Sciences / Russian Academy of Medical Sciences and the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (we are talking about the activation of legal methods of intelligence work in relation to the field of science and technology).

It is necessary to point out the overdue structural reorientation of the goals of our social development, the means and methods of their implementation with the participation of Russia's foreign intelligence. changing the world(the problem of the growth of international terrorism), and the political and economic position of Russia in this world is changing (the country is moving away from the excessive militarization of science, technology, industry and the economy).

It seems that the time is coming for the "demilitarization" of foreign intelligence in Russia and throughout the world. On the other hand, special services are actively involved in systemic network wars, one of the objects of which is the sphere of "big science".

Personal scientific communications and specific external scientific and technical intelligence are especially necessary when working in "scientific breakthrough zones" and at the stages of "scientific revolutions", when the accumulation of a new empirical base is extremely fast, and theoretical understanding of data experimental studies lags behind or is largely secret due to their possible exceptional military or commercial importance.

World scientific practice shows that between the start of even a particularly promising open research (the appearance of an idea, the development of an experimental verification method, mathematical modeling, etc.) and the publication of its results, about three years pass even in those areas of science in which journals publish the received manuscripts with little or no delays. And if a scientist were limited in studying the subject of his research only to formalized and already published information, then this would narrow his awareness by 30-50% (depending on the specifics of a particular science) and, accordingly, competitiveness.

Versatile scientific contacts useful for scientists can be stimulated by the leadership of scientific organizations or, on the contrary, hampered depending on the secrecy of certain areas of science and technology, as well as in the organization of national or international scientific contacts.

In this regard, it seems necessary to mobilize the methods and techniques of traditional intelligence work, worked out in the foreign intelligence services, in relation to the scientific activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences.

According to experts in the field of intelligence (military-industrial espionage), the greatest efficiency in this area is achieved within the framework of a decentralized (and networked) model for collecting primary information. At the same time, it is emphasized that the decisive factor in external as well as internal "competitive" intelligence is the selection of personnel with a person's special qualities and experience of unconventional thinking. If workers endowed with great imagination and broad knowledge are not always desirable for routine production or management activities, then they are indispensable for intelligence activities.

The peculiarity of scientific activity in the RAS lies in the fact that, according to many criteria, scientists and intelligence officers have much in common, and their difference is predetermined mainly by the difference in approaches to the professional training of specialists.

1. A prerequisite for both "those" and "these" is fluency English language, as well as one more foreign language in relation to the leading competitor country (Japan, Israel, India, China, etc.).

2. Even within the framework of the legal activities of collecting primary information, the skillful use of specific espionage techniques and methods of information analysis, including the creation and use of complex spyware for collecting information via the Internet, etc., is becoming increasingly important.

3. Not the last place in these secret technologies belongs to the use of special psychotropic drugs (if possible within the permissible legal framework).

In addition, "related" areas of information activity are characterized by its division into "experimenters" (obtaining primary facts) and "theorists" (analytical functions with the creation of working hypotheses, theories and scenarios for further work under conditions of uncertainty).

All this speaks of the possibility of increasing the function of the intelligence potential of our science and the importance of developing this potential in the context of "scientific reform".

It is in this connection that it is useful for scientists and reformers of Russian fundamental and applied science to recall the ten organizational principles of the intelligence service according to Walter Schellenberg, who led and debugged the foreign intelligence system of the RSHA of Nazi Germany:

Systematic special training of employees in intelligence work;

Special work with personnel and preparation of replenishment;

Timely organizational and personnel changes while maintaining the foundations of the intelligence service (modular principle of capacity building);

Maintaining a business and personal file of information sources (industry and territorial principle and priority areas);

Creation of a circle of "internal" and "external" employees (to work on a permanent or one-time basis and taking into account various categories of sources of scientific information, including in the science-intensive military-industrial complex of countries - potential adversaries);

Allocation among the "authorized persons" of a narrow group of "specially authorized employees" capable of becoming the center of the "operational headquarters" in extraordinary conditions;

Separation of the functions of the primary collection of information and its evaluation and use;

Organization on the basis of various external state structures and international non-governmental organizations of "points of contact" in order to promote intelligence;

The use of modern technology as an important intelligence tool (collection of information, secret writing, documentation and processing, information protection, communications, etc.);

Creation of a specialized foreign intelligence system with its subordination directly to the first head of the ministry (department).

The listed organizational principles are universal, but they can have their original Russian incarnation, corresponding with the peculiarities and traditions that have developed in Russia. state organization scientific and technical intelligence in the SVR, FSB and GRU.

Thus, in the development of Russian science and technology in order to solve the major tasks of ensuring national security and effective industrial development, scientific and technical intelligence and industrial espionage are of great importance. Our RAS and RAMS cannot and should not stand outside such "delicate" information technologies. On the other hand, such a diversification of the information activities of academic science has its natural limits.

In this regard, the question raised about strengthening the ties between the academic RAS and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation and the GRU needs special study.

It is possible to predict a certain positive effect from the creation and clarification of the goals of activities in academic research institutes of special departments for external communications and foreign information of dual subordination: RAS / RAMS and SVR of Russia (we are talking about the activation of legal methods of intelligence work in relation to the field of science and technology).

In the course of the discussed areas of reforming the RAS and RAMS, experts from the defense industry have not yet made some important recommendations.